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ABSTRACT 
In 1976, the Nigerian Government compulsorily acquired the ancestral lands of 
Abuja peoples of Nigeria without payment of compensation or resettlement. This 
is legitimised under Nigerian State laws. Indigenous peoples (IPs) suffer from 
injustices in relation to land globally. The purpose of this thesis is to find answers 
to the research questions emanating from this case study. One avenue explored 
herein in addressing dispossession of IPs’ lands in Africa, is through considering 
the relevance of international law on their rights. However, there is no universally 
agreed definition of IPs. In the determination of whether international law provides 
solutions to the challenges of protecting land rights of Abuja peoples, the existing 
description of IPs is challenged. 
The second avenue explored herein, is through a comparative approach to 
understanding how Kenya has resolved these challenges and how Nigeria should 
respond to similar challenges. The case study is used to illustrate the need for a 
viable relationship between State law, IPs’ customary law and international law. 
The choice of Nigeria is because the case study is in Nigeria. The choice of Kenya 
as a comparator is because like Nigeria, Kenya is Anglophone with a plural legal 
system and has recently embarked on law reforms in relation to customary land 
rights and the place of international law within its legal system. 
Drawing from theories of legal pluralism and post-colonialism, this doctrinal, case 
study and comparative enquiry, makes the following original contributions to 
knowledge. Firstly, the case study is used to argue that international law should 
expand its description of IPs to include collective of peoples with different cultures. 
Secondly, it draws from international child rights law to advance the argument 
that international law on IPs should present them more positively. Finally, the 
comparative analysis between Nigeria and Kenya on the above subjects has not 
been made by any known literature at the time of writing. 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background to the Thesis and Case Study 
Since the emergence of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, international human 
rights law has evolved from its initial focus on individual rights as exemplified 
by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 to the contemporary era where collective rights 
of groups such as minorities and indigenous peoples (IPs) are protected as 
sue generis rights. Indeed, for many victims of marginalisation and historical 
injustices around the world, international law has expanded to protect them 
against violations of their rights by States or dominant groups and institutions.1 
Despite the above developments in international law, a recent report 
commissioned by the UN demonstrates that there are still challenges in 
protecting land rights of IPs worldwide.2 
Indeed, the story of European colonial administration of Africa and of British 
colonial administration of Nigeria in particular and the attainment of political 
independence, together with the relationship between post-colonial Nigeria 
with sub-State elements within it, can be likened to the story line in George 
Orwell’s classic novel Animal Farm.3 In it, Orwell told the story about animals 
who fought tirelessly to overthrow tyrannical man from the farm but ended up 
creating a similarly tyrannical regime. ‘All animals are equal’ the rebellious 
animals proclaimed at the beginning of the revolution, ‘but some animals are 
more equal than others’ the animals later asserted in a post-revolution era. 
Indeed, Animal Farm was a literary allegory for communist Russia but Orwell 
                                            
1 A Cook and J Sarkin, 'Who Is Indigenous: Indigenous Rights Globally, in Africa, and among 
the San in Botswana' (2009) 18 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law 93 and 
TT Ankersen and TK Ruppert, 'Defending the Polygon: The Emerging Human Right to 
Communal Property' (2006) 59 Oklahoma Law Review 681. 
2 See United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, covering the period May 
2015-May 2016 adopted at the HRC thirty-third session. A/HRC/33/27. 20 July 2016. 
3 G Orwell, Animal Farm (Random House, 2010). 
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also intended it to have global implications.4 To put it simply, it is the story of 
a revolution that went wrong by departing from the original intentions of 
equality, justice and fairness for all in communist Russia. In a way, the story 
of Orwell’s Animal Farm and IPs in post-colonial Africa is a literary simile.5 
Indeed, the idea of political independence associated with the struggle for 
political independence of colonial African societies was intended to restore 
freedom from colonialism for all Africans.6 These lofty human equality goals 
were exemplified by the inclusion into the Nigerian Independence Constitution 
1960 of the fundamental rights and freedoms for all as provided under the 
UNDHR.7   
However, as this thesis will demonstrate through the case study of Abuja, just 
as the animal revolution in Orwell’s Animal Farm went wrong by replicating the 
same tyrannical tendencies of man, the lofty objectives of freedom, equality 
and justice signalled by the attainment of political independence from colonial 
rule appear to have been equally dissipated in a post-colonial Nigeria. To build 
this introductory argument, it will be demonstrated later in the following 
Chapters, that through a combined effect of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Nigerian Constitution), the Nigerian Federal Capital 
Territory Act 1976 (FCT Act) and the Nigerian Land Use Act 1978 (LUA), the 
Animal Farm post-revolution situation of ‘all animals are equal but some 
animals are more equal than others’ is literarily replicated in a post-colonial 
Nigeria. In sub-section 1.1.2-1.1.3 below, the case study in this thesis is 
introduced briefly. 
                                            
4 B Pardy, 'Animal Farm Revisited: An Environmental Allegory' (1999) 30 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 135. 
5 E Fadaee, 'Symbols, Metaphors and Similes in Literature: A Case Study of Animal Farm' 
(2010) 2 International Journal of English and Literature 19. 
6 See M Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence (Public 
Affairs, 2011); K Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology (Praeger, 
1961); and IM Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity (University of 
Nebraska Press, 1961). 
7 See BO Nwabueze, A Constitutional History of Nigeria (Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd, 
1982); TO Elias, New Horizons in International Law (BRILL, 1980); TO Elias, Groundwork of 
Nigerian Law (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954); and AO Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1979). 
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1.1.1. Abuja and the Abuja Peoples of Nigeria 
Abuja is currently the administrative capital of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.8 
It is defined geographically under the First Schedule to the Nigerian FCT Act.9 
Based on the latest census figures by the Nigerian National Population 
Commission (NPC),10 despite its status as the capital of Nigeria with people 
from all over the country settled there and being home to about eight different 
indigenous ethnic groups,11 Abuja is the least populated territory amongst the 
thirty-six States of Nigeria. This indicates that the peoples of Abuja are 
minorities in Nigeria. They are predominantly members of the Gbagyi (Gwari) 
ethnic group but there are others such as the Koros, Gades, Bassas, Igbiras, 
Amwamwas, Ajiris, Afos and Gwandaras.12  
Anthropological studies have demonstrated that the peoples of Abuja lived in 
this territory prior to British colonial rule in Nigeria.13 They are mainly farmers, 
                                            
8 See International Consortium of Planners, The Abuja Master Plan (International Planning 
Associates, 1978). See also, Map of Nigeria showing States including Abuja (Appendix 1) 
and Table showing States including Abuja by land size (Appendix 3) below. 
9 Federal Capital Territory Act 1976 (FCT Act), CAP 128 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1990. Available at: <www.nigeria-law.org/Federal%20Capital%20Territory%20Act.htm>, 
accessed 1 December 2016. See also, the First Schedule Part II of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Available at: <www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>, accessed 1 December 2016. 
Where specific geographical information defines the territory as: ‘Starting from the village 
called Izom on 7 E Longitude and 9 15' Latitude, project a straight line westwards to a point 
just north of Lehu on the Kemi River; then project a line along 6 471/2' E southwards 
passing close to the villages called Semasu, Zui and Bassa down to a place a little west of 
Abaji in Kwara State; thence project a line along parallel 8 271/2' N Latitude to Ahinza village 
7 6' E (on the Kanama River); thence project a straight line to Buga village on 8 30' N 
Latitude and 7 20' E Longitude; thence draw a line northwards joining the villages of Odu, 
Karshi and Karu. From Karu the line shall proceed along the boundary between the Niger 
and Plateau States as far as Karu; thence the line should proceed along the boundary 
between Kaduna and Niger States up to a point just north of Bwari village; thence the line 
goes straight to Zuba village and thence straight to Izom.’ 
10 See <www.population.gov.ng/index.php/state-population>, accessed 23 October 2016. 
11 See S Na'ibi, The Gwari Tribe in Abuja Emirate (Federal Government of Nigeria Print 
Department, 1961) at 7-13. See also, S Na'Ibi and A Hassan, The Gwari, Gade and Koro 
Tribes (Ibadan University Press, 1969); R Blench, Atlas of Nigerian Languages vol 3 
(revised and amended edition of Crozier & Blench, 1992); and Abuja Council of Arts and 
Culture, A Socio-Cultural Study of the Peoples of Abuja Vol 1 (Research & Documentation 
Unit, Abuja Council for Arts and Culture, 1995) at Chapters 1-5. 
12 See further anthropological details about these groups below. 
13 For anthropological notes on the history, culture and geographical locations of these tribes 
in Nigeria, see generally, CL Temple, Native Races and their Rulers: Sketches and Studies 
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hunters and fishermen who grow cash-crops like yams, cotton, benni-seed and 
they also produce calabashes and palm-kernels.14 They depend on the 
occupation and use of their ancestral lands which they have held under 
customary law to practice their occupations.15 Rural and subsistence farming 
is an activity that cuts across all the various ethnic groups.16 However, the 
different ethnic groups have their respective specialties in different crafts.17  
These peoples were settled in the area many centuries before the Islamic jihad 
of the nineteenth century that engulfed them.18  This area later became part of 
and under the political hegemony of the ancient Habe (Hausa) kingdom of 
Zazzau (Zaria) in the early part of the nineteenth century.19 Like IPs in other 
parts of the world, the above development highlights the early vulnerability of 
these peoples to external forces prior to British colonial rule.20  British colonial 
administration which was carried out through indirect rule began there in 
1904.21 Abuja was then carved out of and became an independent Emirate 
known as the Abuja Emirate under the Niger Province of the defunct Northern 
                                            
of Official Life and Administrative Problems in Nigeria (Argus printing & Publishing Co Ltd 
and Way & Co Ltd, 1918) at 29-79; OSMM Temple and CL Temple, Notes on the Tribes, 
Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (2nd Edn CMS 
Bookshop, 1922); OSMM Temple and CL Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates 
and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (Barnes & Noble,1965); HD Gunn and F 
Conant, Peoples of the Middle Niger Region: Northern Nigeria, vol 1 (International African 
Institute, 1960); CK Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria: An Ethnographical Account of the 
Northern Provinces of Nigeria together with a Report on the 1921 Decennial Census, vol 1 
(Cambridge University Press, 1925) and CK Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria: An 
Ethnographical Account of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria together with a Report on the 
1921 Decennial Census, vol 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1925). 
14 They have been reported by historians to have inhabited the Abuja areas of Zuba, Kawali, 
Bwari, Kuje, Abaji, Gwagwalada, Karu, Karshi and Garki among other towns and villages. 
See S Na'ibi, (n 11) above at 7-13. See also, S Na'Ibi and A Hassan, (n 11) above and R 
Blench, (n 11) above. See also, Linguistic Map of Nigeria at Appendix 4 below. 
15 See Abuja Council of Arts and Culture, (n 11) above at Chapters 1-5. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
18 S Na'ibi, (n 11) above at 10. 
19 See table of ‘Abuja Genealogy’ showing the order of succession in years of these emirs in 
OSMM Temple and CL Temple, (n 13) above at 518. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.  
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Protectorate22  of Nigeria. Subsequently some parts became territories of four 
States in the Middle-Belt geo-political region of Nigeria until 1976 when the 
FCT Act was enacted through a military decree.23  
1.1.2. Colonial and Post-Colonial Land Administration 
British colonial land administration in this territory began with the enactment of 
the 1918 Land and Native Rights Ordinance which remained the main 
legislation on native lands in the Northern Region until political independence 
in 1960.24 However, it was subsequently repealed and the Land Tenure Law 
1962 was enacted in replacement.25 The colonial legacy of the State 
controlling land through State law continued after political independence from 
Britain, a phenomenon that is replicated in most post-colonial States.26 
Presently, the Nigerian Constitution provides that all citizens have the right to 
acquire and own immovable property.27 However, it is the 1978 LUA28 that is 
the principal land legislation in Nigeria and it nationalises all lands in Nigeria, 
thereby replacing the hitherto existing customary system of land tenure. The 
law vests all land within the territory of each of the thirty-six States that make 
up the Nigerian federation (except for land vested in the Federal Government) 
                                            
22 Later Northern Region/Province after the 1914 amalgamation. 
23 See Historical Map of Nigeria Showing the three Regions created by British colonial 
administration (1954) at Appendix 5 below; Map of Northern Nigeria showing the geography 
in and around the Emirate in R Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria (Oxford University 
Press, 1968) at xxii; and HS John, and AHM Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: 
A Preliminary Survey of their Historical Traditions (Oxford University Press, 1966).  
24 See PE Oshio, 'The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria' 
(1990) 10 Boston College Third World Law Journal 43. 
25 Ibid, at 45. 
26 S Farran, 'Navigating between Traditional Land Tenure and Introduced Land Laws in 
Pacific Island States' (2011) 43 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 65 at 65. 
27 See section 43. 
28 Land Use Act 1978 (LUA), CAP 202, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. Available at: 
<www.nigeria-law.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm>, accessed 1 December 2016. 
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exclusively in the Governor of each State, who holds the land in trust for the 
benefit of all Nigerians indigenous to such States.29  
The introduction of English land tenure law and the idea of the State managing 
land into Nigeria has raised difficulties that have affected the customary land 
rights of most Nigerians.30 However, the preservation of certain aspects of 
customary land tenure within the LUA signifies the survival of some aspects of 
customary land tenure in those States, of which people indigenous to those 
States are beneficiaries.31 In the case of Abuja, the FCT Act vests all of Abuja 
lands in the Federal Government.32 As Abuja is not a State within the Nigerian 
federation, there is no Governor, hence the non-applicability of the LUA. The 
effect is that the powers to administer and manage land in Abuja are vested in 
the President of Nigeria.33 The argument for the compulsory acquisition of the 
territory of Abuja is that a federal capital in a politically neutral region of the 
country with adequate space for expansion would serve as a national point of 
unity.34 However, the factually erroneous view is that the Nigerian Federal 
                                            
29 See section 1. Section 2 gives the Governor responsibility for land in urban areas while 
lands in non-urban areas are the responsibility of the Local Governments. See also, Section 
49 where lands vested in the Federal Government are excluded from the control of State 
Governments.  
30 See PE Oshio (n 24) above at 49. Also see, I Smith, 'Effects of the Land Use Act on 
Customary Land Tenure System in Nigeria' (1990) 2 Journal of Contemporary Legal 
Problems 119; FA Salamone, 'The Clash between Indigenous, Islamic, Colonial and Post-
Colonial Law in Nigeria' (1983) 15 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 15; VC  
Uchendu, 'State, Land, and Society in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment of Land Use Decree 
(1978)' (1979) 6 Journal of African Studies 62; and L Agbosu, 'The Land Use Act and the 
State of Nigerian Land Law' (1988) 32 Journal of African Law 1. 
31 PE Oshio, (n 24) above at 53-54. For example, Section 24 of LUA preserves the 
customary law rules governing devolution of property. Section 25 prohibits partitioning of 
land but it exempts cases which are regulated by customary law. Under Section 29 the 
holder or occupier entitled to compensation is a community and the governor is empowered 
to direct payment of the compensation either to the community or to its chief or leader to be 
disposed of by him for the benefit of the community in accordance with the applicable 
customary law. Section 50 then defines a ‘customary right of occupancy’ as ‘the right of a 
person or community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with customary law ...’  
while an ‘occupier’ is defined as ‘any person lawfully occupying land under customary law 
and a person using or occupying land in accordance with customary law ....’ 
32 See section 1 (3). 
33 The President delegates his powers to do this to the Minister of the FCT. 
34 W Adebanwi, 'Abuja' in S Bekker and G Therborn (eds), Capital Cities in Africa: Power 
and Powerlessness (HSRC Press and CODESRIA, 2012) at 93-94. 
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Capital Territory (FCT) did not belong to any ethnic group within Nigeria as at 
the time of the compulsory acquisition in 1976.35  The recommendations of a 
Panel constituted for that purpose was accepted by the Nigerian Government 
which then promulgated the FCT Act,36 establishing Abuja as the capital of 
Nigeria.37   
The Nigerian Government’s initial attitude towards the indigenes was to 
evacuate and resettle them to some ‘suitable’ locations outside the territory at 
the expense of the Government.38  However, it later claimed not have sufficient 
resources to carry out such a plan.39 Instead, it decided that the peoples of 
Abuja may continue to live there until their lands are needed for developmental 
purposes.40  Without payment of compensation or resettlement, the then 
President of Nigeria took over the administration of Abuja with effect from 1st 
January, 1981.41 Ironically, all the traditional District and Village Heads were 
retained42 - an indication that the government acknowledged the presence of 
established IPs in the territory.43 As explained in section 1.2 below, the 
research questions enumerated in sub-section 1.2.2 below link with the central 
research objective, which is to critically examine whether the Nigerian peoples 
of Abuja are IPs and whether their customary land rights are protected as such 
under international law.  
1.2. Research Objectives and Key Arguments 
In connection to the above central research objective, this thesis aims to 
critically examine the definition of IPs in the literature and under international 
                                            
35 Ibid, at 94. 
36 Enacted through Decree No 6 1976. 
37 F Rodd et al, Around and About Abuja (Spectrum Books, 2005) at 5-6. 
38 Ibid. 
39 MJ Vatsa, The Poetry of Abuja: Nigeria's Capital (Cross Continent Press, 1983) at xii. 
40 Ibid. 
41 F Rodd et al, (n 37) above at 7-8. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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law. The introduction of the case study of Abuja in Chapter Four and the critical 
analysis of indigeneity that follows in Chapter Six lead to the central argument 
in this thesis that international human rights law should expand its definition of 
IPs to cover collective of peoples who belong to different ethnic groups 
whether such peoples have distinct or similar cultures. Support for this 
proposition will be established through using the case study of Abuja to 
critically engage with the existing body of literature on IPs.  
 
Following the introduction of the case study in more detail in Chapter Four and 
the comparative analysis between the case study and the Ogiek peoples of 
Kenya in Chapter Five, in Chapter Six of this thesis, it will be demonstrated 
that the literature on the rights of IPs is characterised by unsettled debates 
about definition.44 For example, James Anaya appears to define IPs in relation 
to people who inhabited a place prior to invasion by colonisers.45 He 
acknowledges the various conceptions of the term in Africa and Asia.46 
However, Anaya appears to contradict himself by stating that colonialism is 
not a factor in determining those who qualify to be regarded as IPs.47 One of 
the themes which comes out of the analysis of the debates on the definition of 
IPs in Chapter Six, is that this largely West-centric definition of IPs,48 if followed 
strictly has the tendency to exclude certain groups of peoples from benefiting 
from the protections under international law on the rights of IPs such as land 
rights.49 However, despite the dominance of this West-centric conception of 
                                            
44 See K Lehmann, 'To Define or Not to Define-The Definitional Debate Revisited' (2006) 31 
American Indian Law Review 509. 
45 SJ Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 3-4. 
46 Ibid, at 3. See also, SJ Anaya, ‘Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International 
Law’ (1991) 8 (1) Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law at 4, where Anaya 
maintains that cultural distinctiveness and colonialism are key features of IPs. 
47 Ibid, at 4. 
48 The West-centric definition places too much emphasis on distinctiveness of culture and a 
link to colonialism. 
49 For a more comprehensive examination of the definition of IPs, see L Hughes, The No-
nonsense Guide to Indigenous Peoples (New Internationalist Verso, 2003) at 11-16. 
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IPs in  international law,50 in the context of this thesis, IPs are defined to mean  
any group of non-dominant and minority peoples who have ancestral roots to 
the territories where they live as against other dominant groups or institutions 
that threaten the enjoyment of their rights as a group.51 
  
Alfred and Corntassel recognise that the literature on IPs has been dominated 
by ‘identity constructions that reflect the colonized political and legal 
contexts.’52  Saugestad also identifies this problem when he recognises an 
African context to the term,53 and examines the process leading up to the 
production of the Cobo Report54 wherein the African conception was brought 
to focus but rejected. However, Saugestad does not provide a case study to 
demonstrate how this impacts on the protection or otherwise of the rights of 
IPs in Africa.55 Indeed, like the definition of IPs their collective rights under 
                                            
50 For example, para 6 preamble of UNDRIP suggests that indigenous peoples are those 
who have suffered from colonialism. See also, Art 1 (1) (a), (b) and (c) as well as Article 1 
(2) of ILO 169 where it is provided that the Convention applies to: tribal peoples in 
independent countries whose socio-cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from 
others; descendants of people who inhabited a place prior to conquest, colonisation, 
emergence of state boundaries and self-Identification as indigenous. 
51 This model of definition is apparent from a reading of the following literature: W Adebanwi, 
'Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in Northern Nigeria' 
(2009) 13 Citizenship Studies 349; A Sayne, Rethinking Nigeria's Indigene-Settler Conflicts 
(US Institute of Peace, 2012); AO Adesoji and A Alao, 'Indigeneship and Citizenship in 
Nigeria: Myth and Reality' (2009) 2 Journal of Pan African Studies 151; African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and International Work Group on Indigenous 
Affairs (IWGIA), Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities (IWGIA and ACHPR, 2005); and V Xaxa, 'Tribes as 
Indigenous People of India' (1999) Economic and Political Weekly 3589. 
52 T Alfred and J Corntassel, 'Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary 
Colonialism' (2005) 40 Government and Opposition 597 at 605. 
53 See S Saugestad, 'Beyond the “Columbus Context”: New Challenges as the Indigenous 
Discourse is Applied to Africa' in H Minde (ed), Indigenous Peoples Self-determination, 
Knowledge, Indigeneity (Eburon Delft, 2008) at 158.  Also, note how Saugestad expresses 
his understanding of the meaning of IPs in the African context at 165-166.  
54 MJ Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations (United 
Nations (UN), 1987). 
55 For further discourse on this, see M Pelican, 'Complexities of Indigeneity and 
Autochthony: An African Example' (2009) 36 American Ethnologist 52. See also, JN Brown 
and PM Sant, Indigeneity: Construction and Re/presentation (Nova Science Publishers, 
1999). For Asian perspectives, see RH Barnes, A Gray and B Kingsbury, Indigenous 
peoples of Asia, vol 48 (Association for Asian Studies Inc, 1995).   
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international law appears to differ from the traditional notions of individual 
rights under general international human rights law.  
 
Under international law there is a distinction between individual rights 
applicable to all and group or collective rights applicable to IPs by being sui 
generis rights under certain special international human rights instruments.56 
Generally, in international law the rights of IPs fall under the broad category of 
group rights,57 and such rights includes land rights as well as cultural rights. 
Despite this distinction, this thesis will demonstrate in Chapter Seven that the 
jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), the UN human 
rights treaty Monitoring Bodies and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights (African Commission) illustrates that the general body of 
international human rights law is significant to the protection of land rights of 
IPs under international law.58   
                                            
56 See MD Freeman, 'Are there Collective Human Rights?' (1995) 43 Political Studies 25. 
57 See P Alston, People's Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001); P Jones, 'Human Rights, 
Group Rights, and Peoples' Rights' (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 80; D Sanders, 
'Collective rights' (1991) 13 Human Rights Quarterly 368; T Van Boven, 'Human Rights and 
Rights of Peoples' (1995) 6 European Journal of International Law 461. 
58 See generally, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Report of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN GAOR, fifty second session, 
Annex V, UN Doc A/52/18 (SUPP) (26 September 1997) (General Recommendation No 23: 
Indigenous Peoples); United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 
on Article 27. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 26 April, 1994; HRC, Aerela and Nakkalajarvi v 
Finland, HRC, Communication No 779/1997, UN Doc CCPR/73/D/779/1997, 24 October 
2001; HRC, Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Case 167/1984. UN Doc. A/45/40, Vol II; HRC, 
Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand, Case 547/1993, view of October 2000; HRC, Sandra 
Lovelace v Canada, Communication No 24/1977: Canada 30/07/81, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977; HRC, General comment No 18:  Non-discrimination, thirty seventh 
session (1989); Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General 
comment No 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para 1 (a), of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 21 December 2009. 
E/C.12/GC/21; CESCR, General Comment No 13: Right of everyone to take part in cultural 
life (article 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights) (2009). E/C.12/GC/21. 21 December 2009, at paras 46 and 47; CESCR, General 
Comment No 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2000), 
E/C.12/2000/4. 11 August 2000, at para 33; CESCR, General Comment No 17: The right of 
everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (article 15, paragraph 
1 (c), of the Covenant, E/C.12/GC/17. 12 January 2006, at para 28; and CESCR, General 
Comment No 18: Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2005) E/C.12/GC/18. 6 February 2006, at para 22; Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para 
6; ACHPR, Advisory Opinion, adopted at its forty first ordinary session held 16-30 May 2007 
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1.2.1. Land Rights of IPs under International Law 
Out of the various rights of IPs under international law, land rights59 have 
dominated debates in the literature because of IPs’ historical connections with 
such lands and the connection of land rights to other rights under international 
human rights law, as land is beyond its usual economic value and tends to 
have spiritual and cultural implications.60 This is the exact situation in Nigeria 
where people’s identities are linked to land.61 However, the need to protect 
land rights of IPs may quite often come into conflict with the interests of the 
State. State interests may negate land rights of IPs, especially where the 
powers of the State to manage and control land are legitimised by national law 
as is the case in Nigeria.62 In this context, IPs are particularly vulnerable 
because of their lack of political and economic power. It will be argued in 
Chapters Four and Five that these kinds of situations demonstrate the 
importance of international law. This then leads and connects to the second 
central research objective in this thesis. 
                                            
in Accra, Ghana; and ACHPR and IWGIA, Report of the African Commission’s Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations Communities, (ACHPR and IWGIA, 2005). 
59 See Arts 13 and 14 of ILO 169 and Art 25 of UNDRIP which seeks to protect the land 
rights of IPs. 
60 G Pentassuglia, 'Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights' (2011) 
22 European Journal of International Law 165, at 166. See also, S Farran, 'Land as a 
Fundamental Right: A Cautionary Tale' (2009) 40 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 387 at 388-389. See also, S Farran, 'Navigating between Traditional Land Tenure 
and Introduced Land Laws in Pacific Island States' (2011) 43 The Journal of Legal Pluralism 
and Unofficial Law 65; and S Farran, 'Fragmenting Land and the Laws that Govern It' (2008) 
40 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 93. 
61 See W Adebanwi, 'Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in 
Northern Nigeria' (2009) 13 Citizenship Studies 349; A Sayne, Rethinking Nigeria's 
Indigene-Settler Conflicts, (United States (US) Institute of Peace, 2012); AO Adesoji and A 
Alao, 'Indigeneship and Citizenship in Nigeria: Myth and Reality' (2009) 2 Journal of Pan 
African Studies 151; African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and 
International Work Group on Indigenous Issues (IWGIA), Report of the African 
Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (IWGIA 
and ACHPR, 2005); and I Nwachukwu, 'The Challenges of Local Citizenship for Human 
Rights in Nigeria, ' (2005) 13 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 235. 
62 For a similar situation in Kenya in relation to Ogieks, see J Kimaiyo and K Nakuru, Ogiek 
Land Cases and Historical Injustices (Egerton and Ogiek Welfare Council, 2004) at Chapters 
5 and 7. See also, D Vinding and IWGIA, The Indigenous World 2001-2002 (IWGIA, 2002) 
at 376-377; and D Vinding and IWGIA, The Indigenous World 2002-2003 (IWGIA, 2003) at 
367-368. 
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After identifying those characterised as IPs under international law in Chapter 
Six and after a critical examination of whether IPs’ land rights are protected 
under international law in Chapter Seven, the second central research 
objective is then to critically examine the relationship between international 
and national law in post-colonial Nigeria. A comparative analysis between 
Nigeria and Kenya in this respect will be made. The justification for such 
comparative analysis will be explained later in sub-section 1.3.3 below.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis will use the case study of Abuja to develop the 
argument in Chapter Nine, that where a State has designed its national laws 
in ways that enable it to deny individuals or groups of their rights, there should 
be ways in which domestic courts of law in such States may have recourse to 
international law for the protection of such rights. To achieve this second 
central research objective, this thesis will in Chapter Eight examine the 
relationship between the Nigerian legal system and international law. 
Following on from the analysis in Chapter Eight, in Chapter Nine there will be 
a comparative analysis of the relationship between international and national 
law in the two Anglophone African States of Nigeria and Kenya.  
 
The afore-mentioned comparative analysis will demonstrate the common 
historical and constitutional challenges that Anglophone African States are 
presented with, in terms of the application of international law domestically. 
This thesis will illustrate how Kenya has responded to these challenges and it 
will indicate how Nigeria may possibly improve the relationship between its 
legal system and international law.63 It will be argued that while Nigeria and 
Kenya have historically followed the British tradition of dualism, recent 
constitutional developments in Kenya makes it easier for Kenyan courts and 
litigants to look to international law to resolve domestic legal issues.  By 
contrast, it will be demonstrated that in Nigeria, international law is rarely 
                                            
63 See T Kabau and C Njoroge, 'The Application of International Law in Kenya under the 
2010 Constitution: Critical Issues in the Harmonisation of the Legal System, ' (2011) 44 
Comparative & International Law Journal of South Africa 293. 
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utilised by litigants with the courts applying international law only occasionally. 
In fact, the way Section 12 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution is worded makes it 
difficult to invoke the provisions of international law by domestic courts in 
Nigeria.64 
 
It will be the argued that the implications of constitutional changes effected in 
Kenya through the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010 
(Kenyan Constitution) has enhanced better enforcement of international law 
by the domestic law courts in Kenya. Accordingly, it will be argued that for 
Nigerians to benefit effectively from the provisions of international law and for 
it to be generally enforceable in Nigeria, it will be necessary to amend the 
Nigerian Constitution by adopting the approach of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution.  
 
Additionally, it will also be argued that if an amendment to the Nigerian 
Constitution is not possible, the courts of law in Nigeria have legitimate 
grounds to use their inherent powers as well as take guidance from other 
jurisdictions like the United Kingdom (UK) in terms of recent judicial 
developments in which the Supreme Court (UKSC) has demonstrated a 
willingness to use the provisions of international treaties to interpret national 
laws and policies, even when such treaties have not been domesticated into 
UK law.65 
1.2.2. Research Questions 
To address the first central research objective, the following central and sub-
research questions have been posed. The first central research questions is: 
1. Are Abuja peoples of Nigeria IPs under international law and are their 
customary land rights protected under international law as IPs? To answer this 
                                            
64 C Nwapi, 'International Treaties in Nigerian and Canadian Courts' (2011) 19 African 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 38. 
65 See Cameron Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] (United 
Kingdom Supreme Court) UKSC 47and R (on the application of SG) and Ors v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16. 
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central research questions the following sub-research questions have been 
posed:  
1) Who are IPs under international law? 
2)  Is the concept of IPs relevant in the African context?  
3) Do Abuja peoples meet the criteria to qualify as IPs under 
international law? 
4) How are children defined under international child rights law and are 
there any insights to be gleaned from this so that IPs may be defined 
in a more positive context? 
5) How relevant is the general body of international human rights law to 
the protection of land rights of IPs and how does international law 
protect such rights?  
However, as the African region in general has adopted its own regional human 
rights framework as a document written by Africans for Africans, it will be 
significant to enquire about its relevance to the protection of land rights of IPs 
in Africa. Accordingly, the following sub-research question is posed: 
6) Are the land rights of IPs protected under the African Charter? 
These research questions are answered in Chapters Six and Seven as 
explained further in section 1.6 below.  
 
To achieve the second central research objective, the second central research 
question posed is: 2. What is the nature of the relationship between 
international and national law in post-colonial Africa? To answer this second 
central research question, the following sub-research questions have been 
posed: 
1) What are the differences in approach and how do these impact on the 
domestic application of international law?  
2) What is the nature of the relationship between international and 
national law in post-colonial Nigeria?  
3) What is the nature of the relationship between international and 
national law in post-colonial Kenya?  
4) What are the differences and similarities in the approaches of Nigeria 
and Kenya towards international law?  
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5)  Do the post-colonial African States of Nigeria and Kenya have 
anything to learn from each other in terms of the relationship between 
international and national law?  
These second central and sub-research questions are answered in Chapters 
Eight and Nine. In answering the above central and sub-research questions, 
this research has been informed by two main theoretical frameworks and they 
include legal pluralism and post-colonialism as explained further in sub-section 
1.2.3 below. 
1.2.3. Theoretical Frameworks: Legal Pluralism and Post-Colonialism 
In Chapter Two, it will be argued that the academic debates among scholars 
of legal pluralism which have been shaped by Jacques Vandalinden,66 Barry 
Hooker,67 Marc Galanter,68 John Griffiths,69 Boaventura de Sosa Santos,70 
Brian Tamanaha,71 Sally Engle Merry,72 Anne Griffiths,73 Paul Schiff Berman,74 
                                            
66 J Vanderlinden, 'Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later' (1989) 21 The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 149. 
67 MB Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial Laws 
(Clarendon Press Oxford, 1975). 
68 M Galanter, 'Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law' 
(1981) 13 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1. 
69 J Griffiths, 'The Idea of Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and to Sociology' (2005) 
8 Current Legal Issues 49 and J Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 18 The Journal 
of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1. 
70 BdS Santos, The Post-Modem Transition: Law and Politics (Oficina Do CES, 1989); BdS 
Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002); and BdS Santos, 'Law: A Map of Misreading-Toward a 
Postmodern Conception of Law' (1987) 14 Journal of Law & Society 279. 
71 BZ Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford University Press, 
2001); BZ Tamanaha, 'The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism' (1993) 
Journal of Law and Society 192; BZ Tamanaha, 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to 
Present, Local to Global' (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 375; BZ Tamanha, 'A Non‐
Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism' (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 296; and BZ 
Tamanaha, C Sage and M Woolcock, Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and 
Practitioners in Dialogue (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
72 SE Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) Law and Society Review 869. 
73 A Griffiths, 'Pursuing Legal Pluralism: The Power of Paradigms in a Global World' (2011) 
43 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 173. 
74 PS Berman, 'Federalism and International Law through the Lens of Legal Pluralism' 
(2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 1149; PS Berman, 'A Pluralist Approach to International 
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Gordon Woodman,75 William Twining,76 Franz von Benda-Beckmann,77 
Gunther Teubner78 and Sally Falk Moore,79 are useful in the context of this 
thesis. lt will be argued in Chapters Two, Three and Four that legal pluralism 
theories explain the monopolisation of law by States which began with the 
emergence of statehood in Western Europe and which was imported into 
Africa through colonialism and that there are significant human rights 
implications of these in the context of protecting land rights of IPs which are 
often based on customary law.80 It will be demonstrated in Chapter Four that 
the case study of Abuja supports this argument. 
 
It will be further argued in Chapter Two that legal pluralism not only 
demonstrates the existence of different forms of law, it also throws up insights 
                                            
Law' (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 301; and PS Berman, 'The New Legal 
Pluralism' (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 225. 
75 GR Woodman, 'Constitutions in a World of Powerful Semi-Autonomous Social Fields' 
(1989) Third World Legal Studies 1; GR Woodman, 'Customary Law in Common Law 
Systems' (2001) 32 Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 28; GR Woodman, 'Ideological 
Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate about Legal Pluralism' (1998) 30 The 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 21; GR Woodman, 'Legal Pluralism and the 
Search for Justice' (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 152; GR Woodman, 'Some Realism 
About Customary Law-The West African Experience' (1969) Wisconsin Law Review 128; 
and GR Woodman, U Wanitzek and H Sippel, Local Land Law and Globalization: A 
Comparative Study of Peri-Urban Areas in Benin, Ghana and Tanzania (Beiträge zur 
Afrikaforschun, 2004). 
76 W Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2000) and W 
Twining, 'Legal Pluralism 101' in BZ Tamanaha, C Sage and M Woolcock (eds), Legal 
Pluralism and Development–Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). 
77 See F von Benda-Beckmann, 'Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?' (2002) 34 The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 37 and K von Benda-Beckmann, Globalisation and Legal 
Pluralism (Springer, 2002) 
78 G Teubner, 'The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, ' (1991) 13 Cardozo 
Law Review 1443. 
79 SF Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978); SF Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications" Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-
1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1986); SF Moore, 'From Giving and Lending to Selling: 
Property Transactions Reflecting Historical Changes on Kilimanjaro' in R Roberts and K 
Mann (eds), Law in Colonial Africa (Heinemann, 1991); SF Moore, 'Certainties Undone: Fifty 
Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology  1949‐1999' (2001) 7 Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 95; and SF Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-
Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study' (Summer 1973) Law and 
Society Review 719. 
80 See BZ Tamanaha, (n 71) above and J Griffiths, (n 69) above. 
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into the inherent conflict that legal pluralism generates.81 Therefore, locating 
Nigeria as a ‘semi-autonomous social field’,82 in Chapter Four it will be shown 
that there are human rights implications of legal pluralism in the context of how 
State law tends to exercise dominance over other forms of law. 
 
Likewise, the ideas of the leading post-colonialists will be used to critically 
examine the case study. In doing this, the theoretical arguments of scholars 
on colonialism and de-colonisation by the four leading post-colonial writers 
prominent in the discipline - Frantz Fanon,83 Edward Said,84 Gayatri Spivak85 
and Homi Bhabha86 - will be critically analysed and applied to the thesis in 
Chapter Four. The argument will be made that together the combined impact 
of their scholarly works provides critical perspectives to the case study. They 
do so through their demonstration of the hegemonic tendencies of colonialism 
through the control of knowledge and representation and the implications of 
these in a post-colonial Nigeria.  
 
The argument then is that the circumstances in which Abuja peoples find 
themselves in terms of their land rights do not only have their origins in the 
colonial encounter with Britain, but they also illustrate the continuing impacts 
of colonialism in a purportedly post-colonial era. Indeed, as the Nigerian 
novelist Chinua Achebe observed in his world renowned literary piece - Things 
Fall Apart87 - African societies fell apart with the consolidation of colonial rule.88 
It will be demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three that with the advent of 
                                            
81 BZ Tamanaha, (n 71) above. 
82 SF Moore, (n 79) above. 
83 F Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove, 1963). 
84 E Said, Orientalism (Pantheon, 1978). 
85 GC Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' in C Nelson and L Grossberg (eds), Marxism and 
the Interpretation of Culture (University of Illinois Press, 1988) at 271-314. 
86 HK Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Psychology Press, 1994). 
87 C Achebe, Things Fall Apart (Everyone’s Library, 1958). 
88 Ibid, at 152. 
General Introduction 
19 
 
British colonial administration of Nigeria, customary law fell apart but not 
entirely. In Chapter Four it will be argued that the falling apart of customary 
law in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria has negative implications for the land 
rights of Abuja peoples. In developing this argument, it will be illustrated that 
some post-colonial scholarly works have demonstrated the colonial effects of 
destroying the organic evolution of indigenous African States.89 This thesis will 
therefore contribute to the existing body of post-colonial literature by 
examining the relationship between the post-colonial African State of Nigeria 
and the IPs of Abuja. 
1.3. Methodology and Methods 
This research is predominantly doctrinal.90 In conducting this research the 
following additional research techniques are utilised: case study and 
comparative research. The research is also law reform-focussed. This 
primarily doctrinal enquiry will review relevant primary sources such as State 
laws in Nigeria and Kenya, government policy documents, and reports of 
national and international human rights bodies. The international laws to be 
analysed include: the 1989 International Labour Organisation Convention 169 
                                            
89 For example, F Fanon, (n 83) above and E Said, (n 84) above. See generally, NL Bruce-
Wallace, 'Africa and International Law—the Emergence to Statehood' (1985) 23 The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 575; OC Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-state 
Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa' (2000) 41 Harvard 
International Law Journal 503; and LD King, 'State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern 
Nigeria' (2001) 36 Journal of Asian and African Studies 339. See also, A Anghie, 'Finding 
the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law' 
(1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1; A Anghie, 'Time Present and Time Past: 
Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World' (1999) 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law & Policy 243; A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005); A Anghie, 'The Evolution of 
International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities' (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 739; 
A Anghie et al, The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); and A Anghie and BS Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to 
International Law and Individual Responsibilities in Internal Conflicts' (2003) 2 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 77. 
90 See M McConville and WHE Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007) and CM Bast and RC Pyle, 'Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm 
Shift' (2001) 93 Law Library Journal 285. 
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on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO 169),91  the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)92  and other 
general international human rights instruments.93 The specific way in which 
this research has been undertaken using the afore-mentioned research 
methods is explained more elaborately in sub-sections 1.3.1–1.3.3 below. 
1.3.1. Doctrinal Analyses 
Doctrinal analyses about the debates on land rights of IPs in journals, 
commentaries, textbooks, encyclopaedias and legal periodicals have been 
made. This kind of enquiry has enabled the construction of alternative 
approaches to the definition of IPs and application of international law in 
Nigeria through its analytical methods.94 Therefore, the main source of 
materials for this research has been the library. As the subject of this research 
requires some heuristic interdisciplinary research into anthropology in relation 
to the debates on the definition of IPs as well as anthropological information 
about the Abuja peoples, a research visit was made at the beginning stages 
                                            
91 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No 
169) reprinted in ILM 1382 (1989), adopted in Geneva, at the 76th International Labour 
Congress (ILC) session on 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991. 
92 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the UNGA 
Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007. 
93 These instruments range from those emanating from the UN treaties and Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies such as the HRC, the CERD and the ILO. Others are: the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), adopted by the UNGA Resolution 217A in Paris, 
France on 10 December 1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
(ICCPR), adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UNGA resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with its 
Art 49 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 ((ICESCR) 
adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into Force 3 January 1976, in accordance with its Art 
27; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) 
(ICERD), adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UNGA Resolution 2106 (XX) 
of 21 December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969, in accordance with its Art 19; 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, 1992 (the Minority Rights Declaration), adopted by UNGA Resolution 
47/135 at the 92nd Plenary meeting on 18 December 1992; and The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights, 1987 (African Charter). Adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 27 June 
1981, entered into force 21 October 1986. 
94 R Banakar and M Travers, ‘Law, Sociology and Method’, in R Banakar and M Travers 
(eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart, 2005) at 7. 
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of this research to the anthropological section of the library at the University of 
Durham, for collection of anthropological literature on IPs and Abuja peoples.  
 
In addition to the above, relevant materials have also been obtained from 
specialised libraries such as the British Library, and many other university 
libraries from across America and the UK with the support of the Northumbria 
University inter-library loan service.  Books have been obtained, studied and 
analysed from the Northumbria University library as well as the Newcastle 
University library. Mainly journal articles from electronic law journals available 
through Westlaw, Hein Online, Lexis Library and JICS Journal Archive have 
been collected and reviewed through the electronic search engines NORA and 
Library Search of the Northumbria University library as well through the 
EndNote online electronic search engine. Documentations available on the 
website of the UN on IPs and relevant documentations from the website of the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (African Commission) as 
well as the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (African Court) have 
been obtained and reviewed. 
1.3.2. Case Study 
Case study methodology95 has also been utilised. The level of analysis is at 
the Nigerian State level. This single case study of Abuja was selected because 
the case study is in Nigeria and because of the researcher’s in-depth 
knowledge of the case study and experience of practicing as a legal 
practitioner in the Nigerian legal system. The unit of analysis is Nigerian State 
laws, policies and the judicial decisions of Nigerian courts of law. Although the 
case-study method of research has been criticised for being ‘the weak cousin' 
of research strategies,96 this limitation has been resolved by the comparative 
                                            
95 See J Hamel, D Fortin and SP Dufour, Case Study Methods (Sage Publications, 1993); B 
Gillham, Case Study Research Methods (Continuum, 2000) and M Hammersley, R Gomm 
and P Foster, Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts (Sage Publications, 2000). 
96 See generally, R Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage Publications, 
1994) and J Hamel, D Fortin and SP Dufour, Case Study Methods (Sage Publications, 
1993). 
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research method employed in this thesis as demonstrated sub-section 1.3.3 
below.   
 
Another reason why this single case-study approach has been chosen is 
because it presents the opportunity for detailed and insight-generating 
analysis.97 This in turn gives room for an in-depth and detailed analysis of 
relevant laws in Nigeria vis-à-vis the international human rights regime on the 
rights of IPs. It also provides the opportunity to discover and analyse multiple 
and possibly conjectural factors that may either inhibit or enhance the 
effectiveness of international law in protecting land rights of Abuja peoples in 
a post-colonial Nigeria. This single case-study illuminates the problem with the 
West-centric description of IPs in a practical way and provides findings that 
can be used to make broad generalisations about the need to adopt a more 
expansive definition of IPs to cover more categories of peoples in the African 
context. In this way, although the research findings in this thesis are generally 
idiographic,98 there are potentials for such findings to be nomothetic.99 
1.3.3. Comparative Research 
The comparative technique utilised in this research examines the legal culture 
of the jurisdictions analysed and raises new insights as to how the law in 
Nigeria may be reformed in the future, while pointing out the possible 
difficulties that may be encountered as well as providing a critical appraisal of 
                                            
97 B Flvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research' (2006) 12 Qualitative 
Inquiry 219. 
98 By Idiographic it is meant that the findings in this research are applicable only to Nigeria 
and the case study in this thesis, generalisability to other similar research scenarios may be 
limited. For the meaning and import of Idiographic research, see H Tsoukas, 'The Validity of 
Idiographic Research Explanations' (1989) 14 Academy of Management Review 551 and 
DH Barlow and MK Nock, 'Why Can't we be More Idiographic in our Research?' (2009) 4 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 19. 
99 Nomothetic research implies the capacity of research findings to be easily generalisable. 
See J Jaccard and P Dittus, 'Idiographic and Nomothetic Perspectives on Research 
Methods and Data Analysis' (1990) 11 Research Methods in Personality and Social 
Psychology 312 and HJ Hermans, 'On the Integration of Nomothetic and Idiographic 
Research Methods in the Study of Personal Meaning' (1988) 56 Journal of Personality 785. 
See also, R Donmoyer, 'Generalizability and the Single-Case Study' in R Gomm, M 
Hammersley and P Foster (eds), Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts (Sage 
Publications, 2000). 
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the Nigerian legal system.100 This is done in Chapters Five and Nine by 
comparing the Nigerian legal system with its Kenyan counterpart in relation to 
the nature of the relationship between State law and other forms of law like 
IPs' customary law and international law respectively in both States. Indeed, 
this technique is also justified because as Kenya is an Anglophone African 
State with a plural legal system just like Nigeria, the experience of recent post-
colonial law reforms in Kenya enables the advancement of possible reform-
oriented solutions in a post-colonial Nigeria based upon approaches that have 
been tested in the Kenyan jurisdiction. This renders both jurisdictions apt for 
such comparative analysis. 
In line with the above argument, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz have argued 
'[t]hat method of comparative law can provide a much richer range of model 
solutions than a legal science devoted to a single nation …'101 because such 
comparison may lead to discovery of alternative solutions to a particular legal 
problem from one jurisdiction to another.102 Indeed, as Kenya has recently 
embarked on a series of law reforms and has also attempted to address 
domestic legal challenges in relations to land rights of IPs, this jurisdiction 
therefore constitutes a useful unit for comparative analysis with Nigeria. 
Although in Chapter Eight some general comparison will be briefly made in 
relation to the relationship between international and national law in 
Francophone post-colonial African States and Anglophone post-colonial 
African States, such comparison will be heuristic as a detailed analysis of 
                                            
100 See G Wilson, 'Comparative Legal Scholarship' in M McConville and WHE Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2010) at 89 and K Zweigert and H 
Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 1998). On the use of legal 
culture as a technique of comparative legal research, see D Nelken, Comparing Legal 
Cultures (Ashgate Dartmouth, 1997); D Nelken, 'Using the Concept of Legal Culture' (2004) 
29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1; D Nelken, ‘Rethinking Legal Culture’ in 
Freeman M (ed), Law and Sociology (Oxford University Press, 2006) 200-224; D Nelken, 
'Thinking about Legal Culture' (2014) 1 Asian Journal of Law and Society 255; JP 
MacKenzie, 'The Legal Culture' (1995) 40 New York Law School Law Review 903; and LM 
Friedman, ‘The Place of Legal Culture in the Sociology of Law’ in  M Freeman (ed), Law and 
Sociology (Oxford University Press, 2006)185-199. 
101 K Zweigert and H Kötz, (n 100) above at 15. 
102 Ibid. 
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judicial interpretation of the law in both legal systems is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Indeed, it has been rightly argued that any such comparison will 
require the use of different methodologies and research techniques which are 
not utilised in this thesis.103 
Although comparative research in law has the limitation that other factors 
outside of law like cultural, social and political developments do have different 
impacts in different jurisdictions on the development of law,104 careful attention 
has been given to the reasoning of the courts in both Nigeria and Kenya as to 
how and on what basis they interpret their domestic laws in the context of the 
applicability of international law in the domestic legal systems of the two 
States.  
A similar attitude has also been taken in relation to how domestic courts of law 
in the two States accommodate or subject IPs' customary law to State law. 
The comparative analysis is aimed at law reforms in Nigeria. The comparative 
examination of the new approaches towards IPs' customary land rights and 
international law in Kenya, makes it possible to advance the hypothesis about 
the possible effectiveness of transplanting such new law reforms in Kenya into 
Nigeria to respond to similar challenges that exist in Nigeria in relation to the 
case study of Abuja.  This kind of research technique contributes to the 
understanding of law in society and identifies possible avenues for law reforms 
in Nigeria.105 
                                            
103 J Dainow, 'The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison' (1966) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 419. 
104 G Wilson, (n 100) above at 93 and Z Konrad and K Hein, (n 100) above. 
105 G Wilson, (n 100) above at 92. For more on comparative research techniques in law, see 
G Dannemann, 'Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?' in M Reimann and 
R Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 
2006) at 384-418; TW Bennett, 'Comparative Law and African Customary Law' in M 
Reimann and A Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 642-671; M Graziadei, 'Comparative Law as the Study of 
Transplants' in M Reimann and A Zimmerman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) at442-474; M Tushnet, 'Comparative Constitutional Law' in 
M Reimann and A Zimmerman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at1226-1256; and HM Watt, 'Globalization and Comparative Law' in 
M Reimann and A Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 583-606. 
General Introduction 
25 
 
1.4. Limitations and Challenges of the Research 
Although this doctrinal enquiry has provided quick answers to the research 
questions posed in this thesis and the construction of alternative approaches 
to law in Nigeria through its analytical methods;106 a major limitation is that of 
subjectivity.107 There is the possibility that the interpretations and analysis may 
have been influenced by personal views, perceptions, unconscious as well as 
conscious idiosyncrasies and understandings. This shortcoming has been 
mitigated with the use of a variety of sources. In addition, the analyses are not 
mere abstractions, as such analyses are of social utility in terms of the practical 
effects of law in society which is illustrated by using case study research 
method. Indeed, most of the laws, policy documents, cases, international laws 
and literature examined are available for public scrutiny and verification. 
Where possible references and links to internet sources have been provided 
in footnotes and bibliography. 
Nevertheless, doctrinal enquiry can be time-consuming, and as Armstrong and 
Knott argue there is ‘the difficulty of knowing when to stop searching’.108 This 
challenge has been largely resolved by setting clear boundaries in terms of 
the type and relevance of documents reviewed at each point. However, 
conducting a doctrinal research from a desktop in Europe about a case study 
and a comparator jurisdiction in Africa is challenging to the extreme! For 
example, the publicly accessible databases of cases in both Nigeria and 
Kenya have no facilities for finding cases by using key words or even by using 
the names of the parties or case numbers.109 These challenges have resulted 
                                            
106 AK Singhal and I Malik, 'Doctrinal and Socio-Legal Methods of Research: Merits and 
Demerits' (2012) 2 Educational Research Journal 252. 
107 Ibid. 
108 JDS Armstrong, and CA Knott, Where the Law Is: An Introduction to Advanced Legal 
Research (Thomson West, 2004) at 3. 
109 For Nigeria, see <www.nigeria-law.org/LawReporting.htm>, and http://lawnigeria.com/, 
accessed 29 November 2016. For Kenya see, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/, accessed 29 
November 2016. 
General Introduction 
26 
 
in expending a lot of time and energy on reading many irrelevant materials and 
cases.  
In line with the above challenges, there is hardly any way of knowing whether 
a case decided by a High Court or Court of Appeal has gone on appeal to the 
Supreme Court in either Kenya or Nigeria, as the publicly accessible 
databases have no facilities to automatically or manually monitor the progress 
of cases on appeal or as they are being decided by courts of law. The 
implication is that a case cited in this thesis may as at the time the reader is 
reading have been overruled or the Supreme Court in either country may have 
made a new decision in a new case that changes the entire position of the law 
in either Nigeria or Kenya. Likewise, the Parliaments in both countries may 
have enacted new legislation, amended a law. The implications are that by the 
time the reader is examining this thesis, such laws may have been revised or 
repealed. To that extent, the information, arguments and analyses made in 
this thesis represent the position of the law as at the time of writing.110 
The last point on limitations and challenges is that the claims in Chapter Four 
in relation to the de facto existence and practice of customary land tenure in 
Abuja, despite the de jure exclusive ownership of the Federal Government of 
Nigeria, could have benefited from empirical evidence such as interviews and 
focus groups with some indigenous individuals and communities in Abuja. 
However, due to limited resources and time to conduct such an empirical 
enquiry, such empirical research methods have not been utilised. This 
limitation has been mitigated by references to available literature like the 2010 
report by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on 
land tenure law in Nigeria; the report of the Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) and Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC); 
and the academic views of some authors.111 Likewise, empirical evidence of 
                                            
110 This thesis is up-to-date as at 31 March 2017.  
111 See USAID (2010), www.land-links.org/country-profile/nigeria/  accessed 07/04/ 17 and 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre (SERAC), The Myth of the Abuja Master Plan: Forced Evictions as Urban Planning in 
General Introduction 
27 
 
the complicity of indigenous elites from Abuja in creating and sustaining the 
problem with the land rights of Abuja peoples could have enriched the thesis 
by providing a holistic picture of the challenge of legally accommodating and 
protecting customary land rights of Abuja peoples. 
1.5. Contribution and Originality 
Studies in the 1980s and 1990s illustrated how law had been used to 
manipulate and determine power relations between people and groups in 
various societies.112 Research also reveals that although African customary 
law was not static, through a combined effect of official colonial interference 
with the evolution of customary law and the role of indigenous African elites in 
the manipulation of power relations, official customary law has emerged which 
is different from the customary law practiced by ordinary African peoples.113 
Scholars have argued for a symbiotic relationship between State law, 
customary law and other forms of law.114 Legal scholars have also revealed 
                                            
Abuja, Nigeria (COHRE & SERAC, 2008) at 32. See Chapter Four, sub-section 4.1.2 at last 
two paragraphs. 
112 See SE Merry, 'Anthropology, Law and Transnational Processes' (1992) Annual Review 
of Anthropology 357 at 360 and JF Collier, Marriage and Inequality in Classless Societies 
(Stanford University Press, 1993). 
113 See RL Roberts and K Mann (eds), Law in Colonial Africa (Heinemann Educational 
Books, 1991); SE Merry, (n 111) above at 364; and SF Moore, Social Facts and 
Fabrications" Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980 (Cambridge University Press, 
1986).  
114 See A Allott and GR Woodman, People's Law and State Law: The Bellagio Papers 
(Walter de Gruyter, 1985); BdS Santos, 'Law: A Map of Misreading-Toward a Postmodern 
Conception of Law' (1987) 14 Journal of Law & Society 279; J Griffiths, (n 69) above; G 
Woodman, 'How State Courts Create Customary Law in Ghana and Nigeria' in Morse BW 
and G Woodman (eds), Indigenous Laws and The State (Foris Publications, 1988); and J 
Vanderlinden, 'Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later' (1989) 21 The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 149. 
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the gap between the ‘living’115 customary law and ‘official’116 or ‘sociologists’ 
customary law.117  
 
The literature has also identified several factors that have introduced changes 
into customary land laws like the State, interactions with other groups, official 
recognition by State institutions and globalisation.118 Indeed, a study has also 
revealed how State law tends to exclude peoples from utilising their indigenous 
accountability systems thereby negating their citizenship rights.119  Studies 
have shown how official State institutions tend to accommodate customary law 
and the influence of other factors on customary land law.120 This thesis aims 
to contribute to the existing debates by illuminating how such official treatment 
of customary land laws negates customary land rights of IPs guaranteed under 
contemporary international law in post-colonial Nigeria. In this modest attempt, 
this thesis introduces the case study of Abuja, Nigeria to the existing debates 
                                            
115 E Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Russell & Russell Inc, 1962). 
116 SF Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study' (Summer 1973) Law and Society Review 719. 
117 GR Woodman, 'Judicial Development of Customary Law: The Case of Marriage Law in 
Ghana and Nigeria' (1977) 14 University of Ghana Law Journal 115.  
118 See GR Woodman, ‘Customary Land Laws within Legal Pluralism over the Generations’, 
4 SADC Law Journal 2014/15, 189-208; GR Woodman, ‘Ghana: How Does State Law 
Accommodate Religious, Cultural, Linguistic and Ethnic Diversity?’, in M Foblets, J 
Gaudreault-Desbiens and A Dundes Renteln (eds), Cultural Diversity and the Law: State 
Responses from Around the World, (Bruylant, Ėditions Yvon Blais, 2010) 255-280; and GR 
Woodman, ‘Legal Pluralism in Africa: The Implications of State Recognition of Customary 
Laws Illustrated From the Field of Land Law’ in H Mostert and T Bennett (eds), Pluralism 
and Development: Studies in Access to Property in Africa (Juta & Co Ltd, 2012) 35-58. 
119 A Claassens, ‘Contested Power and Apartheid Tribal Boundaries: The Implications of 
“Living Customary Law” for Indigenous Accountability Mechanisms, in H Mostert and T 
Bennett (eds), Pluralism and Development: Studies in Access to Property in Africa (Juta & 
Co Ltd, 2012) 174-209. 
120 See AN Allott, 'The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law in British Africa' (1957) 20 
The Modern Law Review 244; AN Allott, 'Towards the Unification of Laws in Africa' (1965) 
14 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 366; AN Allott, 'What is to be Done with 
African Customary Law?' (1984) 28 Journal of African Law 56; and TO Elias, The Impact of 
English Law on Nigerian Customary Law (Ministry of Information, 1958). 
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on legal pluralism by situating the case study within the context of international 
law. 
 
This thesis makes original contributions to knowledge in three main specific 
ways. Firstly, the case study of Abuja peoples’ land rights has not been 
academically studied in the context of the rights of IPs under international law. 
In this context, this case study is used as a vehicle through which to illustrate 
the need for a more expansive approach to the definition of IPs under 
international law to cover peoples with different cultures and belonging to 
different ethnic groups in an African context. There is no known literature as 
at the time of writing which has advanced this argument. In addition to this, the 
application of theories of legal pluralism and post-colonialism to this case study 
has also not been academically examined by any known literature about the 
rights of IPs under international law. Therefore, this thesis makes the original 
contributions to the existing body of literature on the rights of IPs by introducing 
the case study of Abuja to the existing debates on IPs and their rights under 
international law through the theoretical lenses of legal pluralism and post-
colonialism.  
 
Secondly, based on the analysis made in Chapter Six, the original argument 
is advanced that the existing academic, international and regional attempts at 
defining and empowering IPs need to adopt the contemporary approach used 
by international law towards protecting the rights of children. It will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Six that previously, children were presented as 
citizens in waiting.121 Consequently, children were not viewed as individuals 
fully ready to engage, live and participate in a world dominated by adults.122 It 
will be shown that this removed them from any discussion in relation to work, 
                                            
121 See R Lister, 'Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children?' (2007) 8 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 693. For examples of literature that justified this approach, see TH Marshall, 
Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge University Press, 1950) and R Lister et al, 'Young 
People and Citizenship' in M Barry (ed), Youth Policy and Social Inclusion, vol 33 
(Routledge, 2005). 
122 Ibid. 
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politics and sexuality.123 They were presented as uncompleted human 
beings.124 It will be maintained that this attitude towards children justified a lack 
of formal recognition of children as citizens and consequently their exclusion 
from acquiring citizenship rights.125  
 
To develop the above analogical argument, references will be made to the 
1924 League of Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of the Child,126 and the 
1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child.127 It will be argued that under 
these two previous international instruments on the rights of children, there 
was no recognition of the rights of children as autonomous people like their 
adult counterparts and children’s participatory rights in decision matters that 
affected them were not protected.128  
 
After demonstrating the above previous approach to children’s rights, it will be 
argued that by contrast to the above traditional approaches of presenting 
children as ‘future adults’ which created a binary situation in terms of 
citizenship rights between children and adults, the 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, (UNCRC),129 adopts a completely different approach by 
                                            
123 P Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. Translated from the 
French by Robert Baldick (Knopf, 1962) and KLF Calvert, Children in the House: The 
Material Culture of Early Childhood 1600-1900 (North-Eastern University Press, 1992). 
124 C Jenks, 'Sociological Perspectives and Media Representations of Childhood' in J Fionda 
(ed), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart Publishing, 2001) at 23-33. 
125 See O O'Neill, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives' (1992) 6 International Journal of 
Law & Family 24. 
126 1924 League of Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of the Child, adopted 26 September 
1924 in Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: <www.un-documents.net/gdrc1924.htm>, 
accessed 26 November 2016. 
127 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 1959 proclaimed by UNGA Resolution 1386 
(XIV) of 20 November 1959. This formed the adoption of the latter Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 1959 adopted by the UNGA 30 years later on 20 November 1989. The UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990. 
128 MD Freeman, The Moral Status of Children: Essays on the Rights of the Children 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) at 50. 
129 Supra. 
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empowering them with the capacity of being legal subjects in their own right.130 
It will be argued that there are analogical lessons to be gleaned from the 
transformation of children’s rights under international child rights law that could 
be transplanted towards international law on the rights of IPs. The argument 
will be made that IPs are easily presented as victims. Like the previous 
approach towards children’s citizenship rights vis-à-vis adults’ citizenship 
rights, which created a binary situation, the way IPs are presented in 
international law appears to repeat this binary situation between ‘victimised’ 
IPs’ citizenship rights on the one hand, and the citizenship rights of other ‘non-
victimised’ citizens on the other hand. 
 
The third and final point about originality and contribution to knowledge is in 
relation to the comparative analyses of the relationship between State law and 
IPs’ customary law as well as international law in Nigeria and Kenya. As at the 
time of writing, no such comparative study between Nigeria and Kenya on the 
afore-mentioned subjects has been made.131 In this modest way, this thesis 
makes original contributions to the existing body of knowledge about the 
relationship between State law on the one hand, and IPs’ customary law as 
well as international law on other hand. Such original contributions to the 
existing body of knowledge also succeed in pointing out ways in which the 
success of law reforms in Kenya could be transplanted to resolve similar legal 
challenges such as those which the case study of Abuja demonstrates in 
Nigeria. If this thesis succeeds in instigating such law reforms in Nigeria, it 
would have achieved its main objective. 
                                            
130 D Stasiulis, 'The Active Child Citizen: Lessons from Canadian Policy and the Children's 
Movement' (2002) 6 Citizenship Studies 507. 
131 Some comparative analyses found are in relation to international law but such analyses 
are in the context of Canada and Ghana. See C Nwapi, 'International Treaties in Nigerian 
and Canadian Courts' (2011) 19 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 38 and 
CN Okeke, 'The Use of International Law in the Domestic Courts of Ghana and Nigeria,' 
(2015) 32 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 371. 
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1.6. Thesis Structure 
In order to provide the reader with a clear presentation of the issues in this 
thesis and for a logical flow of the arguments advanced, the thesis has been 
divided into two main volumes. Following this introduction, Volume 1 will 
continue by presenting the historical and contextual background to the thesis 
in Chapters Two and Three. The main purpose of Chapter Two is to provide 
the reader with a general contextual and historical background to the colonial 
legal developments in Nigeria until political independence. In Chapter Three, 
the retention of the colonial legal heritage after political independence will be 
demonstrated. Against the background of the historical context set out in 
Chapters Two and Three, the case study of Abuja will be introduced in more 
detail in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five, there will be comparative analyses 
between Abuja peoples of Nigeria and Ogiek peoples of Kenya. The purpose 
of the comparative analyses in Chapter Five is to demonstrate how Kenya has 
responded to the challenges of protecting IPs’ customary land rights and how 
Nigeria may respond to similar challenges. 
 
Volume 2 is aimed at answering the research questions arising from the case 
study of Abuja which have already been enumerated in sub-section 1.2.2 
above. Consequently, Chapter Six will critically examine the emergence of IPs 
and their land rights under international law by answering the first (1) central 
and sub-research questions 1), 2) 3) and 4). Sub-research questions 5 and 6 
to the first central research question will be answered in Chapter Seven. In 
Chapter Eight, the relationship between the Nigerian legal system and 
international law will be critically analysed. In Chapter Nine, there will be 
comparative analyses of the relationship between national and international 
law in Nigeria and Kenya. This will be done by answering the second (2) 
central research question and its associated sub-research questions 1) and 2) 
in Chapter Eight. Sub-research questions 3), 4) and 5) are answered in 
Chapter Nine. Thereafter, the concluding arguments in this thesis will be 
presented in Chapter Ten.
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CHAPTER TWO: ENGLISH LAW, CUSTOMARY LAW 
AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN COLONIAL NIGERIA - A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
The objective in this Chapter is to provide the reader with a historical background 
to this thesis and the case study which will be introduced in Chapter Four. To 
achieve this purpose, the Chapter has been sub-divided into three main sections. 
Section 2.1 examines the existence of indigenous States and customary law in 
pre-colonial Africa. The purpose is to illustrate the nature of pre-colonial statehood 
and the role of indigenous customary laws and legal institutions in the 
administration of justice in Africa prior to European colonial rule. The section 
concludes by examining the nature of the interactions between Africans and 
Europeans prior to colonialism and in the process, it demonstrates the nature, 
influence and balance of power between African customary law and European 
law before the advent of European colonial administration. 
Section 2.2 examines the beginning of European colonialism which was 
formalised by the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference and the resultant partitioning of 
Africa amongst the colonial Powers. Whilst focussing on the colonial 
developments in West Africa and Nigeria it demonstrates the gradual introduction 
of English law into Nigeria and the simultaneous relegation of indigenous 
customary laws to an inferior status by the colonial legal institutions from 1861 
until political independence of Nigeria in 1960. In section 2.3 it will be argued that 
the debates by scholars such as John Griffiths, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
Gordon Woodman, Brian Tamanaha, Gunter Tubner, Sally Engle Merry, Sally 
Falk Moore and others help in contextualising the coexistence of English law and 
customary law in colonial Nigeria. This legal pluralism discourse will be a 
springboard upon which later analyses will be made in subsequent Chapters. 
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2.1. Pre-Colonial Africa, Indigenous States and Customary 
Law 
Africa’s place in the world and the influence of external factors on the 
development of indigenous customary laws and legal systems from the Middle 
Ages to early nineteenth century can be understood within the context of political, 
commercial and historical interactions between Europeans and the more 
significant African States that existed from early times to the eve of colonialism. 
According to recorded history, ancient Ghana existed as a powerful Kingdom 
between 300-1240 A.D and was known in the ninth century to be carrying on trade 
with other indigenous African States such as Morocco.1 Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce 
argues that ‘Ghana had all the attributes of an effective Empire. In the words of 
Basil Davidson, it presented “the familiar picture of a centralized government 
which had discovered the art and exercise of taxation, another witness of stability 
and statehood.”’2  
However, this ancient State of Ghana fell in the year 1240 A.D as it was 
conquered by the Kingdom of Susu and subsequently by the Empire of Mali.3 Like 
Ghana, Mali had all the characteristics of a very powerful empire, ‘with effective 
systems of administration and justice.’4 Elias and Akinjide argued that it rose to 
                                            
1 See TO Elias and R Akinjide, Africa and the Development of International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) at 7; P Englebert, 'Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and 
Economic Development in Tropical Africa' (2000) 53 Political Research Quarterly 7; S 
Michalopoulos and E Papaioannou, 'Pre‐Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African 
Development' (2013) 81 Econometrica 113; and D Northrup, Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial 
Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria (Oxford University Press, 1978). 
2 NL Bruce-Wallace, 'Africa and International Law—the Emergence to Statehood' (1985) 23 The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 575 at 578. See also, M Berbers, 'Archaeology and the 
Prehistoric Origins of the Ghana Empire' (1980) 21 Journal of African History 457; A Holl, 
'Background to the Ghana Empire: Archaeological Investigations on the Transition to Statehood 
in the Dhar Tichitt Region (Mauritania)' (1985) 4 Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 73; and 
JD Fage, 'Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence' (1957) 3 Transactions of the Historical 
Society of Ghana 3. 
3 NL Bruce-Wallace, (n 2) above at 578. 
4 Ibid. 
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become one of the most powerful indigenous African States.5 Indeed, it has also 
been argued that the ancient Empire of Mali was a great example of the capacity 
of Africans to build States and has been described as one of the purely indigenous 
African States, which was remarkable and exemplified the capacity of Africans for 
political organisation.6  In Nigeria there were also numerous indigenous States in 
existence until the nineteenth century. In Northern Nigeria for example, notable 
indigenous States were the Hausa States of Kano, Gobir, Zaria, Katsina and the 
Sokoto Caliphate that extended eastwards from the River Niger to Lake Chad.7 
The Sokoto Caliphate forcefully engulfed the other indigenous Hausa States in a 
nineteenth century expansionism – through a Jihad waged by one Usman Dan 
Fodio to form a theocratic empire that engulfed most of the non-Muslim States in 
Northern Nigeria.8 
Likewise, in Southern Nigeria, pre-existing indigenous States until the nineteenth 
century included the Oyo Empire, the Benin Kingdom and the Kingdom of Ile-Ife 
among others.9 The Benin Kingdom was already a powerful State and 
independent by the time the Portuguese first visited in 1472.10 Therefore, prior to 
European colonialism a number of indigenous States were in existence in Africa, 
                                            
5 TO Elias and R Akinjide, (n 1) above at 9. 
6 Ibid. See also, M Quigley, Ancient West African Kingdoms: Ghana, Mali, & Songhai (Capstone 
Classroom, 2002); A Ghana, Mali (Methuen, 1973); D Lange, Ancient Kingdoms of West Africa 
(Röll, 2004); and P Koslow, Mali: Crossroads of Africa (Chelsea House Publication, 1995). 
7 TO Elias and R Akinjide, (n 1) above at 10. 
8 OC Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of 
Legitimate Statehood in Africa' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 503 and LD King, 
'State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria' (2001) 36 Journal of Asian and African 
Studies 339. See also, A Burns and AC Burns, History of Nigeria (Barnes & Noble, 1972) at 56-
58; and JE Flint and RA Oliver, The Cambridge History of Africa, vol 5 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1976) at 121-160. 
9 OC Okafor, (n 8) above at 508. 
10 TO Elias and R Akinjide, (n 1) above at 10. 
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contrary to the claims of some writers.11 One of these claims is to the effect that 
‘[a]t the time of the first sea voyages to Asia, Africa did not consist of well-
organized states, though it had known some important states in the past.’12 
Indeed, some writers even argue that ‘it was the inability of the rulers of traditional 
Africa to demonstrate and defend their statehood that resulted in the almost 
complete colonisation of the continent by Europe in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century.’13 To the contrary, it is herein submitted in the words of 
Wallace-Bruce that: 
The Euro-centric view that Africa was devoid of state-organisation 
and in a legal vacuum during the pre-colonial period is not 
supported by evidence, and must be rejected. Likewise, the 
argument that the various organised entities were just ‘tribal units’, 
and not sovereign states, must be dismissed.14 
However, developments in Europe in relation to the Berlin Conference of 1884-
1885 would change the course of history in terms of the independence, 
sovereignty and the nature of indigenous customary laws and legal institutions of 
the various indigenous African States. From the latter half of the nineteenth 
century to the latter half of the twentieth century there was a transition from a 
period of mere interactions in trade and diplomatic relations to a period of formal 
colonisation, when the sovereignty of African States was removed from the global 
                                            
11JJG Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International 
Law (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013). 
12 Ibid, at 18. 
13 See RH Jackson and CG Rosberg, 'Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood 
in the African Crisis' (1986) 24 The Journal of Modern African Studies 1 at 2. 
14 NL Bruce-Wallace, (n 8) above at 583. A comprehensive discussion about the status of 
indigenous African States prior to colonialism is beyond the scope of this thesis. For more 
detailed information and studies on these, see B Davidson and J Hughes, The Story of Africa 
(Mitchell Beazley, 1984); B Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the 
Nation-State (Times/Random House, 1993); G Casely-Hayford, The Lost Kingdoms of Africa 
(Bantam Press, 2012); RJ Reid, A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present, vol 7 (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2011); E Coulson ‘African Society at the Time of the Scramble’ in LH Gann and P 
Duignan (eds), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-
1960, vol 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1969) 27-60. 
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map of this period.  Before examining the legal and political developments in 
colonial Nigeria it is important to examine the nature of pre-colonial African 
customary laws and the indigenous legal systems in general. 
2.1.1. Pre-Colonial Africa and Indigenous Customary Laws 
In the context of this thesis, indigenous African customary law refers to the 
unwritten customary rules which are considered as binding upon members of 
various African communities in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times15 
which Elias argued ‘forms part and parcel of law in general’.16 Likewise, Robert 
Smith demonstrated that although there is some diversity in African customary 
law across the continent, such differences do not outweigh the similarities.17 
Anthony Allott,18  identifies and examines the common features of African 
customary laws to include: the unwritten and customary nature of the law;19 some 
similarities in judicial processes,20 which could be indigenous courts presided 
over by chiefs or in the arbitral tribunal in the villages,21 households, families and 
even clans;22 the significance of the supernatural;23 forms of government founded 
upon consent of the community as well as the function and role of the community 
                                            
15 See R Smith, 'Peace and Palaver: International Relations in Pre-colonial West Africa' (1973) 
14 The Journal of African History 599 at 600. See also, M Chanock, 'Neither Customary nor 
Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family Law Reform' (1989) 3 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family; 72 and GR Woodman, ‘African Legal Systems’, in JD Wright (ed), 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd edn, Elsevier, 2015) 272-
275. 
16 TO Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester University Press, 1972) at v. 
17 R Smith, (n 15) above at 600. See also, AN Allott, 'Towards the Unification of Laws in Africa' 
(1965) 14 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 366 at 368. 
18 AN Allott, Essays in African Law (Butterworth, 1960) at 66-70. 
19 Ibid, at 62 and 66. 
20 Ibid, at 68. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, at 68 and 70. 
23 Ibid, at 69. 
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in the application, interpretation and enforcement of the law.24 Elias, appears to 
agree with this characterisation of African law as he also argued that across Africa 
there had emerged rules of customary law that were similar.25 Similarly, Smith 
reported that such customary laws were widespread in Africa and they were 
noticed by European visitors to Africa prior to colonialism.26 Customary law 
evolved with the various pre-colonial African societies. This implies that 
indigenous African customary laws were by no means static or uniform across 
pre-colonial African societies, as Sally Falk Moore observed amongst the pre-
colonial Chagga peoples of Kilimanjaro, Tanzania.27  
Indeed, pre-colonial customary laws and societies in Africa existed harmoniously 
with each other, such that a study of the history of African customary law in any 
African society is akin to a study of the history of such societies.28  Similarly, 
Omoniyi Adewoye observed, in relation to Southern Nigeria, that customary law 
in this area was ‘…latent in the breasts of the community’s ruling elite or of the 
court of remembrance, and was given expression only when…called for…’29 
However, it remained as much ‘a functional element’ or ‘a means of practical 
                                            
24 Ibid, at 68-70. 
25 TO Elias, ‘African Law’ in A Larson and CW Jenks, Sovereignty within the Law (Oceania, 
1965) at 210-222. See also, M Gluckman, Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1969); AN Allott, Essays in African Law: With Special Reference to the 
Law of Ghana (Butterworth, 1960); AL Epstein, Juridical Techniques and the Judicial Process: A 
Study in African Customary Law, vol 1 (Manchester University Press, 1954); S Roberts, 
'Introduction: Some Notes on “African Customary law”' (1984) 28 Journal of African Law 1; C 
White, 'African Customary Law: the Problem of Concept and Definition' (1965) 9 Journal of 
African Law 86; and LA Obiora, 'Reconsidering African Customary Law' (1993) 17 Legal Studies 
Forum 217. 
26 R Smith, (n 15) above at 600. 
27 SF Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications “Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980 
(Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 38. 
28 AI Asiwaju, ‘Law in African Borderland: The Lived Experience of the Yoruba Astride the 
Nigerian-Dahomey Border’ in RL Roberts and K Mann (eds), Law in Colonial Africa (Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1991) 224-238 at 226. 
29 O Adewoye, The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria 1854-1954: Law and Justice in a 
Dependency (Longman, 1977) at 3. 
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action as law in literate society.’30 In line with the above argument, it has been 
argued that indigenous African customary law ‘… provided a bond between the 
different States and peoples of West Africa, and a form of international law by 
which their relations with each other could be regulated.’31 One of the main 
objectives of customary law, as in the case of Southern Nigeria, was for ‘peace-
keeping and the maintenance of the social equilibrium.’32 The reconciliation of 
parties to a particular dispute was also one of the overall objectives of indigenous 
African legal processes.33 In contrast to the nature of the French inquisitorial and 
the British adversarial judicial systems, the overarching goal of law in pre-colonial 
African societies was ‘…to assuage injured feelings, to restore peace, to reach a 
compromise acceptable to both disputants.’34  
The various interactions amongst African societies inter se and the interactions 
between Africans and Europeans in terms of trade and inter-State relations in the 
pre-colonial era had some influences on the development of indigenous African 
customary laws.35 Richard Roberts and Kristin Mann confirm that some legal 
relationships and interactions between Europe and Africa existed prior to 
colonialism.36 The pro-longed interactions between Africans and Europeans pre-
colonially had the effect of gradually influencing the already evolving indigenous 
customary legal rules and institutions as the patterns of resource utilisation, trade 
                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 R Smith, (n 15) above at 600-601. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34  O Adewoye, (n 29) above at 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 RL Roberts and K Mann, ‘Law in Colonial Africa’ in RL Roberts and K Mann (eds), Law in 
Colonial Africa (Heinemann Educational Books, 1991) at 9. 
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and social life were changing.37 This development in terms of the pre-colonial 
interactions between Africans and Europeans including the already polyethnic 
nature of the various indigenous political units gave rise to a pre-colonial situation 
of legal pluralism with the effects of gradually changing some indigenous African 
customary laws.38 Thereby adding another layer to the already existing pre-
colonial pluralism in the indigenous African States.39  
From the above historical analyses, three points are obvious in terms of the nature 
of customary law on the eve of formal colonialism. First, indigenous African 
customary law was largely unwritten and founded upon oral traditions which 
emerged simultaneously with the evolution of various African societies.40 
Secondly, although there were certain similarities in the indigenous African laws 
practiced amongst various pre-colonial African societies as demonstrated by 
Allott and Elias,41 there were some differences as a result of   language, ideology, 
legal rules and social institutions.42 Thirdly, due to the polyethnic and 
heterogeneous nature of some pre-colonial African States as well as the 
introduction of new forms of law by dominant groups or as a result of the 
prolonged interactions between Africans and Europeans - there was already a 
situation of legal pluralism43 evolving within pre-colonial African States. 
                                            
37 Ibid, at 10. See also, E Coulson, ‘African Society at the Time of the Scramble’ in LH Gann and 
P Duignan (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-
1960, vol1 (Cambridge University Press, 1969) at 27-60. 
38 E Coulson, (n 37) above at 27-60 
39 AN Allott, (n 17) above at 369. For the general situation in West Africa see E Coulson, (n 37) 
above at 35-46. 
40 AI Asiwaju, (n 28) above at 226. 
41  AN Allott, (n 17) above at 369 and TO Elias, (n 25) above at 210-222. 
42 E Coulson, (n 37) above at 35-60. 
43 See, J Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 18 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 1 and BZ Tamanaha, 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to 
Global' (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 375. 
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It must be noted however, ‘that prior to the nineteenth century, the balance of 
power in African and European legal interactions favoured the Africans.’44 
Therefore, although the ‘semi-autonomous social fields’45 of pre-colonial African 
societies may have been invaded, African customary law appears to have held 
its own turf, on its own terms whilst sometimes changing in accordance with 
prevailing social, economic and political circumstances of the times. African 
customary laws did not depend on the recognition of any external sovereign 
entity, institution, law or person for recognition and validity.46  
The validity of customary laws were dependent on their acceptance by members 
of a community as binding upon them.47 In this context and in the overall context 
of this thesis, a community in the words of Bromley and Cernea means any group 
which may ‘… vary in nature, size and internal structure across a broad spectrum, 
but they are social units with definite membership and boundaries, with certain 
common interests, with at least some interaction among members, with some 
common cultural norms, and often their own endogenous authority systems.’48 
However, as this Chapter will demonstrate in sub-section 2.1.2 and section 2.2 
below, the balance of power in the legal interactions between Africans and 
                                            
44 RL Roberts and K Mann, (n 36) above at 9. 
45 See SF Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study' (1973) Law and Society Review 719. 
46 See TO Elias, (n 25) above at 210-222. 
47 Ibid. 
48 DW Bromley and MM Cernea, The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: 
Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, vol 57 (World Bank Publications, 1989) at 15. See 
also, A Ainslie, 'When “Community” Is Not Enough: Managing Common Property Natural 
Resources in Rural South Africa' (1999) 16 Development Southern Africa 375 at 375; P Blaikie, 
'Is Small Really Beautiful? Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Malawi and 
Botswana' (2006) 34 World Development 1942; T Kepe, 'The Problem of Defining ‘Community’: 
Challenges for the Land Reform Programme in Rural South Africa' (1999) 16 Development 
Southern Africa 415; J Dyer et al, 'Assessing Participatory Practices in Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management: Experiences in Community Engagement from Southern Africa' 
(2014) 137 Journal of Environmental Management 137; and A Agrawal and CC Gibson, 
'Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation' 
(1999) 27 World Development 629 at 630-631. 
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Europeans shifted from one that favoured African customary law to one that 
favoured European law with the formalisation of colonialism in the mid-nineteenth 
century to the present day. 
2.1.2. The Emergence of English Law and Legal Institutions 
in Nigeria 
Elias reported that prior to 1832 British traders were involved in commercial 
transactions with people in the coast and along the river creeks of Southern 
Nigeria for several years.49 Alan Burns also reported that most of the British 
traders were unable to legally enforce their debts against the local merchants and 
customers, so that the only available authority to regulate these transactions was 
the powers exercised at the time by captains of the Queen of England’s ships 
operating at nearby stations.50 However, in 1849 the first British Consul was 
appointed in Lagos ‘for the purpose of regulating the legal trade between British 
merchants and the ports of Benin, Brass, New and Old Calabar, Bonny, Bimbia, 
the Cameroons, and the ports in the territories of the King of Dahomey’.51 
Therefore, this marked the beginning of direct influence of British legal rules and 
institutions in Southern parts of what was to become Nigeria.52 
Treaties signed between Britain and local chiefs ‘authorised Britain to take military 
action to put an end to slave trade in the Nigerian territories’53 such as the treaties 
entered into by King Akitoye of Lagos with Consul Beecroft and Commodore 
Bruce, while a Vice-Consul was appointed for the purpose of enforcing the 
                                            
49 TO Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian Law (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954) at 38. See also, JA 
Yakubu, 'Colonialism, Customary Law and the Post-Colonial State in Africa: The Case of 
Nigeria' (2005) 30 (4) Africa Development 201 at 202. 
50 A Burns and AC Burns, History of Nigeria (Barnes & Noble, 1972). 
51 As quoted in TO Elias, (n 49) above at 39. See also, BO Nwabueze, A Constitutional History 
of Nigeria (Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd, 1982) at 5. 
52 BO Nwabueze, (n 51) above at 5-6. 
53 Ibid, at 6. 
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provisions of the treaty.54 Such were the administrative and legal scenarios in 
Lagos between 1852 and 1860.55 However, despite the establishment of 
Consular Courts in Lagos, most indigenous Lagosians (Nigeria did not exist at 
this time) still utilised the indigenous customary means of administering justice in 
the various local chief indigenous tribunals.56 Therefore, it was only those 
Lagosians who were involved in business activities with foreign traders and a few 
others who submitted themselves to the Consular Courts for the resolution of their 
trade disputes that came under the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts.57 Elias 
argued that it was because the majority of the disputes continued to be 
adjudicated by the native chiefs using the indigenous customary laws that 
accounted for ‘so few disturbances’ in Lagos.58  
For reasons of historical accuracy, it is important to note that although the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-1885 represents the moment when colonialism in Africa was 
legally effected and hence marked the beginning of formal colonialism in Africa 
by the European Powers as will be demonstrated in section 2.2 below, the gradual 
emergence of the colonial legal developments in Lagos described in section 2.1, 
was a gradual crystallisation of the already existing smaller-scale colonial 
influence by Europeans in Africa.59 For example, the Gold Coast was already a 
Colony by 1850 and Lagos by 1861.60 Tunis and other territories were also 
already international Protectorates before the Berlin Conference.61 However, the 
                                            
54 Ibid. 
55 AE Afigbo, 'Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State' (1991) 
21 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 13 at 16. 
56 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 39 and BO Nwabueze, (n 51) above at 5-6. 
57JA Yakubu, (n 49) above at 202. 
58 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 39. 
59 Ibid. 
60 TO Elias and R Akinjide, (n 1) above at 18. 
61 Ibid. 
English Law, Customary Law and Legal Pluralism in Colonial Nigeria: A 
Historical Perspective 
44 
 
above evolving colonial legal developments and colonial annexation of territories 
was given global imprimatur by the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference. Therefore, the 
Berlin Conference became a catalyst for European acquisition of territories in 
Africa with enormous implications for the legal status of indigenous African 
customary laws as demonstrated further in section 2.2 below. 
2.2. Colonial Africa, English Law and Customary Law in 
Colonial Nigeria (1861-1960) 
British colonial administration of Nigeria was legally effected by the signing of the 
Treaty of Cession with King Docemo of Lagos and four other of his chiefs at the 
Consulate on 6 August, 1861.62 Consequently, Lagos formally became a British 
Settlement under the administration of a British Governor in 1862.63 The Governor 
presided over disputes between merchants.64 Military officials performed law 
enforcement duties within the Settlement of Lagos.65 Other courts were also 
established in January 1862 for increased efficacy in the administration of justice 
by the British colonial administration.66 After the cession of Lagos in 1861, the first 
Legislative Council was established there in 1862.67 English law was made 
applicable in Lagos on 4th March, 1863.68 
In addition, under the English Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, any legislative 
enactment from a Colony which was contrary to the provisions of any Act of the 
                                            
62 O Ikimi, ‘Nigerian Reaction to The Imposition of British Colonial, 1885-1918 in S Förster, WJ 
Mommsen and RE Robinson, Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-
1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford University Press, 1988) 454-467 at 458. 
63 AO Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell, 1979) at 18. 
64 O Ikimi, (n 62) above at 458. 
65 Ibid. 
66 AO Obilade, (n 63) above at 19-21. 
67 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 40. 
68 AO Obilade, (n 63) above at 18. 
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British Parliament extending to the Colony was deemed repugnant and void.69 
The Act also empowered the authorities of a Colony to establish legislative and 
judicial institutions for the making of laws and the administration of justice in the 
Colonies.70  
The organisation of justice in this early colonial period was done on an unofficial 
basis, as the Courts of Equity were created to resolve disputes.71 The Courts of 
Equity were informal courts created for the resolution of trade disputes between 
European traders and their indigenous African counterparts.72 However, by an 
Order in Council  1872  the afore-mentioned Courts of Equity were given 
legislative imprimatur.73 The afore-mentioned Order in Council74 made provisions 
for the official organisation of both Consular and Equity Courts. With respect to 
the Courts of Equity, Article 5 of the Order empowered the Consul to ‘re-organise 
the local Courts known as the Courts of Equity’ in the following jurisdictions: Old 
Calabar, Bonny, Cameroons, New Calabar (Degema), Brass, Opobo, Nun and 
Benin Rivers (these jurisdictions later became known as the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate)75 for resolving trade disputes between ‘British subjects or between 
British subjects and natives’.76  
                                            
69 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 56-57. 
70 Ibid, at 57. 
71 See O Adewoye, The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria, 1854-1954: Law and Justice in a 
Dependency (Longman, 1977) at 31-69. 
72 Ibid, at 31-32. 
73 Ibid, at 31. 
74 The Order in Council of 21 February 1872 as cited in O Adewoye, (n 71) above at 31. 
75 The Oil Rivers Protectorate haven been created later in 1885. 
76 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 57. See also, AO Obilade, (n 63) above at 18. 
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The composition of the Courts of Equity comprised of ‘British agents and traders 
carrying on business at the place where the courts were established’77 and 
Assessors were required to assist the Consul in the adjudication of more serious 
and important cases.78 The courts were to exercise jurisdiction over natives to the 
extent that such native persons or person ‘surrendered himself to the jurisdiction 
and gave security to abide by the decisions of the Consul or of the Courts of 
Equity.’79 In addition to the Courts of Equity, the 1872 Order in Council also legally 
regularised Consular Courts empowering the Consul to apply and ensure the 
enforcement of any treaty, convention or agreements made or to be made 
between Britain and the local chiefs in the afore-mentioned territories.80 Elias 
argued that it was based on the residual powers conferred by the 1872 Order in 
Council81 ’that the Consul got the authority to appoint local chiefs to preside over 
the adjudication of disputes’.82  
The above developments signalled the willingness of the early colonial authorities 
(1861-1874) to accommodate and use indigenous legal mechanisms 
simultaneously with the introduced English legal system in what would later 
become Nigeria.83  It is important to note that the afore-mentioned legal history 
relates only to the Settlement of Lagos and some territories in present day 
southern parts of Nigeria.84 However, as Adiele Afigbo argues ‘[f]rom here, this 
                                            
77 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 57. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, at 57. 
80 Ibid. 
81 As quoted in TO Elias (n 49) above at 57. 
82 TO Elias (n 49) above at 57. 
83 Ibid. 
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political, constitutional, legal and commercial tradition was to assault the rest of 
the Nigerian interior and to seek to overwhelm it ...’85  
In line with the above claim, by virtue of a Royal Commission of 19 February, 
1866, the Settlement of Lagos was united with the Settlements of the Gold Coast, 
Sierra Leone, and the Gambia under one Government known as the Government 
of the West African Settlements with the Capital in Sierra Leone.86 In 1874, the 
Settlements of Gold Coast and Lagos were separated from the Government in 
Sierra Leone to form a separate Colony known as the Gold Coast Colony with its 
own legislature which promulgated the Supreme Court Ordinance No 4 1876.87 
Therefore, Lagos was at this period (1874-1886) part of the Colony of the Gold 
Coast. However, upon separation of Lagos and Gold Coast in 188688 the 
Supreme Court Ordinance No 8 1886 amended the Supreme Court 
Ordinance1876 above.89 
The Supreme Court Ordinance No 8 1886 established the Supreme Court of the 
Colony of Lagos as the Supreme Court of Judicature for ‘the Colony of and for 
the territories thereto near or adjacent wherein Her Majesty may at any time 
before or after the commencement of this Ordinance have acquired power and 
jurisdictions.’90 Section 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance provided that: ‘the 
Common Law, the doctrines of Equity and statutes of general application in force 
in England on 24 July 1874 should be in force within the court’s jurisdiction.’91 
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88 By letters Patent of 13 January, 1886, proclaimed on 13 February, 1886.  
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Section 17 also provided that all relevant imperial laws were to be applied only 
within local limits. By virtue of section 19 all indigenous laws and customs which 
were not ‘repugnant to justice, equity and good conscience’, were to be applied 
by the Court in so far as practicable.92  
Therefore, although the colonial authorities recognised the indigenous customary 
laws, such customary laws were subjected to an inferior status in comparison to 
English and colonial laws as well as the English principles of equity, justice and 
good conscience.93 In addition to subjecting customary laws to the ‘repugnancy 
clause’, the Privy Council in England became the apex Court as appeals from the 
decisions of Supreme Court of Lagos could be referred to the Privy Council. In 
this way, the British colonial authorities succeeded in introducing the common 
law, principles of equity and general principles of English law into the Colony of 
Lagos and other ‘Protected Territories’, while subjecting customary law and 
indigenous legal institutions to an inferior status.94  
It is argued that this was the beginning of formal legal pluralism in the weak sense 
in Nigeria as explained later in section 2.3 below. The meaning of legal pluralism 
in the weak sense will also be demonstrated and examined in section 2.3 through 
a critical examination of the literature and debates on legal pluralism. However, 
to provide the reader with sufficient information about the broader picture of the 
changing legal tradition in Nigeria during British colonial rule as well as the 
evolution of the Nigerian State through colonial unification of hitherto separate 
and independent indigenous political units, it is significant for the reader to be 
presented with the legal development in other parts of the territories that would 
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later constitute parts of Nigeria during colonialism with a focus on Northern 
Nigeria where the case study was in colonial times. Most of the African colonies 
became effective only after 1885 and even Gold Coast and Lagos were only firmly 
established and ‘took their final shape afterwards as the result of the boundary 
agreements involving extension and readjustment of territories.’95 
While the Berlin Conference was ongoing a British company – the National 
African Company - was already moving through Northern Nigeria making treaties 
with local chiefs in the indigenous States of Sokoto and Gwandu.96 It appears 
then that armed with these treaties and others entered into with indigenous chiefs 
even before the Berlin Conference, the British Government quite easily 
succeeded in establishing a claim over the Lower Niger.97 Thereafter, in other 
parts of the Niger and Oil Rivers Districts treaties were quickly entered into with 
local chiefs with the objective of inducing them to accept British protection.98 
Curiously, some of these treaties contained clauses for the annexation and in 
some cases cession of territories to the British.99 
By 1885 earlier commercial as well as anti-slave activities had already 
transformed the political configurations of four British Colonies in West Africa: 
Gold Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Southern Nigeria where an Oil Rivers 
Protectorate was established in 1885 east of the Crown Colony of Lagos.100 
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Indeed, the larger part of Africa was effectively occupied by European Powers 
between 1878 and 1903 when the indigenous State of the Sokoto Caliphate in 
what became Northern Nigeria came under the colonial administration of the 
British.101  
The colonial encounter between the indigenous African States and the European 
Powers had enormous implications on the nature of law in colonial African States. 
Once the colonial powers had ‘consolidated their boundaries by international 
treaties, the existing sovereignties of the old kingdoms and city states became 
submerged under the new sovereignties of the “metropolitan” Powers.’102 
Therefore, owing to the loss of sovereignty by pre-colonial African States to the 
colonial powers, the hitherto historic ways of interacting with the international 
system through commerce, trade and treaties, discussed earlier, were effectively 
closed to the indigenous States.103 Subsequent external relations during 
colonialism came to be identified with the respective colonial powers.104 
The taking over of the sovereignties of indigenous African States by colonial 
powers did not go unchallenged.105 In Nigeria for example, the JaJa of Opobo 
demanded that the word ‘Protectorate’ be explained to him in detail and because 
of his insistence on clarification and eventual opposition to British rule, in 1887 he 
was deported out of West Africa to the West Indies by the British.106 Other leaders 
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of indigenous African States who faced a similar fate as the JaJa of Opobo on 
account of their opposition to British rule include: the Nana of Ebrohimi, the Oba 
of Benin, the Oba of Ijebu and the Sultan of Sokoto.107 In addition to the above 
developments, though the British declared a Protectorate over Northern Nigeria 
in the year 1900, ‘the non-Caliphate parts of “Northern Nigeria” also refused to 
give up their sovereignty and many groups in what was to be known as Middle-
Belt of Nigeria fought against the British off and on from 1900 to the period of the 
1914-18 war.’108  
It has already been demonstrated in section 2.1 above that prior to colonialism, 
customary law in Nigeria was the main legal regime regulating the affairs of 
Nigerians and administration of justice even during the early contacts between 
Africans and Europeans in terms of trade and inter-State interactions. So, 
although in the period of this early legal interaction between Africans and 
Europeans the balance of power was in favour of the indigenous African 
customary law, things changed dramatically with the advent of formal 
colonialism.109 Therefore, the hitherto indigenous legal institutions played a more 
restricted role in the administration of African States during colonialism than they 
had in pre-colonial settings, as colonialism extended to every part of African 
States.110 This development limited the opportunity of indigenous rulers and 
institutions in the administration of justice and governance through law in the 
Colonies.111  
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Indeed, as the British arrogated to themselves the moral and legal superiority of 
their own civilisation over those of the people who later became Nigerians, they 
consequently ‘equated societal standards of morality prevalent in Europe with 
standards of living in Africa, and thought those were lacking in Africa.’112 In order 
to give the reader a complete picture of the legal developments in colonial Nigeria 
and their implications in a post-colonial Nigeria as well as their relevance to this 
thesis, it is important to examine some more general colonial legal developments 
in relation to indigenous legal institutions and colonial legal institutions in what 
later became the Colony of Nigeria. 
2.2.1. Native Courts 
Although under the Supreme Court system in the Lagos Colony and its 
Protectorate no specific provisions were made for statutory Native Courts, it 
appears that ‘traditional tribunals continued to function in their own way.’113 
Indeed, in 1887 the Supreme Court of the Lagos Colony held in Oppon v 
Ackinie114 that the Supreme Court Ordinance No 4 1876 (as amended in 1886) 
which vested all civil and criminal jurisdictions in the Supreme Court of Lagos in 
the Protected territories did not extinguish the indigenous Native Courts.115 
However, in 1900 through the authority of The Native Courts Proclamation No 9 
1900, statutory Native Courts were established in the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria for the effective administration of justice.116 Two types of Statutory Native 
Courts were established: Native Courts presided over by a Native Authority (Minor 
Courts) and Native Courts presided over by a European Officer (Native 
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Councils).117 A Minor Court was empowered to apply any local law and custom 
‘not opposed to natural morality and humanity’.118 The Minor Court had jurisdiction 
whenever both parties before it were either ‘natives’ or if any party was not a 
‘native’ the Court would have jurisdiction if such non-native gave his/her consent 
in writing.119 The Native Councils also had concurrent original jurisdiction as the 
Minor Courts in all civil and criminal matters,120 but in addition, the Commissioner 
in charge of a District could ‘at any stage of any proceedings (civil or criminal) 
before a Minor Court transfer the same to a Native Council for trial’.121 
In 1901, The Native Court Proclamation 1900122 discussed above was repealed 
and superseded by The Native Courts Proclamation No 25 1901123  which 
retained the divisions of the Court into Minor Courts and Native Councils. This 
new Proclamation provided that the civil and criminal jurisdiction of a statutory 
Native Court in relation to ‘natives’ should be exclusive of all traditional 
jurisdictions in any District.124 Elias argued that ‘[t]his was the first express 
legislative provision preserving for the traditional local courts their customary 
jurisdiction in areas served by the new statutory Native Courts.’125 Therefore, this 
latter Proclamation accommodated pre-existing indigenous local courts presided 
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over by local chiefs and allowed them to exist simultaneously with the statutory 
Native Courts.126 
Another major political change in the configuration of the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria occurred in 1906 as the Lagos Colony and Protectorate which had hitherto 
been under a different political administration as a distinct unit was amalgamated 
into the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria under the name of the ‘Colony and 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria’.127 Consequently, it was necessary to unify the 
legal and judicial systems.  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court Ordinance No 7 1906 established the Supreme 
Court of the Colony of Southern Nigeria.128 Section 14 of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance No 4 1876 which made it possible to apply the common law, the 
doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application which were in force in 
England as at 24 July, 1874 to the old Lagos Colony, was amended so that the 
principles of English law in force in England as at 1 January, 1900 were made 
applicable to the entire Southern Nigeria.129 Also, all the statutory Native Courts 
were brought under the direct control of the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria. 
The Native Courts Proclamation 1906130 retained the Native Courts as 
established under the Native Courts Proclamation No 25 1901.131 This signified 
the commencement of unification of laws and the continuing unification of different 
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political units into gradually emerging colonial Nigeria. It is the argument in this 
thesis also that this was the beginning of legal centralisation in Nigeria. 
Another significant legal development in the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and 
Colony at this point relates to the existence of a different type of statutory Native 
Court created by The Native House Rule Proclamation No 26 1901. Under this 
Proclamation a ‘House’ was defined as ‘a group of persons subject by Native Law 
and Custom to the control, authority and rule of a Chief, known as a Head of a 
House’.132 All members of a House, whether by birth or who were or came under 
the authority and control of a House, were to be bound by the ‘native law and 
custom ‘of such House.133 This legislation relating to the Native House Rule 
remained in force in Southern Nigeria until it was repealed in 1914.134  
The above narration about the legal history and colonial treatment of native law 
and customs as well as the entire indigenous legal systems relates to 
developments in Southern Nigeria. However, for a complete picture of the legal 
developments that shaped what is today Nigeria and its legal system and because 
the case study in this thesis which will be introduced in Chapter Four was in 
colonial times in Northern Nigeria, the colonial legal situation in relation to the 
introduced British legal system and indigenous legal system in Northern Nigeria 
is examined in sub-section 2.2.2 below. 
2.2.2. The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (1900–1914) 
Prior to 1899, the territories which later became the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria were under the control and administration of the Royal Niger Company 
which administered and applied law in that area in the same way as had occurred 
in other parts of what was to become Nigeria. However, the British Government 
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revoked the Charter of the Royal Niger Company in Northern Nigeria through the 
Northern Nigeria Order in Council 1899,135 like they did in the Southern Nigeria 
Protectorate and established the Northern Nigeria Protectorate with a High 
Commissioner.136 In accordance with the mandate granted to the High 
Commissioner by the afore-mentioned Order in Council, he enacted The 
Protectorate Court Proclamation 1900,137 which established a Supreme Court 
and other courts for the administration of Justice.138 The Proclamation 
empowered the Supreme Court to apply the common law, the doctrines of equity 
and the statutes of general application which were already in force in England as 
at 1 January, 1900 in the whole of Northern Nigeria.139 
The indigenous and traditional Native Courts already in existence (because a 
large part of the Muslim North already had long established indigenous local 
courts) in Northern Nigeria were accommodated under the Native Courts 
Proclamation No 5 1900140 for the ‘better regulation and control of Native 
Courts’.141 Each of these Native Courts ‘consisted of one or more persons 
appointed by the Head Chief or Emir with the Resident’s approval, but if a 
particular town had no head Chief or Emir, the Resident could make his own 
appointment.’142 The law to be administered and applied by the Native Courts was 
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the prevailing customary law in the territories where they had jurisdictions, to the 
extent that such customary laws were not repugnant to principles of natural justice 
equity and good conscience.143 It should be noted at this point, that in the context 
of Nigeria, Islamic law was and is treated similarly to customary law, therefore 
henceforth references to customary law in Nigeria in both colonial and post-
colonial times include Islamic law. The above developments demonstrate the 
attitude of the colonial administration towards customary law and indigenous legal 
institutions in the various Protectorates until the amalgamation of the Southern 
and Northern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 to create Nigeria thereby unifying 
all the pre-existing territories into one single and unified colonial State. 
2.2.3. The Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria (1914–1960) 
In 1914, the British colonial administration amalgamated the Northern and 
Southern Protectorates of Nigeria.144 In this manner, the Westphalian system of 
statehood was imported from Europe into Nigeria through the merging of 
previously independent and indigenous political units – a process which began 
prior to 1914 as evidenced by the legal developments in sub-sections 2.2.1 – 
2.2.2 above. The consequences of this amalgamation ‘entailed a process of 
unification of the laws and legal systems of both administrations.’145 Therefore, 
the Supreme Court Ordinance No 6 1914, established the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria with similar jurisdiction as the Supreme Courts of the now defunct 
Southern and Northern Protectorates. Likewise, the new Supreme Court was 
mandated to observe and apply English common law, principles of equity and the 
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statutes of general application in force in England as at 1 January, 1900.146 The 
Supreme Court Ordinance 1914 also provided that: 
Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court of the 
right to observe and enforce the observance, or shall deprive any 
person of the benefit of any Native Law and Custom, such law or 
custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by implication with 
any law for the time being in force.147  
In addition to the Supreme Court, Provincial Courts and Native Courts were 
established.148  The Native Courts Ordinance No 5 1918 created a uniform system 
of Native Courts in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria with minor 
variations. Pursuant to Section 5 (1) of the Ordinance every Native Court 
consisted of an Alkali149 with or without native assistants (known as Alkali Court) 
in the northern parts of Nigeria and Native Courts with a single native judge (who 
could be a Chief with or without minor chiefs as assessors) in the southern parts 
of Nigeria.150 The basic law of Native Courts in the northern parts of Nigeria was 
Islamic law whereas the basic law for Native Courts in the south was native law 
and custom to the extent that both systems of laws were not inconsistent with any 
law of the State or repugnant to the principles of natural justice, equity and good 
conscience.151  
However, because the basic law of Native Courts in most northern parts of Nigeria 
was Islamic law it was essential that another system of Native Court (Mixed Court) 
was established to adjudicate over non-Muslim litigants. The Mixed Court was 
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established in Kano in 1932.152 The Mixed Court administered and enforced both 
Islamic law and customary law.153 Islamic law was applicable where any of the 
Parties before the Court was a Muslim.154 By the provisions of the Privy Council 
Appeals Ordinance 1917,155 appeals from the Nigerian Supreme Court 
established in 1914 went to the Privy Council in London. Therefore, the decisions 
made by the Nigerian Supreme Court were subject to the appellate jurisdictions 
of the English judges based in England. In this way, English law came to influence 
the evolution of law in colonial Nigeria.156 
2.3. The Nature of Law in the Colony and Protectorate of 
Nigeria: A Legal Pluralism Perspective 
Before examining the legal scenario in post-independent Nigeria in terms of the 
co-existence of introduced English legal system with the indigenous legal system, 
it is important at this point to briefly review the key legal developments in colonial 
Nigeria as well as their jurisprudential implications in terms of legal pluralism. This 
is necessary because legal pluralism helps to contextualise the simultaneous co-
existence of English law and indigenous customary law in colonial Nigeria. The 
principal means of legislation during the period of colonialism were Ordinances 
which had their origins with the establishment of Lagos as a British Settlement 
from 13 March 1862,157 with the first Legislative Council established there on 24 
June, 1862.158 So, Ordinances remained the primary means of legislation through 
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1866 when Lagos was temporarily annexed with Sierra Leone, it remained so 
when Lagos became part of the Gold Coast Colony and separated from Sierra 
Leone in 1874 and Ordinances remained the only recognised means of legislation 
in 1886 when Lagos became a separate Colony of its own.159  
As demonstrated in sub-section 2.2.1 above, the various Consular and Equity 
Courts in different trading areas were established by means of Orders in Council 
and although the Consul had administrative and judicial powers in the trading 
areas, he did not appear to have any legislative body to work with and make laws 
along with the Consul.160 When the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was created 
in 1899, the Order in Council161 provided that ‘[t]he said Protectorate shall be 
administered by a High Commissioner who shall have powers to make laws which 
will be styled Proclamations enacted by the High Commissioner.’162 
Consequently, the High Commissioner made laws by Proclamations in the 
Protectorate until Lagos and its surrounding territories were merged in 1906 with 
the Southern Nigeria Protectorate under the name of the Colony and Protectorate 
of Southern Nigeria.163 The effect of this merger was that legislation through 
Proclamations by the High Commissioner were terminated as the Legislative 
Council in Lagos was empowered to make laws for the entire Southern Nigeria 
Protectorate by means of Ordinances.164  
At the same time when the Southern Nigeria Protectorate was created, the 
territories of the Royal Niger Company in Northern Nigeria were also promulgated 
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as the Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1899.165 The High Commissioner was also 
empowered to make laws for the administration of the Protectorate through 
Proclamations. Therefore, from 1900 until after the amalgamation of the Northern 
and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria, legislation ‘still took the form of 
proclamations, by which ordinances of the Legislative Council were extended by 
the Governor, with or without modifications, to the Northern Nigeria 
Protectorate.’166 The history of the legal development in colonial Nigeria as 
narrated above illustrates the relevance of engaging with the debates about legal 
pluralism. 
Accordingly, it is argued that the debates about legal pluralism help in explaining 
the simultaneous co-existence of received English law and customary law as well 
as their respective institutions of enforcement in colonial Nigeria. In a seminal 
essay published in 1986, Griffiths introduces his version of legal pluralism as 'that 
state of affairs, for any social field, in which behaviour pursuant to more than one 
legal order occurs'.167 Griffiths distinguishes between the ‘social science’ view of 
legal pluralism which he describes as an empirical state of affairs in society in 
contrast to what he calls a ‘juristic’ view of legal pluralism as a particular problem 
of dual legal systems created when European States established colonies like 
Nigeria and superimposed their legal systems on the pre-existing legal 
systems.168 He then argues that a conception of legal pluralism which is based 
on how a State deals with a situation of normative heterogeneity is on the wrong 
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footing. At best, he maintains that this is a contribution to the theory of ‘legal 
centralism’.169  
Griffiths’ version of the social-scientific theory of legal pluralism ‘refers to the 
normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes 
place in a context of multiple, over-lapping "semi-autonomous" social fields...’170  
This perspective of legal pluralism is one where law, legal doctrines and legal 
institutions are not all encapsulated under one paradigm of law, but have their 
sources and grounds in all the various social fields of a given community.171  Thus 
conceived, law becomes a product and reflection of the complex and diverse 
patterns of societal norms. Griffiths criticises what he terms ‘the ideology of legal 
centralism’ as opposed to hard legal pluralism.172 He argues that the ‘ideology of 
legal centralism’ is to be distinguished from real legal pluralism as legal centralism 
is all about uniform law for the State, where State law’s exclusive dominance over 
other forms of law is exemplified by the administration of a single chain of State 
institutions.173 
This was the kind of situation developed in Nigeria under British colonial 
administration. It is argued that this idea of ‘legal centralism’ was gradually 
introduced into Nigeria through the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
Protectorates of Nigeria. However, having criticised the ‘ideology of legal 
centralism’, Griffiths then makes a connection between it and ‘weak’ pluralism.174 
It is argued that the above situation of legal pluralism in the ‘weak sense’ identified 
                                            
169 Ibid, at 12. 
170 Ibid, at 38. 
171 Ibid. See also, GR Woodman, ‘Customary Land Laws within Legal Pluralism over the 
Generations’, 4 SADC Law Journal 2014/15 189-208 at 191. 
172 J Griffiths, (n 167) above at 38. 
173 Ibid, at 3. 
174 Ibid, at 5. 
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by Griffiths was the exact situation in Nigeria under British colonial rule, in the 
context of how and to what extent the colonial authorities were willing to 
accommodate customary law. By subjecting customary law to the repugnancy 
test as well as to State law for its validity - a situation of Griffith’s ‘weak sense’ of 
legal pluralism was therefore created in colonial Nigeria. Likewise, Gordon 
Woodman argues that such situations where State law assumes a validating role 
over other forms of law such as customary law is a situation of State law 
pluralism.175 
However, it must be acknowledged that because this thesis is primarily a doctrinal 
research based on State laws and legal institutions, it does not deal with issues 
about the evolution and continuous development of ‘living’ or ‘sociologists’ 
customary law in Nigeria and the case study of Abuja. Neither does it deal with 
questions of strong or deep legal pluralism as such questions require the conduct 
and application of empirical research methods that are not utilised in this thesis. 
Clearly, the legal situation in colonial Nigeria where customary law was subjected 
to the validation of State law as represented by the various repugnancy clauses, 
is a situation of weak or State law pluralism and a triumph of the ‘ideology of legal 
centralism’. It has been demonstrated in section 2.2 above that the idea of legal 
centralism in colonial Nigeria began with the merging of the legal system of the 
Colony of Lagos and Niger Coast Protectorate in 1886 to form what was then the 
Southern Nigeria Protectorate. Subsequently, this process of legal centralisation 
was crystallised by the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates 
to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914, with the attendant 
centralisation of the Nigerian legal system administered through the single 
apparatus of the colonial State. Griffiths maintains that Hooker attributed the 
modern origin of legal pluralism in this ‘weak sense begins at least as early as 
                                            
175 GR Woodman, 'Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice' (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 
152 at 158. See also, GR Woodman, (n 171) above at 190 
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1772’176 where it was provided that the ‘laws of the Koran…and those of the 
Shaster with respect to the Gentoos shall invariably be adhered to.’177  
As the experience of Nigeria under British colonial rule illustrates, this system was 
exported to other parts of the world in Africa and Asia during the era of European 
imperialist expansionism through colonisation.178 It is argued and will be 
demonstrated further in Chapter Three that with the unification of indigenous 
customary laws and received English laws as a strategy of State-building as well 
as social and economic development in both colonial and post-colonial Nigeria, 
legal pluralism in the weak sense appears to have taken stronghold in Nigeria.179 
In Chapters Three and Four, it will be demonstrated that this weak sense of legal 
pluralism has negative implications on the customary land rights of IPs at State 
levels.  
The colonial unification of laws in Nigeria continued gradually until political 
independence as demonstrated further in Chapter Three. In 1922, however, the 
legal and legislative culture in Nigeria assumed a new dimension. The Nigerian 
Constitution 1922180 became the basis of law and governance in Nigeria for the 
next twenty-five years. Consequently, the country adopted ‘a unified legal system 
for the first time in its history.’181 This Constitution established a Legislative 
Council with law-making powers for Lagos and the Provinces in Southern 
                                            
176 J Griffiths, (n 167) above at 6. 
177 Griffiths quoting Hooker in J Griffiths, (n 167) above at 6. (See MB Hooker, Legal Pluralism – 
An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Law (Oxford University Press, 1975) at 61). 
178 J Griffiths, (n 167) above at 6. 
179 For attempts at unification and codification of customary law in Kenya and Tanzania, see W 
Twining, 'The Restatement of African Customary Law: A Comment' (1963) 1 The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 221. 
180 The Sir Clifford Constitution 1951. 
181 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 165. 
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Nigeria.182 By 1946, a new Constitution183 was introduced which made it possible 
for a larger Legislative Assembly to make Ordinances having force of law 
throughout Nigeria. The three Regional Administrations184 which the Constitution 
created had no legislative powers and their functions were merely advisory to the 
Central Government.185  
The 1951 Constitution186 retained the division of Nigeria into three Regions and 
additionally established Houses of Assembly for each of those regions with 
legislative powers to make laws in the Regions.187 In a somewhat prophetic note, 
Elias predicted the problem of legal pluralism arising from such arrangements in 
the following terms ‘[a]ccordingly, cases of local conflicts of laws as between the 
three Regions will soon begin to trouble the courts to an extent not perhaps 
paralleled in any other federal system of government; for, already, the divergent 
local customary laws have been giving a good deal of worry of their own.’188 
The 1954 Constitution189 did not change the legal, legislative and judicial 
arrangements in any significant way, but did take Lagos out of any Regional 
control (making it the Federal Capital of Nigeria).190 The 1954 Constitution 
                                            
182 See <www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/1960-1999ConstitutionofNigeria.html>. 
Accessed 20 May, 2016. 
183 The Arthur Richard Constitution 1946. 
184 Northern, Western and Eastern Regions of Nigeria. 
185 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 165-166. See also, BO Nwabueze, (n 51) above at 35-61. 
186 Sir John Macpherson’s Constitution 1951. 
187 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 166. 
188 TO Elias, (n 49) above at 167-168. The emphasis is added. Elias should have added 
international law to the list. 
189 The Lyttleton Constitution, 1954. 
190 See <www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/1960-1999ConstitutionofNigeria.html>. 
Accessed 20 May 2016. 
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remained in force until the political independence of Nigeria in 1960.191 John 
Ademola Yakubu correctly sums up the treatment of customary law during the 
colonial era in Nigeria by arguing that the situation was such that customary law 
became dependent on colonial State law for its validity and in ‘its regulated state, 
its operation became dependent on the satisfaction of the rules of common law, 
equity and good conscience.’192 Likewise, Elias maintained that during colonial 
rule, indigenous African laws were applied only to the extent that they were ‘not 
repugnant to the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience, and if 
they are not inconsistent with any valid local enactment.’193 Consequently, Robert 
and Mann concluded that colonial administration changed African laws and 
institutions significantly.194 
On the eve of political independence, the implication of the colonial encounter 
with Britain on the legal system of Nigeria was obvious. The legal rules and 
institutions of law in Nigeria had changed significantly in comparison to pre-
colonial Nigeria. Legal pluralism became an inevitable phenomenon of the 
Nigerian legal system.195 To put the inter-play and inter-connections between 
various normative or legal orders in a historical context, Tamanaha undertakes 
                                            
191 JA Yakubu, (n 49) above at 206 
192 Ibid, at 201. 
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an overview of the history of the idea of State-building from Medieval Europe 
through to the 20th century.196 In so doing, he demonstrates that the traditional 
idea of viewing law as mainly the monopoly of the State is evidence of the triumph 
of State-building efforts and the ideology behind such, a project that has its origins 
in the late medieval Europe.197 
The above legal tradition was then imported into Nigeria through British colonial 
administration of Nigeria between 1863 and 1960. In line with this argument, 
Tamanaha argues that the ‘[c]onsolidation of law in the hands of the state was an 
essential aspect of the state-building process … The various heterogeneous 
forms of law described earlier were gradually absorbed or eliminated.’198 Indeed, 
theories of legal pluralism ‘require that law be seen pluralistically: not just as the 
unified, systematized law of the nation state, but as produced and interpreted in 
many competing sites and processes in and beyond the state and often relying 
on conflicting, unclear or controversial authority claims.’199 The colonial 
consolidation of law at the hands of the Nigerian State implied that other forms of 
non-State law in Nigeria were subordinated to State law and in most cases 
customary laws lost their pre-colonial legal status.200  
Indeed, the above legal developments in colonial Nigeria illustrate that the 
colonial Nigerian State monopolised law as legal pluralism was being increased 
                                            
196 BZ Tamanaha, 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global' (2008) 30 
Sydney Law Review at 379-389. 
197 Ibid, at 379. 
198 Ibid, at 380. 
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in Nigeria.201  Through a system of ‘indirect rule’, British colonial authorities 
managed the affairs of colonial Nigeria through pre-existing indigenous political 
and legal institutions.202 In the process, colonial laws were gradually introduced 
into Nigeria and they co-existed and as will be illustrated in the following Chapter 
Three, they still co-exist with the indigenous customary law system even after 
political independence.203 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has demonstrated how the British introduced English laws and legal 
institutions into Nigeria by entering into a treaty with the King of Lagos - the Treaty 
of Cession (disguised as a treaty of protection) in 1861 and the introduction of 
English law into Lagos in 1863, ‘represented both the cultural and legal framework 
of the sense of European superiority’204 and the gradual establishment of 
Consular and Equity Courts as well as the appointment of Consuls for Lagos in 
the early stages of colonialism. And as Robert and Mann further note, ‘[t]he new 
faith of Europeans in the moral and material superiority of their own civilization 
convinced them that exporting their culture would be good for Africans.’205 It has 
also been shown that through the establishment of a Legislative Council in Lagos 
in 1862, the Colony of Lagos was administered through the enactments of 
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Ordinances and subsequently English law became applicable throughout Nigeria 
beginning in the year 1900 and the crystallising of this through the amalgamation 
of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 to create what is 
today Nigeria. 
It has been demonstrated that the State-building efforts which started during 
British colonial rule in Nigeria ensured the monopolisation of law by the emerging 
State as the indigenous customary laws and legal institutions were gradually 
subjected to State control and accommodation. Consequently, a situation of legal 
pluralism which was already emerging because of prolonged contacts between 
Africans and Europeans was essentially consolidated during colonial rule in 
Nigeria. It has therefore been argued that the debates on legal pluralism over the 
years throw light on and help in contextualising the simultaneous co-existence 
between the received English laws and the indigenous customary laws in colonial 
Nigeria. In the following Chapter Three, the post-colonial retention of the colonial 
legal system and the judicial application of customary law will be highlighted. The 
impact of the retention of the colonial legacy on the definition of land rights in 
colonial and post-colonial Nigeria will also be demonstrated as a foundation for 
the introduction of the case study in Chapter Four.
 70 
 
CHAPTER THREE: CUSTOMARY LAW, STATE LAW AND 
DEFINITION OF LAND RIGHTS IN COLONIAL AND 
POST-COLONIAL NIGERIA 
Introduction  
In Chapter Two, the introduction of English law and legal system into Nigeria 
during the period of colonialism was examined. Equally, the relegation of 
customary law to an inferior status compared to colonial State law was illustrated. 
The main objective in this Chapter is to demonstrate the impact of colonialism on 
the development of the Nigerian legal system after political independence and the 
continuous co-existence and relegation of customary law to an inferior legal status 
by State law. In demonstrating this post-colonial hybrid legal system, the impact 
on the definition of land rights in a post-colonial Nigeria will be illustrated. In 
addition to the historical and background information provided in Chapter Two, 
this will provide the reader with additional foundational knowledge about the legal 
developments in post-colonial Nigeria before the case study is introduced later in 
Chapter Four. To achieve the above objective, this Chapter has been sub-divided 
into three main sections. 
Section 3.1 will demonstrate the post-colonial retention of introduced English laws 
and legal institutions as well as confirming the relegation of customary law and 
indigenous legal institutions to the institutional apparatus of the post-colonial 
State of Nigeria. In the process of doing this, the Chapter will demonstrate the 
continuous existence of Nigeria as a unified State and the continuous 
monopolisation of law and legal institutions by the State from the time of political 
independence from colonial rule to the present day. Likewise, the judicial 
application of customary law will be critically examined in sub-section 3.1.1. In 
section 3.2, there will be a critical examination of the nature of pre-colonial 
customary land tenure and the subsequent introduction of English land tenure in 
colonial Nigeria. This will provide the foundation for the critical analyses of land 
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control and management by the post-colonial State of Nigeria that follows in sub-
sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Sub-section 3.2.3 will examine the post-colonial 
retention of the colonial legacy of the State managing and controlling the 
ownership of land in Nigeria through legislation. In section 3.3 it will be argued 
that theories of legal pluralism explain the nature of the co-existence of State law 
and customary law in post-colonial Nigeria. This will provide the reader with 
important foundational legal information to understand the legal challenges and 
problems which the case study in this thesis will illustrate in Chapter Four. 
3.1. Customary Law and State Law in Post-Colonial Nigeria 
(1960-Present) 
The relegation of customary law to an inferior status in comparison to State law 
and subjecting it to the test of repugnancy which occurred throughout the period 
of colonialism in Nigeria, as demonstrated in Chapter Two continued after political 
independence of Nigeria on 1 October, 1960. However, it was not until 1963 that 
the British Monarch ceased to be the Head of State of Nigeria and the Privy 
Council no longer had appellate jurisdiction over the Nigerian judiciary as it was 
replaced by the Supreme Court of Nigeria as the final appellate Court for cases 
emanating from Nigeria.1 The 1963 Republican Constitution retained the federal 
legislature with powers to make laws for the entire country as well as the three 
Regions of Nigeria with their respective Houses of Assembly with powers to make 
laws for the Regions which were created under the British colonial administration 
of Nigeria.2  
                                            
1 As provided under the Nigerian Republican Constitution 1963. 
2 For further information on the constitutional evolution of Nigeria, see AO Obilade, The Nigerian 
Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell, 1979). See also, OE Uma, Federalism and Nation Building: 
The Nigerian Experience: 1954-1964 (Arthur H Stockwell Limited, 1977); JA Ballard, 
'Administrative Origins of Nigerian Federalism' (1971) 70 African Affairs 333; K Ezera, 
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Presently, Nigeria operates under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria (as amended).3 Section 1 (1) of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]his 
Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on the 
authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.’ In addition, 
it is also provided that ‘[i]f any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent 
of the inconsistency, be void.’4 The Constitution divides Nigeria into thirty-six 
States5 and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) – the case study in this thesis.6 It 
also establishes a National Assembly with law making powers for the Federation 
while State Houses of Assembly are established to make laws for each of the 
thirty-six States in Nigeria.7 In the event of a conflict between a law validly made 
by the federal legislature and a law made by a State legislature, the former 
prevails.8  
                                            
Developments and the Historical and Political Factors that Affected Constitutional Change 
(Cambridge University Press, 1960); and JA Ajayi, Milestones in Nigerian History (Longman 
Publishing Group, 1980). 
3 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Available at: 
<www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>, accessed 9 December 
2016. 
4 See section 1 (3). 
5 See section 3 (1). They are: Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, 
Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, 
Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, 
Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara. 
6 See sections 2 (2), 3 (4) and Part II of the First Schedule to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
7 See section 4. 
8 See section 4 (5). 
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The Nigerian Constitution establishes several superior courts of record with 
judicial powers9 including a Sharia Court of Appeal10 and a Customary Court of 
Appeal,11 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court as the apex Court.12 The 
jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal is appellate and supervisory in civil 
proceedings on Islamic law and where all the litigants or one of them is a 
Muslim.13 The Customary Court of Appeal exercises appellate and supervisory 
jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving issues of customary law.14 To be 
appointed as a judge of the Customary Court of Appeal one must be a ‘legal 
practitioner’ in Nigeria and must have ‘considerable knowledge and experience in 
the practice of Customary law.’15 Likewise, to be appointable as a judge of the 
Sharia Court of Appeal such person must be ‘a legal practitioner’ in Nigeria and 
must have ‘a recognised qualification in Islamic law’.16  
Appeals from the decisions of a Customary Court of Appeal lie to the Court of 
Appeal ‘in any civil proceedings before the customary Court of Appeal with 
respect to any question of Customary law’.17 Similarly, appeals lie from decisions 
of a Sharia Court of Appeal to the Court of Appeal ‘in any civil proceedings before 
                                            
9 See section 6. 
10 Established under section 260 for the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and under section 275 
for the various States. 
11 Established under section 265 for the FCT and under section 280 for the various States. 
12 Section 233 (1) and section 235. 
13 Section 277 (1) and (2). 
14 Section 282 (1). 
15 Section 281 (3) (a). 
16 Section 276 (3) (a). 
17 Section 245 (1). 
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the Sharia Court of Appeal with respect to any question of Islamic personal law’.18 
For the purpose of hearing appeals emanating from the decisions of the Sharia 
and Customary Courts of Appeal, the Nigerian Court of Appeal must be duly 
constituted with ‘not less than three Justices of the Court of Appeal learned in 
Islamic personal law’19 and ‘not less than three Justices of the Court of Appeal 
learned in Customary law’20 respectively. It is compulsory for judges of the Sharia 
and Customary Courts of Appeals; the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
to be ‘legal practitioners’ with varying levels of experience having so qualified 
depending on the specific Court.21 A ‘legal practitioner’ is defined by the Legal 
Practitioners Act 200422 to be ‘a person entitled in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act to practice as a barrister or as a barrister and solicitor, either generally 
or for the purposes of any particular office or proceedings.’23 Therefore, these 
judges of the superior courts are persons trained as barristers and solicitors in 
accordance with the received and dominant English legal tradition.  
At the lower hierarchy, each of the thirty-six States of Nigeria is entitled to 
establish State courts for the administration of justice.24 Accordingly, all the States 
have established Customary Courts25, Sharia Courts26 and in some cases Area 
                                            
18 Section 244 (1). 
19 Section 247 (1) (a). 
20 Section 247 (1) (b). 
21 See section 231 (3) with respect to the Supreme Court 
22 Legal Practitioners Act, Cap 207 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. Available at: 
<www.nigeria-law.org/Legal%20Practitioners%20Act.htm>, accessed 20 December 2016. 
23 Section 24. 
24 See section 6 (4) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
25 Particularly in the Southern States but also in some Northern States. 
26 Only in the Northern States and the FCT. 
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Courts27 in addition to the various State High Courts.28 The various High Court 
laws of the respective States have provisions with the equivalent of the High Court 
Law of Lagos State, 197229 which provides that: 
The High Court shall observe and enforce the observance of 
customary law which is applicable and is not repugnant to natural 
justice, equity, and good conscience, nor incompatible either 
directly or by implication with any law for the time being in force, and 
nothing in this Law shall deprive any person of the benefit of 
customary law.30 
Also the Nigerian Evidence Act (EA) 201131 provides under section 16 that ‘[a] 
custom may be adopted as part of the law governing a particular set of 
circumstances if it can be judicially noticed or can be proved to exist by 
evidence.’32 It is the responsibility of the person claiming the existence of any 
customary law to prove it.33 Any custom ‘may be judicially noticed when it has 
been adjudicated upon once by a superior Court of Record.’34 This implies that 
even when a custom has been recognised as law by customary courts or other 
courts not being superior Courts of Record, such customary laws will still not be 
recognised as law as such lower courts are not superior courts of record. 
                                            
27 Only in the Northern States. 
28 Mostly in some Northern States and the FCT. 
29 High Court Law of Lagos State, 1972 Cap H3 Laws of Lagos State. Available at: 
http://resources.lawscopeonline.com/stateLaws/LAGOS/HIGH_COURT_LAW_CHAPTER_H3_L
AWS_OF_LAGOS_STATE_.htm, accessed 20 December 2016. 
30 Section 26. See also, section 34 of the High Court Law of Katsina State, Cap 28 Laws of 
Katsina State.  
31 Evidence Act No 18 2011. Available at: <www.nassnig.org/document/download/5945>, 
accessed 5 December 2016. Applicable before all Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria. 
Therefore, the Act does not apply before customary, area and sharia courts discussed above. 
32 Section 16 (1) of the EA. 
33 Ibid, section 16 (2). 
34 Ibid, section 17.  
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Therefore, so long as customs have not been ‘established as one judicially 
noticed, it shall be proved as a fact’ through the opinion of persons who may know 
of the existence of such customs.35  
Unlike customary law, the contents of State laws are deemed to be prima facie 
proof of such upon publication in a Gazette.36 In this way, the post-independence 
Nigerian State treats customary law differently from State law. When it has not 
been judicially noticed, customary law may be proved through providing evidence 
to the courts in relation to facts ‘deemed to be relevant which tends to show how 
in particular instances a matter alleged to be a custom was understood and acted 
upon by persons then interested.’37 For courts to apply customary law, such 
customary law must undergo three main tests: the repugnancy test; the 
incompatibility with law test; and the incompatibility with public policy test. Under 
the repugnancy test, to be applicable by courts such customary laws must not be 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.38 Likewise, to be 
enforceable by courts of law, customary law must not be incompatible with the 
provisions of any law in Nigeria as well as any public policy.39  
In addition, such customary laws must not be inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Nigerian Constitution.40 In the above manner, the repugnancy test41 and 
                                            
35 Ibid, section 18 (1) and (2). 
36 Ibid, section 106 (a) (i). 
37 Ibid, section 19. 
38 Ibid, section 18 (3). 
39 Ibid. 
40 See section 1 (3) of the Nigerian Constitution (supra). 
41 For the how the repugnancy test has been applied in post-colonial Papua New Guinea, see M 
Demian, 'On the Repugnance of Customary Law' (2014) 56 Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 508. 
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incompatibility tests which customary law must undergo are retained in a post-
independence Nigeria.42 Indeed, as the Evidence Act is not applicable before 
lower courts such as the customary courts and sharia courts established by the 
various laws of each of the thirty-six States including the FCT, the laws 
establishing them also retain the repugnancy test.43  
In addition to the above, there exist in Nigeria choice of law rules that have to be 
complied with by Nigerian courts before determining whether customary law 
applies to a particular matter. For example, the various customary court laws have 
provisions similar to section 18(1) of the Federal Capital Territory Customary 
Court Act 2007 which provides that: 
A customary law shall be deemed to be binding upon a person 
where that person- 
(a) is an indigene of a place in which the customary law is in force; 
(b) being in a place in which the customary law is in force, does an act 
in violation of the customary law; 
(c) in cases of claim under a customary law of inheritance, makes a 
claim in respect of the property or estate of a deceased person and 
the deceased person was an indigene of the place in which the 
customary law was in force; 
                                            
42 See D Asiedu-Akrofi, 'Judicial Recognition and Adoption of Customary Law in Nigeria' (1989) 
37 The American Journal of Comparative Law 571 and AA Oba, 'The Administration of 
Customary Law in a Post-Colonial Nigerian State, ' (2006) 37 Cambrian Law Review 95. For the 
situation in post-colonial Zimbabwe, see T Bennett, 'Conflict of Laws—The Application of 
Customary Law and the Common Law in Zimbabwe' (1981) 30 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 59 and for the situation in all the English-speaking Africa, AN Allott, 'What is to be 
Done with African Customary Law?' (1984) 28 Journal of African Law 56. Some scholars have 
also argued that this colonial accommodation of indigenous African law created official 
customary law, see for example SF Moore, 'Certainties undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal 
Anthropology, 1949‐1999' (2001) 7 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 95 at 98. 
43 See for example, section 16 (a) of the Federal Capital Territory Customary Court Act, 2007 
(FCT Customary Court Act). Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig120288.pdf, accessed 
5 December 2016. For more detailed analyses of the interaction between English law and 
customary law in West Africa, see WCE Daniels, 'The Interaction of English Law with Customary 
Law in West Africa' (1964) 13 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 574. 
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(d) agrees or is deemed to have agreed to be bound by the customary 
law. 
The general rule in Nigeria is that in a dispute between two Nigerians indigenous 
to a particular area where customary law is in force, there is a presumption that 
customary law is the applicable law based on the decision in Labinjoh v Abake.44 
However, there are two notable exceptions to this general rule. One of the 
exceptions is when both parties are expressly or by implication in agreement that 
other laws should apply to the matter in dispute.45 The other exception is when 
customary law does not recognise or does not usually apply to the matter at 
issue.46 For disputes between a ‘native’ of an area where customary law is in force 
and a ‘non-native’ of such area the general rule is that customary law will not 
apply unless both parties have agreed that it applies either expressly or by 
implication.47 
The colonial and post-independence treatment of customary is further illustrated 
by the decisions of the Nigerian courts in a long chain of cases as demonstrated 
in sub-section 3.1.1 below. 
 
                                            
44 Labinjoh v Abake [1924] 5 NLR 33 at 13 and 21. See also AO Obilade, (n 2) above at 149. 
45 See Green v Owo [1936] 14 NLR 43; Griffin v Talabi [1948] 12 WACA 371; Nelson v Nelson 
[1951] 13 WACA 248; and Okolie v Ibo [1958] NRLR 80 as cited in AO Obilade, (n 2 above) at 
xii-xv. 
46 See Bakare v Coker [1935] 12 NLR 31 and Salau v Aderibigbe [1963] WNLR 80 as cited in 
AO Obilade, (n 2 above) at xii-xv. 
47 See Nelson v Nelson (supra) and Koney v Union Trading Co Ltd [1934] 2 WACA 188 as cited 
in AN Allott, Essays in African Law (Butterworths, 1960) at xxii-xxviii. A detailed discussion on 
the choice of law rules in relation to the application of customary law by courts in Nigeria and 
Africa is beyond the scope of this Chapter and the thesis. For such detailed analyses, see AN 
Allott, (1960) above at 154-202. 
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3.1.1. Judicial Application of Customary Law in Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Nigeria 
The Courts in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria have expressed their views on 
the nature of customary law in several cases. For example, in the 1908 case of 
Lewis v Bankole,48 the Court observed that customary law is not static and in 
some instances, it has been modified and that one of its striking features is its 
flexibility and ability to change with time.49 This was confirmed by Moore’s findings 
in relation to the Chagga people of Kilimanjaro, Tanzania.50 In Oyewunmi v 
Ogunsesan,51 the Nigerian Supreme Court (SC) described customary law as 
organic to the Nigerian peoples and in its organic state it was subject to change.52 
In Ohai v Akpoemonye,53 the same Court defined customary law in the following 
terms: 
… any system of law not being the common law and not being a law 
enacted by any competent legislature in Nigeria but which is 
enforceable and binding within Nigeria as between the parties 
subject to its sway.54  
                                            
48 Lewis v Bankole [1908] 1 NLR, 308. 
49 Ibid, Per Osborne CJ. 
50 SF Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications" Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980 
(Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
51 Oyewunmi v Ogunsesan [1990] NWLR (Pt. 137) 182 at 207. 
52 Ibid, at 207. 
53 Ohai v Akpoemonye [1991] SCN 73. 
54 Ibid, at 77. See, the earlier case of Zaiden v Mohssen [1973] 11 SC 1. See also the latter 
cases of Adah v Adah [1998] 6 NWLR (Pt. 552) 97 and Oyebisi v Governor of Oyo State [1998] 
11 NWLR (Pt. 574) 441. 
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This confirms that the Nigerian judiciary do recognise the existence of customary 
law and is amenable to applying it whenever the need arises. However, for courts 
to recognise and apply customary law such customs must be proved as a matter 
of fact. This was first given judicial imprimatur in the case of Angu v Attah.55 Such 
requirements that customary law should be proved as a matter of fact was 
condemned in the case of Nzekwo v Nzekwo,56 where Nnaemeka-Agu Justice of 
the Supreme Court (JSC) observed that ‘[i]t is bad enough that our customary law 
has to be proved as a fact in our own country nearly thirty years after 
independence from British rule.’57 Similarly, in Ugo v Obiekwe,58 the same judge 
noted that the requirement that customary laws should be proved as a question 
of fact was an ‘annoying vestige of colonialism’.59 Kwame Nkrumah rightly 
condemned this procedure of proving customary law as question of fact in the 
following terms: 
African law in Africa was declared foreign law … by reason of the 
vast variations in local and tribal custom. African law had to be 
proved by experts. But no law can be foreign to its own land and 
country, and African lawyers … in the independent African states, 
must quickly find a way to reverse this juridical travesty.60 
Indeed, Ghana has abolished the procedure of proving customary law as a 
question of fact and replaced this process with establishing customary law as a 
question of law.61 It is argued that making customary law a question of fact makes 
                                            
55 Angu v Attah [1916] Gold Coast Privy Council Judgments 43 (1874 - 1928). 
56 Nzekwo v Nzekwo [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 104) 373. 
57 Ibid, at 428. 
58 Ugo v Obiekwe [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566 at 583. 
59 Ibid. 
60 K Nkrumah, 'Ghana: Law in Africa' (1962) 6 Journal of African Law 103 at 105. 
61 See section 55 of the Ghanaian Courts Act No 459 1993, available at: 
<www.parliament.gh/assets/file/Acts%202016/COURTS%20ACT%201993.pdf>, accessed 5 
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customary law susceptible to the creation of different forms of customary law from 
the real customary law in the community. Consequently, there is the possibility 
that the interpretation and application of customary law by courts of law may differ 
significantly from the ‘living’ or ‘sociologists’ customary law of the people as 
demonstrated by Gordon Woodman.62  
In line with the above arguments, Woodman has demonstrated that judicial 
application of customary law in Nigeria and Ghana has resulted in the emergence 
of two different forms of customary law.63 The first is what he refers to as ‘lawyers’ 
or ‘official’ customary law which is the customary law as applied by the courts.64 
The second is the ‘sociologists’ customary law which is the actual customary law 
practiced by the people.65 In addition to creating ‘lawyers’ customary law, the 
requirement that once a customary norm has been recognised by a superior court 
of record such customary laws can then be taken judicial notice of by other courts 
also has a negative effect on the development of customary law. In line with this 
it has been argued that through the doctrine of judicial notice, a completely 
different version of customary law may be erroneously applied by courts to 
                                            
December 2016, which provides that ‘[a]ny question as to existence or content of a rule of 
customary law is a question of law for the court and not a question of fact.’ 
62 See GR Woodman, 'How State Courts Create Customary Law in Ghana and Nigeria' in BW 
Morse and GR Woodman (eds), Indigenous Laws and The State (Foris Publications, 1988) at 
181-260. 
63 See GR Woodman, 'Customary Law, State Courts, and the Notion of Institutionalization of 
Norms in Ghana and Nigeria' in AN Allott and GR Woodman (eds), People’s Law and State Law: 
The Bellagio Papers (Walter de Gruyter, 1985) at 143-163. 
64 GR Woodman, 'Some Realism About Customary Law-The West African Experience' (1969) 
Wisconsin Law Review 128 at 140-142. 
65 Ibid. See also, D Asiedu-Akrofi, 'Judicial Recognition and Adoption of Customary Law in 
Nigeria' (1989) 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 571 at 587. 
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different cases in different places where such customs are not recognised by the 
people.66  
It has been argued that the doctrine of judicial precedent could combine with the 
doctrine of judicial notice of customary law to have the effects of homogenising 
customary law in Nigeria.67 In line with this argument, it has been claimed that 
‘[t]here is enough evidence to conclude that after superior courts of record 
ascertain a customary law rule, subsequent courts conveniently forget that it was 
meant for a particular area.’68 An illustration of the above claim is demonstrated 
by the decision in the case of Lewis v Bankole,69 which has been used as an 
authority to establish the customary law rule that the head of the family under 
customary law in Nigeria is the eldest living son of any deceased person,70 without 
taking into account the fact that this customary law rule could vary in different 
localities and at different times.71  
The above homogenising effect of judicial ascertainment of customary law 
through State courts is replicated in the interpretation of customary law as to when 
title in land passes when a person dies. Without considering the fact that the 
customary rules may differ from place to place, the Nigerian courts have 
consistently held in a chain of cases that the title to the land of a deceased person 
                                            
66 See SK Asante, 'Over a Hundred Years of a National Legal System in Ghana: A Review and 
Critique' (1987) 31 Journal of African Law 70 at 86. 
67 See GR Woodman, ‘Customary Land Laws within Legal Pluralism over the Generations’, 
(2014/15) 4 SADC Law Journal, 189-208 at 197. 
68 ES Nwauche, 'The Constitutional Challenge of the Integration and Interaction of Customary 
and the Received English Common Law in Nigeria and Ghana,' (2010) 25 Tulane European & 
Civil Law Forum 37 at 45. 
69 Supra. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See the decision in Olowu v Olowu [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 13) 372 and Eyesan v Sanusi [1984] 1 
SCNLR 353. 
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passes immediately customary rites are performed and the possession of such 
lands are handed over in the presence of witnesses.72 Indeed, in the case of 
Akinterinwa v Oladunjoye,73 the Nigerian SC stated that this custom was of 
‘universal application’ in the whole of Nigeria!74 This demonstrates the danger of 
allowing State courts to apply and enforce customary law. This also illustrates 
that Woodman’s findings that courts do in fact create ‘lawyers’ customary law 
which differs from ‘sociologists’ customary law are very valid and plausible.75 
Like the adage ‘give a dog a bad name and hang him’, the three-prong tests of 
the repugnancy doctrine, incompatibility with law and incompatibility with public 
policy have been used by the Nigerian courts to ‘hang’ customary law. It has been 
argued that in Nigeria the repugnancy test is the most widely used in the 
determination of whether to apply and enforce customary law.76 In Edet v 
Essien,77 a customary law rule which granted paternity of a child to the man who 
had paid the mother’s bride price rather than the biological father was held to be 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. In Okonkwo v 
Okagbue,78 a customary law rule which required a woman to marry a dead person 
was considered repugnant.79 However, it is not in all cases where the repugnancy 
                                            
72 See the following cases: Ajadi v Olarenwaju [1969] 1 All NLR 382; Folarin v Durojaiye [1988] 
1 NWLR (Pt. 70) 351; and Akinterinwa v Oladunjoye [2000] FWLR (Pt. 10) 1690. 
73 Supra. 
74 Ibid, at 1701. See also the case of Egonu v Egonu [1978] 11-12 SC 111. 
75 GR Woodman, (n 64) above at 140-142; GR Woodman, (n 63) above at 143-163 and GR 
Woodman, (n 62) above at 181-260. 
76 ES Nwauche, (n 68) above at 47. 
77 Edet v Essien [1932] 11 NLR 47. 
78 Okonkwo v Okagbue [1994] 9 NWLR (Pt. 368) 301. 
79 See also, the following cases: Mariyama v Sadiku Ojo [1961] NRNLR 81; Ejanor v Okenome 
[1976] 1 WTLR (Pt. III) 378; and Ejanor v Okenome [1976] 1 WTLR (Pt. III) 378. Customary laws 
have also been struck down on grounds of incompatibility with the provisions of the Nigeria 
constitution in the following cases: Mojekwu v Mojekwu [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 283; Muojekwu 
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doctrine is considered that customary law is found to be repugnant. For example, 
In The Estate of Agboruja,80 the court enforced a customary law rule which 
required the wife of a deceased man to marry his brother. Likewise, in Cole v 
Akinyele,81 a rule of customary law which permitted the legitimacy of a child by 
mere acknowledgment of the father was upheld. 
There is a divide among Nigerian legal scholars as to the significance of the 
repugnancy and incompatibility tests in relation to the application of customary 
law by courts of law in Nigeria. According to one school of thought, the 
repugnancy clauses have helped to eliminate acts and customs that are 
considered barbaric and incompatible with civilisation.82 According to the other 
school, the repugnancy doctrine imports standards external to a community and 
applies them to different communities for the purpose of meeting ‘the standard of 
an ordinary civilized society.’83 However, in this thesis a third school of thought is 
advanced. In the first place, the repugnancy test should never have been 
introduced during colonialism. Rather the reverse should have been the case. All 
foreign laws and principles that were introduced during colonialism ought to have 
been subjected to the incompatibility tests in relations to customary law, so that 
                                            
v Iwuchukwu [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 211) 1406; Muojekwu v Ejikeme [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 657) 
419; Asika v Atuanya [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 433) 1293; Uke v Iro [2001] 11 NWLR 196; Ukeje v 
Ukeje [2001] 27 WRN 142; Agbai v Okogbue [1991] 7 NWLR(Pt. 204) 391; Anigbogun v 
Uchejigbo [2002] 10 NWLR (Pt. 776) 472; and Salubi v Nwariakwu [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) 
459. 
80 In The Estate of Agboruja [1949] 19 NLR 38. 
81 Cole v Akinyele [1960] 5 FSC 84. 
82 See F Ajayi, 'The Interaction of English Law with Customary Law in Western Nigeria: I' (1960) 
4 Journal of African Law 40; F Ajayi, 'The Interaction of English Law with Customary Law in 
Western Nigeria: II' (1960) 4 Journal of African Law 98 at 103; and TO Elias, 'Towards a 
Common Law in Nigeria' in Elias TO (ed), Law and Social Change in Nigeria (University of 
Lagos Press/Evans Bros, 1972) at 266. 
83 AO Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell, 1979) at 103. See also, I Agede, 
'Repugnancy Clause as an Instrument of Legal Developments' in TO Elias and M Jegede (eds), 
Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence (MIJ Publishers, 1993) at 407. 
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any such foreign laws or principles that were incompatible with customary law, 
should to the extent of their incompatibility have been void. In line with the above 
argument, Julio Faundez has maintained that African indigenous customary law 
‘is not an add-on to the received (Western) law, but the reverse. It is the received 
Western legal traditions that should adapt and adjust to Africa’s indigenous law.’84   
Taiwo argues that the repugnancy test has outlived its relevance and suggests 
that Nigeria should repeal it.85 In Ghana, Sierra Leone, Botswana and Tanzania 
the repugnancy doctrine has been abandoned.86 Kiye calls for the scrapping of 
the repugnancy doctrine in Anglophone Cameroon.87 A South African (SA) writer 
argues that in the context of SA ‘the repugnancy clause has left African law 
distorted beyond recognition’88 and results in the erosion of African moral 
values.89 Akuffo submits rather bluntly in the context of West Africa that ‘[a]s a 
colonial juridical device, in addition to its traditional facility, equity bears prime 
responsibility for the dislocation of indigenous customary law in West Africa.’90 
                                            
84 J Faundez, 'Legal Pluralism and International Development Agencies' in BZ Tamanaha, C 
Sage and M Woolcock (eds), Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in 
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 181. 
85 E Taiwo, 'Repugnancy Clause and its Impact on Customary Law: Comparing the South 
African and Nigerian Positions-Some Lessons for Nigeria' (2009) 34 Journal for Juridical 
Science 89. 
86 JM Ocran, 'The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Africa' (2015) 39 Akron Law Review 465 at 477-478. 
87 ME Kiye, 'The Repugnancy and Incompatibility Tests and Customary Law in Anglophone 
Cameroon' (2015) 15 African Studies Quarterly 85 at 100. 
88 D Ndima, 'The African Law of the 21st Century in South Africa' (2003) 36 Comparative & 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 325. 
89 Ibid. 
90 K Akuffo, 'Equity in Colonial West Africa: A Paradigm of Juridical Dislocation' (2006) 50 
Journal of African Law 132 at 144. For the situation in Francophone Africa, see M Prinsloo, 
'Recognition and Application of Indigenous Law in Francophone Africa' (1993) Journal of South 
African Law 189 and for the situation in Burundi, Zaire, Rwanda and Lusophone Africa, see M 
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Indeed, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) has rejected the 
repugnancy clause.91 Demian argues that many African States have embraced 
the South African example.92 It is argued that there is no justification for the 
continuous retention of the repugnancy test in a post-colonial Nigeria, when the 
colonial authorities are no longer the makers and enforcers of law in Nigeria. 
Indeed, like other writers cited above, Derek Asiedu-Akrofi has concluded that 
‘the tests applied in the judicial recognition of and adoption of customary law be 
abolished because they have outlived their usefulness.’93  
In line with Woodman’s findings that State courts are creating lawyers’ customary 
law,94 it is argued that courts of law established by the State and administered by 
lawyers are not suitable enforcers of the ‘living’ customary law. The validity of 
customary laws has always been founded on their acceptability by members of a 
community as binding upon them. This was acknowledged in the case of 
                                            
Prinsloo, 'Recognition and Application of Indigenous Law in Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and 
Lusophone Africa' (1993) Journal of South African Law 541. 
91 South African Law Reform Commission (SLRC), The Harmonization of the Common Law and 
the Indigenous Law: Report on Conflict of Laws Project 90 (SLRC, 1999) at para 2.2. Available 
at: http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj90_conflict_1999sep.pdf, accessed 27 January 
2017. 
92 M Demian, 'On the Repugnance of Customary Law' (2014) 56 Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 508 at 511. 
93 D Asiedu-Akrofi, (n 61) above at 572. For similar treatment of Islamic law by State law in 
Nigeria see the following: A Christelow, 'Islamic Law and Judicial Practice in Nigeria: An 
Historical Perspective' (2002) 22 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 185; VOO Nmehielle, 'Sharia 
Law in the Northern States of Nigeria: To Implement or Not to Implement, the Constitutionality is 
the Question' (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 730; AA Oba, 'Islamic Law as Customary Law: 
The Changing Perspective in Nigeria' (2002) 51 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 817; 
AH Yadudu, 'Colonialism and the Transformation of Islamic Law: In the Northern States of 
Nigeria' (1992) 24 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 103; and TM Naniya, 
'History of Shari'a in Some States of Northern Nigeria to Circa 2000' (2002) 13 Journal of Islamic 
Studies 14. 
94 GR Woodman, (n 64) above at 140-142; GR Woodman, (n 63) above at 143-163 and GR 
Woodman, (n 62) above at 181-260. 
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Eshugbayi v Government of Nigeria,95 where Lord Atkin observed that ‘[i]t is the 
assent of the native community that gives a custom its validity.’96 However, this 
position has also been criticised for ignoring the fact that customary law is not 
timeless and it changes with the social, economic and political circumstances of 
the times.97 It could equally be argued that these changes are reflected in the 
‘living’ customary law as well. In an article,98 Allott answers the question ‘[w]hat is 
to be done with African customary law?’ in the following nebulous terms: 
… Whether the end result is an African system with western 
trimmings, or a western system with African trimmings, or … a 
reconciliation of the two types of system, I cannot say; all I know is 
that … the end result will be harmonisation, by the people subject 
to these disparate laws, of the exigencies and the rules of each 
system.99 
In this thesis, it is argued that what ‘is to be done with African customary law’, is 
to return it where it belongs, in the community.100 While there may be legitimate 
concerns that returning customary law to the community may result in traditional 
elites presenting their own version of traditional justice, Sally Falk Moore has 
argued to the contrary that ‘… the idealized court-as-it-should-be of the British … 
appear as tantalizing artefacts of the colonial imagination … could easily and 
                                            
95 Eshugbayi v Government of Nigeria [1932] AC 622. 
96 Ibid. See also, M Jegede, Principles of Equity (Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1981). 
97 K Akuffo, 'Equity in Colonial West Africa: A Paradigm of Juridical Dislocation' (2006) 50 
Journal of African Law 132 and D Asiedu-Akrofi, 'Judicial Recognition and Adoption of 
Customary Law in Nigeria' (1989) 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 571. 
98 AN Allott, (n 42) above. See also, AN Allott, 'The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law in 
British Africa' (1957) 20 The Modern Law Review 244. 
99 AN Allott, (n 42) above at 70-71. 
100 For a contrary view on this, see F Ajayi, 'The Interaction of English Law with Customary Law 
in Western Nigeria: II' (1960) 4 Journal of African Law 98 at 113. For previous attempts to 
abolish customary courts in Nigeria, see E Nwogugu, 'Abolition of Customary Courts—The 
Nigerian Experiment' (1976) 20 Journal of African Law 1. 
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accurately be characterized as self-serving discourses on power, as justificatory 
representations of the ideology of control.’101 
As a form of law the validity of which is founded on the acceptance of members 
of a community, the logical thing to do is to allow the communities to determine 
what happens to customary law. Indeed, in an empirical study conducted in 
Tanzania Moore found that: 
… communities try to control their own members and do everything 
to maximize their internal autonomy, allowing their members 
effective use of the courts only as they see advantage in doing so, 
bypassing the courts and setting their own affairs internally as they 
choose ...102 
It is the argument in this thesis that local chiefs and community heads in their 
respective communities should be the ones enforcing customary laws in their 
domains in the resolution of all civil disputes. State courts administered by lawyers 
who are trained in a British legal tradition are certainly not properly positioned to 
apply Woodman’s ‘sociologists’ customary law applied by people in real life. Like 
Moore’s findings in Tanzania, support for this argument is provided by research 
which has demonstrated that among the Igbo people of Nigeria indigenous modes 
of justice resolution operate effectively and ‘has innovated to preserve its 
independence and influence, while maintaining a cooperative relationship with the 
                                            
101 SF Moore, 'Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What to Say to Africans 
About Running “Their Own" Native Courts' (1992) Law and Society Review 11 at 13. 
102 Ibid, at 12. 
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court and police.’103 Similar findings have been made in Mozambique.104 South 
Africa is already making progress in this regard where attempts are being made 
to create traditional courts headed by local chiefs that will not accept legal 
representation by lawyers.105 The Constitution of South Africa already allows 
traditional leaders to enforce customary law.106 Even in the United States (US) 
tribal courts administered by traditional authorities have  existed since the 
nineteenth century with jurisdiction in criminal matters which was validated by the 
Supreme Court of the US.107  
                                            
103 EE Uwazie, 'Modes of Indigenous Disputing and Legal Interactions among the Ibos of 
Eastern Nigeria' (1994) 26 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 87 at 100. See 
also, AE Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891-1929 
(Cambridge University Press, 1972); P Bohannan, Justice and Judgment among the Tiv 
(Waveland Inc, 1989); A Sachs and GH Welch, Liberating the Law: Creating Popular Justice in 
Mozambique (Zed, 1990); CK Meek and E Arnett, 'Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe: A 
Study in Indirect Rule' (1938) 37 Journal of the Royal African Society 115; CA Odinkalu, 'Poor 
Justice or Justice for the Poor? A Policy Framework for Reform of Customary and Informal 
Justice Systems in Africa' (2006) 2 The World Bank Legal Review 141; GR Woodman, ‘The 
Alternative Law of Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (1991) 32 Les Cahiers de Droit 3; and SF 
Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications" Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1986). 
104 See D Pimentel, 'Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial Africa: Linking Statutory and Customary 
Adjudication in Mozambique' (2011) 14 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 59 and 
Open Society Initiative, Mozambique: Justice Sector and Rule of Law, 2006) at 121. Available 
at: <www.unicef.org.mz/cpd/references/21-Mozambique%20Justice%20report%20(Eng).pdf>, 
accessed 26 January, 2017.  
105 See JM Iyi, 'Fair Hearing without Lawyers? The Traditional Courts Bill and the Reform of 
Traditional Justice System in South Africa' (2016) 48 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 127. See also, section 271 of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992 which recognises 
traditional chieftaincy institutions by providing that ‘the institutions of chieftaincy, together with its 
traditional councils as established by customary law and usage’ should be preserved. 
106 See section 211 (2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. See also, H Ludsin, 
'Cultural Denial: What South Africa's Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the Future of Its 
Customary Law' (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 62 and RL Ellett, 'Courts and 
the Emergence of Statehood in Post-Colonial Africa' (2012) 63 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
343. 
107 See Exparte Crow Dog [1883] 109 US 556. See also, D Pimentel, 'Can Indigenous Justice 
Survive? Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law' (2010) 32 Harvard International Review 32. 
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The contradiction between conventional State courts and traditional modes of 
communal justice is exemplified by the facts and decisions in the US Supreme 
Court Case Exparte Crow Dog.108 In that case, the accused murdered the victim 
and admitted guilt. Since the crime occurred within the territory of the indigenous 
Indian territory of Dakota, it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal 
courts, which resolved the matter through tribal authorities.109 The victim’s family 
and that of the accused were reconciled by the tribal authorities through 
compensating the former with money, horses and a blanket.110 The aim of these 
tribal proceedings was to ‘heal the wounded Brule Sioux community. The wrong 
doer needed to be integrated back into society, and the crime had to be 
acknowledged so that healing could begin.’111 However, white settlers within the 
community opposed this outcome and got federal authorities involved.112 The 
result was that the accused was sentenced to death by State courts.113 But, 
before hanging the accused an appeal was made to the Supreme Court.114 It was 
unanimously held that State courts lacked jurisdiction in the matter and the 
accused was set free.115 Although subsequent legislation in the US has limited 
the jurisdiction of tribal courts, the significance of this case is best captured by a 
commentator who wrote: 
What would have happened to the Sioux community, had Crow Dog 
been executed? It would have wounded them a second time, as 
                                            
108 Exparte Crow Dog (supra). 
109 Ibid, at para 7. 
110 Ibid. 
111 D Pimentel, (n 104) above at 33. 
112 Exparte Crow Dog (supra) at para 7. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid, at para 7 per Mr. Justice Matthews delivering the opinion of the Court. 
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Crow Dog’s death would have been another blow to the Sioux 
community, another act of violence that would deprive the 
community of yet another of its members, harming the community 
all over again.116 
It is argued that over and above the community being injured some more, a 
contrary decision by the Supreme Court would have delegitimised the authority 
of tribal courts in resolving these kinds of cases, thereby destroying an important 
cultural aspect of the community in question. This is the kind of cultural 
destruction that State courts administered by lawyers are doing in Africa and in 
Nigeria.117 In line with this argument, Woodman submits that State institutions are 
unable to reproduce many of the characteristics of ‘living’ customary law.118 
Indeed, the impact of English legal culture on lawyers in Anglophone Africa has 
been comprehensively studied. For example, Harrington and Manji argue that law 
in post-colonial Africa has been shaped by a category of lawyers ‘imbued with the 
virtues characteristic of English practitioners’.119 They credit the work of Lord 
Denning in a 1960 London Conference on the Future of Law in Africa and as the 
Chairman of a 1961 Committee on Legal Education for Students from Africa with 
this legal development in post-colonial Africa.120  
                                            
116 D Pimentel, (n 104) above at 33. 
117 See GR Woodman, ‘Legal Pluralism in Africa: The Implications of State Recognition of 
Customary Laws Illustrated from the Field of Land Law’, in H Mostert and T Bennett (eds), 
Pluralism and Development: Studies in Access to Property in Africa (Juta & Co. Ltd., 2012) 35-
58 at 58. 
118 GR Woodman, (n 67) above at 198. 
119 JA Harrington and A Manji, ‘” Mind with Mind and Spirit with Spirit”: Lord Denning and African 
Legal Education' (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 376 at 376. 
120 Ibid, at 378. See, Report of the Committee on Legal Education for Students from Africa, 
C1255 (1961). 
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For Denning, in Africa ‘law was essentially practitioners’ law and the teaching of 
law needed to reflect this’.121 Indeed, some people challenged the suitability of 
training lawyers in Britain who would have to go back to Africa to work in plural 
legal systems.122 Harrington and Manji maintain that although the impracticality 
of the approach adopted by British towards training African lawyers in Britain in 
their legal traditions established a link between some African States and Britain, 
it nevertheless resulted in the ‘disintegration’ of the network so established in the 
late 1960s.123 The unsuitability of lawyers to administer customary law can be 
summed up in the words of William Twining who argued in the context of legal 
education in East Africa that ‘[s]et a group of lawyers … to devise a programme 
of training and their natural instinct is to re-create as closely as possible the 
system that they themselves underwent. We all have to guard against this 
tendency, academics as much as practioners, Africans as much as 
expatriates.’124  
Although Allott regarded an approach towards customary law that aims to 
preserve it from the influence of English law as ‘romantic’,125 it is argued that 
Twining’s argument in relation to legal education above equally applies to the 
                                            
121 JA Harrington and A Manji (n 119) above at 379. See also, AN Allott, 'London Conference on 
the Future of Law in Africa' (1959) 3 Journal of African Law 148. 
122 JA Harrington and A Manji, (n 119) above at 380. See also, TO Elias, 'Organisation and 
Development of the Legal Profession in Africa, in Particular the Ability of the Bar and Judiciary to 
Uphold the Rights of both the Citizen and the State' (1986) 1 Denning Law Journal 49 at 50. 
123 JA Harrington and A Manji, 'The Emergence of African Law as an Academic Discipline in 
Britain' (2003) 102 African Affairs 109. For the situation in Ghana, see GR Woodman, ‘Ghana: 
How Does State Law Accommodate Religious, Cultural, Linguistic and Ethnic Diversity?’, in M-C 
Foblets, J-F Gaudreault-Desbiens and AD Renteln (eds), Cultural Diversity and the Law: State 
Responses from Around the World (Bruylant, Ėditions Yvon Blais, 2010) 255-280 at 259. 
124 W Twining, 'Legal Education within East Africa' (1966) 12 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly Supplementary Publication 115 at 149. 
125 AN Allott, 'Twenty Years on—The Journal of African Law and African Law: A Look at the Past 
and the Future I' (1977) 21 Journal of African Law 125 at 146. 
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issue of whether lawyers should be administrating customary law through State 
courts in Africa.126 That the State in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria interfered 
with indigenous customary systems of administering law in Nigeria is surprising, 
given the claim that ‘…a cardinal principle of British colonial policy was that the 
interests of a large native population shall not be subject to the will either of a 
small European class or of a small minority of educated and Europeanised natives 
who have nothing in common with them, and whose interests are often opposed 
to theirs.’127  
In a work in which the role of the legal profession in a post-colonial Africa is 
critically examined in the peculiar cultural and social context of Africa, Gower 
rightly concludes that colonialism did not leave behind a system based on the 
traditional African ways operating through the control of traditional rulers but by 
‘British-educated [or American-educated] and politically minded progressives’.128 
This is contrary to the natural modus operandi of customary law in Africa.  
However, the problem in post-colonial Nigeria is compounded by ‘most of the 
trained lawyers … whose belief in the perfection of English law surpasses that of 
the complications flowing from the duality of English law and customary laws.’!129 
As noted in Chapter Two, in the context of Nigeria, Islamic law is treated as 
                                            
126 See generally, SF Joireman, 'Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and 
the Colonial Legacy' (2001) 39 The Journal of Modern African Studies 571; Y Ghai, 'Law, 
Development and African Scholarship' (1987) 50 The Modern Law Review 750; and S Manteaw, 
'Legal Education in Africa: What Type of Lawyer Does Africa Need?’' (2016) 39 McGeorge Law 
Review 903. 
127 F Lugard, Report by Sir Frederick Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
Nigeria and Administration, 1912–1919 at 468, particularly at para 40. See also, F Lugard, The 
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Perham Ltd, 1965) at 86. 
128 LCB Gower, Independent Africa: The Challenge to the Legal Profession (Harvard University 
Press, 1967) at 9. See also, CJ Dias, et al, (eds), Lawyers in the Third World: Comparative and 
Developmental Perspectives (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies and the International 
Centre of Law in Development, 1981). 
129 LCB Gower, (n 128) above at 30. 
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customary law, and for that reason the analyses and arguments made in the 
previous Chapter and this Chapter apply equally to the treatment of Islamic law 
by State law and courts in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.130 Hence, there is 
no need for any detailed and separate examination of Islamic law and its 
application by State law and courts in Nigeria. Attention in section 3.2, will focus 
on the impact of the above legal developments on the definition of land rights in 
colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. 
3.2. Customary Land Tenure in Pre-Colonial, Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Nigeria 
Before examining the post-colonial definition of land rights in Nigeria it is important 
for the reader to be presented with the nature of customary land tenure before 
colonialism and during British colonial administration of Nigeria.  During the period 
prior to and until the commencement of British colonial rule in Nigeria, customary 
land tenure operated in Northern Nigeria where Abuja was geographically 
located.131  Although the arrival of the emirs and their followers heralded the 
introduction of a kind of feudal land tenure under which they claimed over-lordship 
of the land after their Islamic conquest of Northern Nigeria this existed side-by-
side with customary land tenure.132 In theoretical terms, this was the beginning of 
                                            
130 For similar treatment of Islamic by State law in Nigeria see the following: A Christelow, 
'Islamic Law and Judicial Practice in Nigeria: An Historical Perspective' (2002) 22 Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs 185; VOO Nmehielle, 'Sharia Law in the Northern States of Nigeria: To 
Implement or Not to Implement, the Constitutionality is the Question' (2004) 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly 730; AA Oba, 'Islamic Law as Customary Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria' 
(2002) 51 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 817; AH Yadudu, 'Colonialism and the 
Transformation of Islamic Law in the Northern States of Nigeria' (1992) 24 The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 103; and TM Naniya, 'History of Shari'a in Some States of Northern 
Nigeria to Circa 2000' (2002) 13 Journal of Islamic Studies 14. 
131 The jihad took place between1804-1810 and was led by an Islamic scholar named Usman 
Dan Fodio and was the beginning of the introduction of Islamic law into northern Nigeria. 
132 PE Oshio, 'The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria,' (1990) 10 
Boston College Third World Law Journal 43 at 54; K Akuffo, 'The Conception of Land Ownership 
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legal pluralism in the context of land tenure law in the area known today as Abuja, 
Nigeria. Similarly, Oshio argues that prior to the colonial encounter with Britain, 
land ‘[t]enure law in Southern Nigeria as regulated by customary law had its roots 
in the traditional conception of land.’133 Like pre-British colonial Northern Nigeria, 
land in the southern part of Nigeria was conceived as ‘having economic, social, 
political and religious significance.’134 It was also seen ‘as a sacred institution 
given by God for the sustenance of all members of the community’.135 Land was 
conceived as belonging ‘to the dead, the living and the unborn. Since the view 
was that the living merely held land as a kind of “ancestral trust” for the benefit of 
themselves and generations yet unborn.’136 Therefore, individual ownership of 
land was not prevalent in pre-colonial Nigeria and there was no State to manage 
and control it through State law.137  
It is also important to note that in Africa and Nigeria in particular people’s identities 
are linked to land.138 To take away a community or family land is akin to taking 
the lives of members of that community or group.139 The idea of group or 
                                            
International & Comparative Law 57 and TO Elias, Nigerian Land Law and Custom (Routledge & 
Kigan Paul Ltd, 1951) at 88-109. 
133 PE Oshio, (n 132) above at 46. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 See W Adebanwi, 'Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in 
Northern Nigeria' (2009) 13 Citizenship Studies 349; A Sayne, Rethinking Nigeria's Indigene-
settler Conflicts, (US Institute of Peace, 2012); and AO Adesoji and A Alao, 'Indigeneship and 
Citizenship in Nigeria: Myth and Reality' (2009) 2 Journal of Pan African Studies 151. 
139 See, CL Temple, Native Races and their Rulers: Sketches and Studies of Official Life and 
Administrative Problems in Nigeria (Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd and Way & Co Ltd, 
1918). 
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communal ownership of land appears to have been prevalent in the whole of 
Africa.140  Writing in 1918, Temple stated that ‘[f]rom further enquiries and 
observation I am fully convinced that those conditions are not peculiar to Northern 
Nigeria but are common to all the tribes of Africa untouched by the civilisation of 
Europe.’141 Such was the nature of customary land tenure before the advent of 
British colonial administration of Nigeria. 
3.2.1. British Colonial Nigeria and Land Administration – (1861-
1960) 
In the preceding Chapter Two (sub-section 2.1.2), it was demonstrated that formal 
colonialism in Nigeria began with the signing of a Treaty in 1861 in which the King 
of Lagos purportedly ceded territories to the British colonial authorities.142 There 
have been different interpretations of the provisions of the Treaty concerning the 
exact nature of the rights that were passed to the British Crown by King 
Docemo.143 Some argue that it transferred the ownership of all the lands in Lagos 
to the Crown144 while others contend that the treaty was ‘a mere cession of rights 
                                            
140 Ibid, at 140. 
141 Ibid. 
142 See TO Elias, Nigerian Land Law and Custom (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951) at 
Appendix 1. 
143 See A Oyebode, 'Treaties and the Colonial Enterprise: The Case of Nigeria' (1990) 2 African 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 17; Y Kawashima, 'Native Claims: Indigenous Law 
against Empire, 1500–1920' (2013) 100 Journal of American History 182; A von Bogdandy and 
R Wolfrum, Dependent Territories (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & 
International Law, 2009); and AD Elegbede-Fernandez, Lagos, A Legacy of Honour: Dosumu 
(1861) --BabangIbida (1991) (Spectrum Books, 1992). 
144 See AG Hopkins, 'Property Rights and Empire Building: Britain's Annexation of Lagos, 1861' 
(1980) 40 The Journal of Economic History 777; TO Elias, 'Nigeria's Contribution to Colonial 
Law' (1951) 33 Journal of Comparative Legislation & International Law 49; R Smith, 'The Lagos 
Consulate, 1851–1861: An Outline' (1974) 15 The Journal of African History 393; and J 
Mugambwa, 'Treaties or Scraps of Paper? A Second Look at the Legal Character of the 
Nineteenth Century British/African Colonial Agreements' (1987) The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 79. 
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and not a cession of territory’.145 In the case of Attorney-General of Southern 
Nigeria v John Holt,146 the Privy Council was of the opinion that terms of the Treaty 
meant what they said with the implication that the territory of Lagos and its 
environs were ceded to the Crown, the Council however, noted that this was 
‘subject to the condition that all rights of property existing in the inhabitants under 
grant or otherwise from King Docemo and his predecessors, were to be 
respected.’147 
In the famous case of Amodu Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria (Amodu 
Tijani’s case),148 Viscount Haldane found that ‘this cession appears to have been 
made on the footing that the rights of property of the inhabitants were to be fully 
respected.’149 In Oduntan Onisiwo v Attorney-General of Southern Nigeria,150 
Osborne, CJ held that: ‘I am clearly of the opinion that the ownership rights of 
private land owners, including the families … were left entirely unimpaired, and 
as freely exercisable after the Cession as before…’151 Therefore, the attitude of 
the colonial courts towards the Treaty was that the effect of the treaty implied that 
both territory and sovereignty were passed to the Crown but in practice the 
wordings of the Treaty were to be interpreted as relating primarily to sovereign 
rights whilst recognising the customary land rights of the inhabitants.152   
                                            
145 See Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v John Holt [1910] 2 NLR at 8. 
146 Supra. 
147 Ibid, at 58-59. 
148 Amodu Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria [1921] AC 399. 
149 Ibid, at 55. 
150 Oduntan Onisiwo v Attorney-General of Southern Nigeria [1912] 2 NLR at 77. 
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152 See TO Elias, (n 142) above at 8-9. 
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Indeed, prior to contact with Europeans, under customary law individual 
ownership of land in fee simple in the European sense was unknown.153 Quite 
early on in the colonial encounter, the nature of customary land tenure in Nigeria 
was recognised by the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani’s case.154 In that case, the 
Privy Council succinctly identified and enumerated the essential features of 
Nigerian customary land law as community ownership, family ownership, and a 
rule that grantee of land could not dispose of land without the consent of elders 
of the community or family head,155 which bears similarities with the findings of 
several authors.156   
Customary law in relation to land is largely unwritten and it varies from place to 
place. However, this form of land tenure is characterised by the payment of 
annual tributes as opposed to rent under English law by the customary tenant to 
the overlord.157 Such lands are held by the grantee subject to good behaviour. As 
Oshio rightly argues: ‘In essence, the customary land tenant is not a lessee or 
borrower, he is a grantee of land under customary land tenure and holds a 
determinable interest in land which may be enjoyed in perpetuity subject to good 
                                            
153 For further information on customary land tenure in pre-British colonial Nigeria, see PG 
McHugh, Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2011); CK Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies (Oxford University Press, 1946); 
CK Meek, Land Tenure and Administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons, (Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office (HMSO), 1957); and BO Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law (Nwamife Publishers, 
1972). 
154 Supra. 
155 Ibid. 
156 For example, see SD Cameron, A Note on Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces 
(Government Printer, 1933); CK Meek, Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria (Kegan Paul, 1931); 
CL Temple, (n 135) above; TO Elias, (n 142) above at 89-109; AK Ajisafe, The Laws and 
Customs of the Yoruba People (Trubner, 1924); CK Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe 
(Oxford University Press, 1950) and G Jones, Ibo Land Tenure (Cambridge University Press, 
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behaviour on the part of the tenant.’158  As the case study of Abuja is located in 
what was then Northern Protectorate and later Northern Region of Nigeria under 
British colonial administration of Nigeria, it is important to examine the legal 
developments on customary land tenure and the introduced English land tenure 
in colonial Northern Nigeria. 
3.2.2. Colonial Land Administration in the Northern Protectorate 
of Nigeria 
In the preceding Chapter Two, it was demonstrated that Northern Nigeria was 
occupied by the British colonial army and British colonial administration through 
indirect rule which began there in 1904.159 It was also demonstrated in Chapter 
Two, that the British colonial administration revoked the Charter of the Royal 
Niger Company through which the Company had been exercising rights over land 
in this part of Nigeria between 1885 and 1899, because of treaties entered with 
local rulers. However, the validity of the treaties through which the local chiefs 
purportedly ceded territories to the Royal Niger Company160 is debatable.161 
Indeed, it has been argued that the local Emirs as well as other indigenous rulers 
were merely trustees of land.162 
However, Flora Shaw (Lady Lugard)163 argued that ‘[b]y their treaties with the 
Royal Niger Company (the Company) some of them had nominally surrendered 
                                            
158 PE Oshio, (n 132) above at 47. See also the decision of the courts in the following cases: 
Chief Etim v Chief Eke, [1941] 16 NLR 43; Mohammed Ojomu v Salawu Ajao, [1983] 9 SC; 
Bassey and Others v Chief Eteta [1938] 4 WACA. 
159 Ibid.  
160 Formerly African National Company 
161 TO Elias, (n 142) above at 28-31. 
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their territories with sovereign rights’.164 By contrast, Lord Lugard165 observed in 
relation to the treaty between the Company and the Sultan of Sokoto in an official 
report166 that no such agreement as to the transfer of land was made.167 Lugard’s 
views are corroborated by Sir William Geary.168 Elias argued that it appears as 
though Lugard came to the conclusion that ‘the arrangement between the 
Company and the African rulers were really private agreements and not treaties 
in the international sense; it was the grant of the Royal Charter  that lifted them 
out of their obscurity to the status of international treaties.’169 From the above 
discussion it seems logical to conclude in the words of Christopher Temple that 
‘[a]ll those acts of native chiefs which, by means of treaties made with strangers, 
alienated the tribal lands are … according to native law and custom, ultra vires.’170 
Note that similar arguments have been proffered in relation to the purported 
cession of lands by local rulers to the Colonial Authorities and the Company in 
Southern Nigeria.171  
Consequently, the Company could not have had a valid interest in the right to use 
all lands in the Northern Nigeria Protectorate, except where such rights were 
contained in an agreement. All lands were held in accordance with customary law 
                                            
164 FL Shaw, A Tropical Dependency: An Outline of the Ancient History of the Western Sudan 
with an Account of the Modern Settlement of Northern Nigeria (James Lisbett & Co, 1905) at 
417. 
165 He was appointed as High Commissioner for the Northern Protectorate and later as 
Governor-General of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. 
166 See Annual Report of Northern Nigeria 2 September, 1903. 
167 Ibid at 157-160. The emphasis is added. 
168 WM Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule (Methuen & Co Ltd, 1927) at 354-355. 
169 TO Elias, (n 142) above at 30 and BO Nwabueze, A Constitutional History of Nigeria 
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of the natives.172 Whatever is made of the implications of the treaties between the 
local rulers and the Company, upon the revocation of the Charter of the Royal 
Niger Company and the subsequent Proclamation of the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria, agreements were made between Lord Lugard - the High Commissioner 
- and the Company wherein all rights in land possessed by the Company were to 
be vested in the High Commissioner to be held in trust for the British Monarch.173 
Accordingly, The Crown Lands Proclamation No 16 1902174 provided that:  
The lands, rights, and easements mentioned or referred to in the 
Agreements and Instruments set out in the schedule are to the 
extent and in the degree to which such lands, rights, and easements 
were vested in the Royal Niger Company, Chartered & Ltd. hereby 
vested in the High Commissioner for the time being, in trust for His 
Majesty his heirs and successors.175  
The Colonial administration however reserved certain rights to the Company 
under the agreements in some lands in the Northern Provinces where the 
Company had trading and commercial sites and stations.176 But all other rights 
reserved to the Company in the agreements were bought by the Colonial 
administration for the sum of £865, 000 with an additional fifty per cent royalty for 
a period of ninety-nine years.177 Consequently, all other lands purportedly 
belonging to the Company privately were ‘transferred to the Government as 
                                            
172 CWJ Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria (Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1911) at 248. 
173 TO Elias, (n 142) above at 32. 
174 Ibid, at 32 as cited by Elias. 
175 Ibid, at 32 as quoted by Elias. 
176 TO Elias, (n 142) above at 33. 
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“Crown lands”, while other lands in the Protectorate were regarded as “Public 
lands” the ultimate title to which the Government claimed by right of conquest.’178 
At a general level it has been argued that under British colonial and constitutional 
theory, land in any colonial Protectorate was regarded as foreign territory.179 
Therefore, although colonial Protectorates were regarded as Crown territories, 
the Crown did not own the lands.180 It appears then that it was as a result of the 
principle that colonial Protectorates are foreign territories that the theory arose 
that the inhabitants of British colonial Protectorates were not British subjects but 
British protected persons who might owe allegiance to the Crown.181  
Nevertheless, to give legal imprimatur to the claim that ‘Public lands’ in colonial 
Northern Nigeria were under the ultimate title of the colonial Government by right 
of conquest the Crown Lands Proclamation No 13 1902, as quoted by Elias 
provided in section 2 as follows: 
The High Commissioner may by writing under his hand and the Seal 
of the Protectorate declare to be public lands: 
(1) All lands not in the actual occupation of persons or of the tenant’s 
agents or servants of persons having an original or derivative title 
to such lands under any Proclamation enacted for the Protectorate 
or under any law or custom prevailing in that part of the Protectorate 
where such lands are situated. 
(2) Lands being the property of any conquered or deposed ruler.182 
 
Due to the confusion that arose as to the difference between ‘Crown lands’ and 
‘Public lands’ and the apparent contradiction that the afore-mentioned provisions 
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implied in the context of British constitutional theory about Crown rights in land 
located in colonial Protectorates, the Northern Nigeria Protectorate Committee183 
was set up by the Colonial Government.184  Elias argued that the 
recommendations of the Committee led to the enactment of the Land and Native 
Rights Proclamation No 9 1910 which provided that ‘[t]he whole of the lands of 
the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, whether occupied or unoccupied on the date 
of the commencement of this Proclamation, are hereby declared to be native 
lands’.185 The equivalent of this provision was reproduced under section 3 of the 
Land and Native Rights Ordinance No1 1916. This latter Ordinance which was 
modified by the Land and Native Rights Ordinance No 18 1918, provided under 
sections 3 and 4 as follows: 
(3) All native lands, and all rights over the same, are hereby declared 
to be under the control and subject to the disposition of the 
Governor, and shall be held and administered for the use and 
common benefit of the natives of Northern Nigeria; and no title to 
the occupation and use of any such lands shall be valid without the 
consent of the Governor. 
(4) The Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this 
Proclamation with respect to any land, shall have regard to the 
native laws and customs existing in the district in which such land is 
situated.186 
In a somewhat confusing way the Crown Lands Ordinance No 7 1918 which made 
provisions for ‘Crown lands’, defined such lands as: 
‘Crown lands’ means all public lands in Nigeria which are for the 
time being subject to the control of His Majesty by virtue of any 
treaty, cession, convention or agreement, or by virtue of his 
Majesty’s protectorate, and all lands which have been or may 
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hereafter be acquired by or on behalf of his Majesty for any public 
purpose or otherwise howsoever, but does not include lands subject 
to the Land and Native Rights Ordinance.187  
Although it is clear that the definition of ‘Crown lands’ above was subject to the 
sections 3 and 4 of the Land and Native Rights Ordinance 1918 in relation to the 
Northern Region of Nigeria reproduced above, there was confusion as to what 
the implications of this definition of ‘Crown lands’ really meant in relation to 
Southern Nigeria.188 However, the legal position in both Northern and Southern 
Provinces of the Protectorate and Colony of Nigeria remained the position taken 
by the Privy Council in the already cited Amodu Tijani’s case in 1921.189 
Consequently, it is argued that the position of the Crown in relation to lands in 
Colonial Nigeria was that in theory, the Crown, on the basis of British 
constitutional tradition, did not own lands in the Protectorates unless such lands 
were acquired from the Royal Niger Company or for public purposes.190 Indeed, 
in practice the Crown limited its right to merely controlling native interests in land 
against acquisition by aliens.191 
In the above manner, the introduced English land tenure and the management of 
land by the State through statutory law came to co-exist with the indigenous 
customary land tenure in colonial Nigeria. In addition to the above legal 
developments in relation to land tenure law in colonial Nigeria, on the eve of 
political independence, the nature of customary land tenure in Nigeria was 
gradually changing as individual ownership of land was beginning to take hold in 
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urban areas while communal forms of land holdings continued in the larger rural 
areas.192 However, the colonial consolidation of the idea of the State managing 
land through State legislation continued after political independence of Nigeria in 
1960, with State law purportedly accommodating customary land tenure as 
demonstrated further in sub-section 3.2.3 below. 
3.2.3.  Post-Colonial Nigeria and the Administration of Land 
(1960-Present) 
The 1918 Land and Native Rights Ordinance discussed above remained the 
major legislation on native lands in the Northern Region of the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria until political independence in 1960. However, it was 
subsequently repealed in 1962 and the Land Tenure Law 1962 was enacted.193 
This latter legislation designated certain lands in Northern Nigeria as ‘native lands’ 
but conferred the management of these lands on a Minister.194 Section 6 of the 
1962 law empowered the minister to grant rights of occupancy to natives while 
the approval of the minister was required for the occupation and enjoyment of 
land by non-natives.195 This law defined a non-native as a person whose father 
was not a member of any tribe indigenous to Northern Nigeria.196  
                                            
192 Ibid, at 297. See also, E Colson, 'The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land 
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2007). 
193 See PE Oshio, (n 132) above at 45. 
194 See sections 6 and 5 of the Land Tenure Law 1962 as cited in PE Oshio, (n 132) above at 
45. 
195 PE Oshio, (n 132) above at 45. 
196 See Section 2 of the Land Tenure Law 1962 as cited in PE Oshio, (n 132) above at 45. 
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In Africa, post-colonial African States like Nigeria have not only retained the 
colonial legacy of foreign laws but have consolidated them in various areas 
including managing land.197 Although the Nigerian Constitution 1999198 provides 
that all citizens have the right to acquire and own immovable property,199 the 
current Land Use Act 1978 (LUA)200 essentially nationalises all lands in Nigeria, 
thereby replacing the customary system of land tenure described above. The LUA 
is now the main statutory instrument that regulates ownership and management 
of all lands in Nigeria. The law vests all land within the territory of each State 
(except for land vested in the Federal Government) exclusively in the Governor 
of each State, who holds the land in trust for the benefit of all Nigerians indigenous 
to such States.201 
3.3. Post-Colonial State Law and Customary Law through 
the Lens of Legal Pluralism 
The above post-colonial legal developments in Nigeria demonstrate that the 
colonial heritage of legal pluralism in the weak sense have continued as 
customary law continues to be applied only on the terms and conditions upon 
which State law is willing to accommodate it. Similarly, the idea of legal unification 
                                            
197 GR Woodman, 'European Influence on Land law and Land Use in Colonial Ghana and 
Nigeria' in JD Moor and D Rothermund (eds), Our Laws, Their Lands: Land Laws and Land Use 
in Modern Colonial Societies (Lit Verlag, 1994). 
198 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Available at: <www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>, accessed 9 December 2016. 
199 See section 43. 
200 Land Use Act, 1978 CAP., 202 Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Available at: 
<www.nigeria-law.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm>, accessed 9 December 2016. 
201 See section 1. In section 2 the Governor has responsibility for land in urban areas while 
lands in non-urban areas are the responsibility of the Local Governments. See also, section 49 
where land vested in the federal Government are excluded from the control of State 
Governments. For a more detailed discussion on the LUA see Chapter Four under sub-section 
4.1.2. 
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and monopolisation of law by the Nigerian State has been consolidated post-
colonially. Griffith’s view that unification of laws is driven by the idea that it is ‘a 
condition of progress toward modern nationhood (as well as of economic and 
social ‘development’),202 is validated by the post-colonial legal developments in 
Nigeria. This will be further demonstrated later in Chapter Four where the case 
study in this thesis will be introduced. Like Griffiths, Allott observes that in the 
context of Africa and in the post-colonial period most if not all African States tried 
to establish their authority and maintain national unity by ensuring that the 
inherited colonial legal system reflects the quest for national unity.203 
Consequently, post-colonial African States embarked on a process of unification 
of laws with the objective of giving expression to such unity ‘in legal terms’.204  
However, Santos cautions against the idea of centralisation and unification of 
laws as he argues that it is important not to destroy ‘the capacity for traditional 
popular creativity, at a local and regional level, without which it will not be possible 
to create a true national identity towards a more just society.’205 Indeed, it will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Four that in the context of the case study in this thesis, 
Santos’ admonition that an excessive focus on unity at the expense of pluralism 
                                            
202  J Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 18 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law 1 at 7-8. For a comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons of unification of laws in the 
African context, see AN Allott, 'Towards the Unification of Laws in Africa' (1965) 14 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly 366. See also, C Himsworth, 'The Botswana Customary Law Act, 
1969' (1972) 16 Journal of African Law 4. For the post-colonial situation in Botswana, see JF 
Holleman, 'Trouble-Cases and Trouble-less Cases in the Study of Customary Law and Legal 
Reform' (1973) 7 Law in Society Review 585. And for articles criticising attempts at codification 
of customary law as inconsistent with African values, see TW Bennett and T Vermeulen, 
'Codification of Customary Law' (1980) 24 Journal of African Law 206 and SF Moore, 'Treating 
Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What to Say to Africans About Running" Their 
Own" Native Courts' (1992) Law and Society Review 11. 
203 AN Allott, (n 202) above at 389. 
204 Ibid. 
205 BdS Santos, 'From Customary Law to Popular Justice' (1984) 28 Journal of African Law 90 at 
98. 
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may be counter-productive as people whose human rights are jeopardised by 
such excessive quest for unity may end up with resentments and grievances 
against the Nigerian State. This leads to disunity rather than the purported unity 
that the Nigerian State aims to achieve.  
Hard or deep legal pluralism requires the recognition that law is not a unified 
phenomenon or based on a single system of laws. In line with this, Griffiths argues 
that real legal pluralism (deep or strong legal pluralism) must have a different 
objective of demonstrating that law is not ‘unified’, ‘single’ or based on a hierarchy 
determined by the State, as opposed to weak or soft legal pluralism.206 Having 
distinguished between legal pluralism in the strong and weak sense, Griffiths goes 
on to cite with approval the ideas of Pospisil,207 Smith,208 Ehrlich209 and Moore210 
and whilst he appears to align more towards Moore’s idea of the ‘semi-
autonomous social field’ he concludes that all of them211 ‘have no difficulty in 
recognizing legal pluralism in the strong, empirical sense as a feature of the social 
groups with which they are concerned.’212 In this way, Griffiths succeeds in 
demonstrating that the situation such as we have in post-colonial Nigeria in which 
                                            
206 Ibid. 
207 See L Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (Harper & Row, 1971). 
208 See MG Smith, Corporations and Society (Transaction Publishers, 1974). 
209 See E Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Russell & Russell Inc, 1962). 
210 See SF Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study' (1973) Law and Society Review 719, reprinted in SF Moore, Law 
as Process: An Anthropological Approach (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). See also, B 
Malinowski, Malinowski Collected Works: Crime and Custom in Savage Society, vol 3 
(Routledge, 2002). 
211 J Griffiths, (n 202) above at 15-37. Pospisil’s Idea of ‘Legal Levels’, Smith’s Idea of 
‘Corporations’, Ehrlich’s Idea of the ‘living law’ and Moore’s concept of the ‘Semi-autonomous 
Social Field’. 
212 J Griffiths, (n 202) above at 14-15. 
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State law seeks to accommodate and validate customary law is not legal pluralism 
in the empirical sense. Rather it is a triumph of legal centralism. 
It is argued that strong or deep legal pluralism is the best way to account for the 
effective protection and preservation of customary law and the rights of people 
that are founded upon such customary laws, not just in Nigeria but also across 
the African continent. This is in line with Santos’ arguments in favour of expanding 
the concept of legal pluralism to cover all forms of social orderings.213 In his 
studies in Portugal214, Brazil215 and in the Cape Verde Islands216, Santos 
demonstrates the existence of 'three forms of legal spaces and their 
correspondent forms of law: local, national and world-legality.’217 He maintains 
that ‘[l]ocal law is large scale reality; nation-state law is medium-scale reality'.218 
Whereas local law is the most realistic in view of its proximity to its objects, 
international (world) law is the least realistic and national law has a mid-level 
reality.219 
In using the metaphor of the 'symbolic cartography of law’220  Santos submits that 
the ‘struggle against the monopolies of interpretation must be conducted in such 
                                            
213 See BdS Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and 
Emancipation (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
214 BdS Santos, Law and Revolution in Portugal: The Experiences of Popular Justice After the 
25th April, 1974 (Academic Press, 1976). 
215 BdS Santos, 'Law, State and Urban Struggles in Recife, Brazil' (1992) 1 Social & Legal 
Studies 235. 
216 BdS Santos, A Justiça Popular em Cabo Verde (Estudo Sociológico, Centro de Estudos 
Sociais, Faculdade de Economia da Universade de Coimbra, 1984). 
217 BdS Santos, 'Law: A Map of Misreading-Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law' (1987) 14 
Journal of Law & Society 279 at 287. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
220 BdS Santos, (n 216) above at 297. 
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way as to lead to proliferation of political and legal interpretive communities.’221 
His arguments are that a post-modern conception of law ought to be pluralistic, 
considering ‘interlegality’ by uncovering other latent and suppressed forms of 
legality.222 However, Gunther Teubner has compared legal pluralism (in the 
strong, deep or hard sense as advocated by Griffiths and de Sosa Santos) to 
‘…the old Roman god Janus, guardian of gates and doors, beginnings and ends, 
with two faces, one on the front and the other at the back of his head, legal 
pluralism is at the same time both: social norms and legal rules, law and society, 
formal and informal’.223  The critique is that legal pluralism in this broad sense 
seems unable to explain the connections or differences between social and legal 
norms thereby creating ambiguity in its conception of law.224  
Indeed, deep, hard or strong legal pluralism defines law in a very broad way. 
Griffiths’ views ‘that “legal” and “non-legal” forms of social control’225 are not 
‘distinguishable types’226 has been opposed by scholars, as Sally Merry asks: 
‘Where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves simply describing social 
life? Is it useful to call all these forms of ordering law?’227 Similarly, Galanter has 
argued that ‘... it may be useful to have a cut-off point further "up" the scale to 
demarcate what we want to describe as "law" of any sort, indigenous or 
                                            
221 BdS Santos, The Post-Modern Transition: Law and Politics (Oficina Do CES, 1989) at 33. 
222 BdS Santos, (n 217) above at 299. 
223 G Teubner, 'The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, ' (1991) 13 Cardozo Law 
Review at 1443. 
224 See also, BZ Tamanaha, 'The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism' 
(1993) Journal of Law & Society 192 at 192-193. 
225 J Griffiths, (n 202) above at 39. 
226 Ibid. 
227 SE Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) Law and Society Review 869 at 878. 
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otherwise.’228 The problem of differentiating law from other normative orderings 
associated with deep legal pluralism has been also criticised by Tamanaha, who 
argues that there is nothing wrong with understanding law in such expansive 
ways, but such expansive definition of legal pluralism implies that ‘we are 
swimming, or drowning, in legal pluralism.’229 
However, Woodman maintains that it should be accepted that all forms of social 
control are part of the subject of legal pluralism.230 In what appears to be an 
approval of legal pluralism in the expansive way articulated by the legal 
sociologists – Griffiths and Santos - Woodman concludes ‘that law covers a 
continuum which runs from the clearest form of state law through to the vaguest 
forms of informal social control.’231 Nevertheless, it appears that Griffiths has 
recalibrated from his earlier ideas.232 
Woodman appears to sum up the debates on legal pluralism by arguing that the 
scholarship on legal pluralism has been centred around whether there is any 
remarkable difference between State law and non-State law as well as the 
meaning of law itself.233 He identifies various categories of normative orderings 
                                            
228 M Galanter, 'Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law' (1981) 
13 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1 at 18, see particularly note 26. 
229 BZ Tamanaha, 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global' (2008) 30 
Sydney Law Review 375 at 393. 
230  See GR Woodman, 'How State Courts Create Customary Law in Ghana and Nigeria' in BW 
Morse and GR Woodman, (eds), Indigenous Laws and The State (Foris Publications, 1988) at 
44-45. 
231 Ibid, at 45. 
232 J Griffiths, 'The Idea of Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and to Sociology' (2005) 8 
Current Legal Issues 49 at 63-64. 
233 GR Woodman, (n 230) above at 50. 
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including: ethnicity, economic activity, voluntary activity and commons status.234 
On his part Tamanaha summarises the reasons for the lengthy debates on legal 
pluralism by arguing that: ‘law’ ‘… cannot be formulated in terms of a single 
scientific category because over time and in different places people have seen 
law in different terms.’235  
In the above theoretical way, the debates on legal pluralism help in rationalising 
the gradual monopolisation of law by the colonial Nigerian State and the 
continuation of such monopoly of law by the post-colonial Nigerian State. In the 
process of such monopolisation of law, the indigenous customary laws and legal 
institutions in Nigeria have been merged into the State legal system by relegating 
customary law and indigenous legal institutions to an inferior status in comparison 
to State law and its legal institutions,236 thereby creating a situation of Griffiths’ 
legal pluralism in the ‘weak sense’237 and Woodman’s ‘state law pluralism’.238 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has demonstrated the application of customary law by courts of law 
in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. It has illustrated how customary law and 
indigenous legal institutions have been subjected to the validation of colonial and 
post-colonial State legal apparatus in Nigeria. The nature of pre-colonial African 
                                            
234 See GR Woodman, 'The Development “Problem” of Legal Pluralism' in BZ Tamanaha, C 
Sage and M Woolcock (eds), Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in 
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 134. 
235 BZ Tamanaha, (n 229) above at 396. For a comprehensive analysis of all the various version 
of legal pluralism, see BZ Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at 171-205. 
236 See GR Woodman, 'Constitutions in a World of Powerful Semi-Autonomous Social Fields' 
(1989) Third World Legal Studies 1. 
237 J Griffiths, (n 202) above. 
238 GR Woodman, 'Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice' (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 
152. 
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customary land tenure in Nigeria has been examined and the impact of colonial 
rule on the definition of land rights in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria have also 
been discussed. It has been argued that the simultaneous co-existence of 
customary land tenure and English land tenure law in colonial and post-colonial 
Nigeria is a situation of legal pluralism in Griffith’s ‘weak sense’ and in the sense 
of Woodman’s ‘state law pluralism’. 
With political independence of Nigeria in 1960, another layer of normative legal  
order was added to the already pluralist legal situation in Nigeria as it regained 
sovereignty and became a Member of the UN and later the African Union, thereby 
making it subject to the obligations and duties of a State under the UN Charter, 
international law and regional African obligations arising therefrom.239 In Chapter 
Four, the case study will be used to illustrate that situations of legal pluralism in 
Griffith’s ‘weak sense’ and Woodman’s ‘state law pluralism’ have negative 
implications on the rights of people founded on the basis of customary law. 
                                            
239 See Volume 2 of this thesis below where the emergence of international law and the human 
rights obligations of States are discussed in more details in the context of the rights of 
indigenous peoples. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LAND RIGHTS OF ABUJA PEOPLES 
OF NIGERIA - A CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
In Chapters Two and Three, the emergence of colonialism and the relegation of 
customary law to an inferior status compared to State law in colonial and post-
colonial Nigeria was demonstrated. The implications of the above on the definition 
of land rights in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria was also highlighted. The main 
purpose of this Chapter is to introduce the case study of Abuja, Nigeria. The case 
study is then used as a vehicle through which to demonstrate the impact of 
colonialism and the implications of the relegation of customary law to an inferior 
status compared to State law on the land rights of Abuja peoples in post-colonial 
Nigeria. This case study will also be used to critically analyse the concept of 
indigeneity under international law later in Chapter Six.  
In 1976, the Nigerian Government compulsorily acquired the ancestral lands of 
Abuja peoples of Nigeria without payment of compensation or resettlement. As 
demonstrated later in sub-section 4.1.2 below, this is legitimised under Nigerian 
State laws. This Chapter will illustrate the legal implications of the monopolisation 
of law by the post-colonial Nigerian State on the land rights of Abuja peoples. The 
Chapter is comprised of two main sections. Section 4.1 introduces the case study 
of Abuja. In section 4.2, the relevance of this case study to this thesis and the 
legal challenges in this thesis will be examined. It will also be demonstrated that 
the ideas of post-colonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak 
and Homi Bhabha are helpful in the understanding of the legal problems 
presented by the case study. Likewise, the ideas of John Griffiths, Gordon 
Woodman and Sally Falk Moore help in contextualising the legal challenges which 
the case study of Abuja will illustrate. So, who are the Abuja peoples and what 
are the challenges presented by the case study of Abuja, Nigeria’s current 
administrative capital? 
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4.1. The Case Study of Abuja, Nigeria 
The territory of Abuja is currently the administrative capital of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.1 In the First Schedule to the Nigerian Federal Capital Territory Act 
1976 (FCT Act)2 more specific geographical description is provided.3 Abuja is at 
the geographical centre of Nigeria.4 The peoples of Abuja are minority ethnic 
groups in Nigeria and are predominantly members of the Gbagyi (Gwari) ethnic 
group but also there are the Koros, Gades, Bassas, Igbiras, Amwamwas, Ajiri 
Afos and Gwandaras.5 People from other parts of Nigeria now reside in this 
territory given its status as the capital of Nigeria. Anthropological and historical 
studies have demonstrated that the peoples of Abuja have occupied this territory 
                                            
1 See International Consortium of Planners, The Abuja Master Plan (International Planning 
Associates, 1978). See also, Map of Nigeria showing States including Abuja at Appendix 1 
below and Table showing States in Nigeria including Abuja by land size at Appendix 3 below. 
2 Federal Capital Territory Act, 1976 (FCT Act), CAP 128 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1990. Available at: <www.nigeria-law.org/Federal%20Capital%20Territory%20Act.htm>, 
accessed 9 December 2016. 
3 See First Schedule, Part II of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as 
amended), where specific geographical information defines the territory as: ‘Starting from the 
village called Izom on 7 E Longitude and 9 15' Latitude, project a straight line westwards to a 
point just north of Lehu on the Kemi River; then project a line along 6 471/2' E southwards 
passing close to the villages called Semasu, Zui and Bassa down to a place a little west of Abaji 
in Kwara State; thence project a line along parallel 8 271/2' N Latitude to Ahinza village 7 6' E 
(on the Kanama River); thence project a straight line to Buga village on 8 30' N Latitude and 7 
20' E Longitude; thence draw a line northwards joining the villages of Odu, Karshi and Karu. 
From Karu the line shall proceed along the boundary between the Niger and Plateau States as 
far as Karu; thence the line should proceed along the boundary between Kaduna and Niger 
States up to a point just north of Bwari village; thence the line goes straight to Zuba village and 
thence straight to Izom.’ 
4 The area falls within the Guinean forest-savannah zone of the West African sub-region and 
features a tropical wet and dry climate. Demographically, the latest census indicates that Abuja 
has a population of about 1,406,239. See, National Population Commission, Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 2006 Population and Housing Census of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Volume., I) at 
1, available at: <www.population.gov.ng/images/Priority%20Tables%20Volume%20I-
update.pdf>, accessed 01/01/2015, and Y Adamu and AE Ichaba, Abuja: Man and Society 
(Abuja Council for Arts and Culture, 1997) at 2. 
5 See further anthropological details about these groups below. 
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prior to British colonial rule.6 They are mainly farmers, hunters and fishermen.7 
They depend on the occupation of their ancestral lands which they have held 
under customary law to practice their occupations.8 Rural and subsistence 
farming seems to cut across all the various ethnic groups.9 However, the different 
ethnic groups seem to have their respective specialties in different crafts.10  
To understand the challenges that Abuja peoples currently face in relation to their 
ancestral lands and the relevance of this case study to this thesis, it is necessary 
to examine the emergence of the territory of Abuja as the administrative capital 
of Nigeria simultaneously with the evolution of formal State land tenure law in 
Nigeria. The justification for the historical narration that follows is the need to 
establish that Abuja peoples have inhabited this territory since pre-British colonial 
era, under customary law before the introduction of the idea of the State 
managing land through statutory law. This history is also important for 
understanding the theoretical explanations about the case study as a vehicle 
                                            
6 For anthropological notes on the history, culture and geographical locations of these tribes in 
Nigeria, see generally, CL Temple, Native Races and their Rulers: Sketches and Studies of 
Official Life and Administrative Problems in Nigeria (Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd and Way 
& Co Ltd, 1918) at 29-79; OSMM Temple and CL Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, 
Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (2nd edn, CMS Bookshop, 1922); 
OSMM Temple and CL Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the 
Northern Provinces of Nigeria (Cass, 1965); HD Gunn and F Conant, Peoples of the Middle 
Niger Region: Northern Nigeria, vol 1 (International African Institute, 1960); CK Meek, The 
Northern Tribes of Nigeria: An Ethnographical Account of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria 
together with a Report on the 1921 Decennial Census, vol I (Cambridge University Press, 1925); 
CK Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria: An Ethnographical Account of the Northern Provinces 
of Nigeria together with a Report on the 1921 Decennial Census, vol II (Cambridge University 
Press, 1925) and Y Adamu and AE Ichaba (n 4) above at 2. See also, Linguistic Map of Nigeria 
at Appendix 4 below. 
7 They have been reported by historians to have inhabited the Abuja areas of Zuba, Kawali, 
Bwari, Kuje, Abaji, Gwagwalada, Karu, Karshi and Garki among other towns and villages. See, 
S Na'ibi and A Hassan, The Gwari Tribe in Abuja Emirate (Nigeria Magazine Special 
Publications, Federal Government Print Department, 1961) at 7-13. Also, see S Na'Ibi and A 
Hassan, The Gwari, Gade and Koro Tribes (Ibadan University Press, 1969) and R Blench, 'Atlas 
of Nigerian Languages, volume III (Crozier & Blench, 1992). 
8 See Abuja Council of Arts and Culture, A Socio-cultural Study of the Peoples of Abuja Vol 1 
(Research & Documentation Unit, Abuja Council for Arts and Culture, 1995) at Chapters 1-5. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
Land Rights of Abuja Peoples of Nigeria: A Case Study 
117 
 
through which to study the effects of law in society and its implications on the 
rights of IPs in a post-colonial Nigeria. The historical narration has been sub-
divided into the following historical periods: pre-British colonial Nigeria and British 
colonial Nigeria as well as post-colonial Nigeria. 
4.1.1. Pre-British Colonial Nigeria (1800-1904) 
The earliest settlers in the area now known as Abuja11 were peoples from the Kwa 
speaking language group.12 They settled there many centuries before the Islamic 
jihad of the nineteenth century.13  This area became part of and under the political 
hegemony of the ancient Habe (Hausa) kingdom of Zazzau (Zaria) in the early 
part of the nineteenth century.14 The presence of the Hausa Emirs in Abuja had 
some impact on the socio-cultural and economic conditions in this area prior to 
British colonial administration. In addition to the indigenous peoples enumerated 
above, many Hausas and Fulanis came to settle in the area.15 As a result, 
Thomas-Emeagwali reports that:  
On the eve of the British conquest of the area in 1900, the struggle 
for power in the region involved the ruling circles of the Hausa, the 
Fulani, the Gbagyi and the Koro principally…and the extent to which 
the dominant ruling factions in these groups succeeded in wielding 
effective military power. Equally important, the influx of immigrants 
into the Abuja region was related to the economic viability of the 
area.16 
                                            
11 See current Map of Abuja at Appendix 2 below. 
12 Y Adamu and AE Ichaba, (n 4) above at 4. See also, G Thomas-Emeagwali, ‘Notes on the 
History of Abuja, Central Nigeria’ African Study Monographs 9, No 4 (1989) at 191-196. 
13 A Hassan and S Na'ibi, (n 7) above at 10. 
14 See Table of ‘Abuja Genealogy’ showing the order of succession in years of these Emirs in 
OSMM Temple and CL Temple (n 6) above at 518. 
15 G Thomas-Emeagwali, (n 12) above at 192. 
16 Ibid, at 192-193. 
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The above development led to an increased incidences of class formation among 
the various ethnic groups in the area as was already the case in other areas of 
the Middle Belt region of Nigeria.17 Indeed, some of the indigenous ethnic 
nationalities were enslaved by the dominant Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups.18 
This area of the former Zaria Kingdom continued to be increasingly populated by 
several semi-independent tribes.19 In the early 1800s when the Zaria Kingdom fell 
to Fulani invaders, one Muhammadu Makam (a Zaria King) is reported to have 
fled south of Zaria with some of his followers and brothers (Abu Ja and Abu 
Kwaka), all of whom successively became Emirs of Abuja.20 Abu Ja (who the town 
was named after) is said to have succeeded Makam in the year 1837.21  
The fleeing emirs from the old Zaria Kingdom came with and super-imposed their 
culture on the peoples of Abuja as well as taking over control of the lands in this 
area until their conquest by the British colonial army in 1902.22 Like indigenous 
peoples (IPs) in other parts the world, the above development highlights the early 
vulnerability of these groups of people to external forces prior to British colonial 
rule.23  Indeed, many of the minority and indigenous ethnic populations in this area 
saw the Emirs and the immigrant Hausa populations that came along with them 
as settlers, a situation that often leads to violent conflicts across the Middle Belt 
                                            
17 Ibid, at 195. 
18 A Hassan and S Na'ibi, A Chronicle of Abuja (African University Press Ltd, 1962) at 1-37. 
19 Ibid.  
20 See table of ‘Abuja Genealogy’ showing the order of succession in years of these Emirs in 
OSMM Temple and CL Temple (n 6 above) at 518. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Y Adamu and AE Ichaba, (n 4) above at 4. 
23 Ibid. 
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region of Nigeria where some of the Hausa and Fulani settlers are currently 
settled.24 
Another effect of the arrival of Emirs was the introduction of Islam and many 
members of the pre-existing indigenous ethnic groups embraced Islam and its 
tenets came to influence various areas of their lives including Islamic law on 
property and inheritance. Indeed, ‘under Islamic law of the Maliki School, land 
was expropriated from non-Muslims’.25 However, as King noted in the context of 
pre-British colonial Northern Nigeria, ‘though the Caliphate created a Fulani 
aristocracy, and replaced the ideological underpinnings of the Hausa states with 
an Islamic superstructure, it nevertheless, remained an ethnically heterogenous 
polity in which territorial identification superseded any sense of being Hausa-
Fulani.’26 Therefore, like other parts of Northern Nigeria in pre-British colonial 
Abuja land tenure in the area was governed by Islamic law for Muslims and 
customary law among non-Muslims.27 The situation regarding land tenure in this 
area on the eve of British colonial take over is reported by Na’Ibi and Hassan who 
wrote: 
ALL PEOPLE WHO TAKE UP LAND have to own the sarki as their 
chief and pay him a tax. All land is owned by the community, and 
every village has its well-defined boundaries, be they in the bush or 
in the cultivated land. Disputes on village boundaries are settled by 
the District head or Emir; and disputes over farm boundaries by the 
Village Headman and his Elders.28 
                                            
24 W Adebanwi, ‘Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in Northern 
Nigeria’ (2009) 13 (4) Citizenship Studies 349 at 349. 
25 SN Nwabara, ‘The “Received” Nigerian Law and the Challenge of Legal Independence’ (1979) 
14 (1) Journal of Asian and African Studies 99 at 104. 
26 LD King, ‘State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria’ (2001) 36 (4) Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 339 at 339. 
27 SN Nwabara, (n 25) above at 104-105. 
28 S Nai’Ibi and A Hassan, (n 7) above at 34. Emphasis as in the original text. 
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The Islamic Jihad of the nineteenth century that engulfed Northern Nigeria, 
including Abuja, throws light on the role of narratives in the political domination of 
others in a similar way as Western imperialism. For example, the Hausa and 
Fulani colonial domination of Northern Nigeria was facilitated by a grand-narrative 
around the so-called ‘legend of Bayajida’.29 According to this myth and legend, 
the origins of the whole Hausa ethnic group of Northern Nigeria relates to how 
one Bayajida who arrived in the would-be Hausa land from Baghdad, married into 
an existing ruling family, and became the father of the rulers of the seven city-
States through his legitimate wife who made up the Hausa Bakwai (seven 
authentic Hausa States).30  
Bayajida is also claimed to have had seven other ‘illegitimate’ children which he 
fathered through his legitimate wife’s slave!31 These latter ‘illegitimate’ children of 
Bayajida purportedly founded the Banza Bakwoi (seven unauthentic Hausa 
States).32 According to this legend the Gbayis originated from one of the seven 
‘illegitimate’ children of Bayajida.33 While the authenticity of the aforementioned 
legend in terms of explaining the origins of the States in Northern Nigeria remains 
contested34 and has been claimed to exist only in the imaginations of those who 
concocted it,35 its role in feeding into the narratives of political domination by the 
dominant Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria remains in present-
                                            
29 W Hallam, 'The BayajIbida Legend in Hausa Folklore' (1966) 7 The Journal of African History 
47. 
30 Ibid. The seven Hausa States named are: Daura, Kano, Katsina, Gobir, Rano, Zaria and 
Biram.  
31 See D Lange, 'The BayajIbidda Legend and Hausa History ' in E Bruder and T Parfitt, (eds), 
African Zion: Studies in Black Judaism (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012) 139-174. 
32 These so-called inauthentic States are: Zamfara, Kebbi, Nupe, Gwari, Yauri, Yoruba and 
Kwararafa (Jukun). 
33 D Lange, (n 31) above at 140. 
34 Ibid, at 141-167. 
35 See for example, A Smith, 'Some Considerations Relating to the Formation of States in 
Hausaland' (1970) Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 329. 
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day Nigeria.36 Indeed, the use of narratives in the political domination of others, 
is a theme that has resonated with many post-colonial scholars.  
For example, Edward Said’s famous book Orientalism,37 examines how the 
colonial powers of the West got involved in colonialism and imperialism. Said, 
specifically identifies Great Britain, France and America38 and narrates how they 
created and continue to represent an idea of the ‘Orient’ for their interests and 
consumption that has no connection with the reality of the ‘Orient’.39 By ‘Orient’, 
Said is referring to the Middle East although in his later work Culture and 
Imperialism,40 he also focused on India and Africa and other parts of world. 
Indeed, scholars have maintained that Said has demonstrated ‘how imperialism 
changes other lands – to look more like Europe; to produce in a more European 
way (or at least in a way which benefits Europe).’41 For example, some have 
argued that the very idea of statehood in the Westphalian sense that was 
imported into Africa through colonialism by Europeans was aimed at facilitating 
European engagement with the colonies.42  
However, Said’s Oriental has been criticised because it ‘neglects evidence of 
native agency in general and indigenous resistance in a manner which parallels 
                                            
36 See M Smith, The Affairs of Daura: History and Change in a Hausa State 1800-1958 
(University of California Press, 1978) and WF Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and 
Independence in Nigeria and Niger (University of California Press, 1978). 
37 E Said, Orientalism (Pantheon, 1978). See page 3, where Said acknowledges that ‘I have 
found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse, as described by him in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to Identify Orientalism.’ 
38 Ibid, at 4.  
39 Ibid.  
40 E Said, Culture and Imperialism (Random House LLC, 1993). 
41 Ibid, at 103. 
42 See RH Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, vol 
12 (Cambridge University Press, 1993) and A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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Western or Orientalist attitudes.’43 Said’s Orientalism is too monolithic as the 
focus of its discourse is only on the Arab world.44 It focuses on a large amount of 
diverse ways through which the West engaged in ‘Orientalism’, the focus was too 
narrowly based on the Arab world in the Middle East. In response to this criticism 
Said produced his later work- Culture and Imperialism. As he described it ‘I… 
have tried here to expand the arguments of the earlier book to describe a more 
general pattern of relationships between the modern metropolitan West and its 
overseas territories’.45 
In general, Said does not appear to recognise the various hierarchies of 
representations (Orientalism) that other dominant groups seem to exercise in their 
relationship and cultural contacts with smaller groups within even the colonised 
societies that he studies. Nevertheless, Said’s work leads to an understanding 
that ‘[t]he battle in imperialism is over land … but when it came to who owned the 
land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, 
and who now plans its future – these issues were reflected, contested, and even 
for a time decided in narrative.’46 Indeed, the power of narration which entails 
representation and misrepresentation is significant in our understanding of the 
power dynamics that are involved in the control over land. It is argued that as 
narration aided the colonial authorities in their acquisition of territories in Africa, 
the case study of Abuja demonstrates that the use of narration as a means of 
acquiring territory and exercising power over people with little or no political power 
did not begin with European colonialism (as the use of the ‘legend of Bayajida’ in 
Northern Nigeria demonstrates), nor did it end with political independence of 
African States as demonstrated in sub-section 4.1.2 and section 4.2 below. 
                                            
43 P Childs, et al, An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory (Prentice Hall London, 1997) at 107. 
44 For further criticism of Said’s work on orientalism see, J McLeod, Beginning Postcolonialism 
(Manchester University Press, 2000) at 46-55. 
45 E Said, (n 37) above at xi. 
46 Ibid, at xiii. 
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4.1.2. Colonial and Post-Colonial Nigeria (1904-Present) 
The British colonial land tenure law in Northern Nigeria described in Chapter 
Three,47 operated in the territory of Abuja until political independence in 1960. 
The colonial authorities merely retained the political structure existing in this area 
and governed through a process of indirect rule.48 The Abuja Emirate was 
designated a Native Authority known as the Abuja Native Authority under the 
administration of the Emir who was answerable to the British colonial District 
Officers.49 The position in relation to the land rights of the indigenous inhabitants 
remained the position taken by the Privy Council in Ahmodu Tijani v Secretary 
Southern Nigeria,50 to the effect that whatever interest the Crown had on the lands 
in this territory was subject to the land rights of the ‘natives’ under customary law. 
Once the decision had been made by the Nigerian Government to relocate the 
Nigerian Capital from Lagos to Abuja, ‘the Emir of Abuja at the time…was asked 
to meet with his Emirate Council to approve contributing four of the five districts 
of Abuja to become the new capital.’51 Hence, ‘the Abuja Emirate in Niger States 
contributed 80%, Plateau State (now Nassarawa State) contributed 16 percent of 
the South-east territory and Kwara States (now Kogi State) contributed about four 
percent of the South-west territory.’52 The old Abuja town (the headquarters of the 
defunct Abuja Emirate) which was not included in the territory of the new FCT 
was asked to relinquish its name for the FCT while it (the  old Abuja town) was 
                                            
47 See sub-section 3.2.2 
48 See KP Maddocks and DA Pott, Report on Local Government in the Northern Provinces of 
Nigeria (1950) at 26. 
49 Ibid, at 26-28. 
50 Amodu Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria [1921] AC 399. 
51 F Rodd et al, (n 96) below at 7. 
52 Ibid, at 7-8. See also, Appendix 1 for the location of the neighbouring States that purportedly 
made this contribution. 
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renamed Suleja after the then Emir.53 Thereafter, on 4 February 1976 the military 
Government in Nigeria promulgated Decree No 6 of 1979 (now known as the 
Federal Capital Territory Act)54 compulsorily acquiring the ancestral lands of the 
Abuja peoples without payment of compensation or resettling them. 
The Nigerian Land Use Act 1978 (LUA)55 discussed in Chapter Three is not 
applicable in Abuja Nigeria. It is the narrative of the government of Nigeria that 
Abuja is a symbol of the political unity and all lands there belong exclusively to 
the Federal Government of Nigeria.56 Consequently, the Federal Capital Territory 
Act 1976 (FCT Act)57 vests all of Abuja lands in the Federal Government.58 As 
Abuja is not a State within the Nigerian federation, there is no Governor, hence, 
the non-applicability of the LUA. The effect is that the powers to manage land in 
Abuja are vested in the President of Nigeria.59 This compulsory acquisition of the 
customary land rights of Abuja peoples is then given constitutional imprimatur 
under Section 297 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
(Nigerian Constitution). That section provides that ‘[t]he ownership of all lands 
comprised in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall vest in the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.’ Indeed, section 1(3) of the FCT Act states that: 
                                            
53 F Rodd et al, (n 96) below at 8. 
54 Infra, (n 57) below. 
55 Land Use Act, 1978 CAP., 202 Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Available at: 
<www.nigeria-law.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm>, accessed 9 December 2016. 
56 See KT Imoro, Federal Capital Territory Abuja: Centre of Unity = Territoire de la Capitale 
Federale Abuja: Centre d' Unite (Episteme Global Concepts, 2006); S Ago, Federal Capital 
Territory Abuja, Nigeria: Report of Ministerial Committee for the Appraisal of Physical Planning 
and \Development Issues in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Federal Capital Territory 
Development Authority, 1999); and Y Adamu and AE Ichaba, Abuja: Man and Society (Abuja 
Council for Arts and Culture, 1997). 
57 Federal Capital Territory Act, CAP. 128 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. Available at: 
<www.nigeria-law.org/Federal%20Capital%20Territory%20Act.htm>, accessed 16 December 
2016. 
58 See Section 1 (3). 
59 Who often delegates his powers to the Minister. 
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The area contained in the Capital Territory shall, as from the 
commencement of this Act, cease to be a portion of the States 
concerned and shall thenceforth be governed and administered by 
or under the control of the Government of the Federation to the 
exclusion of any other person or authority whatsoever and the 
ownership of the lands comprised in the Federal Capital Territory 
shall likewise vest absolutely in the Government of the Federation. 
The introduction of English law and the idea of State managing land into Nigeria 
have given rise to several difficulties that have generally affected the customary 
land rights of Nigerians in general.60 However, the preservation of certain aspects 
of customary land tenure within the LUA implies the survival of some aspects of 
customary land tenure in the 36 States, of which people indigenous to those 
States are beneficiaries.61 Hence, some Nigerians have benefited from this hybrid 
land tenure system compared to Abuja peoples whose customary land rights are 
terminated. Nigerians indigenous to other States within Nigeria who occupied land 
under customary tenure before the commencement of the LUA on 27th March, 
1978 are beneficiaries of section 36 of LUA which provides that: 
(1) The following provisions of this section shall have effect in 
respect of land not in an urban area which was immediately before 
the commencement of this Act held or occupied by any person. 
                                            
60 See PE Oshio, 'The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria,' (1990) 
10 Boston College Third World Law Journal 43 at 49. See also, I Smith, 'Effects of the Land Use 
Act on Customary Land Tenure System in Nigeria' (1990) 2 Journal of Contemporary Legal 
Problems 119; FA Salamone, 'The Clash between Indigenous, Islamic, Colonial and Post-
colonial Law in Nigeria' (1983) 15 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 15;  VC 
Uchendu, 'State, Land, and Society in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment of Land Use Decree 
(1978)' (1979) 6 Journal of African Studies 62; L Agbosu, 'The Land Use Act and the State of 
Nigerian Land Law' (1988) 32 Journal of African Law 1; and I Umezulike. ‘The Customary 
Tenant and the Land Use Act’ (1978) 20 People's Law Journal 1. 
61 PE Oshio, (n 60) above at 53-54. For example, section 24 of the Act preserves the customary 
law rules governing devolution of property. Section 25 prohibits partitioning of land but it 
exempts cases which are regulated by customary law. Under section 29 the holder or occupier 
entitled to compensation is a community and the governor is empowered to direct payment of 
the compensation either to the community or to its chief or leader to be disposed of by him for 
the benefit of the community in accordance with the applicable customary law. Section 50 then 
defines a ‘customary right of occupancy’ as ‘the right of a person or community lawfully using or 
occupying land in accordance with customary law ...’  while an ‘occupier’ is defined as ‘any 
person lawfully occupying land under customary law and a person using or occupying land in 
accordance with customary law ....’ 
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(2) Any occupier or holder of such land, whether under customary 
rights or otherwise howsoever, shall if that land was on the 
commencement of this Act being used for agricultural purposes 
continue to be entitled to possession of the land for use for 
agricultural purposes as if a customary right of occupancy had been 
granted to the occupier or holder by the appropriate Local 
Government... 
(4) Where the land is developed, the land shall continue to be held 
by the person to whom it was vested immediately before the 
commencement of this Act as if the holder of the land was the holder 
of a customary right of occupancy issued by the Local 
Government… 
 As mentioned above, the LUA is not applicable in Abuja. Indeed, the FCT Act 
which was enacted in 1976 pre-dates the 1978 LUA. Therefore, the protection of 
customary land rights of occupiers of land before the commencement of the LUA 
does not apply to the benefit of holders or occupiers of land under customary land 
tenure in Abuja.  
The combined effects of the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution and the FCT 
Act alienates Abuja peoples from their ancestral lands. Consequently, any rights 
to land that they are entitled to under customary tenure is under the Nigerian laws 
invalid. The above legal situation in relation to customary land tenure in Abuja has 
been confirmed by the decisions of the Nigerian Court of Appeal (CA) in the only 
known case on the issue as at the time of writing. In the case of Ona v Atenda,62 
the Nigerian CA relied on the provisions of the afore-mentioned provision of the 
FCT Act and the Nigerian Constitution when it held rather brutally, per Akinta 
Justice of the Court of Appeal (JCA) (as he then was) who delivered the lead 
judgment that: 
The law is settled that where land is acquired for public purposes 
under a statute, as in the instant case, the Government takes such 
land as of right and no implied contract by the Government to pay 
compensation can be inferred from the taking. Similarly, claims for 
compensation for lands acquired by the Government for public 
purposes under a statute are statutory: and no owner of land so 
                                            
62 Ona v Atenda [2000] 5 NWLR 244. 
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expropriated by statute, is entitled to compensation unless he can 
establish a statutory right to such compensation.63 
 
Clearly, the express decision of the Nigerian CA in the above case implies that 
claims for payment of compensation for Abuja lands compulsorily acquired by the 
Government based upon customary law cannot be validly and successfully made.  
Effectively, customary land rights have been terminated in Abuja. The above legal 
developments demonstrate that the colonial legacy of the State managing land 
continued after Nigeria’s political independence from Britain. Sue Farran 
describes the situation generally as a phenomenon of post-colonial States.64 
Indeed, Frantz Fanon categorically admonished African States against retaining 
the structures put in place by colonialism. In his The Wretched of the Earth65 
Fanon exposes the trauma of colonisation. He argued that to break free from 
colonialism in any nation, a national culture must be recovered and imbibed.66 
Fanon was particularly concerned with the lasting effects of colonialism and the 
foreign culture which it superimposes on the colonised. He demonstrated that, by 
its nature, colonialism tends to disrupt the cultural life of colonised people.67 He 
further demonstrated that this act of cultural annihilation is achieved through a 
deliberate negation of the cultural reality of colonised people by the colonisers, 
through ‘new legal relations introduced by the occupying power’.68  
 
One example of the above is the gradual erosion of customary land tenure by the 
received English land tenure system introduced into Nigeria during colonialism. 
Towards the end of his essay on national culture, Fanon metaphorically made the 
                                            
63 Ibid, at 268. 
64 S Farran, 'Navigating between Traditional Land Tenure and Introduced Land Laws in Pacific 
Island States' (2011) 43 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 65 at 65. 
65 F Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove, 1963). 
66 Ibid, at 210. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid, at 236. 
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case that if Africa is to make any meaningful progress, it would be necessary for 
Africans to figuratively create a ‘new man’ that is different from the ‘Man’ from 
Europe.69  Fanon therefore enjoined Africa not to mimic Europe, thereby drawing 
from a theme that appears to have been well received amongst other post-
colonial theorists.70 Fanon tackles the problem of culture as a factor in the 
subjugation of non-Western peoples. He warned Africa against paying ‘tribute to 
Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies which draw their inspiration 
from her.’71 Rather, he encouraged Africa to ‘turn over a new leaf … work out new 
concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.’72  
 
Fanon has been rightly commended for providing a framework for ‘international 
and intercultural affairs’ as well as giving a specific road-map for groups that need 
cultural liberation.73 Indeed, Fanon’s work is a call for the revival of the culture of 
colonised peoples. Others have credited his work for being ‘a kind of 
internationalism which will reunite into its own humanness in an open-ended way 
- a world where no human being will be subject to dehumanization.’74 His work 
                                            
69 By ‘Man’ Fanon seems to figuratively and metaphorically refer to societies or nation-states. 
70 F Fanon, (n 65) above at 314. 
71 Ibid, at 315. 
72 Ibid, at 316. See also, S Hall, 'Ethnicity: Identity and Difference' (1991) 23 Radical America 9, 
where Hall argues like Fanon, that it is at the point when colonial societies first recognise and 
confront colonial structures that their influences on the indigenous and dominant culture can be 
more effectively dis-empowered. 
73 See HH Fairchild, 'Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth in Contemporary Perspective' 
(1994) Journal of Black Studies 191 at 191. See also, HK Bhabha, The Location of Culture 
(Routledge, 1994); HK Bhabha, 'Is Frantz Fanon Still Relevant?' (2005) 51 Chronicle of Higher 
Education 14;  HH Fairchild, 'Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth in Contemporary 
Perspective' (1994) Journal of Black Studies 191; IL Gendzier, Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study 
(Pantheon, 1973); N Lazarus, 'Disavowing Decolonization: Fanon, Nationalism, and the 
Problematic of Representation in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse' (1993) Research in 
African Literatures 69; W Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London and Dar es 
Salaam, 1972); and C Tiffin and A Lawson, De-scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality 
(Taylor & Francis, 1994). 
74 AM Agathangelou, 'Fanon on Decolonization and Revolution: Bodies and Dialectics' (2015) 
Globalizations 1 at 1. 
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also presents a challenge to intellectuals from Africa to embark on ‘cultural 
nationalism’ as a pre-condition to real liberation.75 
 
The colonial and post-colonial co-existence of customary land tenure and the 
received land tenure in Nigeria also creates a situation of John Griffith’s legal 
pluralism in the ‘weak sense’76 and Gordon Woodman’s ‘state law pluralism’77 
discussed in Chapters Two (section 2.3) and Three (section 3.3). Consequently, 
as demonstrated by the case of Abuja, customary land tenure is extinguished on 
the altar of State-building. The argument then is that this case study demonstrates 
the capacity of State law to terminate legal pluralism irrespective of the practical 
circumstances of people in social life. In line with the above argument, it is also 
argued that the case study of Abuja throws up insights about the implications of 
the power of State law. Accordingly, the argument is made that with the exception 
of ‘living’ customary law, the power of State law to extinguish other forms of law 
raises critical concerns about land rights of IPs in a post-colonial State with a 
plural legal system such as Nigeria. 
It must be emphasised that, the ability of State law to terminate legal pluralism or 
other forms of non-State law is only possible in situations of Woodman’s ‘State 
law pluralism’ or legal pluralism in Griffith’s ‘weak sense’. State law is certainly 
not capable of terminating ‘deep pluralism’ or legal pluralism in the ‘strong sense’ 
                                            
75 For further works on the relevance of Fanon’s work see, HM Adam, 'Frantz Fanon as a 
Democratic Theorist' (1993) African Affairs 499; E Burke, 'Frantz Fanon's" The Wretched of the 
Earth"' (1976) Daedalus 127; PA Beckett, 'Frantz Fanon and Sub-Saharan Africa: Notes on the 
Contemporary Significance of His Thought' (1972) Africa Today 59; IL Gendzier, Frantz Fanon: 
A Critical Study (Pantheon, 1973) and HK Bhabha, 'Is Frantz Fanon Still Relevant?' (2005) 51 
Chronicle of Higher Education 14. 
76 See J Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 18 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 1. 
77 See GR Woodman, 'The Idea of Legal Pluralism', in B Dupret, M Berger and L Al-Zwaini 
(eds), Legal Pluralism in the Arab World (BRILL 1999) 3-20 and GR Woodman, 'Ideological 
Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate about Legal Pluralism' (1998) 30 The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 21. 
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particularly in the context of the relationship between State law and ‘living’ 
customary law.78 
Locating Nigeria as a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ illustrates the divide between 
the de jure situation where the legal ownership of land in the FCT vests in the 
Federal Government of Nigeria and the de facto situation where the peoples of 
Abuja are in actual occupation of their ancestral lands. Sally Falk Moore’s study 
of the ‘semi-autonomous social field’79 of the Chagga people of Mount 
Kilimanjaro, Tanzania illustrates that the semi-autonomous social field ‘is 
simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade 
it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its own 
instance.’80 For Moore, the entire society (for example a State) is a larger ‘social 
matrix’ or ‘complex society’, that may or not ‘invade’ the smaller ‘semi-
autonomous social-field’. While different ‘semi-autonomous social-fields’ may 
overlap, a particular ‘semi-autonomous social field’ is an appropriate locus of 
studying the effect or otherwise of law (originating from a larger ‘social matrix) for 
the purposes of any anthropological investigation.81  
Indeed, the ‘semi-autonomous social field’ of Abuja is ‘invaded’ by State law with 
the effects of a de jure termination of customary land tenure. However, Moore 
maintains that ‘the decisions people make, the actions they take and the 
relationships they have…[and] important aspects of the connection between law 
and social change emerge only if law is inspected in the context of social life.’82 
The reality of the situation in relation to land tenure in Nigeria generally and Abuja 
                                            
78 See GR Woodman, Customary Land Laws within Legal Pluralism over the Generations’ 
(2014/15) (1) SADC Law Journal 189 at 200. 
79 SF Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate 
Subject of Study' (1973) Law and Society Review 719, reprinted in SF Moore, Law as Process: 
An Anthropological Approach (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) at 54. 
80 SF Moore, (n 79) above at 720. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, at 743. 
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in particular validates her findings as notwithstanding the above provisions of the 
LUA, and in the context of Abuja the FCT Act and the Nigerian Constitution, 
Nigeria‘s customary land tenure is still the most widely practiced and is 
recognised by the general populace as a valid way of acquiring rights in land.83  
In line with this it has been reported that: ‘Customary law continues to govern land 
tenure for the majority of Nigerians, even though tenure security in urban areas 
(and as against the government and community outsiders in rural areas) is low. 
Land rights are transferred mostly in informal markets.’84 In terms of rights to rural 
land held under customary law such rights are considered to be secure as against 
other claims from within the community or from other communities recognising 
customary law.85  
In the particular context of Abuja and the Abuja peoples, it has been reported that:  
As the vast majority of indigenes have survived through farming as 
their sole occupation, they were forced to find an alternative means 
of earning income. Many indigene households chose to use the 
additional land in their settlements to supply additional income, 
while also meeting the urgent need for affordable housing for non-
indigenes. Although illegal under the FCT Act for individuals to rent 
land or build housing for rental purposes without the approval of the 
FCDA, indigenes have been doing so for several decades.86 
Whereas some of the indigenes of Abuja have been pushed out of the Capital 
City most of them still live in satellite towns and villages away from the Federal 
Capital City (FCC).87 Evidence that the indigenes still believe that they occupy 
their lands on the basis of customary law is provided by one of the most recent 
                                            
83 See PE Oshio, (n 60) at 47-51. 
84 See USAID (2010), https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/nigeria/, accessed 07/04/ 17. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre (SERAC), The Myth of the Abuja Master Plan: Forced Evictions as Urban Planning in 
Abuja, Nigeria (COHRE & SERAC, 2008) at 32. 
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study of the Gbayis (one of the indigenous ethnic groups in Abuja) which found 
that ‘communities are governed traditionally by Esu, the head of the community’.88 
Indeed, it was observed that ‘…the settlements believe that their land was 
bequeathed to them by their ancestors. The land serves the purposes of 
practicing their farming livelihood and other uses. They believe that leaving their 
land for another place is not only against their interest but a permanent loss of 
identity and heritage.’89 The study also found that: ‘Wasa is also an original native 
community in the FCT with indigenes also of the Gbagyi extraction. The indigenes 
are mainly local farmers and grow crops such as yams, maize and guinea corn. 
The community however lacks basic social amenities like primary school, access 
road, electricity supply, water supply and health centres.’90 A situation that 
epitomises the situation of most of the indigenes in various villages and satellite 
towns in the FCT. 
The above findings corroborated the work of an earlier research which found that:  
Speaking on condition of anonymity recently, a local Gbagyi chief 
described the stand-of situation between official land policy and the 
rights of indigenous people as being like ‘a pregnant woman—
anything can happen any time, either in our time, or in the future.’ 
The sense one gets speaking with community leaders is that the 
Gbagyi people…are standing their ground over the few remaining 
pockets still under their control.91 
                                            
88 Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMITI), Resettlement and Social Audit: 
Abuja Technology Village (FMITI, 2015) at 24. 
89 Ibid, at 20. 
90 Ibid, at 14. 
91 S Gusah, (n 142) below at 144. See also, AA Babatunde et al, ‘Analysis of the Activities of 
Land Administration Machineries in Abuja and Minna, Nigeria’ (2014) 8 (1) Journal of 
Environmental Science, Toxicology and Food Technology 31 at 34 which found that: ‘From the 
response, it is clear that informal land market is a fundamental source of access to land at the 
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In a 2003 anthropological study of the Gbagyi indigenes in Abuja, Ada Okau 
argued that due to the negative: 
…effects of the establishment of Abuja on the organisation of labour 
and agricultural production, it is necessary to consider the important 
consequences of the alienation of land and the restricted traditional 
economic activities of the Gwari such as hunting, fishing, farming 
and grazing. These economic activities were part of a system of 
social relationships and were supported by certain value systems 
which have been destroyed by the alienation of Gwari’s land.92 
Indeed, Ibrahim Jibril notes that although the Abuja peoples ‘hold customary titles, 
they are not supposed to alienate (after 1976, the year the FCT Act gained legal 
force), without the consent of the Authority. This provision of the law was 
observed mostly in breach thereby leading to the flourishing of a vibrant illegal 
land market.’ 93  
The above situation in Abuja in which local traditional rulers and Abuja peoples 
are still involved in alienating their ancestral lands which they believe to be theirs 
under customary law has created what the Government terms ‘illegal markets’. 
This in turn has led to the emergence of squatter settlements inhabited by people 
migrating from other parts of Nigeria into the FCT. As the Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Social and Economic Rights Action Centre 
(SERAC) found: ‘Owners thus began to sell in the open market rather than wait 
for Government acquisition and subsequent perceived low compensations. That 
led to a flourishing illegal land market, which was operated mainly by leaders of 
                                            
92 A Okau, Perspectives on Urban Anthropology: Abuja and Gbagyi Grievances (Aboki 
Publishers, 2003) at 64. 
93 IU Jibril, ‘Resettlement Issues, Squatter Settlements and the Problem of Land Administration 
in Abuja, Nigeria’s Federal Capital’, paper presented at the 5th International Federation of 
Surveyors (FIG) Regional Conference entitled: ‘Promoting Land Administration and Good 
Governance’ in Accra, Ghana 8-11 March 2006 at 9. At page 10, Jubril states that ‘the local 
traditional Rulers got seriously involved in the operation of the illegal land “markets” and 
subsequent outright alienation of their ancestral land.’ 
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local communities. The illegal markets were the easiest way for Abuja residents 
to acquire land.’94  
The continuous alienation of ancestral lands by Abuja peoples and the 
emergence of illegal squatter settlements is happening despite the fact that 
section 7 (1) of the FCT Act prevents any such alienation and development of 
land in the FCT as it provides that: 
 …no person or body shall within the Federal Capital Territory, carry 
out any development…unless the written approval of the Authority 
has been obtained by such person or body: Provided that the 
Authority may make a general order with respect to the interim 
development of land within the Federal Capital Territory and may 
make special orders with respect to the interim development of any 
portion of land within any particular area. 
The legal problems which this case study demonstrates in relation to the 
indigenous peoples of Abuja and their land rights as well as in the general context 
of this thesis are summed up in section 4.2 below. 
4.2. The Case Study and the Problem in this Thesis 
Upon the creation of the FCT, the misleading view was that the territory of the 
FCT did not belong to any ethnic group within Nigeria.95 Hence, the 
recommendations of a Panel constituted for that purpose was accepted by the 
Nigerian Government which promulgated the FCT Act establishing Abuja as the 
capital of Nigeria and setting up the Federal Capital Development Authority 
(FCDA) - the organisation tasked with developing the capital.96  Consequently, 
                                            
94 COHRE and SERAC, (n 86) above at 22. See also, W Adebanwi, (n 95) below at 98-99 and 
IU Jibril, (n 93) above at 9-13. Similar findings have been made in relation to three villages in 
Abuja, see S Gusah, (n 142) below at 150-152. 
95 See W Adebanwi, 'Abuja' in S Bekker and G Therborn (eds), Capital Cities in Africa: Power 
and Powerlessness (Human Science Research Council (HSRC) Press and Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research (CODESRIA), 2012) at 94. 
96  F Rodd et al, Around and About Abuja (Spectrum Books, 2005) at 5-6. 
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Abuja began to operate officially as the new capital of Nigeria in 1991.97  It 
appears that the original intention of the Nigerian Government was to evacuate 
all the peoples of Abuja and resettle them at some ‘suitable’ locations outside the 
territory at the expense of the Government.98  However, as the Government later 
admitted it had no sufficient resources for such.99  
Hence, the authorities decided that the peoples of Abuja should continue living in 
the FCT unless their lands were needed for developmental projects.100  As the 
government remained unsure about how to proceed, in May 1980 an ad-hoc 
Committee on the Resettlement of the Inhabitants of Abuja was set up by the 
President.101  The Committee conducted an in-depth study and recommended 
that the Government should assume full responsibility for the resettlement of 
those compelled to leave Abuja.102  Such resettlements were meant to provide for 
planned housing, alternative farmlands, employment and basic infrastructural 
facilities for the indigenous communities.103 It was also recommended that the 
Government should render financial assistance to the indigenes that chose to 
leave the territory out of their volition.104  However, while the issue of resettlement 
and financial assistance remained unresolved, the President took over the 
administration of Abuja with effect from 1st January, 1981.105 Lamenting the 
                                            
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 MJ Vatsa, The Poetry of Abuja: Nigeria's Capital (Cross Continent Press, 1983) at xii and MJ 
Vatsa, ‘Abuja’ (1981) Okike-African Journal New Writ 62. 
100 MJ Vatsa, (n 99) above at xii. 
101 It was headed by Senator AD Rufa’i of the Senate Committee on the FCT. 
102 MJ Vatsa, (n 99) above at xii. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, at xii-xiii. 
105 Ibid, at xiv. See Rodd F et al, (n 96) above at 7- 8. 
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human rights implications of this development, in 1983 Frank Salamone wrote 
that: 
This scheme is affecting the Gbagyi … The size alone is startling, 
365,000 square miles … There would be new laws regarding 
property holding, essentially taking away communal ownership of 
land and vesting it in the state … New, and artificial, political units 
would be established which would nullify indigenous political 
leadership.106 
4.2.1. Policy Considerations in Relation to the FCT and Abuja Peoples 
The main reason for the choice of Abuja as the FCT is reflected in the words of 
General Murtala Mohammed who was the Nigerian Head of State in 1976 who 
stated that the Government needed a place ‘with easy accessibility from all parts 
of the country by road, rail and air which would facilitate the administration of the 
country,…serve as a symbol of our unity and greatness and from the view point 
of national security, be less vulnerable to external aggression as it would be 
practically immune to sea-borne attack.’107 However, having selected Abuja as 
the appropriate location of the new Capital of Nigeria, the policy challenges before 
the Nigerian Government in relation to the indigenous peoples of Abuja and their 
ancestral lands could be summed up through the words of Okau who argues that 
‘[t]he main challenge facing the Federal Government of Nigeria and the 
administration of Abuja…is how to save the Gbagyi from possible cultural and 
economic annihilation. The major means of achieving this goal is the appraisal of 
the Gbagyi indigenous social structures especially as it affects land and land 
use.’108 
                                            
106 FA Salamone, (n 60) above at 44-45. 
107 As quoted in IU Jibril, (n 93) above at 2. See also, W Adebanwi, (n 95) above at 93; F Rodd 
et al, (n 96) above at 7. OI Obateru, The Genesis and Future of Abuja (Penthouse Publications, 
2003) at 8-11. 
108 A Okau, (n 92) above at 87. 
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Between 1976 and 2017 the Nigerian Government has made four policy changes 
in relation to the indigenous peoples of Abuja. As noted in section 4.2 above, the 
first policy direction of the Government of Nigeria in relation to the indigenous 
peoples of Abuja was to resettle them out of the territory at the expense of the 
Government. Jibril contends that the Government’s intention was to enshrine a 
principle of ‘equal citizenship’ in the FCT wherein ‘no one can “claim any special 
privilege of ‘indigeneity’ as was the case with Lagos.’109 The idea was to evacuate 
all the pre-existing indigenous communities so that Abuja may be concieved as 
place for all Nigerians with equal citizenship rights in contrast to the thirty-six 
States of Nigeria where people have indigenship rights.110 
However, as this initial policy direction appeared to be very costly for the 
Government it decided to jettison it for another policy.111 In addition to the costly 
nature of wholesale resettlement of the indigenes, in 1978 the Government 
realised that the territory was infested with tsetse fly and that the farming activities 
of Abuja peoples helped in destroying the habitats of dangerous tsetse fly.112 This 
discovery and the cost of resettlement motivated the Government to revise its 
initial wholesale resettlement policy as it decided that resettlement and payment 
of compensation would be ‘undertaken only in respect of those occupying the site 
chosen for building the city.’113 
The second policy change came in 1992 when the Government adopted an 
‘integration policy’ in relation to the indigenes of Abuja still living in the FCT as 
against the initial policy of wholesale resettlement.114 However, no legislative 
                                            
109 IU Jibril, (n 93) above at 2. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid, at 2-3. 
112 Ibid, at 5. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
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action was taken by the Government to implement this so called ‘integration’ 
policy. In another reversal of policy made in 1999, the Government decided to 
revert to its initial policy of complete resettlement and evacuation of the 
indigenous people of Abuja.115 This time, several villages and settlements ‘were 
slated for resettlement outside the FCC to the north.’116 Houses were built and 
prepared for the occupation of those to be resettled by 2002 but this was never 
actualised as the houses were rather allocated to security officials for the purpose 
of ensuring security in Abuja in the build up to the Nigerian 2003 general 
election.117  
In the current and fourth policy change the government claims to have again 
reverted to its initial policy of complete resettlement of the indigenous peoples as 
the ‘cardinal principles of this policy is of course the complete resettlement of all 
areas hitherto earmarked for resettlement’.118 This inconsistency in policy in 
relation to the Abuja peoples has been rightly criticised by human rights non-
governmental organisations.119  
It is the argument herein that the concept of hybridity and legal pluralism converge 
to provide jurisprudential explanations to the legal challenges which this case 
study presents. There is a relationship between the legal scholarship on legal 
pluralism with Homi Bhabha’s concept of hybridity.120 As a post-colonial theorist 
                                            
115 Ibid, at 5-6. 
116 Ibid, at 5. 
117 Ibid, at 6. 
118 Ibid, at 7. 
119 See COHRE and SERAC, (n 94) above at 49-61. 
120 The concept of hybridity has its origin in the natural sciences. For example, in horticulture it 
refers to the process of cross-breeding through which two or more species of plants produce a 
hybrid specie. On the origin of this concept see, RJ Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, 
Culture and Race (Routledge, 2005); MM Kray, 'Hybridity in Cultural Globalization' (2002) 12 
Communication Theory 316; S Mabardi, 'Encounters of a Heterogeneous Kind: Hybridity in 
Cultural Theory' (2000) 13 Critical Studies 1; and P Nikos, 'Tracing Hybridity in Theory' in P 
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often compared with his contemporaries,121 Bhabha is known for his theory of 
hybridity122 and his concept of ‘mimicry’.123 In his 1994 publication,124 Bhabha 
argues that hybridity arises as a result of several forms of colonialism, which 
results in ‘cultural interchanges’,125 in the process of creating colonial subjects.126 
For Bhabha, hybridity is a contradiction that arises in the bid to manage 
indigenous cultures after colonialism.127 Hybridity is a situation where the 
structures left behind by colonialism like the laws that co-exist with the indigenous 
laws such as customary law, leading to interfusion that takes place between the 
two, creating a situation of hybridity.128 Hybridity explains the co-existence of 
State land tenure and customary land tenure in post-colonial Nigeria. 
Equally relevant to this thesis is Bhabha’s concept of mimicry. According to 
Bhabha, mimicry is the result of the doubling that takes place when one culture 
dominates another as happens during colonialism.129 Some of those dominated 
will attempt to mimic those in the dominant culture and members of the dominant 
culture will encourage mimicry among those they dominate.130 This applies to the 
                                            
Werner and M Tariq (eds), Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and Politics of 
Anti-Racism (Zed Books, 1997) 257-281. 
121 Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak. The three are often regarded as the ‘trinity’ of post-
colonialism. 
122 See HK Bhabha, 'Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a 
Tree outside Delhi, May 1817' (1985) 12 Critical Inquiry 144 and HK Bhabha, The Location of 
Culture (Psychology Press, 1994) at 145-174. 
123 HK Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse' (1984) 28 
Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis 125 and HK Bhabha, (n 79) above at 121-131. 
124 HK Bhabha, (1994) (n 70) above at 121-131. 
125 Ibid, at 111. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid, at 175. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid, at 121-131. 
130 Ibid. 
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colonial situation but Bhabha maintains that this is also applicable in the context 
of post-colonial situations, where minorities are assimilated into the dominant or 
majority culture.131 Consequently, with mimicry comes hybridity – between 
colonised and coloniser, which takes the colonised away from their culture.132 This 
results in an identity crisis that shapes the people (colonised) into people who are 
neither themselves nor their colonisers.133 Bhabha’s notion of mimicry and 
hybridity leads him to the concept of the ‘third space’ in cultural spaces.134 Bhabha 
maintains that: ‘For me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two 
original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the “Third 
Space”, which enables other positions to emerge.’135 
To function fully in the second space with the colonial structures put in place, a 
new form of identity in the ‘third space’ is created.136 For Bhabha hybridity is a 
form of panacea which creates the ‘third space’ and enables the colonised to 
rearticulate meaning out of the structures put in place through colonialism.137 
Indeed, this is the situation in Nigeria where the post-colonial Nigerian State aims 
to rearticulate meaning out of the colonial structures put in place during British 
                                            
131 Ibid.  See also, R Williams, Marxism and Literature, vol 1 (Oxford University Press, 1977) at 
121-128, where he makes the point like Bhabha that dominant cultures have the tendency to 
imbibe values that were prevalent in a previous cultural period. Williams maintains that dominant 
cultures tend to appropriate values from a previous cultural period and incorporate them into 
current definitions of cultural practices in a later stage in each society. 
132 HK Bhabha, (n 70) above at 145-174. 
133 Ibid. See also, PE Oshio, (n 60) above at 89 who maintain that ‘…post-colonial countries are 
marked by a crisis of Identity, bounded on the one side by the constructions of the colonial past 
and on the other by the onset of an international postmodernism that dispels ideas of a stable, 
whole, or single identity.’ 
134 J Rutherford, 'The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha' in J Rutherford (ed), Identity: 
Community, Culture, Difference (Lawrence and Wishart LTD, 1990) and HK Bhabha, 'Cultures in 
Between' in S Hall and P du Gay, (eds), Questions of Cultural Identity (Sage Publications, 
1996). 
135 J Rutherford, (n 134) above at 211. 
136 Ibid. 
137 See HK Bhabha, (n 70) above. 
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colonial administration of Nigeria with the indigenous system of customary land 
tenure. Nigeria does this through the accommodation of customary land tenure 
law that existed prior to the commencement of the LUA.  Bhabha’s concept of 
hybridity in the ‘third space’ has been commended for ‘the creation of new 
transcultural forms within the contact zone produced by colonisation’.138  
However, this thesis aligns with the criticism levelled against Bhabha’s concept 
of hybridity that it neglects several other ways in which hybridity has been used 
to maintain inequalities within the ‘third space’.139 By accommodating the 
customary land rights of Nigerians indigenous to the other 36 States of Nigeria 
under the LUA,140 while the customary land rights of Abuja peoples are terminated 
through the instrumentality of the FCT Act and the Nigerian Constitution,141 the 
criticism of Bhabha’s concept of hybridity that it neglects inequalities in the ‘third 
place’ becomes obvious to the reader. Indeed, the case study demonstrates that 
the concept of hybridity and the ‘third space’ appears to celebrate a false sense 
of liberation from the continuous negative influences of colonialism.142  
The case study also highlights the various categorisations of representations 
among different groups at different levels nationally and internationally. This is a 
theme that is examined by the post-colonial theorist - Gayatri Spivak. The lack of 
awareness in Said’s works of the complicity of dominant indigenous groups in 
carrying out their own forms of ‘Orientalism’ in their relations with smaller groups 
                                            
138 B Ashcroft, G Griffiths and H Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back (Routledge, 2002) at 118. 
139 A Acheraïou, Questioning Hybridity, Postcolonialism and Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011). 
140 See section 1 (3) of the FCT Act. 
141 See section 297 (2). 
142 See P Meredith, ‘Hybridity in the Third Space: Rethinking Bi-cultural Politics in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand', paper presented at the Oru Rangahau Maori Research and Development Conference, 
7-9 July 1998, Massey University, New Zealand at 3. For general discussion on post-colonial 
theory see, H Schwarz and S Ray, (eds), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2008). For general criticisms of post-colonial theory see, A Loomba, 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism (Routledge, 2007) at 246-257 and A Dirlik, 'The Postcolonial Aura: 
Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism' (1994) Critical Inquiry 328 at 328-356. 
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within previously colonised territories whether before, during or after colonialism 
is a theme that is addressed by Gayatri Spivak.  In her essay,143 Spivak’s 
‘Subaltern’ refers to the least powerful in society. For her, ‘Subaltern’ is a term for 
those in the lower economic, and social status of society.144 It is an important term 
in the writings of Antonio Gramsci,145 adopted by a group of Indian intellectuals 
who formed the Subaltern Studies Group.146 Spivak’s essay appears to be a direct 
response to the studies of the Subaltern Studies Group.147  
By ‘speak’ she means can the lowest members of society express their concerns 
and engage in dialogue with those who hold political power? Indeed, if they speak 
will they be heard? She argues that those around the ‘Subaltern’ who possess 
either State or non-State power, tend to create an environment where there are 
no infrastructures and institutions that will either enable them to speak or if they 
do, to be heard.148  
She identifies four class positions in Indian society which are: dominant foreign 
groups - as in the case of colonial powers such as the Portuguese, British and 
French; international powers such as the Americans and Russians as well as 
international corporations.149 The second class is the dominant indigenous 
groups at the national level - this includes Indian politicians and business 
interests, national governments and national companies in India.150 The third are 
                                            
143 GC Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' in C Nelson and L Grossberg, (eds), Marxism and 
the Interpretation of Culture (University of Illinois Press, 1988) at 271-314. 
144 It is originally taken from military references and refers to a person of junior or inferior rank. 
145 See A Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, vol 2 (Columbia University Press, 1996). 
146 GC Spivak, (n 143) above at 283. See also, L Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical 
Introduction (Columbia University Press, 1998) at 1-2. 
147 GC Spivak, (n 143) above at 283. 
148 Ibid, at 295-296. 
149 Ibid, at 284. 
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the dominant indigenous groups at the local and regional levels.151  Finally the 
fourth class – the ordinary people (Subaltern class).152  Spivak appears to answer 
her question in the last paragraph of her essay, no she maintains, ‘the Subaltern 
cannot speak’!153 She argues that female intellectuals must speak for the 
Subaltern (in her case the peasant Indian women).  
In the context of this case study, it is argued that like Spivak’s ‘Subaltern’ the 
peoples of Abuja have been silenced by the domestic laws of post-colonial 
Nigeria. Hence, there is need for their empowerment. The case study illustrates 
the need for a viable relationship and interaction between national law and other 
forms of law such as customary law and international law so that the ‘subaltern’ 
peoples of Abuja can ‘speak’. In line with this argument, in Volume 2 of this thesis, 
the significance of international human rights law and the need for its 
enforceability within the Nigerian legal system will be demonstrated. 
It is also the argument herein that in a society where identities are linked to land 
and where land is customarily conceived as sacred and where the means of 
livelihood of people depends on occupying such lands, compulsorily acquiring 
such lands even for public purposes without adequate remedies remains a 
violation of human rights. As Farran argues ‘[i]n subsistence economies and 
among rural communities land represents a communal resource and association 
with the land reflects ties of ancestry and belonging as well as being important to 
identity.’154 Indeed, other writers have argued that in the case of Abuja the 
government has been unable to balance state interests and the rights of the IPs 
                                            
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid, at 309. 
154 S Farran, 'Navigating between Traditional Land Tenure and Introduced Land Laws in Pacific 
Island States' (2011) 43 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 65 at 71. 
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still living there.155 Abuja peoples have expressed their grievances about their 
land rights to no avail against the Nigerian Government in various ways.156  
Before enumerating the central and sub-research questions which this case study 
generates, comparative analyses will be made between this case study and the 
land rights of the Ogiek people of Kenya in the following Chapter Five. The 
purpose of such comparative analyses is to demonstrate how Kenya has 
responded to similar legal challenges in relation to customary land rights and how 
Nigeria should respond to similar problems. 
Conclusion 
In addition to the discussion on the definition of land rights in colonial and post-
colonial Nigeria in Chapter Three, this Chapter has illustrated the effects of the 
colonial introduction of English land tenure law and the idea of State managing 
land through legislation as well as the co-existence of statutory land law and 
customary land tenure in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria on the case study of 
Abuja. The case study of Abuja has been introduced and its significance within 
the broader context of this thesis has been explained. The main significance of 
this case study is that it demonstrates that the compulsory acquisition of Abuja 
peoples’ ancestral lands which is legitimised under the domestic laws of Nigeria, 
implies that it is impossible for Abuja peoples to obtain a legal remedy 
domestically in respect of their customary land rights.  
                                            
155 S Gusah, 'Community Land Trusts: A Model for Integrating Abuja’s Urban Villages within the 
City Master Plan' in LE Herzer (ed), Changing Cities: Climate, Youth, and Land Markets in 
Urban Areas (Wilson Centre Comparative Urban Study Project, 2011) 141-159 at 141. See also, 
W Adebanwi, (n 95) above at 94. 
156 See ‘Justice for Abuja’s Original Inhabitants’ Editorial of Thisday Newspaper, 12 October, 
2012 available at: <www.thisdaylive.com/articles/justice-for-abuja-s-original-
inhabitants/128267/>, accessed 14 December 2014. 
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Indeed, the decision of the Nigerian CA in Ona v Atenda157 illustrates this point 
vividly. It has been argued that post-colonial theories help in contextualising the 
challenges that Abuja peoples currently face in relation to their customary land 
rights as this has its origins in the colonial encounter between Britain and Nigeria. 
Theories of pluralism also help in explaining the superiority of State law over 
customary land tenure as the land rights of Abuja peoples are effectively 
extinguished by State law.  In the following Chapter Five, comparative analyses 
will be made between the land rights of Ogiek peoples of Kenya and the Abuja 
peoples of Nigeria in search of a solution within Africa to the problems highlighted 
by the case study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: LAND RIGHTS OF ABUJA AND OGIEK 
PEOPLES - A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
In the preceding Chapter Four, the case study of Abuja, Nigeria was introduced. 
It was demonstrated that the compulsory acquisition of the ancestral lands of 
Abuja peoples by the Nigerian government without payment of compensation or 
resettlement is legitimate under Nigeria’s domestic laws. The legal challenges 
which the case study illustrates was also highlighted. The main purpose of this 
Chapter is to undertake some comparative analyses of the land rights of Abuja 
peoples of Nigeria and Ogiek peoples of Kenya, in search of a solution within 
Africa to the legal challenges that the case study reveals.  
In section 5.1, the land rights of the Ogiek people of Kenya will be introduced for 
comparative analyses with Abuja peoples. It will be demonstrated that like Abuja 
peoples, the Ogiek peoples of Kenya have historically suffered injustices in 
relation to their land rights, but recent legal developments in Kenya appear to 
have resolved the problems with land rights of the Ogiek. Consequently, in the 
following section 5.2 comparative analyses will be made between Abuja and 
Ogiek peoples. The main purpose of the comparative exercise is to illustrate how 
Kenya has responded to customary land rights of Kenyans and how Nigeria 
should respond to resolve the challenges with the land rights of Abuja peoples.  
There will then be an examination of whether Nigeria can replicate similar land 
law reforms towards the customary land rights of Abuja peoples and customary 
land rights generally in Nigeria. One reason for the choice of Kenya as a 
comparator is the fact that although both States have similar legal systems, 
because of their common colonial heritage, Kenya more than Nigeria appears to 
have responded directly to the challenges of dealing with customary land rights 
of its citizens through recent law reforms. This comparative examination will also 
be additional background about the relevance of international law in determining 
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land rights of indigenous peoples (IPs) in the following Volume 2 of this thesis in 
further search for solutions. 
5.1. State Law and Customary Land Tenure in Kenya 
The State of Kenya came into existence in the colonial period.1 However, like 
most pre-colonial African States, prior to the colonial encounter the various 
communities of peoples living in Kenya each had their distinct ways of maintaining 
law and order through customary law.2 Many of these peoples were involved in 
fishing, hunting and gathering as well as being pastoralists.3 They also had 
various modes of political organisation.4 After the colonial conquest of Kenya by 
the British colonial army, institutions were established to serve the interests of the 
colonial authorities thereby introducing changes into the socio-cultural and 
political lives of Kenyans. 5 In the specific context of managing land, the colonial 
authorities acquired land as a commodity and this enabled them to grant parcels 
of land to white settlers.6 Consequently, the colonial administration made efforts 
to secure large chunks of land through signing of treaties, such as the Maasai 
Agreements in 1904 and 1911.7  
The colonial administration consolidated its control over Kenyan lands by 
enacting various combination of land legislation to give legal backing to these 
                                            
1 See MO Makoloo, Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity, (Minority Rights 
Groups International (MRG), 2005) and I Mwathane, 'Land Policies in East Africa: Is There A 
Way and Goodwill for Implementation?' paper presented at the International Conference on 
Land policies in East Africa, held 4-5 October, 2012 at Kampala, Uganda. 
2 MO Makoloo, (n 1) above at 5. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 YP Ghai and P McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal 
Framework of Government from Colonial times to the Present (Oxford University Press, 1970) at 
25. 
7 MO Makoloo, (n 1) above at 5. 
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acquisitions.8 Examples of such colonial legislation include: the Crown Lands 
Ordinance, 1902 and 1915.9 The combined effects of these laws and agreements 
were that all Kenyans became tenants at the will of the British Crown at the risk 
of displacement from their ancestral lands in the colonial era.10 One effect of 
colonialism in Kenya is that it introduced and imposed statutory land tenure, whilst 
also instigating changes in the hitherto existing customary land tenure and to 
some extent disrupted customary land tenure.11 Consequently, customary land 
tenure and any rights in land acquired therefrom were relegated to an inferior 
status in comparison to land rights acquired on the basis of introduced English 
land tenure which was the tenure law for white settlers during colonial rule.12  
It appears that the colonial administration was of the opinion that private and 
individual ownership of land was a more suitable tenure regime for the purpose 
of enhancing agricultural productivity as opposed to the communal system of 
customary land tenure.13 Another consequence of the colonial encounter was the 
simultaneous co-existence of introduced English land tenure and the indigenous 
customary land tenure in the early colonial period.14 This situation resulted in a 
dual system of land tenure with English law applying to areas occupied by white 
settlers while customary law applied to the areas occupied by ‘natives’ known as 
                                            
8 Ibid. 
9 Other colonial legislation is discussed below under sub-section 5.1.1 below. 
10 See also, B Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination 
(James Currey Publishers, 1990) and H Okoth-Ogendo, Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of 
Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya (African Centre for Technology Studies Press, 1991). 
11 P Kameri-Mbote, et al, Ours by Right: Law, Politics and Realities of Community Property in 
Kenya (Strathmore University Press, 2013) at 26-31. 
12 Ibid. See also, RL Tignor, Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai 
from 1900-1939 (Princeton University Press, 2015). 
13 P Kameri-Mbote, et al, (n 11) above at 23. See also, G Feder and R Noronha, 'Land Rights 
Systems and Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa' (1987) 2 The World Bank 
Research Observer 143. 
14 P Kameri-Mbote, et al, (n 11) above at 26-27. 
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‘native reserves’.15 However, later in the colonial encounter, the colonial 
administration embarked on a policy of abolishing customary land tenure and 
made legal arrangements to convert the communal system of customary land 
tenure in Kenya into individual and private ownership.16 To this end, in 1954 the 
colonial administration adopted the Swynnerton Plan (the Plan)17 which was 
aimed at promoting agricultural commercialisation among ‘native’ Kenyans inter 
alia by granting ‘secure’ individual land titles to indigenous Kenyan farmers.18 The 
Plan was implemented through the colonial enactment of the Native Lands 
Registration Ordinance, 1959 and the Lands Control (Native Lands) Ordinance, 
1959 along with their respective Regulations.19 
5.1.1. Post-Colonial Kenya (1963-Present) 
Kenya became independent from colonial rule in 1963.20 Despite this political 
change, the above colonial developments in which the colonial administration 
aimed to convert communal customary land tenure into individual and private 
ownership were retained in the early post-colonial period.21 Although colonial and 
early post-colonial State law in Kenya appears to have focused on the process of 
individualising land rights to the detriment of customary rights to land, thereby 
                                            
15 See M Adams and S Turner, 'Legal Dualism and Land Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa' 
in E Mwangi and E Patrick, (eds) Land Rights for African Development: From Knowledge to 
Action (Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi), United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) & International Land Coalition, 2005) at 6-8. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The Swynnerton Plan was a Kenyan colonial government report put together in 1954 with the 
purpose intensifying agricultural production in the Kenyan Colony. 
18 L Cotula, Toulmin C and Hesse C, Land Tenure and Administration in Africa: Lessons of 
Experience and Emerging Issues (International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED), 2004). 
19 Ibid. 
20 MO Makoloo, (n 1) above at 5. 
21 L Juma, 'The Legitimacy of Indigenous Legal Institutions and Human Rights Practice in 
Kenya: An Old Debate Revisited, ' (2006) 14 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 
176. 
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undermining the indigenous customary land rights of Kenyans,22 many 
communities in Kenya continued to use, occupy and manage community lands 
through customary law.23 In 2010, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) observed that ‘[a]lthough not part of the formal land 
system, customary land holding systems continue to exist, and vary among ethnic 
groups...The elders and other local leaders monitor these informal arrangements, 
often in tandem with local authorities.’24 The resilience of customary land tenure 
in Kenya despite sustained subjugation by State law,25 is evidence that 
contemporary assumptions regarding wholesale modernisation of customary land 
tenure in colonial and post-colonial Africa are not founded on sound empirical 
evidence and theories.26 
5.1.2. IPs and Customary Land Rights in Post-Colonial Kenya 
According to a Report27 commissioned by Minority Rights Group International 
(MRG),28 Kenya is home to several groups of IPs that include: the Turkana, 
                                            
22 Ibid. 
23 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Property Rights and Resource 
Governance: Kenya, (USAIBID, 2010). Available at: 
<www.usaIbidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-
reports/USAIBID_Land_Tenure_Kenya_Profile.pdf>, accessed 18 June 2016. 
24 Ibid, at 5. For a general discussion on the treatment of customary land law by colonial and 
early post-colonial State law in Kenya see, S Coldham, 'Colonial Policy and the Highlands of 
Kenya, 1934–1944' (1979) 23 Journal of African Law 65; S Coldham, 'Land Reform in Kenya—
Some Problems and Perspectives' (1982) Third World Legal Studies 82; S Coldham, 'A 
Comparative Study of Land Tenure Legislation in Africa' (1985) Acta Jurica 189 at 191-196; S 
Coldham, 'The Settlement of Land Disputes in Kenya—An Historical Perspective' (1984) 22 The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 59 and S Coldham, 'Land Control in Kenya' (1978) 22 Journal 
of African Law 63. 
25 P Kameri-Mbote et al. (n 11) above. 
26 Ibid, at 11. See also, S Coldham, 'Land-Tenure Reform in Kenya: The Limits of Law' (1979) 
17 The Journal of Modern African Studies 615 at 627 and S Coldham, 'The Effect of Registration 
of Title upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya' (1978) 22 Journal of African Law 91 at 109-111. 
27 Available at: http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-147-
Kenya-Minorities-Indigenous-Peoples-and-Ethnic-Diversity.pdf, accessed, 23 June 2016. 
28 See http://minorityrights.org/, accessed, 23 June 2016. 
Land Rights of Abuja and Ogiek Peoples: A Comparative Analysis 
151 
 
Nubian, Maasai, Ogiek and Endorois among others.29 Although all of them are 
historic victims of dispossession of lands,30 it is the Ogiek that will be discussed 
here in detail because of the notoriety of recent legal developments concerning 
their land rights at both national and international levels.31 A critical examination 
of the land rights of all the IPs in Kenya is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, before examining the legal developments about land rights of the Ogiek 
in further details, it is important to first examine recent post-colonial legal 
development in relation to customary land rights in Kenya generally because in 
2010, Kenya embarked on a series of land law reforms.  
The current land rights regime in Kenya is a combination of both colonial and 
post-colonial legislation.32 In addition, there are the Constitution of the Republic 
of Kenya 2010 (Kenyan Constitution)33 and a National Land Policy (NLP).34 The 
                                            
29 MO Makoloo, (n 1) above at 9-19. See also, African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights (ACHPR) and International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Report of the 
African Commision's Working Group on Indigenous Populations Communities, (IWGIA & 
ACHPR, 2005), adopted by the African Commission on Human and People’s Right at its 28th 
ordinary session. DOC/OS(XXXIV)/345 at 6-15; G Lynch, 'Kenya's New Indigenes: Negotiating 
Local Identities in a Global Context' (2011) 17 Nations and Nationalism 148; G Lynch, 
'Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya' (2006) 33 Review of African 
Political Economy 49; S Balaton-Chrimes, 'Indigeneity and Kenya's Nubians: Seeking Equality in 
Difference or Sameness?' (2013) 51 The Journal of Modern African Studies 331; and OZ Mitto, 
'Indigenous Communities and their Rights to Ancestral Land' (2015) Kenya Journal of Law and 
Justice: Justice Be Our Shield and Defender 1. 
30 MO Makoloo, (n 1) above at 14-19. See also, R Verma, We Are the Land, and the Land Is 
Us”: The Complexities of Land Tenure and Struggles for Pastoralist Livelihoods in Kenya 
(Sustainable Agricultural Rural Development (SARD) Initiative and Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), 2007) and BO Koissaba, 'Elusive Justice: The Maasai Contestation of Land 
Appropriation in Kenya: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective' in MM Kithinji et al, (eds), 
Kenya After 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016) at 189-219. 
31 See, Chapter Seven below. 
32 USAID, (n 23) above. 
33 Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010. Available at: 
<www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/rest//db/kenyalex/Kenya/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya/d
ocs/ConstitutionofKenya%202010.pdf>, accessed 8 December 2016. 
34 The National Land Policy. Adopted in December 2009. See, Ministry of Lands, Sessional 
Paper No 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy. Available at: 
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NLP is the overarching policy framework which sets out its objectives on land 
management in Kenya.35 The NLP protects customary rights to land;36  outlines 
principles of increased recognition of land rights of vulnerable groups;37  
establishes the National Land Commission, District Land Boards, Community 
Land Boards and Land Courts;38 and calls for the development of a legal 
framework to handle land restitution and resettlement for those who have been 
dispossessed.39 In particular, the NLP provides that ‘[i]t adopts a plural approach, 
in which different systems of tenure coexist and benefit from equal guarantees of 
tenure security.’40 It also recognises that there have been historic inadequacies 
in terms of legal protection of customary land tenure in Kenya.41  
In order to address these inadequacies, the NLP aims to make provision for 
community land, and presents mechanisms for developing effective new land 
laws for the protection of customary land tenure.42 In line with the above objective, 
the NLP emphasises that colonial and post-colonial individualisation of land 
tenure has undermined community land holdings whilst ignoring customary land 
rights of Kenyans resulting in numerous incidences of abuse of trust’.43 The NLP 
defines ‘customary land rights’ as ‘rights conferred by or derived from African 
                                            
http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/ministry_of_lands_2007_national_land_policy.pdf, 
accessed, 8 December 2016. 
35 Kenyan NLP, (n 34) above at iv. 
36 Ibid, at 2. 
37 Ibid, at 40. 
38 Ibid, at 46-50. 
39 Ibid, at 41-43. 
40 Ibid, at 33. 
41 See Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands (n 34) above at paras 64 and 65. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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customary law whether formally recognized by legislation or not.’44 It identifies 
gatherers, hunters, pastoralists and subsistence farmers45 as people who are 
vulnerable groups and requiring empowerment in gaining access to and 
protection of their land rights.46 The NLP therefore proposes that there should be 
a detailed inventory into the situation of land rights of all vulnerable groups in 
Kenya with the aim of dealing effectively with the concerns of such peoples.47  
Following the broad policy objectives set out in the NLP, the Kenyan Constitution 
provides that ‘every person has the right, either individually or in association with 
others, to acquire and own property - (a) of any description; and (b) in any part of 
Kenya.’48 In order to remedy the afore-mentioned inadequacies in the colonial 
and post-colonial treatment of customary land rights, the Kenyan Constitution 
vests community land in communities, which it identifies on the basis of ethnicity, 
culture or any similar community of interest.49 It provides further that all 
unregistered community lands should be held in trust by County Governments on 
behalf of the communities for whom such lands should be held.50 Community land 
is defined by the Kenyan Constitution to include among others: ‘land lawfully 
transferred to a specific community by any process of law’51 as well as ‘ancestral 
lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer communities’.52 The 
Kenyan Constitution then enjoins Parliament to enact legislation to give legal 
                                            
44 The Glossary to Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands (n 34) above at 63. 
45 Kenyan NLP, (n 34) above at para 194. 
46 Ibid, at para 194-197. 
47 Ibid, at 198-199. 
48 Art 40. 
49 Art 63 (1). 
50 Art 63 (2) (d) (iii). See also, Art 63 (3) and (4). 
51 Art 63 (2) (b). 
52 Art 63 (2) (d) (ii). 
Land Rights of Abuja and Ogiek Peoples: A Comparative Analysis 
154 
 
effect to its provisions on community lands.53 In pursuance of the afore-mentioned 
constitutional directive, a number of land statutes have been enacted to wit: 
National Land Commission Act 2015;54 Land Registration Act 2012;55 and Land 
Act 2012 56 while Land (Group Representatives) Act 201057 and Land 
Adjudication Act 196858 have been revised. Indeed, land law reforms in Kenya 
are still on-going at the time of writing. 
5.1.3. Kenya’s Current Land Legislation and Customary Land Rights 
The National Land Commission Act59 defines a ‘community’ to mean users of 
community land which could be identified on the basis of their ethnicity, culture 
and any such similar community in line with Article 63 (1) of the Kenyan 
Constitution, and ‘which holds a set of clearly defined rights and obligations over 
land and land-based resources’.60 One of the functions of the National Land 
Commission (the Commission) which the Act establishes includes the 
responsibility ‘to initiate investigations, on its own initiative or on a complaint, into 
present or historical land injustices, and recommend appropriate redress’.61 In 
                                            
53 Art 63 (5). 
54 No 5 of 2012. (As revised in 2015). Available at: 
<www.kenyalaw.org/lex/rest//db/kenyalex/Kenya/Legislation/English/Acts%20and%20Regulatio
ns/N/National%20Land%20Commission%20Act%20Cap.%205D%20-
%20No.%205%20of%202012/docs/NationalLandCommission5of2012.pdf>, accessed 8 
December 2016. 
55 No 3 of 2012. Available at: 
<www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/Land_Registration_Act___No_3_of_2012_.
pdf>, accessed 8 December 2016. 
56 No 6 of 2012. 
57 Cap. 287, Laws of Kenya. 
58 Supra. 
59 Supra. 
60 Section 2 (1). 
61 Section 5 (1) (f). 
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addition to the above, The Trust Land Act62 makes provision for the management 
of trust land in Kenya. ‘Trust lands’ refers to lands that were occupied by 
indigenous Kenyans during the colonial period but which have not been 
consolidated, adjudicated or registered in individual or group names, and 
customary lands that have not been taken over by the Government of Kenya.63  
The Trust Land Act grants every tribe, group, family and individuals ‘[a]ll the rights 
which they enjoy or may enjoy by virtue of existing African customary law’.64 It 
also protects the rights of residents from expropriation without compensation who 
occupy and use land ‘under African customary law’.65 However, it has been 
observed that this provision is often violated as officials regularly dispose of trust 
lands without compensation to the customary land rights holders.66 Likewise, the 
Land (Group Representatives) Act67 recognises communal land tenure which 
such groups may have held prior to the current land regime in Kenya.68 It also 
makes provision for the incorporation of representatives of groups who have been 
recorded as owners of land under the Land Adjudication Act.69 The Land (Group 
                                            
62 Supra (as revised in 2012). For a comprehensive analysis of pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial land laws and policies in Kenya and their implications for customary land rights and the 
culture of indigenous peoples in Kenya, see AH Adam, Recognising Sacred Natural Sites and 
Territories in Kenya: An Analysis of how the Kenyan Constitution, National and International 
Laws can Support the Recognition of Sacred Natural Sites and their Community Governance 
Systems (Institute for Culture and Ecology (Kenya), African Biodiversity Network & the Gaia 
Foundation, 2012) at 24-54 and SK Karanja, 'Land Restitution in the Emerging Kenyan 
Transitional Justice Process' (2010) 28 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 177. 
63 USAID, (n 23) above at 5. 
64 Section 69. 
65 See the Long Title and Sections 7 and 8. 
66 Kenya Ministry of Lands, (n 34) above at para 65. 
67 Supra. 
68 In this context, the current land regime in Kenya comprises of the relevant national land 
provision like the 2010 Constitution of Kenya and the NLP; the new legislations on land that 
were enacted in 2012 including: The Land Act; the Land Registration Act and The National Land 
Commission Act; as well as the on-going legal reforms in the land sector in Kenya. 
69 See section 7 of Land (Group Representatives) Act 2010. 
Land Rights of Abuja and Ogiek Peoples: A Comparative Analysis 
156 
 
Representatives) Act defines a group as any ‘tribe, clan, family or other group of 
persons, whose land under recognized customary law belongs communally to the 
persons who are for the time being the members of the group, together with any 
person of whose land the group is determined to be the owner.’70 This Act has 
been the basis of registration and granting of group ranches to pastoral 
communities in Kenya.71 However, it has been reported that the Group 
Representatives who are entrusted with the management of such group lands 
‘lack the authority of traditional leaders, and therefore with the questioning of their 
legitimacy comes disregard for group ranch rules.’72  
The Land Registration Act,73 makes provisions for community lands, subject to 
other legislation made pursuant to Article 63 (5) of the Kenyan Constitution. It 
adopts the definition of ‘community’ within the meaning of Article 63 (1) of the 
Kenyan Constitution.74 The significance of the above land law reforms in relation 
to customary land tenure in Kenya becomes obvious when viewed in the context 
of historical and contemporary legal developments in relation to land rights of 
Ogiek peoples as demonstrated in sub-sections 5.1.4 - 5.1.5 below.  
5.1.4. The Ogiek and their Customary Land Rights in Kenya 
The Ogiek are hunter-gatherers who live in the Eastern part of the Mau 
Escarpment in the Rift Valley Province of the Republic of Kenya.75 They are IPs 
                                            
70 Note that the definition of a group under section 2 of the Land (Group Representatives) Act 
2010 is similar to the definition under section 2 of the Land Adjudication Act 2012. 
71 P Kameri-Mbote et al, (n 11) above at 27. See also, S Coldham, 'The Registration of Group 
Ranches among the Maasai of Kenya: Some Legal Problems' (1982) 14 The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1. 
72 P Kameri-Mbote et al, (n 11) above at 29. 
73 Supra (as revised in 2012). 
74 See section 2. See also two most recent land law legislation - Community Land Act 2016 and 
Land Laws (Amendment) Act 2016. 
75 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 29) above at 15; NO Ohenjo, Kenya’s Castaways: The Ogiek and 
National Development Processes (CEMIRE & MRG, 2003); and R Blackburn, A Preliminary 
Report of Research on the Ogiek Tribe of Kenya: Discussion Paper No 89, (Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1970). 
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who have been living in Kenya since pre-colonial times and they are estimated to 
be about 20,000 countrywide and about 6,000 in the East Mau Forests.76 The 
entirety of the Mau Forests comprise of seven different forested areas which 
include: South West Mau (Tinet); East Mau; Mau Narok; Transmara; Maasai Mau; 
Western Mau and Southern Mau.77 The Ogiek consider the entire Mau Forests to 
be their ancestral lands which covers 250,000 hectares.78  
The Ogiek have experienced exclusion from these forests and their ancestral 
lands in colonial and post-colonial times.79  The contemporary challenges they 
are facing in relation to their land rights are mainly a result of the Kenyan 
Government’s expropriation of their customary lands by declaring them to be 
properties of the Government.80 This has occurred despite the fact that these 
forests are known to be their homes and means of livelihood.81 Some of these 
traditional forests include the Tinet Forest in Nakuru District; the Narok Forest in 
Nakuru District and the Mount Elgon Forests within Mount Elgon District.82 One 
of those notorious violations of their land rights relates to their ancestral land 
                                            
76 See AK Barume and IWGIA, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa (IWGIA, 2010) at 
91. 
77 Ibid. 
78 J Sang, 'The Ogiek in Mau Forest in Kenya' in J Nelson and L Hossack (eds), Indigenous 
Peoples and Protected Areas in Africa: From Principles to Practice (Forest Peoples Project, 
2003) at 111-138; AK Barume, 'Indigenous Battling for Land Rights: The Case of the Ogiek of 
Kenya' in J Castellino and N Walsh (eds), International Law and Indigenous Peoples (Martinuus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at 365. See, generally AK Barume and IWGIA (n 76) above at 91. 
79 See J Kimaiyo and K Nakuru, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices (Egerton & Ogiek 
Welfare Council, 2004) at Chapters 5 and 7. See also, D Vinding and IWGIA, The Indigenous 
World 2001-2002 (IWGIA, 2002) at 376-377; and D Vinding and IWGIA, The Indigenous World 
2002-2003 (IWGIA, 2003) at 367-368. 
80 M Makoloo, (n 1) above at 10. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. See also, C Médard, 'Indigenous’ Land Claims in Kenya: A Case-study of Chebyuk, 
Mount Elgon District' in WA Chris (ed), The Struggle over Land in Africa: Conflicts, Politics & 
Change (Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Press, 2010) at 21-33. 
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located in the Mau Forests area which was declared ‘a protected forest area’, by 
the Government of Kenya thereby rendering about 5,000 of them homeless.83  
5.1.5. The Ogiek Land Rights Cases at National Courts 
The post-colonial Kenyan courts have been buffeted with a number of cases 
concerning the land rights of the Ogiek peoples.84 One of such cases is the case 
of Joseph Letuya and 21 others v Attorney General and 5 Others.85 The facts of 
the case are that sometime in the early 1990s, the Kenyan Government gazetted 
some lands belonging to the Ogiek as public lands under Kenyan State laws and 
made allocation of plots of land in and around the Mau Forests to some individuals 
who were non-members of the community.86 Consequently, some members of 
the community were forcibly evicted.87 Several members of them considered 
these forceful evictions as violations of their customary land rights, and they 
instituted this case in the High Court of Kenya.88  
While the above matter was pending, on 16 February, 2001, the Kenyan Minister 
for Environment declared through a Gazette notice that on the basis of the 
provisions of section 4 (2) of the Kenyan Forests Act,89 the boundaries of the 
                                            
83 See ACHPR and IWGIA, (n 29) above at 26. 
84 See for example the following cases: Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney General and 5 Ors 
(ELC Civil Suit No. 821 of 2012); Francis Kemei and 9 Ors v Attorney General and 3 Ors (HCCA 
No. 238/99 and Appeal No. 98/2000:); Simon Kiwape and 19 Ors v Muneria Naimodu and 2 Ors 
(Civil Case No. 19/97, Narok Misc Application No. 7 of 1999); Marinwa, Sogoo and Ololoigero 
families v Isaiah Cheluget (Tribunal case No. 19/1998); Republic v Minister for Environment and 
Natural Resources and Ministry of Land Officials (Judicial Review HCCA No. 421 OF 2002); and 
Simon Milgo v Land Dispute Tribunal, Elburgon Division (NRC Misc., Civil Application No 1 of 
2003).  
85 Supra. 
86 Ibid, at 3-4. 
87 Ibid, at 4. 
88 Ibid. 
89 This Act has now been repealed and re-enacted as the Forest Conservation and Management 
Act, 2016.  Available at: 
http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/ForestConservationandManagementActNo3
4of2016.pdf , accessed 12 January, 2011. 
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Eastern Mau Forest had been altered.90 This notice which was gazetted related 
directly to the lands that were the subject of this suit.91 In reaction to this 
development, by March 2001, the Ogiek Plaintiffs approached the same Court,92 
praying for this latter Gazette notice to be quashed.93 In 2014, the Environment 
and Land Court (ELC) of Kenya (a new Court created pursuant to the above law 
reforms in Kenya to which the 1997 case was transferred)94 gave a ruling in this 
matter.95 In determining whether members of the Ogiek community had any 
customary land rights arising from their occupation of East Mau Forests, the Court 
relied on the provisions of the NLP of Kenya and section 63 of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution among other legal instruments and held that their customary land 
rights were violated.96 The Court therefore ruled in their favour and ordered the 
Government of Kenya to reverse its actions accordingly.97  
Indeed, during the pendency of the above case, the Ogieks continued to 
encounter challenges in relation to their customary land rights and they continued 
to challenge these before the domestic courts in Kenya.98  One of such cases 
which was decided before the first case discussed above is the case of Francis 
                                            
90 See Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney General and 5 Ors (supra) at 4. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid, at 4. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Sitting in Nairobi. This Court was established pursuant to the Environment and Land Court Act 
2011 (as revised in 2015) to determine disputes relating to the environment and the use and 
occupation of land. 
95 Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney General and 5 Ors (supra) at 7-20. 
96 Ibid, at 12-14. 
97 Ibid, at 19-20. 
98 See Simon Kiwape and 19 Ors v Muneria Naimodu and 2 Ors (supra); Marinwa, Sogoo and 
Ololoigero Families v Isaiah Cheluget (supra); Republic v Minister for Environment and Natural 
Resources and Ministry of Land Officials (supra) and Simon Milgo v Land Dispute Tribunal, 
Elburgon Division (supra). 
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Kemei and Ors v The Attorney General and Ors.99 This case was instituted by ten 
Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and 5,000 members of the Ogiek community of 
Tinet Forest in south western Mau Forests.100 It was the position of Ogiek peoples 
that the Tinet forest was part of their ancestral lands which they had occupied 
since time immemorial.101 However, as in the previous case, the lands in dispute 
in the present case were gazetted by the Kenyan Government as forest reserves 
during colonial rule, and following this there were also several attempts in the 
early 1990s by the post-colonial Government to evict the Ogiek peoples from the 
disputed lands.102  
Although the post-colonial Government succeeded in evicting some of the Ogiek, 
most of them returned to the forest almost immediately.103 However, the Kenyan 
Forests Act,104 prohibited cutting, grazing, removal of forest produce or 
disturbance of the flora in such reserves, except where the permission of the 
forest authorities in Kenya had been obtained.105 Similarly, there was a prohibition 
to the effect that no person(s) should be found in a forest area between 9 p.m. 
and 6 a.m. and no one was permitted to erect buildings within a gazetted forest 
in Kenya under the Forest Act.106 Against the above background, in 1999 the 
Government of Kenya issued a 14 days’ ultimatum to the Ogiek peoples living in 
the Tinet Forest in the south western Mau Forests demanding that they should 
vacate the forest area.107 In reaction to this order to vacate, ten members of the 
                                            
99 Francis Kemei Ors v The Attorney General and Ors (supra). 
100 Ibid, at 3. 
101 Ibid, at 4. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Supra. 
105 Francis Kemei and Ors v The Attorney General and Ors (supra) at 5-6. 
106 Ibid, at 4. 
107 Ibid. 
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Ogiek community instituted this action challenging the threat of eviction.108 The 
Plaintiffs claimed that they were dependent for their livelihoods on living in the 
forest since they were food gatherers, hunters, peasant farmers, bee-keepers and 
that their culture was associated with the forest.109 Among other reliefs, they 
urged the Court to declare that: their eviction from Tinet Forest by the Government 
was in violation of their rights to the protection of the law;110 their rights not to be 
discriminated against; their right to reside in any part of Kenya; and their right to 
life and that this had been contravened by the forcible eviction from the Tinet 
Forest.111 
In response, the Respondents contended that: the Plaintiffs were not genuine 
members of the Ogiek community and that it was not true that the Plaintiffs had 
been living in Tinet forest since time immemorial;112 the Plaintiffs had entered 
illegally into the Tinet forest;113 the rights and freedoms provided for in the old 
Kenyan Constitution were subject to derogations aimed at ensuring that their 
enjoyment by individuals or communities do not prejudice the rights and freedoms 
of others;114 the Plaintiffs were not landless as they claimed, and that since 
colonial times, members of this community had been resettled along with other 
Ogiek;115 and that the eviction was not discriminatory, as all other illegal occupiers 
of the disputed lands were also asked to leave.116 Consequently, the respondents 
submitted that the Plaintiffs were no longer dependent on the forest resources for 
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their survival.117 The Court did not accept the arguments of the Plaintiffs and 
instead dismissed all their claims. The Court upheld the claim of the Government 
to the Mau Forests as Government lands and therefore refused to recognise 
customary land rights of the Ogiek to the forest lands.  
It is argued that the contrast between the decision of the Court in this case and 
the case of Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney General and 5 Ors,118 
demonstrates the importance of constitutional and legislative reforms to the 
protection of customary and communal land rights of IPs in post-colonial Africa. 
The two cases illustrate how different laws lead to different outcomes in terms of 
the enforceability of customary land rights in a post-colonial Kenya. This latter 
case was decided before the 2010 adoption of the new Constitution of Kenya, the 
NLP and the post-2010 enactments of new land legislations, all of which added 
up to give constitutional, statutory and policy recognition to customary land rights 
of IPs in Kenya.  
It is further argued that had this case been decided under the current land rights 
regime in Kenya, the outcome may have been different. This argument is 
supported by the legal challenges encountered by the Endorois peoples of Kenya 
in relation to their customary and community land rights in a number of pre-2010 
Kenya land rights cases.119 It is the argument in this thesis, that to the extent that 
post-colonial domestic courts continue to afford superiority to State law over 
                                            
117 Ibid, at 6. 
118 Joseph Letuya and 21 others v Attorney General and 5 Others (supra). 
119 See William Arap Ng’asia & 29 Ors v Baringo County Council and Koibatek County Council. 
HC - Nakuru, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 522 of 1998. For further analysis of the judicial 
struggles and difficulties encountered by the Endorois before the domestic Courts of Kenya, see 
C Morel, 'Defending Human Rights in Africa: The Case for Minority and Indigenous Rights' 
(2004) 1 Essex Human Rights Review 54 at 56 and L Kimathi, Contesting Local Marginalization 
through International Instruments: The Endorois Community Case to The African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights - A Case Study (Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IBIDEA), 2012) at 12-15. However, it is also possible that the unfriendly climate for 
the independence of the Kenyan judiciary may also have impacted on the negative attitudes of 
judges to land rights of IPs in pre-2010 Kenya. See M Mutua, ‘Justice under Siege: The Rule of 
law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya’ (2001) 23 (1) Human Rights Quarterly 96. 
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customary law, to that extent, any claims by IPs for the protection of their 
customary land rights before such national courts would succeed or fail on the 
basis of the terms and the extent to which State law is willing to recognise 
customary land rights of IPs. This argument is buttressed by the comparative 
examination of land rights of Abuja and Ogiek peoples in section 5.2 below. 
5.2. Comparative Analyses of Land Rights of Abuja and Ogiek 
Peoples 
Pre-colonially, in Nigeria as well as in Kenya customary land tenure was the 
prevailing mode of land tenure based on community and family land ownership.120 
Both Nigeria and Kenya have similar experiences of British colonial rule and the 
consequential introduction of English land tenure into the domestic legal systems 
of the two States, along with the systematic subjugation of customary land tenure 
to a lower status compared to State land law during colonialism.  
It must be noted that the fact that Kenya was heavily settled by European settlers 
in colonial times could have influenced the historical hostility towards customary 
and community land tenure.121 This could also perhaps explain the motivation for 
recent customary land rights reforms in Kenya which could be driven by 
nationalist and decolonisation objectives towards addressing the historical 
injustices in relation to customary land tenure in colonial and early post-colonial 
times.122 Therefore, the Kenyan reforms could be understood in the context of 
                                            
120 For Nigeria, see PG McHugh, Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 2011); CK Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, 1946); CK Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe (Oxford 
University Press, 1950); BO Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law (Nwamife Publishers, 1972); and 
TO Elias, Nigerian Land Law and Custom (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951). For Kenya, see 
MO Makoloo, (n 1) above; H Okoth-Ogendo, (n 10) above; and B Berman, (n 10) above. 
121 YP Ghai and P McAuslan, (n 6) above at 25 and MO Makoloo, (n 1) above at 5. 
122 For critical review of the current land tenure reforms in Kenya see P Narh et al, ‘Land Sector 
Reforms in Ghana, Kenya and Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis of Their Effectiveness’ (2016) 
5 (2) Land 8; JW Bruce, ‘The Variety of Reform: A Review of Recent Experience with Land 
Reform and the Reform of Land Tenure, with Particular Reference to the African Experience’ 
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repatriation of land confiscated in colonial times. As Nigeria, did not have the 
experience of the level of European settlements as in colonial Kenya, and did not 
experience the kind of hostility towards customary land tenure experienced in 
colonial Kenya, there may be no such nationalist and anti-colonial motivation to 
embark on such land law reforms in Nigeria as has been recently undertaken in 
Kenya.123 
In Kenya, the colonial administration made efforts to secure large chunks of land 
through various means including signing of treaties, such as the Maasai 
Agreements in 1904 and 1911.124  In Nigeria, a similar attitude was adopted by 
entering into treaties with local chiefs such as the one between King Docemo of 
Lagos and the British – the Treaty of Cession.125 In the case of Kenya, colonial 
land legislation had the combined effects of making Kenyans tenants at the will 
of the British Crown and by implication liable to displacement at the convenience 
of the colonial authorities.126 In Nigeria, the colonial authorities were very good at 
recognising and accommodating the pre-existing indigenous customary land 
tenure as illustrated by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Amodu 
Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria.127 
Also, while the British colonial administration embarked on a policy of abolishing 
customary land tenure and made legal arrangements to convert the communal 
system of customary land tenure in Kenya into individual and private ownership 
                                            
(2014) 9 Occasional Paper 13; and A Manji, ‘The Politics of Land Reform in Kenya 2012’ (2014) 
57 (1) African Review 115. 
123 See G Wasserman, ‘Continuity and Counter-Insurgency: The Role of Land Reform in 
Decolonizing Kenya, 1962-70 (1973) 7 (1) Canadian Journal of African Studies 133 and JW 
Harbeson, ‘Land Reform and Politics in Kenya, 1954-70’ (1971) 9 (2) The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 231. 
124 MO Makoloo, (n 1) above at 5. 
125 TO Elias, (n 120) above. 
126 H Okoth-Ogendo, (n 10) above and B Berman, (n 10) above. 
127 Amodu Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria [1921] AC 399. 
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based on English land tenure principles,128 this did not happen in Nigeria during 
British colonial administration. Both post-colonial States of Nigeria and Kenya 
have upon attainment of political independence from Britain in the early 1960s 
retained the colonial legacy of the State managing land through legislation.129 
However, while post-colonial State law in Kenya appears to have initially 
embarked on a process of individualising land rights to the detriment of customary 
rights to land, thereby undermining the indigenous customary land rights of 
Kenyans,130 in Nigeria, such wholesale attempt at individualising customary land 
tenure has not been done. Instead, section 36 of the Nigerian Land Use Act 1978 
(LUA) attempts to accommodate customary land tenure in the 36 States of the 
Nigerian federation. 
A major point of divergence is that whereas Kenya now has much post-colonial 
legislation that accommodate customary land rights of Kenyans, Nigeria has just 
one statute. Indeed, while the Kenyan Constitution131 recognises customary land 
rights of Kenyans under its Article 63, the Nigerian Constitution132 has no 
equivalent provision. In addition, Kenya has a broad and overreaching policy 
framework in the form of the NLP which expressly sets out the objectives of 
addressing historical injustices in relation to minorities and IPs’ customary land 
rights. Nigeria does not have any such policy. Unlike Kenya, Nigeria has not 
embarked on any land law and land policy reforms since the enactment through 
a military decree in 1978 of the LUA. 
                                            
128 L Cotula, C Toulmin and C Hesse, (n 18) above at 3. 
129 E Colson, 'The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights' in V Turner 
(ed), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, vol 3 (Cambridge University Press, 1971) and Cotula L 
and Chauveau J-P, Changes in Customary Land Tenure Systems in Africa (International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 2007). 
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131 Supra. 
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It is the argument in this thesis that the facts surrounding the land rights of Ogiek 
peoples are in pari materia with the facts surrounding the land rights of Abuja 
peoples. The gazetting of the ancestral lands of Ogiek peoples as Government 
lands was made through the instrumentality of the Kenyan Forests Act,133 likewise 
the ancestral lands of Abuja peoples of Nigeria were also compulsorily acquired 
as lands belonging to the Federal Government of Nigeria through the 
instrumentality of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT Act)134 and the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Nigerian Constitution).135  
The contrast is that while the Constitution of Kenya now protects customary land 
rights of Ogiek peoples, the Nigerian Constitution remains the major legal 
obstacle to the protection of customary land rights of Abuja peoples.  This paradox 
is further demonstrated by the decisions of the Nigerian CA in Ona v Atenda,136 
and the Kenyan ELC in Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney General and 5 
Ors.137 While the Nigerian Constitution was used as a ‘sword’ to terminate land 
rights of Abuja peoples on the altar of national unity in the former case, in the 
latter case the Kenyan Constitution was used as a ‘shield’ to safeguard land rights 
of Ogiek peoples.  
It is argued that although anti-colonial and nationalist motivations in relation to 
repatriation of lands acquired during colonial rule may be lacking in Nigeria, 
however, as the experience in Nigeria in both colonial and post-colonial times has 
been the accommodation of customary land tenure by the colonial and post-
colonial State, Nigeria may not have serious difficulties in transplanting the recent 
                                            
133 Supra. 
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135 Supra. 
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Kenyan land law reforms to resolve similar legal challenges, not just in relation to 
land rights of Abuja peoples but towards Nigerians in general.  
It is argued also that the main similarity between land rights of Abuja peoples and 
land rights of Ogiek peoples is that they both illustrate the power of State law to 
extinguish customary land rights of groups of people on the one hand, and the 
ability of the same State law to protect customary land rights of groups of people 
on the other hand. It is therefore, the argument in this thesis that such powers of 
State law to either extinguish or protect customary land rights of groups of people 
raises critical, interesting, academic and research questions as to the relationship 
between State law and other forms of law such as customary law and international 
law.138  
Based on the analyses above, the case study of Abuja raises the following 
research questions: The first central research question is: 1. Are the Abuja 
peoples of Nigeria indigenous peoples (IPs) under international law and are their 
customary land rights protected under international law as IPs? To answer this 
first central research question, the following sub-research questions have been 
generated: 1) Who are IPs under international law? 2) Is the concept of IPs 
relevant in the African context? 3) Do the Abuja peoples of Nigeria meet the 
criteria to qualify as IPs under international law? 4) How are children defined 
under international child rights law and are there any insights to be gleaned from 
this so that IPs may be defined in a more positive context? 5) How relevant is the 
general body of international human rights law to the protection of land rights of 
IPs and how does international law protect such rights?  
However, as the African region in general has adopted its own regional human 
rights framework as a document written by Africans for Africans it will be 
significant to enquire about its relevance to the protection of land rights of IPs in 
                                            
138 For critical analysis of such power of State law to terminate communal customary land rights 
in various African states, see LA Wily, 'The Law is to Blame’: The Vulnerable Status of Common 
Property Rights in Sub‐Saharan Africa' (2011) 42 Development and Change 733. 
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Africa. Accordingly, the following additional sub-research question is posed: 6) 
Are the land rights of IPs protected under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter)? These research questions are answered 
in Chapters Six and Seven. 
In line with the above central and sub-research questions, the following second 
central and sub-research questions are posed: 2. What is the nature of the 
relationship between international and national law in post-colonial African 
States? 1) What are the differences in approach and how does this impact on the 
domestic application of international law? 2) What is the nature of the relationship 
between international and national law in post-colonial Nigeria? 3) What is the 
nature of the relationship between international and national law in post-colonial 
Kenya? 4) What are the differences and similarities in the approaches of Nigeria 
and Kenya towards international law? 5) Do either of the post-colonial African 
States of Nigeria and Kenya have anything to learn from each other in terms of 
the relationship between international and national law? These latter research 
questions will be answered in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Conclusion 
Whilst making comparative analyses between land rights of Abuja and Ogiek 
peoples, it has been argued that such comparative analyses illustrates the power 
of State law to extinguish the rights of groups of people on the one hand, and its 
capacity to protect such rights on the other hand. Conscious of the fact that 
insights from law reforms in one jurisdiction may not be easily transplanted 
elsewhere, it has been submitted that the recent progressive land law reforms in 
Kenya should be replicated in Nigeria to resolve similar legal challenges in 
relation to land rights of Abuja peoples.  
Indeed, it has been submitted also that such land law reforms should be made to 
the benefit of Nigerians in general to protect the customary land rights of all 
Nigerians. It must be noted that despite the above recommendations for Nigeria, 
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the arguments in this Chapter do not aim to situate the Kenya land law reforms 
as a template for all African States regarding customary land rights and their 
accommodation by State law, rather such reforms provide a new way of 
contextualising the Kenyan jurisdiction as a possible way of placing it within 
broader avenues that may be pursued by African States with similar legal systems 
and customary land rights issues.  
Theoretically, Palley suggested that there are two main approaches which States 
use to legally articulate the position of vulnerable groups within their domestic 
jurisdictions to wit: integration and maintenance of difference.139 While integration 
involves assimilationist and dominative approaches, maintaining difference 
involves the technique of pluralism.140 It appears the idea behind the Kenyan land 
law reforms is the preservation of legal diversity in relation to land rights through 
using the techniques of pluralism. Whereas, the Nigerian approach is 
assimilationist. It has also been demonstrated that the case study of Abuja raises 
some academic research questions which have been enumerated at the end of 
section 5.2 above. 
In conclusion, the main purpose of Volume 1 has been to present the reader with 
the legal challenges that the case study of Abuja highlights in a post-colonial 
Nigeria. In Chapters Two and Three, a broad historical and contextual 
background relating to the legal developments in colonial and post-colonial 
Nigeria respectively were examined. The case study has been introduced in 
Chapter Four and comparative analyses have been made between the case study 
and land rights of Ogiek peoples in the present Chapter. In the following Volume 
2, the main research objective will be to examine the relevance of international 
                                            
139 C Palley, ‘The Role of Law in Relation to Minority Groups’ in AE Alcork, BK Taylor and JM 
Welton (eds), The Future of Cultural Minorities (Macmillan Press, 1979) 120-160. 
140 GR Woodman, ‘Ghana: How Does State Law Accommodate Religious, Cultural, Linguistic 
and Ethnic Diversity?’, in M-C Foblets, J-F Gaudreault-Desbiens and AD Renteln (eds) Cultural 
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law in the context of finding solutions to the legal challenges arising from the case 
study of Abuja, through finding answers from international law to the research 
questions which the case study generates.
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CHAPTER SIX: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ABUJA 
PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Introduction 
In the preceding Volume 1, the research objective was to illustrate the colonial 
origin of contemporary legal challenges that the case study presents. Accordingly, 
in Chapter Two the introduction of English law into the Colony of Nigeria and the 
concomitant relegation of customary law to colonial State law was demonstrated. 
Likewise, the subjugation of customary law to State law and the nature of the 
definition of land rights in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria was demonstrated in 
Chapter Three. In Chapter Four, the consequences of the relegation of customary 
law to an inferior status compared with State law on the definition of land rights in 
the case study was demonstrated. In Chapter Five, comparative analyses 
between Abuja and Ogiek peoples was made with a suggestion that Nigeria 
should replicate the law and constitutional reforms in relation to customary land 
tenure undertaken in post-colonial Kenya. In addition to the recommendations in 
Chapter Five, the main objective of Volume 2, is to find answers to the research 
questions emanating from the legal challenges demonstrated in Volume 1 
through recourse to international law.  
Against the background of the legal problems arising from the introduction of the 
case study of Abuja in Chapter Four, which demonstrated that the compulsory 
acquisition of the ancestral lands of Abuja peoples without payment of 
compensation or resettlement is legitimised by the domestic laws of Nigeria, this 
Chapter is aimed at answering the following research questions:(1) Who are 
indigenous peoples (IPs) under international law? This research question is 
significant to this thesis as the answer to it will enable this research to identify 
those characterised as IPs in international law. 2) Is the concept of IPs relevant 
to Africa? This research question is also significant as answering it will also help 
to determine if the concept of IPs is relevant to Africa and to Abuja peoples of 
Nigeria. 3) Do the Abuja peoples of Nigeria meet the criteria to qualify as IPs 
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under international law? 4) How are children defined under international child 
rights law and are there any insights to be gleaned from this so that IPs may be 
defined in a more positive context? The answers to the afore-mentioned research 
questions (sub-research questions 1 and 2) will help to answer sub-research 
question 3) through applying the criteria of IPs identified in answering sub-
research questions 1) and 2) above. The answers to sub-research question 4) will 
enhance an analogical examination of international child rights law with the 
objective of drawing insights as to how IPs may be presented in a more positive 
way under international law.  
At a general level, it is important to find answers to the above research questions 
to determine the central research objective highlighted in Chapter One. This is, 
whether Abuja peoples of Nigeria are IPs under international law and whether 
their land rights are protected under international law. To answer the above 
research questions, this Chapter has been sub-divided into three main sections.  
Section 6.1 begins with an examination of the emergence of the United Nation 
(UN) human rights system and its relevance towards advancing the rights IPs. In 
section 6.2 the emergence of the international human rights regime specifically 
on the rights of IPs will be examined. This section will engage with the debates 
on the definition of IPs in the existing literature and whether the concept of IPs is 
relevant in the African context. The main objective is to answer the research 
questions: Who are IPs under international law? Is the concept of IPs relevant to 
Africa? Do the Abuja peoples of Nigeria meet the criteria to qualify as IPs under 
international law? In section 6.3, the main task is to answer the sub-research 
question 4) How are children defined under international child rights law and are 
there any insights to be gleaned from this so that IPs may be defined in a more 
positive context? In answering this question there will be analogical analyses 
between the definition of IPs and the definition of children under international law. 
The purpose is to illustrate how one branch of international human rights law has 
responded to the challenges of defining subjects of international law and how the 
other branch may respond to similar challenges. 
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6.1. The UN Human Rights System and IPs in Historical 
Perspective 
Although some writers have argued that the origin of international law dates back 
to antiquity in the form of the Jewish, Greek and Roman City States,1 modern 
international law began in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.2 The 
Age of Discovery in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to the 
development of international rules relating to the acquisition of territories by 
European Powers.3 The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that led to the 
establishment of the League of Nations was the beginning of a movement towards 
a global society. Prior to this, European exploration and conquest of the Western 
Hemisphere raised questions about the relationship between Europeans and the 
IPs that they encountered.4 Within a naturalist framework, early European 
theorists like Bartolome de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria questioned the 
legitimacy of Spanish conquerors and the colonialist system which granted them 
lands and rights to the labour of the Indians who lived in them.5  
The above early European and naturalist jurisprudence in relation to IPs has been 
associated with the early development of international law which was the legacy 
of the humanism of European ecclesiastical jurists.6 This early naturalist frame 
was replaced by the emergence of modern States and international law in Europe 
                                            
1 See L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol 1 (Longmans, Green & Co, 1905) at 44-
50. 
2 Ibid, at 54. See also, RMM Wallace and O Martin-Ortega, International Law (6th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009) at 5. 
3 RMM Wallace and O Martin-Ortega, (n 2) above at 5. 
4 SJ Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 16. 
5 See BdL Casas and A Collard, History of the Indies (Harper & Row, 1971); BdL Casas, The 
Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account (John Hopskin University Press, 1974); L Hanke, The 
Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Southern Methodist University Press, 
1949); A Nussbaum , A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan, 1954); and JB Scott 
and F de Vitoria, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of 
Nations (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2000). 
6 SJ Anaya, (n 4) above at 16. 
Indigenous Peoples, Abuja Peoples and International Law 
175 
 
which prompted a revision of the framework of legal discussion in relation to IPs.7 
Before 1945, there was hardly any development internationally in relation to 
human rights and human rights were rarely the subject of bilateral or multilateral 
treaties.8 For instance, the Treaty of Westphalia 1648 merely recognised the 
principle of equality of rights for Catholics and Protestant States.9 
However, the era of modern international law began with the Treaty of 
Westphalia, thereby ushering in the era of positivism in international law.10 
Although the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, 181511 included provisions 
against the slave trade, it was not until 1890 that the European Powers agreed 
on specific enforcement mechanisms through the Brussels Act 1890 for the 
abolition of slavery.12 The abolition of slavery signalled the beginning of 
international action on human rights by the comity of nations. However, the 
emergence of positivism in international law, particularly in the nineteenth century 
                                            
7 Ibid. 
8 E Stamatopoulou, 'Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights as a Developing 
Dynamic' (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 58 at 61. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See C Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History of European State-Making’ in C Tilly (ed), The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe (Priston University Press, 1975) at 18; JL 
Brierly and A Clapham, Brierly's Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law 
in International Relations (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012) at 5; JR Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 10; L Gross, 'The 
Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948' (1948) American Journal of International Law 20; D Croxton, 
'The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty' (1999) 21 The International 
History Review 569 at 570 and B Straumann, ‘The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular 
Constitution’ (2008) (15) 2 Constellations 173 at 183-184. 
11 Completed on 9 June, 1815. For more on the historical significance of the Final Act of the 
Congress of Vienna to international law and statehood, see C Dupont, 'History and Coalitions: 
The Vienna Congress (1814–1815)' (2003) 8 International Negotiation 169; R Langhorne, 
'Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna' (1986) 12 Review of International 
Studies 313 at 316-317; JS Barkin and B Cronin, 'The State and the Nation: Changing Norms 
and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations' (1994) 48 International Organizations 
107 at 11; PW Schroeder, 'The Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?' (1992) The 
American Historical Review 683; HA Kissinger, 'The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal' (1956) 
8 World Politics 264 and KS Gleditsch and MD Ward, 'A Revised List of Independent States 
since the Congress of Vienna' (1999) 25 International Interactions 393. 
12 E Stamatopoulou, (n 8) above at 61. 
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removed IPs from the international legal arena and focused mainly on the 
sovereignty of European States and their territorial integrity.13 Most of the 
significant events leading to the formation of the UN and the era of human rights, 
began in January 1919 after the First World War, when delegates from about thirty 
Allied and other associated States converged in Paris to negotiate and restore 
European and world peace.14 The Powers represented at the Paris Peace 
Conference,15 were inspired by the reality that the First World War was evidence 
that the international system which was comprised mainly of the Super Powers 
as the main actors was a failure and there was a need for change in the balance 
of power globally.16  
The result of the Paris Peace Conference was the Treaty of Versailles 191917 and 
the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919 (League Covenant).18 
It is the League Covenant that made ‘the most crucial contribution that the 
statesmen meeting in Paris could make to building the new international order.’19 
The League Covenant did not include the protection of human rights as part of its 
aims and objectives.20 It did not also include issues about racial equality as its 
objectives and an attempt by some IPs to participate in the League of Nations in 
                                            
13 BJ Richardson, S Imai and K McNeil (eds), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative 
and Critical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 102. 
14 See A Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking after the First World War, 1919-1923 
(2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at 1. 
15 Paris Peace Conference of 1919. 
16 See R Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933 (2nd edn, Routledge, 1995) at 9. 
17 Ibid, at 29. 
18 See Covenant of League of Nations reprinted in A Sharp (n 14) above at 68-80. Which came 
into force on 10 January, 1920. 
19 A Fleury, ‘The League of Nations: Towards a New Appreciation of Its History’ in E Gläser, MF 
Boemeke and GD Feldman (eds), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years 
(German Historical Institute & Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 507. 
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the 1920s were unsuccessful.21 The insignificant place of IPs in the international 
arena at the time is illustrated by the Island of Palmas Case of 1928, where the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration did not consider treaties between IPs and the 
Dutch East India Company as binding international treaties, but it recognised that 
the Spanish had title over the islands which derived from discovery.22 The 
arbitrator merely focused on the legal consequences of European assertions of 
power over the lands and did not consider the rights of the IPs living on them.23 
In a similar way, Indian IPs were not deemed to have legal personality under 
international law in the earlier case of Cayuga Indian Claims of 1926.24 
6.1.1. The League Covenant and the Movement towards a Global Society 
The adoption of the League Covenant signalled the emergence of a new direction 
for international law amongst the comity of States. States committed themselves 
to an era of collective security and international solidarity.25 However, of particular 
relevance to Africa was the establishment of the mandate system to manage 
German colonies in Africa in the aftermath of the defeat of Germany in the First 
World War.26 Therefore, the former German colonies were shared among the 
Allies as Mandated Territories and their inhabitants were to be ‘tutored’ by each 
European mandatory to develop towards political independence.27 Mandated 
Territories were to be administered through the authority of the Mandate Powers 
                                            
21 Ibid. 
22 Island of Palmas Case (United States v Netherland) [1928] 2 Report of International Arbitral 
Awars (RIAA) 829. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Cayuga Indian Claims (Great Britain) v United States [1926] 6 RIAA 173, 176.  
25 Art 10 of the Covenant. 
26 Art 22 (1). 
27 See Art 22 (2) and (3). See, TO Elias and R Akinjide, Africa and the Development of 
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subject to the monitoring of the Permanent Commission.28  The implications of 
these developments were that although African States had lost their sovereignty 
to European powers and consequently their capacity to enter into external 
relations, nonetheless Africans continued to have an effect on the development 
of international law as their territories became the subject of an increasing need 
to end colonialism.29 
At a more general level, the League Covenant represented an attempt at a 
process aimed at achieving international cooperation on a global scale.30 
However, as Alan Sharp records there were disagreements among the Great 
Powers and the US pulled out which left only Britain and France as the main 
players.31 Despite this failure, the League of Nations provided the foundations 
upon which a new world order based on international cooperation would emerge 
in the aftermath of the Second World War in the form of the UN. Flury argues that 
at the League of Nations, States still believed in the overall supremacy and 
sovereignty of States without regard for a globalised society where States were 
to be held accountable under international or regional law.32 This sovereigntist 
approach to international law and cooperation changed with the emergence of 
human rights as cardinal principles and objectives of the UN Charter.33 
 
                                            
28 Art 22 (8) and (9). 
29 A Fleury, (n 19) above at 517. 
30 Ibid. 
31 A Sharp, (n 14) above at 65. 
32 A Fleury, (n 19) above at 516. For further analyses of League of Nations and its contributions 
to the development of international law, see IJ Lederer, The Versailles Settlement: Was it 
Foredoomed to Failure? (Heath, 1960) and M Housden, The League of Nations and the 
Organization of Peace (Routledge, 2014). 
33 The Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, US after the 
United Nations Conference on International Organisation, came into force on 24 October 1945. 
See Art 1. 
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6.2. The Emergence of IPs in International Law 
This section aims to answer the research question: Who are IPs under 
international law? This research question is significant to this thesis as the answer 
to it will enable this research to determine if the international human rights regime 
on IPs is applicable in the context of the case study of Abuja. Hurst Hannum points 
out that until the adoption of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention No 107 (ILO 107) in 1957,34 IPs’ rights were not recognised under 
international law except for the treaties that were entered between Indian nations 
and colonial Powers in early American history.35  
However, the literature on the rights of IPs under international law is dominated 
by debates about definition.36 As Ken Coates notes, the question is, is it the 
smallness of a population that should be the main criteria for defining IPs, or could 
it be some other criterion, like ancestral connection to land, the length of time in 
a territory, or commitment to pre-industrial and pre-colonial culture?37 ‘Or is it 
perhaps the product of more recent historical processes? Is being indigenous 
simply to have been the victim of colonization? To complicate matters further 
there are difficulties identifying the unique identities of specific cultural groups.’38   
The controversy surrounding the definition of IPs is exemplified by the opposing 
views of two anthropologists - Adam Kuper on the one hand and Alan Barnard on 
                                            
34 Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, adopted in Geneva, at the 40th International 
Labour Congress (ILC) session on 26 June 1957, entered into force 2 June 1959. 
35 H Hannum, 'New Developments in Indigenous Rights' (1987) 28 Vermont Journal of 
International Law 649. 
36 See for example, K Lehmann, 'To Define or Not to Define-The Definitional Debate Revisited' 
(2006) 31 American Indian Law Review 509; HN Weaver, 'Indigenous Identity: What Is It and 
Who Really Has It?' (2001) 25 The American Indian Quarterly 240 and J Corntassel, 'Who is 
Indigenous? ‘Peoplehood’ and Ethnonationalist Approaches to Rearticulating Indigenous 
Identity' (2003) 9 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 75. 
37 K Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples: Struggle and Survival (Springer, 2004) at 
1. 
38 Ibid. 
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the other hand. In a widely cited paper,39 Kuper launches a strong argument 
against the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’, where he argues that the concept of 
‘indigenous peoples’ is merely a ‘euphemism for what used to be termed 
“primitive”’.40 He maintains further that it is not possible to attach any cultural 
distinctiveness to IPs as farmers, hunters or nomadic herders given the various 
historical interactions with so-called ‘indigenous peoples’ in several encounters 
between them and other groups.41 Indeed, Kuper ridicules the idea of defining IPs 
on grounds of ‘descent’ from pre-invasion peoples.42 In his view if a group of 
people are afforded certain rights on grounds of ‘descent’ this would result in a 
‘drift to racism’.43 He therefore concludes that the idea behind IPs and their rights 
‘…rely on obsolete anthropological notions and on a romantic and false 
ethnographic vision. Fostering essentialist ideologies of culture and identity, they 
may have dangerous political consequences.’44  
By contrast, Barnard argues that the notion of ‘indigenous peoples’ is very 
important in the context of explaining the relationship between dominant groups 
or institutions and non-dominant ones.45 To buttress his views Barnard gives the 
example of the Botswana Government that once threatened to change the 
constitution of the country should some IPs living there succeed in claiming land 
rights against the Government in the courts.46 His argument is that such exercise 
                                            
39 A Kuper, 'The Return of the Native' (June 2003) 44 Current Anthropology at 389-402. 
40 Ibid, at 389. 
41 Ibid, at 390. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, at 392. 
44 Ibid, at 395. For other commentaries for and against Kuper’s views, see M Guenther et, al., 
'Discussion: The Concept of Indigeneity' (2006) 14 Social Anthropology 17 and J Kenrick and J 
Lewis, 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights and the Politics of the Term "Indigenous"' (2004) 20 
Anthropology Today 4. 
45 A Barnard, 'Kalahari Revisionism, Vienna and the “indigenous peoples” Debate' (2006) 14 
Social Anthropology 1 at 2. 
46 Ibid. 
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of State power by using its ability to make or change laws to the detriment of the 
rights of IPs illustrates the political and legal relevance of the concept of IPs, as 
this empowers them against the interests of the State.47 In response to Kuper’s 
critique of the concept of IPs Barnard submits that to reject ‘indigenous people’ 
as an anthropological concept is not the same thing as rejecting it as a legal 
concept, or rejecting it as a useful tool for political persuasion.’48 Likewise, 
Jonathan Friedman argues that ‘[c]ontrary to Kuper, indigeneity does not refer to 
a particular kind of society or even life style, but to a political identity that is, as 
we have argued here, a product of the structure of the state itself.’49  
Although Barnard agrees with Kuper that it is difficult to define IPs and some of 
the definitions proffered are untidy however, he (Barnard) suggests that despite 
the problems with defining the concept of IPs, in the context of the relationship 
between peoples and the modern State it is a useful concept in relation to non-
dominant groups who self-identify and are identified by others as such.50 
Consequently, Barnard opts for a polythetic definition which was first adumbrated 
by Sidesel Saugestad.51 This definition identifies IPs according to four criteria 
which include: first-come, self-identification, non-dominance and cultural 
difference.52 Barnard submits that this definition sums up the international 
consensus amongst anthropologists, lawyers and politicians in the context of the 
relationship between peoples and the State.53  
                                            
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, at 7. 
49 J Friedman, 'Indigeneity: Anthropological Notes on a Historical Variable' in M Henry (ed), 
Indigenous Peoples Self-Determination, Knowledge, Indigeneity (Eburon Delft, 2008) at 43-44.  
50 Ibid. 
51 S Saugestad, The Inconvenient Indigenous: Remote Area Development in Botswana, Donor 
Assistance and the First People of the Kalahari (Nordic Africa Institute, 2001). 
52 Ibid, at 43. 
53 A Barnard, (n 45) above at 7. 
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It is no wonder then that the concept of IPs is even more problematic in the context 
of Africa and even a sympathiser of the concept like Barnard admits that there 
are problems in applying this concept to Africa.54 Saugestad recognises that there 
is an African context to the term,55 and explains the process leading up to the 
production of the Martinez Report56 where the African conception of IPs was 
brought to focus but was rejected. However, this rejection does not seem to imply 
that the concept of IPs is not relevant to Africa.  
Despite the seeming lack of consensus on the meaning of IPs, academics have 
continued to proffer various definitions. For example, James Anaya appears to 
consider the definition of IPs in relation to people who inhabited a place prior to 
invasion by colonisers.57   Anaya contends that within international law and 
international institutions the terms ‘indigenous’, ‘native’ or ‘aboriginal’ ‘has long 
been used to refer to a particular subset of humanity that represents a certain 
common set of experiences rooted in historical subjugation by colonialism, or 
something like colonialism.’58 He then goes further to proffer his definition by 
arguing that: 
Today, the term indigenous, refers broadly to the living descendants 
of preinvasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. 
Indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally 
                                            
54 Ibid, at 8. For another author who makes a brilliant case about the need to support the 
concept of indigenous peoples for its political advantages to certain groups, see RB Lee, 
'Twenty-first Century Indigenism' (2006) 6 Anthropological Theory 455. 
55 See S Saugestad, 'Beyond the “Columbus Context”: New Challenges as the Indigenous 
Discourse is Applied to Africa' in H Minde (ed), Indigenous Peoples Self-determination, 
Knowledge, Indigeneity (Eburon Delft, 2008) 157-173 at 158.  Also, note how Saugestad 
expresses his understanding of the meaning of indigenous people in Africa at 165-166.  
56 MJ Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations (United 
Nations, 1987). 
57 SJ Anaya, (n 4) above at 3-4. 
58 Ibid, at 5. 
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distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies 
born of the forces of empire and conquest.59  
Although Anaya begins his analysis of the definition of IPs by placing a lot of 
emphasis on a history of ‘colonialism or something like colonialism’60 in a 
somewhat contradictory note he argues that presently IPs are identified as well 
as identifying themselves in accordance with identities that ‘predate historical 
encroachments by other groups and the ensuing histories that have wrought, and 
continue to bring, oppression against their cultural survival and self-determination 
as distinct peoples.’61 Anaya appears to introduce the criteria of self-identification 
in connection with ‘identities that predate encroachment’, ‘oppression against 
their cultural survival’, and ‘distinct peoples’.62  
Such West-centric descriptions of IPs also place a lot of emphasis on 
distinctiveness of culture as a key criterion for identifying them. In this respect 
Julian Burger contends that the idea of belonging to a distinct culture is a central 
aspect of defining IPs.63 In an attempt to be heterogeneous in defining IPs Anaya 
acknowledges that ‘many of the minority or non-dominant tribal peoples of Africa 
and Asia are generally regarded, and regard themselves, as indigenous … 
because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in which they live, or 
would like to live’.64 However, he is silent on whether such IPs of Africa are 
‘indigenous peoples’ for the purposes of international law and the rights that are 
protected and guaranteed therein.  
                                            
59 Ibid, at 3. 
60 Ibid, at 5. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See SJ Anaya, ‘Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law’ (1991) 8 (1) 
Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 1 at 4, where Anaya maintains that cultural 
distinctiveness and colonialism are key features of IPs. 
63 J Burger, Report from the Frontier: The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples (Cultural 
Survival Inc, 1987) at 12. 
64 SJ Anaya, (n 4) above at 3. 
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Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel argue that the literature on IPs has been 
dominated by ‘identity constructions that reflect the colonized political and legal 
contexts in which indigenous peoples are forced to live and operate.’65  They note 
further that colonialism should not be allowed to be the only narrative of IPs as 
this limits their freedom and imposes an outcome that further feeds into the power 
dynamics that disempowers them.66 Indeed, it appears that a lot of the literature 
on IPs tend to present them in the context of victimisation, as Coates argues IPs 
are defined in the context of powerlessness and exploitation by other dominant 
groups.67  
The most widely cited definition is the one provided by Jose Martinez Cobo.68 
Cobo’s study identifies certain key elements in defining and identifying IPs such 
as: the significance of traditional and ancestral lands; linkage of IPs to original or 
prior inhabitants of a territory; and distinctiveness of culture. However, as Coates 
argues, defining IPs in terms of victimisation is not only dis-empowering but also 
fails to acknowledge the fact that some IPs have in the past also ‘exploited, 
defeated, ruled over, and dislocated other indigenous societies.’69  
Even international organisations in the business of promoting the rights of IPs 
also seem to define them in terms of victimhood and distinctiveness of culture. 
For example, Survival International describes them as ‘a group which has had 
ultimate control of their lands taken by later arrivals; they are subject to the 
                                            
65 T Alfred and J Corntassel, 'Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary 
Colonialism' (2005) 40 Government and Opposition 597 at 605. See also, JN Brown and PM 
Sant, Indigeneity: Construction and Re/Presentation (Nova Science Publishers, 1999) and RH 
Barnes, A Gray and B Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, vol 48 (Association for Asian 
Studies Inc, 1995). 
66 Ibid, at 601. 
67 K Coates, (n 37) above at 5. 
68 MJ Cobo, (n 56) above at paras 379-382. 
69 K Coates, (n 37) above at 9. See also, H Minde, 'The Destination and the Journey: Indigenous 
Peoples and the United Nations from the 1960s through 1985' in H Minde (ed), Indigenous 
Peoples: Self-determination, Knowledge, Indigeneity (Delft Eburon, 2008) 49-86 at 56-57. 
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domination of others.’70 Similarly, according to the International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) IPs ‘face the same experience of discrimination and 
marginalization as other ethnic minorities’.71 It is the argument herein that this 
idea of defining IPs in such negative terms contradictorily feeds into the narratives 
that have accounted for the historical injustices encountered by IPs as well as 
their contemporary challenges globally. However, before examining the 
implications of this idea of defining IPs in such negative terms in further detail, it 
is important at this juncture to critically examine the approaches to the definition 
or descriptions of IPs by international organisations as well as under relevant 
international human rights instruments.  
6.2.1. The UN, International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Definition of 
IPs 
The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (ILO 107)72 
appears to be the first international instrument to define IPs73 as it described them 
similarly to the latter Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (ILO 169), 198774 which identifies them as: 
…peoples in independent countries who are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which 
inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country 
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment 
of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal 
status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and 
political institutions.75  
                                            
70 See <www.survivalinternational.org/info/terminology>. Accessed 17 March 2016. 
71 See <www.iwgia.org/culture-and-Ibidentity/Ibidentification-of-indigenous-peoples>. Accessed 
17 March 2016. 
72 Supra. 
73 Under its Art 1 (b). 
74 ILO, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
adopted in Geneva, at the 76th International Labour Congress (ILC) session on 27 June 1989, 
entered into force on 05 September 1991. 
75 See Art 1 (b). 
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It provides further that ‘[s]elf-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded 
as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of 
this Convention apply.’76 It has been suggested that the definition of IPs in the 
latter ILO Convention differs from the former in emphasising ‘self-identification’ by 
IPs as a criteria for identifying them.77 Indeed, ILO 169 remains the only existing 
and binding international instrument that contains criteria for describing IPs. 
Although it is claimed that the UN has no definition for IPs, however, a reading of 
paragraph 6 of the preamble to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP)78 suggests that IPs are those who ‘have suffered from historic 
injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their 
lands, territories and resources’. So, even the UN appears to describe and identify 
IPs in the context of victimhood.   
By contrast to the above preambular description, Article 9 of UNDRIP provides 
that ‘[i]ndigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an 
indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs 
of the community or nation concerned.’ Similarly, Article 33 (1) of UNDRIP 
provides that ‘[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity 
or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions.’ It is argued that 
the combined effects of Articles 9 and 33 of UNDRIP are that the identification or 
definition of IPs is to be determined by IPs themselves in accordance with ‘their 
own customs and traditions’. So, in as much as the UN is concerned, when the 
determination of who are IPs is at issue, self-identification as such appears to be 
                                            
76 See Art 1 (2). 
77 RT Ako and O Oluduro, 'Identifying Beneficiaries of the UN-Indigenous Peoples' Partnership 
(UNIPP): The Case for the Indigenes of Nigeria's Delta Region' (2014) 22 African Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 369. 
78 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A/RES/61/295, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on Thursday, 13 September 2007 by a majority of 144 states in favour, 4 
votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstentions 
(Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian 
Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). Available at: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 17 March 
2016. 
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the key criterion. It is obvious therefore that the concept of IPs has transcended 
the discipline of anthropology as ‘the term has come to occupy wide currency in 
general as well as in the other social sciences literature.’79 Indeed, IPs are today 
recognised as distinct subjects of international law with rights as such.80 However, 
as noted above there are practical problems with the application of the West-
centric definition or description of IPs in the context of the protection of their rights 
in Africa.  
6.2.2. Definition of IPs in the African Context 
The objective of this section is to answer the research question: Is the concept of 
IPs relevant to Africa? This research question is significant to this thesis as 
answering it will also help to determine if the concept of IPs is relevant to Africa 
and to the Abuja peoples of Nigeria. The relevance or otherwise of the concept of 
IPs in the African context has been the subject of academic debates by scholars 
like James Woodburn who critically examines the political status of hunter-
gatherers in present day Africa by demonstrating that through the combined 
effects of their lack of political status and low numerical strengths these peoples 
have very negligible political power and influence in countries where they live.81 
He argues that ‘[i]n most, but not all, Sub-Saharan African countries, hunter-
gatherers are politically, to all intents and purposes, invisible, they lack voting 
power, lobbying capacity and any significant form of representation even at local 
                                            
79 V Xaxa, 'Tribes as Indigenous People of India' (1999) Economic and Political Weekly 3589 at 
3590. For further discussions on the definition of indigenous peoples, see M Pelican, 
'Complexities of Indigeneity and Autochthony: An African Example' (2009) 36 American 
Ethnologist 52; JN Brown and PM Sant, Indigeneity: Construction and Re/Presentation (Nova 
Science Publishers, 1999); RH Barnes, A Gray and B Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, 
vol 48 (Association for Asian Studies Inc, 1995);  L Hughes, The No-nonsense Guide to 
Indigenous Peoples (New Internationalist Verso, 2003), at 11-16; and R Stavenhagen, The 
Emergence of Indigenous Peoples (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012) at 46, 47, 48 
and 81-83. 
80 RA Williams, 'Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the 
Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World' (1990) Duke Law Journal 660. 
81 J Woodburn, 'The Political Status of Hunter-Gatherers in Present-Day and Future Africa' in A 
Barnard and J Kenrick (eds), Africa’s Indigenous Peoples: ‘First Peoples’ or ‘Marginalized 
Minorities’? (Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 2001) 1-14 at 1. 
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level.’82 He shows how there is a general recognition that these hunter-gatherers 
are the ‘first inhabitants of the countries in which they live’.83  
Woodburn maintains that ‘[b]y far the most important problem facing hunter-
gatherers and former hunter-gathers in Africa today is the theft of their land and 
the loss of their livelihood.’84 However, Woodburn concludes that because there 
is a general feeling in Africa that all Africans are IPs since almost all of them 
experienced colonialism, ‘more is likely to be gained by stressing that they are 
First Peoples’ and not IPs.85  
Likewise, in an essay examining the status of the San86 in southern Africa, James 
Suzman examines the issue of identifying the San as IPs by arguing that given 
the problematic context of the term ‘indigenous’ in Africa it is counter-productive 
to articulate the rights of the San through the indigenous rights framework.87 
Whilst he does not deny that the San of southern Africa can be legitimately 
categorised as IPs, Suzman concludes that it is better to regard them as a 
‘marginalized minority rather than indigenous peoples’ as they stand to gain more 
in terms of the legal protection of their rights through reference to their 
marginalised status.88 It is argued herein that notwithstanding the merits in 
Suzman’s arguments above, the concept of IPs is relevant to the promotion and 
protection of the rights of certain minority groups in Africa as demonstrated by the 
                                            
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid, at 2. 
84 Ibid, at 8. 
85 Ibid, at 12. 
86 The Sans are a population of marginalised and minority people who live in Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and Zambia, see J Suzman, Things from the Bush: A 
Contemporary History of the Omaheke Bushmen (Schlettwein Publishing, 2000). 
87 J Suzman, 'Indigenous Wrongs and Human Rights: National Policy, International Resolutions 
and the Status of the San of Southern Africa' in A Barnard and J Kenrick (eds), Africa’s 
Indigenous Peoples: ‘First Peoples’ or ‘Marginalized Minorities (Centre of African Studies, 
University of Edinburgh, 2001) 273-297 at 274-275. 
88 Ibid. 
Indigenous Peoples, Abuja Peoples and International Law 
189 
 
jurisprudence of African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (African 
Commission) and African Court on Human Peoples Rights (African Court) in 
subsections 6.2.3–6.2.4 below. 
Although Saugestad admits that ‘Africa and much of Asia represent special 
conceptual challenges’89 in terms of defining IPs, she argues that to link the 
concept of IPs to only European colonial expansion ‘leaves us without a suitable 
concept for analysing the same type of internal relationships that have persisted 
after the liberation from colonial dominance.’90 Saugestad maintains that in Africa 
there are many groups of people who have been socially marginalised, 
economically exploited and socially excluded by other dominant ethnic groups 
from the national political systems and economic structures post-colonially.91 She 
therefore submits that the concept of IPs is necessary to describe the relationship 
between some populations and dominant sections within post-colonial African 
States.92 This submission is validated by the African Commission as 
demonstrated in sub-section 6.2.3 below. 
6.2.3. The African Commission and the Definition of IPs  
In a Report,93 the African Commission through its Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities found that ‘[t]he African peoples who are facing 
particular human rights violations, and who are applying the term “indigenous” in 
their efforts to address their situation, cut across various economic systems and 
embrace hunter-gatherers, and pastoralists as well as some small-scale 
                                            
89 S Saugestad, 'Contested Images: ‘First Peoples’ or ‘Marginalized Minorities’ in Africa?' in A 
Barnard and J Kenrick (eds), Africa’s Indigenous Peoples: ‘First Peoples’ or ‘Marginalized 
Minorities (Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 2001) 299-322 at 303. 
90 Ibid, at 304 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and International Work Group 
on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Report of the African Commission’s Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities, (ACPHR and IWGIA, 2005). 
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farmers.’94 It provides a list of specific groups of peoples which it describes as IPs 
by using the examples of hunter-gatherers,95 pastoralists,96 across the African 
continent including the Ogoni people of South-East Nigeria which it describes as 
‘mostly farmers and fishermen.’97 The Report notes that the examples given are 
neither exhaustive nor comprehensive enough to cover all those that may qualify 
to be described as IPs in Africa.98 In an attempt to address the challenges 
surrounding the usage of the term IPs in the African context, the African 
Commission concludes that ‘[i]t is by no means an attempt to question the identity 
of other groups or to deny Africans the right to identify as indigenous to Africa or 
to their country.’99 Instead the African Commission is of the view that the concept 
of IPs is: 
… today a term and a global movement fighting for rights and justice 
for those particular groups who have been left in the margins of 
development and who are perceived negatively by dominating 
mainstream development paradigms, whose cultures and ways of 
life are subject of discrimination and contempt and whose very 
existence is under the threat of extinction.100 
Like the UN, the African Commission is also of the opinion that a strict definition 
of IPs is ‘neither necessary nor desirable.’101 However it has identified the 
characteristics of IPs in Africa. The following characteristics are enumerated as 
the key attributes of IPs in Africa: (1) their cultures and way of living are different 
from other dominant groups in the society; (2) their cultures are under threat of 
                                            
94 Ibid, at 5. 
95 Ibid, at 6. 
96 Ibid, at 8-10 
97 Ibid, at 18. For an analysis of whether the people of the Niger-Delta, Nigeria meet the criteria 
to be recognised as IPs, see RT Ako and O Oluduro, (n 77) above at 380-383. 
98 ACPHR and IWGIA (n 93) above at 10. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid, at 58. 
101 Ibid, at 59. 
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extinction; (3) their survival is dependent on access to and control of their 
traditional lands; (4) they suffer from discrimination from the State and other 
dominant ethnic groups as they are regarded as underdeveloped; (5) they live in 
isolated areas of society as a result of marginalisation politically and socially. 
According to the African Commission, as a result of the above characteristics, IPs 
in Africa are vulnerable to the violations of their human rights,102 and are unable 
to participate in determining their own future and development.103 It is also worth 
noting that the African Commission expressly distinguishes between IPs and 
‘minorities’, as it maintains that ‘the concept of indigenous peoples in its modern 
forms more adequately encapsulates the real situation of groups and 
communities concerned.’104 But it acknowledges that there are obvious overlaps 
between the concept of IPs and minorities under international law.105 Indeed, 
Abuja peoples of Nigeria are certainly minorities and as argued in sub-section 
6.2.5 below they are also IPs, this illustrates that the concepts of minorities and 
IPs in international law can overlap in relation to certain groups of people. 
6.2.4. The Meaning of ‘Peoples’ under the African Charter – Does this 
include IPs? 
Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)106 the 
word ‘peoples’ is used in its title, preamble107 and substantive provisions108 
                                            
102 Ibid, at 60. 
103 Ibid. For further analysis of the African Commission’s views on the definition and description 
of indigenous peoples, see ACHPR and IWGIA, Indigenous Peoples of Africa: The Forgotten 
Peoples? The African Commision's Work on Indigenous Peoples in Africa, (ACPHR and IWGIA, 
2006) at 8-14 and KN Bojosi and GM Wachira, 'Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An 
Analysis of the Approach of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' (2006) 6 
African Human Rights Law Journal 382 at 391-400. 
104 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 93) above at 64. 
105 Ibid. 
106 African Charter on Human and Peoples Right, adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986. 
107 See paras 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 of the preamble to the African Charter. 
108 See Arts 19-24 of the African Charter. 
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without defining it anywhere in its text.109 The African Commission which is 
established by the African Charter,110 has the mandate of interpreting the 
provisions of the African Charter,111 but it is yet to define the word ‘peoples’ as 
used in the African Charter.112  In the case of Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)  v Nigeria 
(Ogoni case),113 the African Commission held that the rights of the Ogoni people 
of Nigeria (a minority ethnic group) were  protected and enforceable against the 
Government of Nigeria under the African Charter without determining if they were 
IPs within the meaning of the African Charter.114  
In the more recent case of Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya (Endorois 
case),115 the African Commission had to determine whether usage of the word 
‘peoples’ under the African Charter was inclusive of IPs. Although the African 
Commission admitted that there was no universally acceptable definition of IPs,116 
it nevertheless relied on the provisions of UNDRIP, ILO 169, and the decisions of 
                                            
109 For a more detailed analysis of usage of the word ‘peoples’ in the African Charter, see R 
Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2000). 
110 Art 30 of the African Charter. 
111 Art 45 (3) of the African Charter. 
112 R Murray, The African Commission on Human and People's Rights and International Law 
(Hart Publishing, 2000) at 103-104 and PN Barney, ‘The Challenge of Culture for Human Rights 
in Africa’ in M Evans and R Murray (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
The System in Practice 1986–2006 (Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 233-234. 
113 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (CESR) v Nigeria. Communication 155/96. 
114 Ibid, at paras 62, 66 and 69. See also, D Shelton, 'Decision Regarding Communication 
155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action Centre/Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria). Case No ACHPR/COMM/A044/1' (2002) American Journal of International Law 937. 
115 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya. Communication 276/03. 
116 Ibid, at para 147. 
Indigenous Peoples, Abuja Peoples and International Law 
193 
 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) to find that the word ‘peoples’ 
in the African Charter was applicable to IPs in Africa.117  
The African Commission in the Endorois case relied on three criteria 
(distinctiveness of culture and the culture being under threat of extinction; survival 
dependent on access to and control of traditional lands; and self-identification) to 
rule that the Endorois of Kenya were IPs within the meaning of the term under 
international law as well as under the African Charter.118 An important point worth 
pointing out is that the African Commission’s characterisation of IPs also portrays 
them as victims thus carrying on with the conventional conceptions of IPs through 
the lens of victimhood.  It is argued that this approach is counter-productive since 
the main objective of international and regional attempts to promote and protect 
the rights of IPs are aimed towards empowering them. Defining and describing 
them as mere victims contributes to disempowering them by identifying them with 
factors that are responsible for their vulnerability in the first place.119  
On 26 May 2017, the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (African Court) 
gave judgment in the case of African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
v The Republic of Kenya (Ogiek case).120 Before then, no international court had 
ever given a judgement on the merits on any matter in relation to the rights of 
indigenous peoples (IPs) in the African context. Therefore, this judgement is 
                                            
117 Ibid, at paras 142-162. 
118 Ibid. 
119 For critical analysis on the definition of IPs see generally, R Maaka and A Fleras, The Politics 
of Indigeneity: Challenging the State in Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand (Otago University 
Press, 2005); and R Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of 
Identity (University of California Press, 2003). 
120 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya. Application No 
006/2012. This case emanated from the African Commission but was referred to the African 
Court. See http://en.african-court.org/images/Cases/Judgment/Application%20006-2012%20-
%20African%20Commission%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples’%20Rights%20v.%20the%
20Republic%20of%20Kenya..pdf, accessed 31 May 2017. 
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certainly a pivotal movement in the development of the African human rights 
system in general but particularly for IPs and minorities in the African continent. 
The African Court noted that IPs are not defined under the African Charter and 
there is no universally agreed definition of the concept.121 It then referred to the 
report of the African Commission’s Working Group on IPs and identified the 
following characteristics of IPs in Africa: self-identification; attachment to 
traditional lands which are very important to their survival; a state of 
marginalisation and subjugation and whose ways of life are distinct from dominant 
segments of society.122 Relying on Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, the 
Court referred to the description of IPs under the Article 1 of ILO 169123 and the 
Report of the UN Rapporteur on Minorities,124 and concluded that the Ogiek meet 
the criteria to be considered IPs and so held.125 It must be emphasised that this 
is the first legally binding judicial decision by an international court on the rights 
of IPs in the African continent. In this context, the decision of the African Court 
finally lays to rest the debates about whether the concept of IPs is relevant in the 
African context. 
However, in the context of this thesis and for the purposes of protecting their land 
rights, IPs are hereby defined to mean any group of non-dominant peoples who 
have ancestral roots to the lands where they live as against other dominant 
groups or institutions that threaten the enjoyment of their rights as a group, 
particularly, where the livelihood and continuous existence of such groups as a 
community of farmers, hunters, fishermen and where their continuous survival as 
a people is dependent on their occupation, control and use of the lands upon 
                                            
121 Ibid, at para 105. 
122 Ibid, at paras 105 and 107. 
123 Ibid, at footnote 13. 
124 Ibid, paras 106-107 
125 Ibid, at para 110-112. 
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which they live and have lived prior to the emergence of modern statehood, 
whether through colonialism or by the efforts of State-makers indigenous to such 
modern States.126  
6.2.5. The Abuja Peoples of Nigeria – Are they IPs? 
This section aims to answer the research question: Do Abuja peoples of Nigeria 
meet the criteria to qualify as IPs under international law?  This research question 
is very significant to this thesis. The answer to this research question is related to 
the central research objective in this thesis, which is to determine whether Abuja 
peoples of Nigeria are IPs under international law. There are two main points to 
consider in the determination of whether Abuja peoples are IPs. Firstly, since 
there are no universally acceptable criteria with which to determine if a group of 
people can be regarded as IPs, preference will be accorded to the characteristics 
of IPs given by the African Commission’s Report,127 which claims to have taken 
the peculiarities of African societies into account128 in addition to the recent 
decision of the African Court in the Ogiek case.  
The second point is that Abuja peoples are eight different ethnic groups, a 
situation replicated in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria where the Ogoni peoples 
are found. However, in the Ogoni case,129 decided by the African Commission, it 
was only the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta that brought a claim and the other 
different ethnic groups in the region did not bring a claim. So, the issue of whether 
a combined collective of different ethnic groups can come within the meaning of 
                                            
126 This model of definition is apparent from a critical reading of the following literature: W 
Adebanwi, 'Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in Northern 
Nigeria' (2009) 13 Citizenship Studies 349; A Sayne, Rethinking Nigeria's Indigene-Settler 
Conflicts, (US Institute of Peace, 2012); AO Adesoji and A Alao, 'Indigeneship and Citizenship in 
Nigeria: Myth and Reality' (2009) 2 Journal of Pan African Studies 151; ACHPR and IWGIA (n 
93) above and V Xaxa, 'Tribes as Indigenous People of India' (1999) Economic and Political 
Weekly 3589. 
127 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 93) above at 60. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Supra. 
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‘peoples’ under the African Charter was not addressed. Similarly, in the Endorois 
case,130 it was again only one ethnic group (the Endorois) from Kenya that 
brought a claim before the African Commission. Even the Ogiek case,131 recently 
decided by the African Court relates to just one ethnic group (the Ogieks) from 
Kenya.132 In a way, this appears to follow the general trend of cases which relate 
to single groups of ethnic peoples coming before the international human rights 
treaty Monitoring Bodies, even though there is yet no case emanating from Africa 
that has come up before the Monitoring Bodies as demonstrated later in Chapter 
Seven below.  
As at the time of writing there is no known case either before the African 
Commission or the African Court relating to the rights of IPs, in which a collective 
of ethnic groups has brought a claim. In addition, there is a gap in the existing 
body of literature on IPs on whether people belonging to different ethnic groups 
can qualify as IPs in Africa.133 Therefore, it is important for this thesis to assess if 
a collective of different ethnic and linguistic people such as the Abuja peoples of 
Nigeria can meet the characteristics of IPs as adumbrated by the African 
Commission. 
As noted above, the African Commission enumerates the following criteria as the 
characteristics of IPs in Africa: (1) distinctiveness of culture and such culture 
should be under threat of extinction; (2) survival dependent on access to and 
control of traditional lands; (3) suffering from discrimination from the State and 
                                            
130 Supra. 
131 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya. Application 
006/2012. 
132 Supra. 
133 For a survey of some of the recent literature on the definition of IPs, see S Pritchard (ed), 
Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights (Federation Press, 1998); R 
Stavenhagen, The Emergence of Indigenous Peoples (Springer Science & Business Media, 
2012); and A Gupta, Human Rights of Indigenous People, vol 1 (Gyan Publishing House, 2005). 
On the issue of definition of IPs in the specific context of Africa, see AK Barume, Land Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in Africa (IWGIA, 2010). 
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other dominant ethnic groups; and (4) living in isolated areas of society as a result 
of marginalisation politically.134 The first element that a group must hold to qualify 
to be considered as IPs is that such group should have a distinct culture that 
differs from those of dominant groups of society and such culture should be under 
threat of extinction.135 The culture of each of the Abuja peoples of Nigeria differs 
from people from other parts of Nigeria in the sense that each of the different 
groups speak distinctly different languages from each other inter se as well as 
from other dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria.136 However, a significant part of 
their culture in relation to farming, fishing and hunting have similarities and 
differences among them inter se and with other dominant ethnic populations in 
Nigeria.137  
It has been rightly argued that there is danger in attaching too much significance 
to the element of distinctiveness of culture as most ethnic communities in Africa 
have similar cultures and traditions.138 Therefore, it is argued that there is far more 
importance in considering whether and to what extent the culture and way of life 
of the various ethnic communities in Abuja are threatened by the national laws 
which have terminated their customary land rights. There are two main ways in 
which the culture of Abuja peoples is threatened. The first is in connection to land. 
It was demonstrated in Chapter Four (section 4.1) that they have historically been 
                                            
134 ACHPR and IWGIA, (n 93) above at 60. 
135 Ibid. 
136 See Abuja Council of Arts and Culture, A Socio-Cultural Study of the Peoples of Abuja Vol 1 
(Research & Documentation Unit, Abuja Council for Arts and Culture, 1995) at Chapters 1-5; A 
Hassan and S Na'ibi, The Gwari Tribe in Abuja Emirate (Nigeria Magazine Special Publications, 
Federal Government Print Department, 1961) at 7-13. See also, S Na'ibi and A Hassan, The 
Gwari, Gade and Koro Tribes (Ibadan University Press, 1969) and R Blench, 'Atlas of Nigerian 
Languages, vol III (revised and amended edition of Crozier & Blench, 1992). 
137 See S Na’ibi and A Hassan, (n 136) above; S Na'ibi (n 136) above; and Abuja Council of Arts 
and Culture, (n 136) above. 
138 RT Ako and O Oluduro, (n 77) above at 380. See also, GR Woodman, ‘Ghana: How Does 
State Law Accommodate Religious, Cultural, Linguistic and Ethnic Diversity?’, in M-C Foblets, J-
F Gaudreault-Desbiens and AD Renteln (eds) Cultural Diversity and the Law: State Responses 
from Around the World (Bruylant, Ėditions Yvon Blais, 2010) 255-280 at 257. 
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and currently are farmers, hunters and fishermen. Like IPs all over the world, land 
is intrinsically connected to Abuja peoples’ cultural survival as farmers, hunters 
and fishermen.139 For similar reasons, they also satisfy the second criterion which 
requires that their survival should be dependent on access to and control of 
traditional lands.140 The second point as to how their culture is under threat, 
relates to their languages. Some researchers have concluded that the languages 
of the various ethnic groups indigenous to Abuja are currently under threat of 
extinction.141 
The third criterion requires that they suffer from discrimination from the State and 
other dominant ethnic groups. While this requirement appears to suggest that 
such groups are minorities rather than IPs, it is argued that this requirement 
combines with the other characteristics identified by the African Commission to 
create the distinction between IPs and minorities. In Chapter Four, it was 
demonstrated that since the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century 
the peoples of Abuja were engulfed by the Islamic jihad of the dominant Hausa 
and Fulani ethnic groups led by Uthman Dan Fodio, bringing them under the 
political hegemony of the now defunct Zaria Emirate.142 State-based 
                                            
139 W Adebanwi, 'Abuja' in S Bekker and G Therborn (eds), Capital Cities in Africa: Power and 
Powerlessness (HSRC Press and CODESRIA, 2012). 
140 ACHPR and IWGIA, (n 93) above at 60. 
141 R Blench, 'The Status of the Languages of Central Nigeria' in M Brenzinger (ed), Endangered 
Languages in Africa (Rüdiger Köppe, 1998) 187-206; R Blench, 'Endangered Languages in 
West Africa' in M Brenzinger (ed), Language Diversity Endangered (Mouton de Gruyter, 2007) 
140-162; and O Yusuf, 'Disappearing Languages of the Middle Belt: Steps to Safeguard' in L 
Ihezue and OE Osuji (eds), Proceedings of the National Workshop on best Practices to 
Safeguard Endangered Nigerian Languages (UNESCO, 2007) 67-81. 
142 See G Thomas-Emeagwali, ‘Notes on the History of Abuja, Central Nigeria’ African Study 
Monographs 9, No 4 (1989) 191-196; OSMM Temple and CL Temple, Notes on the Tribes, 
Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (Cass, 1965); HD Gunn 
and F Conant, Peoples of the Middle Niger Region: Northern Nigeria, vol 1 (International African 
Institute, 1960); CK Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria: An Ethnographical Account of the 
Northern Provinces of Nigeria together with a Report on the 1921 Decennial Census, vol 1 
(Cambridge University Press, 1925); CK Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria: An 
Ethnographical Account of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria together with a Report on the 1921 
Decennial Census, vol 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1925) and DC Tambo, 'The Sokoto 
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discrimination can be said to have begun in 1976 when the then military junta 
promulgated a military Decree143 designating their ancestral lands as lands 
belonging exclusively to the Federal Government of Nigeria without first resettling 
them or paying compensation to all the IPs living there.  
Evidence that no adequate compensation has been paid nor have all the peoples 
been resettled is illustrated by two Bills currently before the Nigerian Senate.144 
Such discrimination from the State becomes even more apparent when one 
considers that Section 36 of the Nigerian Land Use Act (LUA) 1978,145 
accommodates the customary land rights of other Nigerians indigenous to the 
other 36 States that make up the Nigerian Federation, but its application in Abuja 
is made impossible by its Section 49, Section 1 (3) of the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT Act),146 and Section 297 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Nigerian Constitution),147 to the effect that the entire lands in the FCT are 
owned exclusively by the Federal Government of Nigeria. This issue will be 
addressed later in Chapter Seven below in the context of the specific provisions 
of international human rights treaties in more detail. 
                                            
Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century' (1976) 9 The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 187. 
143 Decree No 6 1976, now known as the Federal Capital Territory Act, CAP L F4, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Available at: http://lawnigeria.com/LawsoftheFederation/FEDERAL-
CAPITAL-TERRITORY-ACT.html, accessed 23 October 2016. 
144 See The FCT Resettlement, Integration and Development Commission And For Related 
Matters Bill 2016 (HB 513) sponsored by Hon. Zaphania Jisalo, available at: 
<www.nassnig.org/document/download/8074>, accessed 23 October 2016. See also, Lead 
Debate on A Bill for an Act to Amend the Federal Capital Territory Act Cap f6 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004 And Other Matters Connected Therewith (SB 115), sponsored by 
Senator David Umaru (APC) (Niger East Senatorial District). 
145 Land Use Act (LUA) 1978. Available at: http://lawnigeria.com/LawsoftheFederation/LAND-
USE-ACT.html, accessed 23 October 2016 
146 Supra. 
147 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as emended). Available at: 
<www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution.html>, accessed 23 October 2016 
Indigenous Peoples, Abuja Peoples and International Law 
200 
 
The final criterion requires that such groups should be living in isolated areas of 
society as a result of marginalisation.148 While a few of the Abuja peoples now 
live close to the city of the FCT as a result of the increasing development and 
expansion of the Capital City, the majority of them still live in villages and rural 
areas located in the six Local Government Councils of the FCT with no accessible 
roads, hospitals and other social amenities.149  In any case, it appears the criteria 
identified by the African Commission are not conjunctive, implying that a group is 
not required to meet all the criteria to be considered IPs.150 Indeed, in the Endorois 
case,151 the African Commission relied only on three criteria (distinctiveness of 
culture and the cultures being under threat of extinction; survival dependent on 
access to and control of traditional lands; and self-identification) to rule that the 
Endorois of Kenya were IPs.  
In the Ogiek case, the African Court relied on four criteria (priority of occupation 
in time in relation to territory, cultural distinctiveness, self-identification and 
experience of victimisation, subjugation).152 Therefore, based on the authority of 
the Ogiek case, Abuja peoples satisfy enough of the characteristics identified by 
the African Court as elements for identifying IPs in Africa. Even if Abuja peoples 
are subjected to the further key test of self-identification under UNDRIP153 and 
the requirement under ILO 169 that their ‘social, economic, cultural and political 
institutions’154 should distinguish them from other dominant sections of the 
                                            
148 ACHPR and IWGIA, (n 93) above at 60. 
149 S Gusah, 'Community Land Trusts: A Model for Integrating Abuja’s Urban Villages within the 
City Master Plan' in LE Herzer (ed), Changing Cities: Climate, Youth, and Land Markets in 
Urban Areas (Wilson Centre for Comparative Urban Study Project, 2011) at 141-159. See also, 
Map showing the Six Local Government Areas in Abuja at Appendix 2 below. 
150 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya. Supra. 
151 Supra at paras 142-162. 
152 Ogiek case (supra) at paras 107-112 
153 Art 33 (1) of UNDRIP. 
154 Art 1 (1) (b) of ILO 169. 
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society, the conclusion is not different. The various ethnic groups in Abuja, self-
identify as distinct ethnic groups and as IPs, including their identification by others 
as such.155 They are also peoples who descended from those who ‘inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of 
conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries’.156  
It was also demonstrated in Chapter Four above that the peoples of Abuja 
inhabited the territory now designated as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of 
Nigeria, prior to the commencement of British colonial rule in Nigeria and they 
were forcefully brought into Nigeria through the amalgamation of the Northern 
and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 by the British colonial 
administration.157 The logical conclusion from the above analyses is that each of 
the various indigenous ethnic groups of Abuja of themselves and  all of them 
together as a collective of different ethnic communities satisfy the requirement to 
be regarded as IPs. Consequently, it is argued that any such collective of different 
ethnic groups in Africa that satisfy the characteristics of IPs identified by the 
African Commission, UNDRIP and ILO 169, are entitled to the rights attached to 
such groups in international law.158  
 
 
                                            
155 See S Gusah, (n 149) above at 141-159. See also, SU Ago et al, Federal Capital Territory 
Abuja, Nigeria: Report of Ministerial Committee for the Appraisal of Physical Planning and 
\Development Issues in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja Vol. 1 (FCDA, 1999). 
156 Art 1 (b) and Art 1 (2). 
157 See O Ikimi, ‘Nigerian Reaction to The Imposition of British Colonial Rule, 1885-1918 in S 
Förster, WJ Mommsen and RE Robinson, Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa 
Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford University Press, 1988) 454-467 and 
JE Flint, ‘Nigeria: The Colonial Experience from 1880 to 1914’ in LH Gann and P Duignan (eds), 
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1960, vol 1 
(Cambridge University Press, 1969) at 234-235. 
158 RT Ako and O Oluduro, (n 77) above at 383. 
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6.3. Definition of IPs: Lessons from the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 
It is the argument advanced in this thesis that the existing academic, international 
and regional attempts at defining, describing and empowering IPs need to adopt 
the current approach used by contemporary international law towards promoting 
and protecting the rights of children. Traditionally, children were conceived and 
characterised as citizens in waiting.159 The idea of conceiving children as citizens 
in waiting represented a future-oriented approach towards defining children as 
potential citizens of the future.160 Children were not viewed as individuals fully 
ready to engage, live and participate in an adult dominated world.161 They were 
also portrayed as innocent and frail, thereby removing children from any 
discussion about work, politics and sexuality.162 Rather they were presented as 
underdeveloped or uncompleted human beings or ‘human becomings’.163 The 
idea that children were citizens in development and in need of protection has been 
rightly subjected to academic criticism for allowing children to be presented as 
objects of intervention rather than as legal subjects with rights as such.164 This 
attitude towards children promoted and enhanced the justification for a lack of 
                                            
159 See R Lister, 'Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children?' (2007) 8 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 693. For an example of literature that justified this approach, see TH Marshall, 
Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge, 1950). 
160 R Lister, (n 159) above at 696. 
161 Ibid. 
162 P Aries, Centuries of Childhood; a Social History of Family Life. Translated from the French 
by Robert Baldick (Knopf, 1962) and KLF Calvert, Children in the House: The Material Culture of 
Early Childhood 1600-1900 (Northeastern University Press, 1992). 
163 C Jenks and J Fionda, 'Sociological Perspectives and Media Representations of Childhood' 
in J Fionda (ed), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart Publishing, 2001) 19-43 at 23-33. 
164 See for example, MD Freeman, 'Taking Children's Rights More Seriously' (1992) 6 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 52 at 54. 
Indigenous Peoples, Abuja Peoples and International Law 
203 
 
formal recognition of children as citizens and consequently their exclusion from 
acquiring citizenship rights.165  
For example, the 1924 League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child,166 made merely passing provisions about the future citizenship 
responsibilities of children by providing that ‘[t]he child must be brought up in 
consciousness that its best qualities are to be used in the service of its fellow 
men.’167 Indeed, children were referred to as ‘it’ in the entire document thereby 
objectifying children and denying them the right to be assigned a gender.168  
Although the 1959 UN Declaration on the Right of the Child,169 went beyond the 
afore-mentioned Declaration by making provisions for a broader range of rights 
for children,170 there was no recognition of the right of children as autonomous 
people like adults and their participatory rights in decision matters that affected 
them were not protected.171 It has been rightly argued that the strategy of 
presenting children as ‘future beings’ ‘conceals a more fundamental set of closed-
                                            
165 See O O'Neill, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives' (1992) 6 International Journal of Law & 
the Family 24. 
166 1924 League of Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of the Child, adopted 26 September 1924 
in Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: <www.un-documents.net/gdrc1924.htm>, accessed 26 
November 2016. 
167 Ibid, at last paragraph. 
168 C Goddard and B Saunders, 'Journalists as Agents and Language as an Instrument of Social 
Control: A Child Protection Case Study' (2001) 26 Children Australia 26. 
169 1959 UN Declaration on the Right of the Child, proclaimed by UNGA Resolution 1386(XIV) of 
20 November 1959. This formed the adoption of the latter Convention of the Rights of the Child, 
1989, adopted by the UNGA 30 years later on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 
September 1990. 
170 See for example, Principles 1-10. 
171 MD Freeman, The Moral Status of Children: Essays on the Rights of the Child (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) at 50. 
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mind attitudes that acts as a barrier to young people who want to get involved in 
civic life and contribute to policy-making’.172 
In contradistinction to the above previous approaches of defining and presenting 
children as ‘future adults’ which created a binary situation in terms of citizenship 
rights between children and adults, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, (UNCRC),173 promotes the idea of children as full citizens in their own right 
and as independent bearers of such rights as well as empowering them with the 
capacity of being legal subjects in their own right including decision-making 
powers.174 The UNCRC promotes the view that children are no longer merely ‘pre-
citizens’ or ‘potential adults’ or ‘becomings’.175 Instead, children are now 
presented and characterised as full human beings who are invested with 
important social and citizenship rights.  
For example, Article 1 of the UNCRC defines a child as ‘every human being below 
the age of 18 years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is 
attained earlier.’ It also provides that ‘States Parties shall assure to the child who 
is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views 
freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given 
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.’176 In 
addition, the UNCRC requires that in all judicial and administrative proceedings 
affecting any child, ‘the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
                                            
172 P Haid, EC Marques and J Brown, Re-focusing the Lens: Assessing the Challenge of Youth 
Involvement in Public Policy (The Ontario Secondary School Students’ Association & The 
Institute on Governance, 1999) at 56. 
173 Supra. 
174 D Stasiulis, 'The Active Child Citizen: Lessons from Canadian Policy and the Children's 
Movement' (2002) 6 Citizenship Studies 507. 
175 A James, 'To be (come) or not to be (come): Understanding Children’s Citizenship' (2011) 
633 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 167. 
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heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child …’177 
Indeed, the UNCRC makes provision for civil and political rights enjoyable by 
adults and makes them enjoyable by children. Such rights include: the right to 
freedom of expression;178 the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion;179 and of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly.180 
It is herein argued that there are significant lessons from the above analyses for 
the international and regional regimes on the rights of IPs. IPs are easily 
presented as victims. Like the previous approach towards children’s citizenship 
rights vis-à-vis adults’ citizenship rights, which created a binary situation, the way 
IPs are presented in international law appears to replicate this binary between 
‘victimised IPs’ citizenship rights on the one hand, and the citizenship rights of 
’other non-victimised’ citizens on the other hand. This conventional approach of 
defining IPs as victims of colonialism or domination by others must now give way 
for a more empowering and positive definition. Already, like children IPs have 
emerged as distinct legal subjects under international law but the way they are 
defined and presented ought to deviate from further propagating the narratives of 
victimisation that have historically disempowered them. 
Although there is power in victimhood in terms of its potency in eliciting remedial 
actions for victims of harm and injustice,181 it is the argument in this thesis that 
                                            
177 Art 12 (2). See L Lundy, '‘Voice’ is Not Enough: Conceptualising Article 12 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child' (2007) 33 British Educational Research Journal 
927; L Lundy, L McEvoy and B Byrne, 'Working with Young Children as Co-researchers: An 
Approach informed by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child' (2011) 22 Early 
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Child and Child Well-Being', in A Ben-Arieh et al, (eds), Handbook of Child Well-Being (Springer, 
2014) 2439-2462. 
178 Art 13. 
179 Art 14. 
180 Art 15. 
181 For critical discussions on the potency of victimhood, see M Lazar, (ed) Feminist Critical 
Discourse Analysis: Gender, Power and Ideology in Discourse (Springer, 2005); N Renwick and 
C Qing, ‘China's Political Discourse Towards the 21st Century: Victimhood, Identity, and Political 
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the narrative of victimhood in the context of IPs has achieved its purpose and 
have now outlived its usefulness. The narrative of victimhood has been useful in 
adopting the UNDRIP. It has also been helpful in the creation of the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). Indeed, there has 
been a lot of positive legal developments in relation to the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the rights of IPs in the Americas.182 In 
the context of Africa, the African Court’s decisions in the Ogiek case183 
demonstrates that IPs rights are germane human rights issues in the context of 
the African Charter and the African continent. 
In view of the above, it is argued that the narrative of victimhood is no longer 
useful in describing and defining IPs as it has now outlived its usefulness. In a 
futuristic sense, it is counter-productive to continue identifying IPs with narratives 
that have been responsible for their historical subjugation and oppression in 
various parts of the world. Identifying them as such comes with risk that IPs’ 
identities would be perennially linked and associated only with the negative 
experiences that they have encountered in the past. Thereby stigmatising and 
tagging IPs with identity constructions that obfuscates the many positive and more 
empowering narratives associated with IPs in the past and in the present.184 
An example of the danger with presenting IPs in negative terms is illustrated by 
the justification for colonialism. In this context, it should be understood that at the 
onset of colonialism and in the context of the relationship between Europeans 
and Africans at the time, all Africans were for all intent and purposes IPs. The 
                                            
Power’ (1999) 17 (4) East Asia 111; and J Ochs, ‘The Politics of Victimhood and its Internal 
Exegetes: Terror Victims in Israel’ (2006) 17 (4) History and Anthropology 355.  
182 See SJ Anaya and WA Robert ‘The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and 
Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2001) 14 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 33. 
183 Supra. 
184 T Alfred and J Corntassel, (n 65) above at 605. 
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Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the resultant partitioning of Africa was 
facilitated by a very negative narrative and description of Africans as uncivilised, 
barbaric, eccentric, without States and needing protection from slavery as 
opposed to the civilised, rational and diametrically opposite West.185 For instance, 
the main purpose of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 was highlighted by the 
opening statements of the President to the Conference – Prince Bismarck of 
Prussia who remarked that: 
In convoking the Conference, the Imperial Government was guided 
by the conviction that all the Governments invited share the wish to 
bring the natives of Africa within the pale of civilization by 
opening up the interior of that continent to commerce … by 
encouraging missions and enterprises calculated to spread 
useful knowledge, and by preparing the way for the 
suppression of slavery…186 
This negative conception of Africans and Africa as helpless and in need of help 
and protection justified the civilising mission and the complete subjugation of 
Africans through colonialism from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century. 
Presenting IPs in such similarly negative context comes with the risks that in some 
States dominant groups and institution could capitalise on such narratives as 
justificatory grounds to marginalise and discriminate against IPs. 
It is argued that one possible solution to this problem of presenting IPs in negative 
terms of victimisation is for the UN to adopt a new Convention on the Rights of 
IPs. As demonstrated later in Chapter Seven below (sub-section 7.2.3.3 (a)), the 
four States which voted against UNDRIP have adopted positive reactions to it. 
This illustrates that there is now near universal acceptance of its provision by 
States all over the world. Accordingly, this thesis invites the UN to commence 
                                            
185 See discussion of Edward Said’s Orientalism at Chapter Four (4.1.1) above. 
186 See Protocol No1 – Meeting of 16 November, 1884 reprinted in RJ Gavin and J Betley, The 
Scramble for Africa: Documents on the Berlin West African Conference and Related Subjects, 
1884/1885 (Ibadan University Press, 1973) at 129. The emphasis is added. 
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actions towards following the tradition it adopted in respect of the 1989 UNCRC. 
It is argued that such a process will present the opportunity for the international 
community to re-articulate the rights of IPs and present IPs in a more positive way 
as was done in the case of the definition of a child and children’s rights under the 
current UNCRC. As at the time of writing there are no such attempts, rather the 
UNPFII is more interested in adopting an optional protocol to monitor State 
compliance with the provisions of UNDRIP.187 
6.3.1. International Law, IPs and Children through the Lens of Paternalism 
Perhaps a more common denominator between children and IPs is the idea of 
paternalism or protectionism in international law. ‘A state, organization, or even 
an individual is said to be acting paternalistically with respect to another state, 
organization, or individual when it is acting as a father acts with respect to his 
child or his children.’188 In this context, international law seems to determine and 
regulate the relationship between States and subjects as well as bearers of rights 
under international law such as children and IPs. Indeed, it has been argued that 
paternalism includes ‘the claim or attempt to supply the needs or to regulate the 
life of a nation or community in the same way as a father does those of his 
children.’189 
A practical illustration of paternalism in international law in relation to IPs is the 
provision of Article 38 of UNDRIP which demands that States should adopt 
legislative and policy measures within their domestic jurisdictions to give effects 
                                            
187 See United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), Study on an Optional 
Protocol to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Focussing on 
Voluntary Mechanism, adopted at the UNPFII thirteenth session in New York on 12-23 May 
2014, E/C.19/2014/7, 4 March 2014. See also, UNPFII, Expert Group Meeting: Dialogue on an 
Optional Protocol to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous. 
PFII/2015/EGM. 27-29 January 2015. 
188 N Fotion, ‘Paternalism’ (1979) 89 (2) Ethics 191 at 191. 
189 Oxford English Dictionary as quoted in E Sankowski, ‘Paternalism and Social Policy’ (1985) 
22 (1) American Philosophical Quarterly 1 at 1. 
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to the provision of UNDRIP. Likewise, Article 2 of the UNCRC imposes obligations 
upon States to take measures to ensure that the rights of children guaranteed 
thereunder are protected without distinction of any kind. It could also be argued 
that the requirement and reliance of the State as the institution through which 
these rights are to be protected and respected demonstrates that international 
law regards the State as an institution with ‘paternalistic’ relationships with 
subjects of international law such as IPs and children. 
It should be noted that paternalism as a theoretical concept has various 
meanings, categorisations and is controversial.190 As Garren argues: 
A  review of the contemporary literature, therefore, reveals a 
clamorous cacophony in which there are as many competing 
conceptions of paternalism as there are authors…Indeed, the 
terminological inexactitude surrounding the concept and the 
attendant lack of consensus it has occasioned, has led one author 
to surmise that, ‘the word is sometimes more trouble that it is worth 
and that we would be better off philosophically doing without 
“paternalism” in discussing some genuine problems now often 
formulated by using the word.’191 
 
With the above controversy surrounding the concept of paternalism in mind, in 
this thesis and in relation to international law’s paternalistic attitude towards IPs 
and children, paternalism is understood in the context of Boom’s and Ogus’ sense 
of ‘strong paternalism’192 wherein international law seeks ‘not merely to inform or 
                                            
190 See WH van Boom and A Ogus, ‘Introducing, Defining and Balancing “Autonomy v. 
Paternalism”’ (2010) 3 Erasmus Law Review 1 at 1-2. 
191 DJ Garren, ‘Paternalism, Part 1’ (2006) 47 (4) Philosophical Books 334 at 340. For more 
critical discussion on the concept of paternalism, see D Luban, ‘Paternalism and the Legal 
Profession’ (1981) Wisconsin Law Review 454; AT Kronman, ‘Paternalism and the Law of 
Contract’ (1983) 92 (5) The Yale Law Journal 763; HM Malm, ‘Bad Samaritan Law and Legal 
Paternalism’ (1995) 106 (1) Ethics 4; and P Burrows, ‘Analyzing Legal Paternalism’ (1995) 15 
Review of Law and Economic 489. 
192 WH van Boom and A Ogus, (n 211) above at 2. 
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even to persuade but to ensure that … behaviour that leads to adverse 
consequences is altered or stopped if necessary.’193 
The purpose of the above analogy between the paternalistic approach of 
international law towards IPs’ and children’s rights is not intended as a critique 
but as a way of demonstrating how international law approaches issues to do with 
the protection of such groups. It is the argument in this thesis that such 
paternalistic approaches to the protection of IPs and children is morally justified 
in view of their vulnerability in relation to dominant groups and institutions within 
the State. Indeed, it has been rightly contended that ‘while there is little or no 
agreement among contemporary authors as to paternalism’s intention or 
extension … there is widespread agreement that paternalism however defined … 
does give rise to a question of moral justification.’194 
However, it has been argued that paternism tends to deprive the individual of his 
or her rights.195 It has also been demonstrated that attempts to reject paternalism 
entirely is fruitless and will probably not eliminate paternalism in the society.196 It 
has been further argued that paternism raises critical issues regarding the power 
and ability of the State to interfere with individual rights and autonomy.197 
Charbonnier opines that paternalism seems to be an obstacle to emancipation.198 
Indeed, it is also contentious whether expression and demonstration of acts of 
gratitude on the part of vulnerable groups such as the mentally ill and and young 
                                            
193 Ibid. 
194 DJ Garren, (n 191) above at 341. 
195 M Smiley, ‘Paternalism and Democracy’ (1989) 23 (4) The Journal of Value Inquiry 299-318. 
196 E Tonkens and JW Duyvendak, ‘Paternalism–caught between Rejection and Acceptance: 
Taking Care and Taking Control in Community Work’ (2003) (38) (1) Community Development 
Journal 6. 
197 G Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ (1972) 56 (1) the Monist 64. 
198 S Charbonnier, ‘How Can One Recognize Emancipation? Familiarity versus Paternalism’ 
(2013) 2 Tracés 83. 
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people who may be protected by parnalistic attempts by the State or international 
law does in fact justify paternalism.199 Whatever side of the debate is taken as to 
the relevance or otherwise of paternalism in international law in relation to 
vulnerable groups such as IPs and children, it appears such paternalistic 
approaches will remain for the foreseeable future. In the following Chapter Seven, 
the manner in which international law protects land rights of IPs will be critically 
examined. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter Four, it was demonstrated that the compulsory acquisition of the 
ancestral lands of Abuja peoples, without payment of compensation or 
resettlement by the Nigerian Government is legitimised by the domestic laws of 
Nigeria. The main objective of this Chapter has been to determine whether the 
Abuja peoples meet the criteria to qualify as IPs under international law. 
Accordingly, and on the basis of the characteristics of IPs in Africa enumerated 
by the African Commission and the African Court, a group ought to fulfil the 
following criteria to be considered as IPs: (1) distinctiveness of culture and such 
cultures should be under threat of extinction; (2) survival dependent on access to 
and control of traditional lands; (3) suffering from discrimination from the State 
and other dominant ethnic groups; and (4) living in isolated areas of society as a 
result of marginalisation politically.200  
It has been demonstrated that Abuja peoples satisfy a substantial number of the 
characteristics of IPs identified by the African Commission and African Court. In 
addition, it has also been demonstrated that even if the criteria of distinctiveness 
of culture under ILO 169 and self-identification under UNDRIP are applied to 
Abuja peoples of Nigeria, similar conclusions are reached. In line with this 
conclusion, the argument has been advanced that whenever any collective of 
                                            
199 T Kasachkoff, ‘Paternalism: Does Gratitude Make it Okay?’ (1994) 20 (1) Social Theory and 
Practice 1. 
200 ACHPR and IWGIA, (n 93) above at 60. 
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different ethnic peoples claims any rights as IPs in Africa, they should be 
recognised as such once they satisfy the criteria identified by the African 
Commission and the African Court. 
In section 6.3 above, the argument was developed that the international human 
rights regime on IPs and their rights can draw insights from the departure from 
the previous international human rights regime on the rights of children from the 
era where children were presented as future beings, thereby creating a binary 
situation where adults and children lived in a divided human rights world, to the 
contemporary situation where children are presented as human beings and 
independent bearers of human rights as such. The argument has therefore been 
advanced that it is time to depart from the conventional approach of presenting 
IPs in negative terms.  
Therefore, there is a need for a new direction in line with contemporary 
approaches to the definition of children and their rights under the current UNCRC 
to reconceptualise IPs in a more positive and less negative way. Having 
demonstrated that the Abuja peoples of Nigeria satisfy the characteristics of IPs 
identified by the African Commission, the African Court as well as under ILO 169 
and UNDRIP, the next significant issue which this thesis must critically examine 
is whether there is any protection for the customary land rights of Abuja peoples 
under international human rights law. This will be the main research objective in 
the following Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: LAND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ABUJA 
PEOPLES OF NIGERIA 
Introduction 
Following on from the research findings in the preceding Chapter Six that Abuja 
peoples of Nigeria are indigenous peoples (IPs) under international law, the main 
research objective in this Chapter is to consider whether there is protection for 
land rights of Abuja peoples under international law. In line with this research 
objective, this Chapter aims to answer the research questions: how relevant is 
the general body of international human rights law to the protection of land rights 
of IPs and how does international law protect such rights? This research question 
leads to an examination of the international human rights regime to determine 
whether Nigeria is bound by its international human rights obligations in relation 
to land rights of Abuja peoples. The answer to this research question helps to 
critically examine specific international instruments on land rights of IPs and their 
applicability or otherwise to Nigeria and the case study of Abuja.  
The second research question to be answered in this Chapter is: are the land 
rights of IPs protected under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(the African Charter)? This research question invites a critical appraisal of the 
African Charter and the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) as well as the jurisprudence of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court). The answer to this second 
research question will help to illustrate the significance of the African Charter and 
its applicability to the case study of Abuja.  
To answer the afore-mentioned research questions, this Chapter has been sub-
divided into four main sections.  Section 7.1 focusses on the general body of 
international human rights law and the relevance to the protection of land rights 
of IPs. The jurisprudence of the United Nations’ (UN) human rights treaty-based 
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Monitoring Bodies on land rights of IPs will also be examined. The main purpose 
is to answer the research questions: how relevant is the general body of 
international human rights law to the protection of land rights of IPs and how does 
international law protect such rights? In Section 7.2, there will be critical analyses 
of three special international instruments on the rights of IPs and their relevance 
to the protection of land rights of IPs. The objective here is also to answer the 
research question: how relevant is the general body of international human rights 
law to the protection of land rights of IPs and how do international law promote 
and protect such rights?  
Section 7.3 is aimed at examining the provisions of the African Charter and its 
significance to the protection of land rights of IPs in Africa. The goal here is to 
answer the research question: are the land rights of IPs protected under the 
African Charter? The analyses made in the process of answering the research 
questions enumerated above will then be used as a spring board to demonstrate 
the significance of a viable interaction between international and national laws in 
Nigeria. This will also be the foundation upon which later comparative analyses 
of the relationship between international and national law in the post-colonial 
African States of Nigeria and Kenya will be made in Chapter Nine. In section 7.4, 
the relevance of the concept of self-determination to protecting land rights of IPs 
and Abuja peoples will be examined. 
7.1. Land Rights of IPs under International Law 
One major area of consensus in defining or describing IPs is that virtually all 
attempts at doing so identify them with land or territories.1 Land rights of IPs have 
                                            
1 See K Lehmann, 'To Define or not to Define-The Definitional Debate Revisited' (2006) 31 
American Indian Law Review 509; HN Weaver, 'Indigenous Identity: What Is It and Who Really 
Has It?' (2001) 25 The American Indian Quarterly 240; J Corntassel, 'Who is Indigenous? 
“Peoplehood” and Ethnonationalist Approaches to Rearticulating Indigenous Identity' (2003) 9 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 75; S Saugestad, 'Beyond the “Columbus Context”: New 
Challenges as the Indigenous Discourse is Applied to Africa' in H Minde (ed), Indigenous 
Peoples Self-determination, Knowledge and Indigeneity (Eburon, 2008); SJ Anaya, Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 3-8; MJ Cobo, Study of the 
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations (United Nations, 1987) at 379-382; 
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dominated existing literature on the rights of IPs because of their historical 
connections with such lands and the connection of land rights to other rights 
guaranteed under international human rights law2. As Sue Farran argues in the 
context of IPs in Pacific island countries ‘[l]and is more than its physical substance 
or exploitable potential.’3 Indeed, this is the situation in Africa where people’s 
identities are linked to land.4 However, the protection of land rights of IPs can 
conflict with the interests of the State in a post-colonial Africa.  
As demonstrated in Chapters Three,5 Four6 and Five,7 this sort of conflict was a 
feature of colonial Nigeria where the colonial authorities were entering into 
treaties with local chiefs most of whom had no locus to transfer land rights without 
the consent of members of the community.8 Likewise, as demonstrated in 
                                            
and RT Ako and O Oluduro, 'Identifying Beneficiaries of the UN-Indigenous Peoples' Partnership 
(UNIPP): The Case for the Indigenes of Nigeria's Delta Region' (2014) 22 African Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 369. See also, Art 1 (b) of ILO 169 and para 6 preamble to 
UNDRIP. 
2 G Pentassuglia, 'Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights' (2011) 22 
European Journal of International Law 165, at 166. 
3 S Farran, ‘Land as a Fundamental Right: A Cautionary Tale,’ (2009) 40 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 387, at 388-389. See also, S Farran, 'Navigating between Traditional 
Land Tenure and Introduced Land Laws in Pacific Island States' (2011) 43 The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 65; and S Farran, 'Fragmenting Land and the Laws that Govern It' 
(2008) 40 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 93. 
4 See W Adebanwi, 'Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in 
Northern Nigeria' (2009) 13 Citizenship Studies 349; A Sayne, Rethinking Nigeria's Indigene-
Settler Conflicts, (US Institute of Peace, 2012); AO Adesoji and A Alao, 'Indigeneship and 
Citizenship in Nigeria: Myth and Reality' (2009) 2 Journal of Pan African Studies 151; African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and International Work Group on 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)’ Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities (ACPHR and IWGIA, 2005); and I Nwachukwu, 'The 
Challenges of Local Citizenship for Human Rights in Nigeria, ' (2005) 13 African Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 235. 
5 See section 3.2. 
6 See sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
7 See sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
8 CK Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies (Oxford University Press, 1946); A Oyebode, 
'Treaties and the Colonial Enterprise: The Case of Nigeria' (1990) 2 African Journal of 
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Chapters Four9 and Five,10 this conflict persists in a post-colonial Nigeria.11 State 
interests may negate the rights of IPs, especially where the powers of the State 
to manage and control land are legitimised by national law. In this context, IPs 
may be particularly vulnerable because of their lack of political power and dis-
advantaged position in States as minority groups.12 Hence, the significance of 
international law. 
7.1.1. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Declarations and 
Land Rights of IPs 
In furtherance of achieving its human rights objectives the UNGA has contributed 
to the development of international human rights law through adopting many 
resolutions aimed at promoting human rights and the rights of IPs. Most famously, 
in 1948 the UNGA proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)13 as a common standard for protecting human rights all over the world.14 
                                            
International & Comparative Law 17; and OSMM Temple and CL Temple, Notes on the Tribes, 
Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (2 edn, CMS Bookshop, 
1922). 
9 See section 4.2. 
10 See section 5.2. 
11 PE Oshio, 'The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria' (1990) 10 
Boston College Third World Law Journal 43; VC Uchendu, 'State, Land, and Society in Nigeria: 
A Critical Assessment of Land Use Decree (1978)' (1979) 6 Journal of African Studies 62; GR 
Woodman, 'European Influence on Land Law and Land Use in Colonial Ghana and Nigeria' in 
JD Moor and D Rothermund (eds), Our Laws, Their Lands: Land Laws and Land Use in Modern 
Colonial Societies (Lit Verlag, 1994) 5-24; and MG Yakubu, Land Law in Nigeria (Macmillan 
Publishers, 1985). 
12 AK Abebe, 'Limitations to the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa: A Model for Balancing 
National Interest in Development with the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (2012) 20 African 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 407. 
13 UNGA Resolution 217A. available at: 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf>. Accessed 14 December 
2015. 
14 For a comprehensive analysis of the status and impact of the UDHR on national and 
international human rights law, see H Hannum, 'The Status of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in National and International Law' (1995) 25 Georgia Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 287. 
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In addition, the UN now has various Charter-based international human rights 
instruments15 on the one hand, and treaty-based human rights instruments on the 
other hand, with their corresponding Monitoring Bodies.16 In the remaining 
sections of this Chapter, some of these human rights instruments are examined 
in more detail in the context of land rights of IPs.17 
While it is trite that States are bound by their treaty obligations – in the context of 
this thesis the UN Charter-based instruments and treaty-based instruments when 
they have signed and ratified them - UNGA resolutions are not legally binding.18 
Nevertheless, UNGA resolutions, particularly those on human rights, may lay 
down tenets of law when adopted by a majority of States or unanimously they can 
represent the opinio juris of many individual States as well as the opinio juris 
communis (the common opinion of States) as to the law which when combined 
with State practice, have the capacity to metamorphose into binding customary 
rules of international law.19 While some scholars maintain that UNGA resolutions 
have the attribute of international legislation others have refused to accept that 
view.20 Those that deny the legal binding nature of UNGA resolutions maintain 
                                            
15 See LB Sohn, 'The Human Rights Law of the Charter,' (1977) 12 Texas International Law 
Journal 129. 
16  See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx, accessed 14 
December 2015. See, also, 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UniversalHumanRightsInstruments.aspx>, 
accessed 14 December 2015. 
17 See J Donnelly, 'International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis' (1986) 40 International 
Organization 599 and T Maluwa, International Law in Post-Colonial Africa (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1999) at 124-141. 
18 J Donnelly, (n 17) above. 
19 N Singh, 'The United Nations and the Development of International Law' in A Roberts and B 
Kingsbury (eds), United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations (2 edn, 
Oxford University Press, 1993) at 396. 
20 J Castaneda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions (Columbia University Press, 1969) 
at 14. 
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that they are at best ‘normative’ – a way of denying that they are law.21 One such 
instrument that has unarguably attained the status of customary international law 
is the UDHR22 and its relevance to the land rights of IPs is examined in sub-
section 7.1.2 below. 
7.1.2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 and the 
Land Rights of IPs 
The UDHR, 194823 makes provisions for certain human rights that operate to the 
benefit of protecting land rights of IPs as individuals and in association with other 
members of an indigenous community. For example, Article 2 of the UDHR 
provides that ‘[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.’ Article 7 also provides that ‘[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to 
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration 
…’24 It is herein argued that the combined effects of Articles 2 and 7 above are 
that when State laws restrict or extinguish any rights of an individual or group of 
individuals on the basis of any of the grounds stipulated in Article 2, such State 
laws must be deemed to be in violation of the UDHR.  
                                            
21 There are more analyses on this issue later in sub-section 7.2.3.3 below. 
22 H Hannum, (n 14) above at 287; S Cavandoli and M Odello, Emerging Areas of Human Rights 
in the 21st Century: The Role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Routledge, 2011); 
and MA Glendon, 'Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (1997) 73 Notre Dame 
Law Review 1153. 
23 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, the Declaration was proclaimed by 
the UN General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 as UNGA Resolution 217(III) A, as a 
global bench-mark of achievements for all peoples and all nations. Available at: 
<www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html>, accessed 26 September 2016. 
24 The emphasis is added. 
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As demonstrated in Chapters Three25 and Four,26 the provisions of Section 36 of 
the Nigerian Land Use Act (LUA), 197827 which recognises the customary land 
rights of Nigerians is not applicable in Abuja.28 Without resettlement or the 
payment of adequate compensation to the IPs of Abuja,29 the non-applicability of 
Section 36 of LUA in Abuja is a de jure contravention of Articles 2 and 7 of the 
UDHR (right to freedom from discrimination). It is also argued that, in so far as 
the IPs of Abuja are excluded from benefiting from the provisions of section 36 of 
LUA, when in fact and in law this benefit inures in favour of other citizens of 
Nigeria who are indigenous to the 36 States of the Nigerian Federation, this 
amounts to discrimination against all the various ethnic communities indigenous 
to Abuja. 
Of direct relevance to land rights of IPs is Article 17 of UDHR which provides that 
‘[e]veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others.’30  And that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.’31 It is 
argued that the provision of Article 17 of the UDHR is applicable to the case study 
of Abuja peoples individually and collectively as members of their communities. 
                                            
25 See sub-section 3.2.3. 
26 See section 4.2. 
27 Nigerian Land Use Act (LUA), 1978 CAP 202 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. 
28 By section 49 (1) of LUA. See also, section 1 (3) of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT Act). 
See also, section 297 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
29 Evidence that no adequate compensation has been paid nor have all the people been 
resettled is supported by two Bills currently before the Nigerian federal parliament. See, The 
FCT Resettlement, Integration and Development Commission And for Related Matters Bill 2016 
(HB 513) sponsored by Hon. Zaphania Jisalo, available at: 
<www.nassnig.org/document/download/8074>, accessed 23 October 2016. See also, Lead 
Debate on A Bill for an Act to Amend the Federal Capital Territory Act Cap f6 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004 And Other Matters Connected Therewith (SB 115), sponsored by 
Senator David Umaru (APC) (Niger East Senatorial District). 
30 Art 17 (1). 
31 Art 17 (2). 
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Therefore, Sections 1 (3) of the FCT Act,32 and 297 (2) of the Nigerian 
Constitution 1999,33 which provide that the ownership of all the lands in Abuja the 
FCT shall be exclusively that of the Federal Government are a de jure violation of 
Article 17 of the UDHR, to the extent that there has been no resettlement or 
adequate compensation paid to the IPs of Abuja. 
Rightly described as an instrument with the capacity to set standards for the entire 
global community of States,34 as well as the foundation of the post-Second World 
War codification of human rights nationally and internationally,35 the UDHR is 
founded upon a general sense of fairness in society.36 It also challenges 
traditional notions of sovereignty in so far as it seeks to preserve the interests and 
rights of the individual or community of individuals against the interests of the 
State, which may sometimes be tempted to trample upon such rights, by 
positioning such individual or community interests within the purview of the 
international arena.37 The legal significance of the UDHR is such that writers have 
concluded that its contents have attained the status of customary international 
law and consequently binding upon all States.38  
                                            
32 Supra (n 28) above. 
33 Supra (n 28) above. 
34 H Lauterpacht, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' (1948) 25 British Year Book of 
International Law 354 at 354. 
35 H Hannum, (n 14) above at 296-340 and J von Bernstorff, 'The Changing Fortunes of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the turn to Rights 
in International Law' (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 903 at 904. 
36 H Landorf, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (2012) 76 (5) Social Education 247 at 
248. 
37 JP Humphrey, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (1949) 4 International Journal 351 
at 359. 
38 H Hannum, (n 22) above at 289; RB Lillich, 'The Growing Importance of Customary 
International Human Rights Law, ' (1995) 25 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative 
Law 1; B Simma and P Alston, ' The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and 
General Principles,' (1988) 12 The Australian Year Book of International Law 82 at 90-100; JP 
Humphrey, 'The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, ' (1975) 17 William & 
Mary Law Review 527; H Waldock, 'Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the 
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Indeed, as Hurst Hannum argues ‘there can be no question that, under whatever 
list of criteria one adopts, the Universal Declaration constitutes at least significant 
evidence of customary international law.’39 An international consortium of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has also concluded that the 1948 UDHR 
has attained the status of customary international law.40 Likewise, the 
International Law Institute and the International Law Association have concluded 
that the UNDHR constitutes customary international law and some legal scholars 
have argued that its provisions have attained the status of ius cogens (preemptory 
norms) of international law.41 Others argue that it is an over-statement to view the 
UNDHR as customary international law.42 Indeed, one writer describes it as a 
                                            
Significance of the European Convention' (1965) 11 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
Supplementary Publication 1; LB Sohn, 'The Human Rights Law of the Charter' (1977) 12 Texas 
International Law Journal 129; A Philip, 'The Universal Declaration at 35: Western and Passé or 
Alive and Universal' (1982) 31 International Court of Justice Review 69; AH Robertson and JG 
Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of the International Protection 
of Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 1996); and L Henkin, The Age of Rights 
(Columbia University Press, 1990). For a general appraisal of the provisions of the UDHR, see 
MA Glendon, 'Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (1997) 73 Notre Dame Law 
Review 1153. 
39 H Hannum, (n 14) above at 322. 
40 See Montreal Statement of the [Nongovernmental] Assembly for Human Rights (1968) 
reprinted in (1968) 9 Journal of International Community of Jurists Review at 94 and L'Annuare 
de L'instrtut De Droit International: Resolutions 1957-1991 at 206 and Resolution adopted by the 
International Law Association, in International Law Association (ILA), Report of the Sixty-Sixth 
Conference (ILA, 1995) respectively. 
41 Justice J Lallah, in Bhagwati JP et al, (eds), Judicial Colloquium on The Domestic Application 
of International Human Rights Norms Bangalore, India 24-26 February 1988 (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1988) at 33; J Humphrey, No Distant Millennium: The International Law of Human 
Rights (United Nations Educational and Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 1989); 
B Ramcharan, 'The Legal Status of the International Bill of Human Rights, ' (1986) 55 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 366; and MS McDougal, HD Lasswell and LC Chen, Human Rights 
and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (Yale 
University Press, 1980). 
42 See MT Kamminga, Inter-State Accountability for Violations of Human Rights (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992); KJ Partsch, 'The Contribution of Universal International Instruments 
on Human Rights' in AL De Mestral (ed), The Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1986); and EIA Daes, Freedom of the Individual 
under Law: An Analysis of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United 
Nations, 1990). 
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document filled with Western ideologies and as an instrument of imperialism 
which has no relevance in Africa.43 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has expressed its views on the legal 
character of the UDHR in at least one case. Firstly, the idea that international 
human rights obligations may be binding upon States as customary international 
law has been confirmed by the ICJ.44 Although the UDHR was cited before the 
ICJ in the South West Africa cases,45 the case was dismissed because of the 
Applicant’s lack of locus standi.46 However, in another case the ICJ per the then 
Vice President Ammoun J. stated that it was taking: 
… judicial notice of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .... 
Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding qua 
international convention ... they can bind States on the basis of 
custom within the meaning of paragraph l(b) of [Article 38 of 
the Statute of the Court] ... because they constituted a 
codification of customary law... or because they have acquired 
the force of custom through a general practice accepted as 
law.47 
Although it remains unclear whether all the provisions of the UDHR have attained 
the status of customary international law, research has demonstrated that the 
provisions of Articles 1, 2, 6, and 7 of the UDHR, which provides for the right to 
equal treatment and non-discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of human 
rights ‘without distinction of any kind’, have been widely accepted by most States 
                                            
43 IG Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (African Books Collective, 1989). 
44 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, [1951] ICJ 15. Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951 at 23. See also, Barcelona Traction, 
Light & Power Co Ltd [1970] ICJ 3 at 32 (Second Phase). Judgment of 5 February 1970. 
45 South West Africa, [1966] ICJ 6 (Second Phase). Judgment of 18 July 1966. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] ICJ 16 at 57. 
Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971). The emphasis is added. 
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if not all.48 As Hannum submits, ‘[o]ne specific kind of discrimination, that based 
on race, is held by all commentators to be prohibited under customary 
international law, at least when it is pervasive.'49 
Nigeria was the first African State to implement many provisions of the UDHR in 
its Constitution soon after independence in 1960,50 this demonstrates that Nigeria 
has accepted the UDHR as binding upon it. Indeed, Chapter IV of the Nigerian 
Constitution, 199951 applies most of the rights proclaimed under the UDHR.52 In 
the Nigerian High Court case of Nolokwu v Commissioner of Police,53 the Court 
stated that ‘in as much as and for as long as the Federal Government of Nigeria 
remains ... [committed to] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for so long 
would Nigerian courts protect and vindicate fundamental human rights 
entrenched in the Declaration.’54  
                                            
48 H Hannum, (n 14) above at 342. 
49 Ibid at 343. See also, J Dugard, 'The Application of Customary International Law Affecting 
Human Rights by National Tribunals' (1982) Proceedings of American Society of International 
Law 245. However, the attitude in Britain towards the UDHR has been to cite it and reject it as a 
source of law. See the following cases: Alexander v Wallington, General Comments, [1993] STC 
588; R v London Borough of Barnet ex parte Islam and Quraishi, [1989] QB 2181; R v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Minta, [1990] QB 1248; R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex parte Ruddock, [1987] All ER 518; and Wheeler v Leicester City Council, 
[1985] 1 AC 1054. 
50 See C Heyns, 'African Human Rights Law and the European Convention' (1995) 11 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 252 at 257 and ME Adjami, 'African Courts, International Law, 
and Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence' (2002) 24 
Michigan Journal of International Law 103 at 116. 
51 See particularly, sections 33-46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
52 See sections 17-30 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1960; sections 18-33 of Constitution of 
Nigeria, 1963; and Sections 30-42 of Constitution of Nigeria 1979. Available at: 
<www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/1960-1999ConstitutionofNigeria.html>, accessed 
23 October 2016. 
53 Nolokwu v Commissioner of Police reported in Fawehinmi G, (ed) Law of Habeas Corpus 
[1986] 96. 
54 Ibid. 
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Indeed, section 44 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution provides that: 
No moveable property or any interest in an immovable property 
shall be taken possession of compulsorily and no right over or 
interest in any such property shall be acquired compulsorily in any 
part of Nigeria except in the manner and for the purposes prescribed 
by a law that, among other things -  
(a) requires the prompt payment of compensation therefore and  
(b) gives to any person claiming such compensation a right of 
access for the determination of his interest in the property and the 
amount of compensation to a court of law or tribunal or body having 
jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria. 
In National Universities Commission v Oluwo,55 the Nigerian Court of Appeal held 
that the Nigerian Government cannot legally compulsorily acquire a person’s 
property without payment of compensation as this will constitute a violation of the 
above provision of the Constitution.56 Therefore, in relation to the land rights of 
Abuja peoples, in so far as compensation has not been paid by the Nigerian 
Government for the compulsory acquisition of their ancestral lands there is a 
conflict between section 44 on the one hand and section 297(2) of the Nigerian 
Constitution on the other. In addition, section 1(3) of the FCT Act is a violation of 
section 44 of the Nigerian Constitution above.  
In addition to the UDHR there are other UNGA resolutions that complement its 
provisions that are relevant in the context of the land rights of IPs as demonstrated 
in sub-section 7.1.3 below. 
 
                                            
55 National Universities Commission v Oluwo [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt. 542) 438. 
56 Ibid, at 490. See also the following cases: Ogunleye v Oni [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt 135) 745; 
Goldman Nigeria Ltd v Ibafon Co Ltd [1994] LPELR-14116; Kukoyi v Aina [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 
624) 633; and ELF Petroleum Nigeria Ltd v Umah [2007] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1014) 44. 
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7.1.3. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (Minority Rights 
Declaration) 1992 
The Minorities Right Declaration57 aims to promote the human rights principles 
under the UDHR among other international human rights instruments.58 It 
provides that persons who belong to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities ‘have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and 
without interference or any form of discrimination.’59 It also provides that 
‘[p]ersons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights … individually as well 
as in community with other members of their group, without any discrimination.’60  
Article 3 (1) provides that persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights 
under the Minority Rights Declaration both individually and in association with 
others and no disadvantage should occur as a result of membership of a minority 
group.61 States are consequently mandated to take measures towards ensuring 
that minorities exercise all their rights without discrimination and in full equality of 
the law.62  
Based on the latest census figures by the Nigerian National Population 
Commission,63 despite its status as the administrative capital of Nigeria with 
                                            
57 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities, UNGA Res 47/135, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm forty seventh session and ninety second 
plenary meeting, Annex, Agenda Item 97(b), UNGA Resolution /47/135 3 February 1993. 
Available at: <www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm>, accessed 26 September 2016. 
58 Para 3 of the preamble to the Minorities Rights Declaration. 
59 Art 2 (1). 
60 Art 3 (1). 
61 Art 3 (2). 
62 Art 4 (1). See also, Arts 6 (1) and 8 (1) of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, 
adopted 4 December 1986 at 97th plenary meeting through UNGA Resolution 41/128. 
63 See <www.population.gov.ng/index.php/state-population>, accessed 23 October 2016. 
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people from all over the country currently settled there, as well as being home to 
about eight different indigenous ethnic groups,64 Abuja is a less populated 
territory in comparison with the 36 States of Nigeria. This indicates that the IPs of 
Abuja are certainly minorities in Nigeria and the provisions of the Minorities Rights 
Declaration are relevant to them. The discriminatory nature of the non-recognition 
of the customary land rights of Abuja peoples has already been demonstrated in 
Chapter Six65 and sub-section 7.1.2 above. It is argued that this also constitutes 
violations of Articles 2 (1) and 3 (1) and (2) of the Minorities Rights Declaration. 
Under Article 4 (2) of the Minority Rights Declaration, States are mandated ‘to 
create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to ethnic minorities to 
express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, 
traditions and customs…’ Article 5 (1) imposes an obligation on States to adopt 
State policies and programmes ‘with due regard for the legitimate interests of 
persons belonging to minorities.’ Since as demonstrated in Chapter Four above,66 
Abuja peoples are mainly farmers, hunters and fishermen, the de jure denial of 
their customary land rights therefore contravenes Articles 4 (2) and 5 (1) as this 
is a threat to the exercise of their cultural right to farm, fish, hunt and live on their 
ancestral lands.  
The Minority Rights Declaration re-enforces the debates about the balance of 
individual rights with the collective rights of groups such as IPs and other 
minorities.67 It draws upon already existing international human right law to create 
                                            
64 See A Hassan and S Na'ibi, The Gwari Tribe in Abuja Emirate (Nigeria Magazine Special 
Publications, Federal Government Print Department, 1961) at 7-13. Also, see, S Na'Ibi and A 
Hassan, The Gwari, Gade and Koro Tribes (Ibadan University Press, 1969) and R Blench, Atlas 
of Nigerian Languages, vol 3 (Crozier & Blench, 1992). 
65 See sub-section 6.2.5. 
66 See section 4.1. 
67 NS Rodley, 'Conceptual Problems in the Protection of Minorities: International Legal 
Developments' (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 48; P Thornberry, The UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: 
Background, Analysis and Observations: An Occasional Paper from Minority Rights Group 
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collective rights for minorities.68  The above provisions of the UDHR and the 
Minority Rights Declarations have been given stronger legal weight in the context 
of existing international human rights treaties and their respective Monitoring 
Bodies in relation to land rights of IPs as demonstrated in sub-sections 7.1.4–
7.1.6 below. 
7.1.4. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 1965 and the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
Article 1(1) of ICERD69 defines ‘racial discrimination’ as any distinction which, 
excludes, restricts or offers preferential treatment based on the following grounds: 
‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’ which prevents the enjoyment 
and exercise of human rights ‘on an equal footing’ in ‘the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life.’ ICERD imposes a duty upon States 
to take measures to ensure the equal protection and enjoyment of human rights 
of racial groups or individuals belonging to them just as other members of 
society.70  Article 2 (c) of the ICERD places an obligation upon States to eliminate 
all forms of racial discrimination within their domestic jurisdictions and for them to 
take affirmative action in this respect.  
Article 5 also enjoins States ‘…to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in 
all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, 
                                            
(Minority Rights Group (MRG), 1993); and BM Van Den and W Van Genugten, 'International 
Legal Protection of Migrant Workers, National Minorities and Indigenous Peoples—Comparing 
Underlying Concepts' (2002) 9 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 195. 
68 Y Dinstein, 'Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities' (1976) 25 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 102; N Lerner, 'The 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities' (1993) Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 55; and L Green, 'Internal Minorities and Their Rights' in J Baker 
(ed), Group Rights (University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 101-117. 
69 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
1965, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UNGA Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 
December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969, in accordance with its Art 19. 
70 Art 2 (2). 
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colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law…’ in the enjoyment 
of the ‘right to own property alone as well as in association with others’71 including 
‘economic, social and cultural rights’.72 In order to monitor States’ compliance with 
the provisions of ICERD, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) was established.73 Indeed, CERD has reminded 
States that the provisions of ICERD are of an immediate effect.74 Nigeria is a 
Party to ICERD and is consequently bound by its provisions. CERD has 
interpreted the ICERD in favour of protecting land rights of IPs and remains of the 
opinion that it is relevant to the protection of the rights of IPs in general as 
contained in its 1997 General Recommendation No 23 on IPs.75  
CERD has through its monitoring processes and interpretation of human rights 
standards across the world, contributed to the protection of the rights of IPs.76 It 
promotes the collective rights of IPs and it has emphasised that ‘a “hands-off”, or 
“neutral” or “laissez-faire” policy is not enough’.77 Xanthaki notes that CERD’s 
recommendations and official comments have enabled several States to review 
and amend their laws and policies which impact negatively on the rights of IPs.78 
CERD has also utilised its ‘Urgent Action Procedure’ to put pressure on States to 
                                            
71 Art 5 (d) (v). 
72 Art 5 (e). 
73 Art 8. 
74 See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Diop v France 
CERD/C/39/D/2/1989. Communication No 2/1989 10 May 1991. 
75 CERD, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, adopted at the 
UNGA fifty second session, Annex V, UN Doc A/52/18 (SUPP) (26 September 1997) (General 
Recommendation No 23: Indigenous Peoples). 
76 A Xanthaki, 'Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future 
Developments' (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 27 at 28. 
77 See P Thornberry, 'Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective' (2005) 5 Human 
Rights Law Review 239 at 260. 
78 A Xanthaki, (n 76) above at 28. 
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change and amend discriminatory laws and policies. New Zealand was the 
subject of an ‘early warning procedure’ in 2004 for its Foreshore and Seabed Act 
(2004) because the law discriminated against the Māori in that State.79 Likewise, 
in March 2006, CERD issued a similar decision demanding that the United States 
(US) must stop any further violation of the land rights of Western Shoshone.80 
There has been no case emanating from victims in Africa concerning land rights 
of IPs as at the time of writing. However, CERD has continued to explain the 
relevance of ICERD to the land rights of IPs in Africa as contained in its 
Concluding Observations on the Periodic Reports submitted to it by States.  
For example, in its 2011 Concluding Observation on Kenya,81 CERD expressed 
serious concern that the Kenyan Government was yet to act on the decisions of 
the African Commission on the forced evictions of the Endorois and Ogiek from 
their ancestral lands without any adequate redress in contravention of Article 5 of 
ICERD which guarantees the right of every one to equal protection of the law 
without distinction as to ethnic origin including the right to own property in 
community or association with others under Article 5 (v) of ICERD.82 Therefore, it 
was recommended that the State Party (Kenya) should respond to the decision 
of the African Commission by providing redress to the IPs concerned.83 This 
demonstrates that ICERD’s provisions are applicable to concerns about land 
rights of IPs in Africa. This argument is also buttressed by the Concluding 
Observations of CERD about IPs and minorities in Nigeria. 
                                            
79 Ibid. 
80 CERD, Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1 (68): United States of 
America, UN Doc CERD/C/USA/DEC/1. 11 April 2006. 
81 CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
– Kenya, 14 September 2011. CERD/C/KEN/CO/1-4. 
82 Ibid, at para 17. 
83 Ibid. See also, paras 18, 19 and 20 where CERD took note of the historical and current 
injustices in relation to the land rights of IPs in Kenya. See recent decision of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights discussed in sub-section 7.3.1 below. 
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In the afore-mentioned Concluding Observation on Nigeria,84 CERD expressed 
concerns that Nigeria had not provided it with specific information regarding the 
list of minorities and precise figures in relation to the ethnic composition of Nigeria 
to enable it assess how ICERD is applied there in practice. It then demanded that 
Nigeria provides it with such information to determine and identify the groups that 
fall within the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in accordance with Article 1 of 
ICERD.85 CERD also expressed serious concerns about the absence of a 
definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in accordance with Article 1 of ICERD within 
Nigeria’s domestic laws.86 It was also noted that the main principles under ICERD 
had not been incorporated into the domestic laws of Nigeria so that they could be 
invoked before the national Courts of Nigeria in accordance with Article 2 of 
ICERD by victims.87 CERD was deeply concerned that the provisions of the 
Nigerian LUA, 1978 were in contravention of the provisions of ICERD.88 
Consequently, it drew the attention of Nigeria to its General Recommendation 23 
on the rights of IPs and recommended that the Nigerian LUA be repealed and 
new legislation should be adopted which takes account of the principles set forth 
in ICERD which govern the exploitation of land – such principles include fair and 
equitable exploitation of natural resources, obligations towards local communities 
as well as ‘effective and meaningful consultation.’89 It was further noted that the 
mere absence of complaints before it from Nigeria by victims of racial 
discrimination could be an indication of the absence of appropriate legislative 
                                            
84 CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
– Nigeria, 27 March 2007. CERD/C/NGA/CO/18. 
85 Ibid, at para 10. 
86 Ibid, at para 11. 
87 Ibid, at para 13 
88 Ibid, at para 19. 
89 Ibid.  
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measures.90 It therefore requested specific information from Nigeria in the next 
Periodic Report regarding specific legislation put in place by the Government 
making information available to Nigerians about the availability of all legal and 
policy measures on racial discrimination.91 Indeed, Nigeria was also invited to 
ratify the International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (ILO 169).92 There is as yet no evidence that Nigeria has 
complied with the recommendations made by CERD as there are no documents 
on the UN website or in Nigeria showing this at the time of writing.  
It is significant at this point to consider the relevance and applicability of ICERD 
and the jurisprudence on ICERD to the case study of Abuja. It has already been 
demonstrated in Chapter Six above93 that Abuja people are minorities and IPs, it 
is argued here that the non-recognition of the customary land rights of Abuja 
peoples by the Nigerian Constitution, 199994 and the FCT Act, 197695 is a violation 
of Articles 1, 2, 5 and 6 of ICERD, as Article 1 of ICERD defines racial 
discrimination in a very wide sense that encompasses ethnic minorities. It is 
further argued that such definition is applicable and relevant to Abuja peoples 
who are minority ethnic groups and IPs in Nigeria. The various ethnic 
communities comprising the IPs of Abuja come within this wide definition and 
                                            
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, at para 23. 
92 Ibid, at para 26. See also, para 27 where it was recommended that Nigeria makes the 
declaration provided for under Art 14 (1) of ICERD to enable individuals and groups file 
communications before it. Nigeria was also requested to submit information to CERD regarding 
its compliance with the above recommendation at the its next Periodic Report by 4 January 
2008 (see para 31). 
93 See sub-section 6.2.5. 
94 Supra. 
95 Supra at footnote 28. 
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hence the applicability of the ICERD not just to them, but also to other ethnic 
groups in Africa in circumstances where discrimination arises. 
7.1.5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
1966 and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
Under the ICCPR96 the word ‘peoples’ is used without any definition.97  For 
example, the ICCPR provides that all ‘peoples’ have the right to dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources and that in ‘no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence.’98 In addition, Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that 
'... all persons are entitled to equal protection under the law and prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.' It is also significant to note that the ICCPR 
specifically imposes an obligation on States requiring them to adopt legislation 
which give effect to its provisions.99 Perhaps the most important provision that 
has direct relevance to land rights of IPs is the protection accorded to ‘linguistic 
minorities’ and ‘persons belonging to such minorities’ of ‘the right, in community 
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture’.100  
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) which is established by the ICCPR101  
with the objective of monitoring State compliance with their human rights 
obligation under it, has interpreted Article 27 of the ICCPR in a manner that 
                                            
96 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, in accordance with its Art 49. 
97 Art 1 (1) and (2). See W Van Genugten and C Perez-Bustillo, 'The Emerging International 
Architecture of Indigenous Rights: The Interaction between Global, Regional, and National 
Dimensions' (2004) 11 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 379 at 390. 
98 Art 1 (2). 
99 Art 2 (1) and (2). 
100 Art 27. The emphasis is added. 
101 Art 28. For a critique of the composition of the HRC, see C Mallory, ‘Membership and the UN 
Human Rights Council’, (2013) 2 (1) Canadian Journal of Human Rights, 1-38. 
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favours the protection of IPs’ land rights in a very strong way,102 as evidenced by 
its decision in the case of Aerela and Nakkalajarvi v Finland.103 Indeed, in its 
General Comment on Article 27,104 the HRC states that ‘… culture manifests itself 
in many forms, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may 
include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in 
reserves protected by law.’105  
Although Article 27 of the ICCPR above does not create collective rights stricto 
sensu, its provision for the rights of individual members of minority groups to enjoy 
their culture is complemented by the possibility that such rights are exercisable 
‘in community with the other members of their group’.106 In the case of Lubicon 
Lake Band v Canada,107 a case which was related to land rights claims of IPs, the 
HRC stated that it had no problems with ‘a group of individuals, who claim to be 
                                            
102 United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), Aerela and Nakkalajarvi v Finland, 
Communication No 779/1997, UN Doc CCPR/73/D/779/1997, 24 October 2001. In this case the 
authors alleged a violation of Article 27 of the ICCPR because of logging and road construction 
activities in the Kariselk area in Finland, thereby disrupting their herding culture. The authors 
argued that these logging activities on their herding lands amounted to a denial of their right to 
enjoy their culture, in community with other Sami peoples, for which the survival of their reindeer 
herding was essential. Although, the HRC could not conclude its decision in this case due lack 
of sufficient information before it, however, it maintained that: ‘the claim of a violation of article 
27 in that logging was permitted in the Kariselk area, the Committee notes that it is 
undisputed that the authors are members of a minority culture and that reindeer 
husbandry is an essential element of their culture. The Committee's approach in the past 
has been to inquire whether interference by the State party in that husbandry is so 
substantial that it has failed to properly protect the authors' right to enjoy their culture.’ 
The emphasis is added. For a commentary on this, see BM Van Den and W Van Genugten, 
'International Legal Protection of Migrant Workers, National Minorities and Indigenous Peoples-
Comparing Underlying Concepts' (2002) 9 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
195 at 195-233. 
103 Supra. 
104 HRC, General Comment No 3: Article 27. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 26 April 1994. 
105 Ibid, at para 7. 
106 Ibid. 
107 HRC, Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Case 167/1984. UN Doc. A/45/40, Vol II 
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similarly affected, collectively to submit a communication’108 to it. Also, in Sandra 
Lovelace v Canada,109 the HRC stated that:  
Article 27 of the ICCPR establishes that states cannot deny minority 
groups the right to enjoy culture. The Committee determined that 
people who are born and raised on a reserve, have maintained ties 
and want to further maintain ties to that community, are considered 
part of that minority group within the meaning of Article 27.110 
It should be noted that the ICCPR allows derogations from the rights guaranteed 
therein by State Parties only in circumstances that endanger the existence of a 
State subject to the proviso that such derogations are not in conflict with a State’s 
‘obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the 
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.’111    
There is as yet no case arising because of complaints by victim(s) or by any 
person(s) on their behalf emanating from Africa to the HRC. However, in a 
Concluding Observation,112 the HRC welcomed the adoption of a new Kenya 
Constitution in 2010.113 But the HRC raised concerns in relation to the lack of 
clarity regarding Section 2 (6) of the Kenyan Constitution, 2010 which makes 
provision to the effect that all international treaties ratified by Kenya shall become 
part of the laws of Kenya under the Constitution.114 In particular, the HRC was 
concerned that there was nothing clear in the jurisprudence of the courts in Kenya 
                                            
108 This position of the HRC has been restated among other things in the case of Apirana 
Mahuika et al, v New Zealand, Case 547/1993, view of October 2000. 
109 See HRC, Sandra Lovelace v Canada, Communication No. 24/1977: Canada 30/07/81, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Art 4. See also, HRC, General Comment No. 18:  Non-discrimination, thirty seventh- session 
(1989).  
112 HRC, Concluding Observations, adopted by the Human Rights Committee at its one hundred 
and fifth session, 9-27 July 2012 Kenya, 31 August 2012. CCPR/C/KEN/CO/3. 
113 Ibid, at para 3 (a). 
114 Ibid, at para 5. 
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on the status of the ICCPR in the domestic legal order, so it recommended that 
Kenya should take measures to ensure that the ICCPR was part of the domestic 
laws of Kenya.115  
In recalling its previous Concluding Observation,116 the HRC regretted the 
continued evictions of people from their lands in Kenya without their free, prior 
and informed consent and reiterated that Kenya must adopt appropriate laws, 
policies and practices to ensure that people were evicted from their lands only 
when the people concerned had been consulted and resettled.117 The HRC also 
expressed deep concerns over the land rights of Ogiek and Endorois communities 
given their continuous evictions when they were dependent on the occupation of 
such lands for their economic survival and cultural practices.118 It noted also that 
Kenya had not complied with the decision of the African Commission in relation 
to the land rights of the Endorois in accordance with Articles 12, 17, 26 and 27 of 
ICCPR.119 It was then recommended that Kenya should take account of and 
respect the land rights of IPs to their ancestral lands and that projects must only 
be started on such lands when their free, prior and informed consent had been 
obtained.120 
In the case of Nigeria, the latest HRC Concluding Observation as at the time of 
writing is the one made in 1996.121 In it, the HRC recommended that there should 
be a review of the entire legal framework aimed at protecting human rights in 
                                            
115 Ibid. 
116 HRC, Concluding Observation on Kenya, CCPR/CO/83/KEN, at para 22. 
117 Ibid. See also HRC, Concluding Observations (n 112) above at para 5. 
118 HRC, Concluding Observations (n 112) above at para 24. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. See also recent decision of the African Courts discussed in sub-section 7.3.1 below. 
121 HRC, Concluding Observation of the Human Rights Committee – Nigeria, 24 July 1996. 
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Nigeria in conformity with the provision and principles set-forth in the ICCPR.122 
The HRC also recommended that Nigeria should protect the rights of persons 
belonging to ethnic minorities and ensure that the particular provision of Article 
27 of the ICCPR are fully protected.123 Therefore, to the extent that the provision 
of Section 297 (2) of the Nigerian Constitution,124 and Section 1 (3) of the FCT 
Act,125provides that the entire land in Abuja, the FCT of Nigeria, belongs 
‘exclusively’ to the Federal Government of Nigeria when compensation or 
resettlement of all the IPs has not been made, these constitute a violation of the 
rights of the IPs of Abuja to practice their culture both individually and in 
association with others as farmers, hunters and fishermen. This situation clearly 
constitutes a de jure and de facto violation of Article 27 of the ICCPR.126 Evidence 
of non-payment of compensation or resettlement has already been adduced in 
relation to the discussion regarding the UDHR and its relevance to land rights of 
the IPs of Abuja in sub-section 7.1.2 above. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
122 Ibid, at para 28. 
123 Ibid, at para 37. See also, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, Rita 
Izsák Mission to Nigeria (17-28 February 2014). A/HRC/28/64/Add.2. 
124 Supra (n 28). 
125 Supra (n 28). 
126 HRC, Aerela and Nakkalajarvi v Finland (supra); HRC, Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (supra); 
HRC, Sandra Lovelace v Canada (supra) and HRC, Ángela Poma Poma v Peru, 
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7.1.6. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) 1966 and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) 
Like the ICCPR, under the ICESCR127 the expression ‘peoples’ is used in its 
substantive provisions128 without defining it. The ICESCR guarantees that all 
‘peoples’ have the right to ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development,’129 as well as the right to cultural freedoms.130 It also guarantees 
that ‘[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.’131  
The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has 
emphasised that cultural rights are intrinsically linked to other human rights just 
as they are universal, indivisible and interconnected.132 This is particularly 
important for IPs whom the CESCR recognises as having the right to the full 
enjoyment of the rights under the UN Charter, UDHR and UNDRIP both 
collectively and individually.133 The CESCR has acknowledged the expansive 
nature of cultural rights by explaining that culture is multifaceted and a 
manifestation of human existence.134  
                                            
127 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 
entered into Force 3 January 1976, in accordance with its Art 27. 
128 See for example Art 1 (1) and (2). 
129 Art 1 (1). 
130 Art 15 (1) (a). 
131 Art 1 (2). 
132 CESCR, General Comment No. 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (Art 15 para 
1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 21 December 
2009. E/C.12/GC/21, at para 1. 
133 Ibid, at para 7. 
134 Ibid, at paras 10, 11 and 12. 
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Indeed, under Article 15 (1) ICESCR, culture includes methods of production of 
food.135 It has also emphasised that any limitation on cultural rights must be 
through the adoption of the least restrictive measures by taking into consideration 
various types of restrictions.136 The situation in the case study of Abuja is 
predicated on the need for an administrative capital for the State, which is a 
legitimate issue. However, it is argued that the usurpation of the entire lands in 
the FCT, including several villages and farm lands exclusively by the Federal 
Government is not the least restrictive measure. Rather it is the most restrictive 
measure which terminates the customary land rights of Abuja peoples in 
contravention of Articles 1 (2) and 15 (1) of ICESCR. The least restrictive measure 
would require that the Government retains and limits its ‘exclusive’ ownership to 
the territories in the Capital City (see Appendix 6) while the customary land rights 
of Abuja peoples to the villages and farm lands in the Six Local Government Areas 
are accommodated and protected by the Nigerian Constitution and the FCT Act. 
The CESCR identifies minorities and IPs as requiring special protection of their 
cultural rights.137 As for IPs, the CESCR notes that their cultural rights are linked 
to the land, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise acquired or used.138 It therefore enjoins States to respect, 
protect and guarantee that the relationship which IPs have with their ancestral 
lands and nature are protected from degradation as these are important to their 
subsistence and preservation of their cultural identity.139 It is acknowledged that 
IPs have the right to act collectively to ensure the protection of their right to 
                                            
135 Ibid, at para 13. 
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139 Ibid. 
Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Abuja Peoples of 
Nigeria 
239 
 
maintain, control and develop their cultural heritage in line with Article 15 (1) (a) 
of the ICESCR.140  
The obligation imposed upon States with respect to cultural rights is tripartite and 
they include: the obligation to respect; the obligation to protect; and the obligation 
to fulfil.141 There is also provision for the right to the enjoyment of the rights 
guaranteed under the ICESCR without any discrimination based on ‘race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.’142 In this regard, the CESCR defines discrimination 
to mean any distinction, exclusion, or restriction which ‘has the intention or effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of Covenant rights.’143  
The CESCR has also emphasised that eliminating discrimination requires that a 
State’s constitution, laws, and policies do not discriminate on the basis of any of 
the grounds mentioned under Article 2 – formal discrimination.144 The CESCR 
explains that eliminating discrimination in practice demands that sufficient 
attention should be given to groups of individuals who have historically and 
persistently suffered as a result of prejudice, and urges States to take measures 
                                            
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid, at para 48. According to the CESCR, ‘The obligation to respect requires States parties 
to refrain from interfering, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to take part in 
cultural life. The obligation to protect requires States parties to take steps to prevent third parties 
from interfering in the right to take part in cultural life. Lastly, the obligation to fulfil requires 
States parties to take appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial, budgetary, promotional and 
other measures aimed at the full realization of the right enshrined in article 15, para 1 (a), of the 
Covenant.’ See, CESCR, General Comment No 13 (1990), paras 46 and 47; No. 14 (2000), 
para 33, No. 17 (2005), para 28 and No. 18 (2005), para 22. See also, the Limburg Principles on 
the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at 
para 6. 
142 Art 2 (2). 
143 CESCR, General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 2 
July 2009. E/C.12/GC/20, at para 7. 
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to eliminate conditions that enhance formal, substantive and de facto 
discrimination.145 Membership of any group based on any of the grounds 
mentioned under Article 2 upon which an individual or group claims to have been 
discriminated against is by self-identification.146 The CESCR has defined ‘race 
and colour to include ethnic origin of an individual or group.147 Therefore, Article 
2 of ICESCR has direct relevance to all the various ethnic groups in Abuja in 
relation to the discriminatory termination of their customary land rights, when such 
customary land rights exist to the benefit of Nigerians of other ethnic groups 
indigenous to the other 36 States of Nigeria.148  
It should be noted that although the ICESCR allows derogations from the rights 
guaranteed under it, such derogations are limited ‘only to such limitations as 
are determined by law and only in so far as this may be compatible with the 
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society.’149  In line with this, the CESCR has emphasised 
‘that there exist minimum requirements, ‘core obligations’, for all the rights 
enshrined in the Covenant, that all States parties have to comply with 
independently of their available resources.’150  
                                            
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid, at para 16. 
147 Ibid, at para 19. 
148 See Section 36 of the LUA 1978 (supra). 
149 Art 4. The emphasis is added. 
150 CESCR, General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, UN Doc. E/1991 
23, 14 December 1990 at para 10. See also, CESCR, General Comment No14: The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
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In referring to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
1969,151 which provides that a State cannot rely on a provision of its domestic law 
as a justification to violate its treaty obligations, the CESCR has maintained that 
States should modify their national laws to conform with the provision of the 
ICESCR.152 It is argued therefore that the legitimisation of the termination of the 
land rights of Abuja peoples through the Nigerian Constitution and the FCT Act 
cannot justify the violation of Nigeria’s treaty obligations under the ICESCR.  
Such domestic laws would have to be amended or repealed if Nigeria refuses or 
is unable to compensate or resettle the peoples of Abuja. Otherwise, Nigeria 
remains in violation of the ICESCR to which it is a Party. However, as Kenya has 
recently embarked on constitutional and law reforms in relation to customary land 
rights of Kenyans as demonstrated in Chapter Five,153 it is important to investigate 
the reaction of the CESCR to such law reforms in the context of Kenyan State 
obligations under the ICESCR. The purpose is to demonstrate that the CESCR 
interprets customary land rights issues in Africa as coming within the purview of 
the ICESCR. 
In a Concluding Observation on Kenya,154 the CESCR welcomed the 
incorporation of the rights under the ICESCR into the Constitution of Kenya 2010 
and in the rulings of High Courts in that country as demonstrated in Chapter 
                                            
151 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969, 
entered into force 27 January 1980.  
152 CESCR, Draft General Comment No 9:  The Domestic Application of the Covenant, 
E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998 at para 3. See also, CESCR, General Comment 12: The 
right to adequate food (art. 11) E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, at para 29. 
153 See section 5.1. 
154 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Combined Second to fifth Periodic Reports of 
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Five155 and as will be further illustrated in Chapter Nine.156 However, it was 
concerned that Kenya was still delaying the implementation of the decision of the 
African Commission in the case relating to the land rights of  Endorois discussed 
later in section 7.3 below, despite accepting that decision.157 It consequently 
recommended that the Kenyan Government should take immediate actions 
towards implementing the decision of African Commission as well as ratifying ILO 
169.158  
The CESCR expressed concerns about the absence of comprehensive legislation 
on anti-discrimination in accordance with Article 2 of the ICESCR. It therefore 
recommended that Kenya should adopt comprehensive legislation on anti-
discrimination prohibiting both direct and indirect discrimination.159 It also 
expressed concerns about the continuous threat of eviction of IPs such as 
pastoralist communities in Kenya without their prior and informed consent as well 
as adequate compensation.160 It then recommended that Kenya should adopt 
legislation granting security of tenure to various IPs communities in Kenya.161  
The CESCR’s emphasis on legislative reforms in Kenya demonstrates that it 
relies on States to give legal effect to the rights protected under the ICESCR 
through their domestic laws. It is argued that this should be the position in relation 
to land rights of the IPs of Abuja as well. As at the time of writing, the latest 
                                            
155 See sub-section 5.1.5. 
156 See sub-section 9.2.1. 
157 CESCR, (n 154) above at para 3. 
158 Ibid, at paras 15 and 16. 
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Concluding Observation on Nigeria is the one made in 1998,162 which merely 
noted that the absence of rule of law in Nigeria was negatively impacting on the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.163 However, in an earlier 
document,164 the CESCR observed that about one million people had been 
affected by forced evictions in Nigeria.165 It also raised concerns about land and 
resource rights of the oil-producing areas of Nigeria whose lands were being 
polluted by the exploitation of oil, and emphasised the need to protect the rights 
of Ogoni people.166  
7.1.7. Legal Effects of General Comments, Recommendations and 
Concluding Observations 
One point worth examining is the legal nature of general comments, concluding 
observation, communications and recommendations of the human rights treaty 
Monitoring Bodies discussed in sub-sections 7.1.4-7.1.6 above. General 
Comments and Concluding Observations have become a growing part of 
international human rights law. Indeed, most human rights issues are examined 
and elucidated through these instruments.167 Through them, useful and 
authoritative statements in relation to the content and practical implementation of 
international human rights instruments are made.168 However, despite their long 
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and widespread usage by human rights treaty Monitoring Bodies, their legal 
weight and implications in international law remains rather unclear.169  
Indeed, it has been claimed that the exact sources of international human rights 
law in general is far from being certain in terms of their legal significance in 
international law.170 It has been argued that the jurisprudence of the UN human 
rights treaty Monitoring Bodies as well as those of the African Commission in the 
form of General Comments and Concluding Observations such as those 
examined in this Chapter, ‘do not fit easily within the traditional accounts of 
international law.’171 Therefore, although they seem to have some significance in 
terms of explaining the human rights provision of human rights treaties they 
remain non-binding.172   
A general analysis of the role and significance of General Comments and 
Concluding Observations by all human rights treaty Monitoring Bodies is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.173 Therefore, preference is herein accorded to the 
relevant Bodies discussed in this Chapter. In the context of the HRC and the 
ICCPR, the HRC responds to human rights issues in relation to the provision of 
the ICCPR through its General Comments by summarising and promoting the 
objectives of human rights that should be implemented by State Parties to the 
ICCPR.174 As demonstrated in sub-section 7.1.5 above, it does this through 
                                            
169 C Blake, (n 167) above at 2. 
170 See P Alston, 'Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control' (1984) 78 
The American Journal of International Law 607; B Simma and P Alston, 'The Sources of Human 
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informing States about its regrets on violation or non-implementation of the 
provisions of the ICCPR and pointing out areas where States may improve their 
implementation of the obligations thereunder.175 It also demands that States 
report their responses to its recommendations in their periodic reporting.176 
Through the mechanism of its General Comments, the HRC shed light on the 
rights protected under the ICCPR by examining specific articles.177 In making its 
findings, the HRC examines the views of experts who are its members, the reports 
by States and cases decided on the basis of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.178 However, the HRC’s 
General Comments have been criticised as ‘not scholarly’179 and unhelpful to the 
understanding of the substantive rights guaranteed under the ICCPR.180 The 
above arguments in relations to the HRC and its General Comments applies 
mutatis mutandis to the CERD and ICERD as well as ICESCR and CESCR 
respectively in relation to their General Comments. 
O’Flaherty argues that concluding observations are a very important activity of 
human rights Bodies as they represent the most ‘authoritative overview of the 
state of human rights in a country and for the delivery of forms of advice which 
                                            
175 Ibid, at 340. 
176 See for example, HRC, General Comment No 23 (n 104) above at para 9. 
177 See HRC, General Comment No 35 - Article 9: Liberty and security of person, 
CCPR/C/GC/35 (advanced unedited version); HRC, Draft general comment No. 34 (Upon 
completion of the first reading by the Human Rights Committee): Article 19, 
CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP, 22 October 2010; and HRC, General Comment No 12: Article 1 (The right 
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178 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by 
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can stimulate systematic improvements.’181 As human rights treaty Monitoring 
Bodies do not have judicial powers, they cannot adjudicate on the compliance or 
otherwise of State parties with the provision of human rights treaties.182 Therefore, 
their concluding observations are not legally binding on the States upon which 
they are made at each point in time.183 However, some States such as Norway 
have developed the habit of using them as guidance in the implementation of their 
obligations under international human rights treaties184 and it has also been 
suggested that some domestic courts rely on them in resolving human rights 
issues at national levels.185  
By contrast, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Ireland held in the case of 
Kavanagh v Governor of Mount Joy Prison,186 that communications and 
concluding observations of the HRC did not have binding legal effect in the 
country.  Nevertheless, concluding observations do have interpretative legal 
effects before international courts.187 For example, in an Advisory Opinion, the 
ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
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Palestinian Territory,188 relied on the HRC’s concluding observation on Israel from 
1998 to 2003 as aid to the interpretation of the obligation of the State of Israel in 
the context of the ICCPR and held that the provisions of the ICPPR were 
applicable to Israel’s activities outside its territorial jurisdiction. Similar argument 
applies to general recommendations of the human rights treaty Monitoring 
Bodies.189  
However, a distinction between Concluding Observations and General 
Comments or Recommendations on the one hand and Concluding Observations 
on the other is that while the former are made in relation to all State Parties to the 
relevant instruments, concluding observations relate to the specific individual 
State upon which such observations are made.190 Section 7.1 has so far focussed 
on the relevance of general international human rights instruments to the 
protection of land rights of IPs. In section 7.2 below the relevance of three specific 
instruments on the rights of IPs under international law are examined.  
7.2. Specific Instruments on the Land Rights of IPs  
Despite the significance of some of the general international human rights 
instruments and the jurisprudence of the HRC, CERD and CESCR towards 
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Press, 2005) at 77. See also, J Morijn, 'Reforming United Nations Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring Reform' (2011) 58 Netherlands International Law Review 295; PS Rao, 'Multiple 
International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or its 
Fragmentation' (2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 929; O Schachter, 'United 
Nations Law' (1994) 88 The American Journal of International Law 1; and M Bowman, 'Towards 
a Unified Treaty Body for Monitoring Compliance with UN Human Rights Conventions? Legal 
Mechanisms for Treaty Reform' (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 225. 
190 AC Byrnes, 'The Other Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women' (1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law 1 at 
42-43 and HJ Steiner, 'Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the 
Human Rights Committee' in P Alston and J Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human Rights 
Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 22. 
Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Abuja Peoples of 
Nigeria 
248 
 
protecting IPs’ land rights191 as elaborated in section 7.1 above, they remain 
insufficient in the context of addressing historical injustices in relation to IP's land 
rights.192 Therefore, their impact can only be minimal in addressing the wide range 
of claims in relation to IPs’ land rights. Against this background, it is important to 
critically examine the provisions of the only existing and binding international 
treaties on IPs’ rights as well as the only UN backed legally non-binding 
instrument on the specific rights of IPs as enunciated in sub-sections 7.2.1-7.2.3 
below.  
7.2.1. ILO Convention No 107 1957 Concerning the Protection and 
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries (ILO 107) 
The only existing and legally binding international instruments on the rights of IPs 
are the ILO 107193 and ILO Convention No 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries 1989 (ILO 169).194 ILO 107 makes specific 
provisions for land rights of IPs including: the right to ownership of land both 
individually and collectively which IPs have occupied traditionally;195 the right to 
                                            
191 For comprehensive analyses of the contribution of human rights instruments to the protection 
and promotion of IPs right in general, see P Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 
(Manchester University Press, 2002) and P Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of 
Minorities (Oxford University Press, 1991).   
192 SJ Anaya, (n 1) above at 290. 
193 ILO Convention No 107 of 1957 Concerning the Protection of the Protection and Integration 
of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, adopted 
in Geneva, at the 40th ILC session held on 26 June 1957, entered into force on 02 June 1959. 
Available at 
<www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C107>, 
accessed 30 September 2016. 
194 ILO Convention No 169 of 1989 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, adopted in Geneva, at the 76th ILC session held on 27 June 1989, entered into force 
on 05 September 1991. Available at 
<www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_IBID,P12100_LA
NG_CODE:312314,en:NO>, accessed 30 September 2016. 
195 Art 11. 
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free consent before their removal from such lands;196 the right to transmission of 
ownership in accordance with their customs;197 and the right to equal treatment 
with other communities in relation to the availability of land for their 
subsistence.198 When ILO 169 was adopted in 1989, ILO 107 was declared closed 
for ratification, however, it remains applicable and valid for the 17 States that 
ratified it but who are not currently Parties to the latter ILO 169.199 In addition to 
the limited number of ratifications which limit its scope of application, it has also 
been criticised for its assimilationist approach towards IPs’ rights thereby 
diminishing its ability to effectively accommodate the rights of IPs.200 For example 
under Articles 2, 4 and 5 ILO 107 makes provisions for the ‘integration’ of IPs and 
their culture into the States where they exist. Nigeria is not a Party to it and so its 
provisions are not binding on Nigeria. 
7.2.2. International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention No 169 1989 (ILO 169) 
ILO 169201 has been ratified by only 22 States, of these only one African State 
(Central African Republic) has ratified it,202 implying that many IPs in Africa may 
                                            
196 Art 12. 
197 Art 13. 
198 Art 14. 
199 The list of those countries is available at: 
<www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_IBID:3122
52>. Accessed 30 September 2016. Of these only six are African States to wit: Angola, Egypt, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi and Tunisia. 
200 M Barelli, 'The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (2009) 58 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 957 at 958 and SJ Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) at 54-56. For more positive views on the approach of ILO 107 to IPs’ 
rights, see A Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-determination, 
Culture and Land (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 49-67. 
201 Supra. 
202 The list is available at: 
<www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_IBID:3123
14>, accessed 30 September 2016.  
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be unable to rely on it to legally enforce their rights. Nigeria has neither signed 
nor ratified it. Therefore, the analyses herein remain largely academic. However, 
it has been stated that the legal contribution of ILO 169 to the rights of IPs 
transcends the number of ratifications as the ILO itself has described it as ‘… the 
foremost international legal instrument which deals specifically with the rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples, and whose influence extends beyond the 
number of actual ratifications.’203  
Indeed, it has been described as ‘a central feature of international law’s 
contemporary treatment of indigenous people’s demands’.204 Perhaps, this is the 
reason it continues to provide significant legal foundations and grounds for IPs’ 
claims in several States as it has been used to make successful legal claims for 
IPs before national legal systems. An example of this is illustrated by the 
Australian case of Police v Abdulla,205 where Perry J referred to ILO 169, which 
had not been ratified by Australia as ‘an indication of the direction in which the 
international law is proceeding’ in relation to the rights of IPs.206 
7.2.3. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
Like contemporary international child rights law where children have emerged as 
subjects of international law with rights as such under the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC)207 as demonstrated in the preceding Chapter 
                                            
203 ILO, ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989 (No. 169): A Manual (Dumas-
Titoulet Imprimeurs, 2003) at i. The emphasis is added.  
204 SJ Anaya, (n 1) above at 58. 
205 Police v Abdulla [1999] 74 SASR 337. 
206 Ibid, at para 37. 
207 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 
September 1990, in accordance with its Art 49. 
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Six,208  it has been rightly argued that the adoption of UNDRIP209 by the UN 
General Assembly signifies and crystalises the transformation of IPs from victims 
into actors of international law,210 thereby demonstrating a triumph over the era 
when there was opposition to the recognition of sui generis rights for IPs.211  
Consequently, the UN human rights system has become increasingly active in 
the protection of IPs’ rights.212 Nigeria gave explanations for its abstention from 
voting during the adoption of UNDRIP by first welcoming it, while stating that its 
provisions were in line with the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution.213 
However, it maintained that ‘a number of concerns that were critical to Nigeria’s 
interests, had not been satisfactorily addressed, including the issue of self-
determination and the control of lands, territories and resources’.214 It argued that 
Nigeria’s ‘... national institutions and laws all ensured national integration’215 and 
promised to promote and protect the rights of IPs as well as ‘… the rights of all 
Nigerians with its more than 300 ethnic groups speaking more than 300 
                                            
208 See section 6.3. 
209 UNGA Resolution 61/295, adopted on 13 September 2007, adopted by a vote of 143 in 
favour to four against. (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United States), with 11 abstentions 
(Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian 
Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). 
210 J Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 
(Transnational Publishers, 2006) and M Barelli, 'The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal 
System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' 
(2009) 58 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 957. 
211 I Brownlie and FM Brookfield, Treaties and Indigenous Peoples (Oxford University Press, 
1992). 
212 E Stamatopoulou, 'Indigenous peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights as a 
Developing Dynamic' (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 58. 
213 See UNGA/1090612, 13 September 2007. 
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languages’.216 In the above ambiguous manner, Nigeria claims to have welcomed 
the adoption of UNDRIP even though it abstained from voting.217 
The UNDRIP makes provisions for a wide range of rights for IPs as collectives218 
and as individuals.219 It also addresses certain specific concerns in relation to IPs’ 
life, the integrity of their identity and culture.220 UNDRIP protects IPs against 
genocide, and makes provisions against the militarisation of their lands as well as 
the use of IPs’ children as soldiers.221 UNDRIP has also been projected to be the 
legal basis for the recognition of IPs cultural and land rights under international 
law.222 
7.2.3.1.  Individual and Collective Rights under UNDRIP 
Xanthaki maintains that one of the main significant aspects of UNDRIP is that it 
puts an end to the debates about whether or not there is any recognition or non-
recognition of the ‘collective rights for sub-national groups in current international 
law.’223 Xanthaki notes also that Article 27 of the ICCPR ‘did not go as far as 
expressly recognising the collective rights of these minorities.’224 Indeed, although 
ILO 169 recognises some collective rights of IPs, the special collective dimension 
                                            
216 Ibid. See, WV Genugten, 'The African Move Towards the Adoption of the 2007 Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Substantive Arguments Behind the Procedures' 
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of IPs rights articulated under UNDRIP were the more controversial issues during 
the debates leading up to its adoption at the UN.225 The recognition of collective 
rights of IPs under UNDRIP demonstrates that current international law 
recognises collective rights as applicable to sub-State groups. As demonstrated 
in section 7.1 above, some international human rights instruments before 
UNDRIP had already recognised collective rights for certain groups.226 However, 
it is UNDRIP that crystalises the notion that collective rights are central to the 
claims of IPs, their cultures and land rights.227 In this respect, UNDRIP is unique 
since it appears to be the only international human rights instrument to be 
substantially focussed on the collective rights of IPs.228  
Whereas UNDRIP frequently makes references to the collective rights of IPs, the 
other main UN human rights instruments which protect the rights of minorities, 
examined in section 7.1 above, merely make simplistic references to rights of 
‘persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities.’229 
UNDRIP uniquely creates a balance between individual rights and collective 
rights through the adoption of a conciliatory approach which could enable 
indigenous persons/individuals to have rights as well as responsibilities within the 
broader context of collective rights.230 For instance, UNDRIP provides that ‘… 
                                            
225 Ibid. 
226 See below for analyses of the collective rights focus of the African Charter. 
227 M Barelli, (n 200) above at 963. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Para 4 of the preamble to the Minorities Rights Declaration. See also, Art 2 (1) of the 
Minorities Rights Declaration. 
230 M Barelli, (n 200) above at 963. For a more detailed analysis of the significance of collective 
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indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals 
to their communities.’231 In addition to the above, UNDRIP recognises and affirms 
that ‘indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights 
recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective 
rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral 
development as people.’232 Following the above recognition and affirmation, 
substantive provisions of UNDRIP actually strengthen the simultaneous co-
existence of collective and individual rights of IPs.233  
For example, Article 1 stipulates that ‘[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the 
full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms …’234 This is sufficient evidence within the text of UNDRIP 
itself to submit that one of its main aims is to solidify a viable interaction between 
the collective and individual rights of IPs. It has been rightly argued that the focus 
of UNDRIP on collective rights does not undermine the individual rights provided 
under international human rights law, but rather, it strengthens and enriches the 
international jurisprudence on human rights.235 This Chapter will now focus on the 
land rights provisions under UNDRIP. 
 
 
                                            
Human Rights Quarterly 80. For critical views on collective rights, see M Freeman, 'Are There 
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7.2.3.2. Land Rights of IPs under UNDRIP 
UNDRIP recognises IPs’ ‘right to the lands, territories and resources which they 
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired’.236 It has been 
earlier demonstrated in sub-sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 above that until UNDRIP 
was adopted, IPs’ land rights were advocated in the international arena through 
references to ILO 169, as well as through the UN human rights treaties Monitoring 
Bodies and through State practice. Therefore, the provision of strong land rights 
for IPs in UNDRIP is a positive development for the international jurisprudence 
on IPs’ rights in particular and international law in general.237  
Accordingly, UNDRIP makes provision for various categories of land rights for 
IPs, including rights to traditional practices and natural resources, as well as rights 
to the development and management of their lands.238 UNDRIP provides under 
Article 25 that IPs have the right to their spiritual relationships with the traditional 
lands which belong to them and which they have occupied and used through their 
traditions and customs. Article 26 makes provision for the right to be entitled to 
the lands, territories and resources which belong to them in accordance with their 
traditions and customs. States are obligated to give legal recognition to such 
ownership.  
Article 28 provides that where they have been dispossessed of such lands they 
are entitled to redress for the lands, territories and resources confiscated, taken, 
occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.239 
Such redress must take the form of restitution or, where that is not possible, 
compensation in the form of equivalent lands, monetary redress, or other forms 
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of appropriate redress, unless otherwise agreed by the IPs in question.240 This is 
also another area where UNDRIP strengthens the development of international 
law by making references to reparations and redress for historical injustices.241  
Their rights to ownership, possession, development and control over their lands 
which they presently possess and their rights to lands from which they have been 
dispossessed without their free, prior and informed consent, are recognised.242 
For example, a broad approach which may include ownership or possession is 
adopted in relation to lands which they have ‘traditionally’ held.243 On the one 
hand UNDRIP recognises IPs’ rights to usage and on the other hand it also 
recognises the traditional ways of acquiring ownership of land by IPs and it 
encourages legal recognition of such traditional ways of acquiring ownership over 
lands by States.244  
In addition to the above, provisions are made for the right to development and 
control over developmental projects on IPs’ lands as well as the right to be 
consulted and compensated before such projects are implemented.245 UNDRIP 
also recognises the rights of IPs to natural resources on their lands. It therefore 
provides for their rights to ‘own, use, develop and control’ the natural resources 
of the lands they possess.246 It has been argued that this is ‘a ground breaking 
provision for international law, as ownership and use of natural resources has 
always been the monopoly of the state.’247 Even though the context of such 
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ownership of natural resources by IPs is not clear, this is another area where 
UNDRIP goes beyond ILO 169, which also recognises the right of IPs to the ‘use 
and management’ of natural resources.248 This rather progressive nature and 
strong contents of the provisions of UNDRIP in terms of how it articulates the 
rights of IPs to own, manage and control lands and resources have been rightly 
said to challenge traditional notions of State sovereignty to a very high degree.249 
UNDRIP also makes provisions for other rights that have a direct connection to 
IPs’ rights to land and natural resources. For example, UNDRIP recognises the 
right of IPs to be free from any kind of discrimination,250 the right to practice and 
revitalise their culture,251 the right to manifest and practice religious and spiritual 
traditions,252 the right for them to participate in decisions on matters that would 
have an effect upon them,253 and the right to be the determinants of their identities 
as well as membership of their communities in consonance with their traditions 
and customs.254 However, as UNDRIP is a UNGA resolution and not a treaty, it 
is important to examine its legal status and effect in international law so as to 
assess its significance to the case study of Abuja. 
7.2.3.3. Legal Status and Effect of UNDRIP 
Although ILO 169 and its predecessor, the ILO 107 have recognised land rights 
of IPs as demonstrated in sub-section 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 above, such as the right to 
demarcation of their lands, which go beyond the provisions of UNDRIP on land 
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rights of IPs, the small number of signatories and ratification of ILO 169 negates 
and limits the protection of land rights of IPs contained therein. Indeed, Nigeria is 
a not Party to either ILO 107 or ILO 169. In paragraphs a-c below, the legal status 
of UNDRIP as customary international law, or general principles of international 
law, and its relationship with other international human rights instruments is 
examined in more detail. 
a. UNDRIP as Customary International Law 
There appear to be many academic views that customary international law (CIL) 
is comprised of the two elements of State practice and opinio juris.255 Article 38 
(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute)256 provides 
that the Court shall apply among others ‘international custom as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law’. However, the ICJ Statute does not expressly 
state the elements that must exist to determine whether a rule of CIL has been 
established. This has led to several legal scholarly views on this issue. For 
example, Dennis Arrow proposes four-elements that should exist before the 
creation of CIL which are: State practice; opinio juris; adherence to a norm by a 
majority of ‘specially affected States’; and continuous practice over a period.257 In 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,258 the ICJ stated that the need for the 
                                            
255 AE Roberts, 'Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
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belief in the existence of opinio juris by States was central to the formation of 
CIL.259 
Anaya maintains that UNGA resolutions could lead to the creation of CIL by 
evidencing consensus in the international community that imbue the contents of 
such resolutions with the expectation that they are obligatory when supplemented 
with additional activities by the international community.260 Indeed, in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) 
(Nicaragua case),261 the ICJ relied on UNGA resolutions to determine that the 
principle of non-use of force and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States 
were principles of CIL. However, the decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case 
has been criticised ‘as a failure of legal scholarship … [i]t reveals the august 
judges of the International Court of Justice as collectively naïve about the nature 
of custom as the primary source of international law.’262  
The idea of whether or not opinio juris is necessary to the formation of CIL remains 
largely contentious and unsettled.263 Gunning argues that the requirement of 
actual physical practice by States for the formation of CIL has a tendency to result 
in an international society where only physical actions may  be the means of 
resolving international disputes and not non-physical means.264 He maintains that 
uniformity of practice may come to be seen as evidence that such practice may 
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be performed with the understanding that such arises out of legal obligations, 
thereby creating opinio juris.265 Kelly argues that acceptance by States give CIL 
legitimacy and that without this acceptance, practice is merely habitual and not 
CIL, but since there is no universally agreed mechanism for quantifying general 
practice of States as proof of opinio juris, this means it is a legal fiction.266 He 
maintains that even the ICJ has difficulty in investigating and proving State 
practice of a majority of States and ‘when the I.C.J. has required direct proof of 
the opinio juris element, the Court has found the evidence inadequate.'267  
Despite the above shortcoming, the main way of ascertaining opinio juris is 
through finding out the practice of States.268 The first case in which an 
international court determined the significance of opinio juris to the formation of 
CIL is the case of SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Lotus case).269 In that case the 
French claimed that a CIL rule had emerged which required acceptance that  
criminal trials arising from accidents on the high seas were within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the flagship State.270 They contended that as States had abstained 
from claiming jurisdiction in the matter, this was evidence of State practice which 
prevented other States other than France from asserting jurisdiction in the instant 
case.271 The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) rejected this 
argument and held that opinio juris was necessary to demonstrate that such 
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abstentions ‘were based on states being conscious of having a duty to abstain … 
to speak of an international custom.’272 
However, in the Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada),273 the tribunal 
did not rely on State practice to establish opinio juris as it found none, choosing 
rather to apply US Supreme Court judgments, this has led to the argument that 
the decision here was not based upon ‘any grounding in state practice, its 
conclusions about CIL are neither persuasive, nor evidence of anything.’274 
Likewise, in Libya v Malta,275 the ICJ did not rely on opinio juris or State practice 
in the determination of the principle of 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) on the continental shelf, it chose rather to rely on the provisions of 
the UN Law of the Sea Convention 1982276 to rule that the principle of EEZ was 
CIL.277 The above decisions demonstrates the uncertainty about whether opinio 
juris is really necessary to establish a rule of customary international law.278 
In the Asylum case (Colombia v Peru),279  Colombia asserted a right based upon 
a principle of CIL applicable in the Latin American region,280 in order to prosecute 
an offense committed by a political refugee against the government of Peru.281 
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Colombia demanded that the alleged refugee be free to leave Peru since he had 
been granted asylum by Colombia.282 In finding if such a rule existed as CIL, the 
Court expressed the need to establish opinio juris through State practice.283  
The above decision regarding the requirement of State practice to prove opinio 
juris was affirmed in the Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory 
(Portugal v India).284 In this case, the ICJ was presented with the issue of whether 
there was a regional CIL between India and Portugal in which Portugal had the 
right of passage through Indian territory. It was held that based on State practice 
on the right of passage in the region, a CIL had emerged in favour of Portugal.285  
However, in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark) (Western 
Germany v Netherland),286 the ICJ confirmed that opinio juris was necessary to 
the formation of CIL and that in looking for evidence of such, the Court could rely 
on treaties.287 
In terms of time and its relevance to the formation of CIL, it seems the length of 
time in which a norm has been practiced by States is not of the essence. Thus, in 
the Continental Shelf cases the ICJ held that: 
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not 
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of 
customary international law on the basis of what was originally a 
purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be 
that within the period in question, short though it might be, State 
                                            
282 Ibid, at 273. 
283 Ibid, at 276. 
284 Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), [1960] ICJ 
Reports 266 at 277. 
285 Ibid, at 40. 
286North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark) (Western Germany v Netherland), 
[1969] ICJ Reports 3. 
287 Ibid, at 42-44. See generally, JL Slama, 'Opinio Juris in Customary International Law' (1990) 
15 Oklahoma City University Law Review 603 at 641-645. 
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practice, including that of States whose interests are especially 
affected, it should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in 
the sense of the provision invoked ...’.288 
However, it has been argued that consistent State practice of a norm over a long 
period of time may outweigh one that has been practiced over a shorter period in 
determining whether such norms have metamorphosed into CIL.289 Karol Wolfke 
argues that continuous practice by States without interruption is not a sine qua 
non for the emergence of CIL.290 Cheng appears to agree with Wolfke on the 
issue of length of time not being of the essence in State practice.291 Therefore, 
the issue of length of time in State practice for the purpose of the emergence of 
a norm as CIL is not essential.292 Kuntz maintains that State practice by a majority 
of States is not sufficient, rather such practice must be in existence and applied 
‘by the overwhelming majority of states which hitherto had an opportunity of 
applying it.’293 Therefore, it would appear that irrespective of the length of time in 
which a norm has been practiced by States, once such norm has been practiced 
by a substantial number of States specially affected by such rule a CIL would be 
deemed to have emerged. 
It is argued that the role of State practice in providing evidence of opinio juris in 
the formation of CIL is largely unclear.294 It is not certain whether State practice 
is needed as evidence of opinio juris or if it is an independent ingredient to the 
                                            
288 North Sea Continental Shelf, (supra) at para 74. 
289 J Kammerhofer, 'Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of its Problems' (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 
523 at 530. 
290 K Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (Tow Nauk, 1964) at 60. 
291 B Cheng, 'United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary 
Law' (1965) 23 Indian Journal of International Law 23 at 45. 
292 J Kammerhofer, (n 289) above at 530. 
293 JL Kunz, (n 255) above at 666. 
294 Ibid, at 532. 
Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Abuja Peoples of 
Nigeria 
264 
 
formation of CIL.295 In the determination of whether there is sufficient State 
practice and whether there is evidence of the existence of opinio juris to establish 
CIL, Kuntz recommends that courts could rely on diplomatic correspondence, the 
decisions of domestic courts and provisions of international treaties.296 However, 
Anaya and Williams have argued that there should not be an over reliance and 
emphasis on actual State practice and that mere express communications 
amongst States, irrespective of whether this is done in association with real 
events or not should be counted as ‘a form of practice that builds customary 
rules.’297  
Academic debates about the legal status of some of the rights of IPs which are 
now guaranteed under UNDRIP, have led some scholars into arguing that some 
IPs’ rights are already CIL. For example, Anaya and Wiessner contend that 
several categories of IPs’ rights have developed into CIL, such as the rights to 
‘demarcation, ownership, development, control and the use of lands that 
[indigenous peoples] have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and 
used’.298 In line with the above claim, a 1999 comparative research conducted by 
                                            
295 See generally, CA Bradley and JL Goldsmith, 'Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position' (1997) Harvard Law Review 815 and PR 
Trimble, 'A Revisionist View of Customary International Law' (1985) 33 University of California 
Law Review 665. 
296 JL Kunz, (n 255) above at 667-668. See also, RR Baxter, 'Multilateral Treaties as Evidence 
of Customary International Law' (1965) 41 British Year Book of International Law 275 at 277-
278. 
297 SJ Anaya and RA Williams, 'The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and 
Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System, ' (2001) 14 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 33 at 54-55. 
298 SJ Anaya and S Wiessner, 'The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Towards Re-empowerment' (2007) 206 Third World Resurgence 15; SJ Anaya, 'Divergent 
Discourses about International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights over Lands and Natural 
Resources: Toward a Realist Trend' (2005) 16 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law & Policy 237; and SJ Anaya, 'International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The 
Move Towards the Multicultural State' (2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 13 at 44. See also, RT Ako and O Oluduro, 'Identifying Beneficiaries of the 
UN-Indigenous Peoples' Partnership (UNIPP): The Case for the Indigenes of Nigeria's Delta 
Region' (2014) 22 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 369 at 385. 
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Wiessner into State practice on IPs’ rights demonstrates that there are many 
positive developments in States’ legislation, policies and practices,299 which 
provide evidence that land rights and rights to natural resources by IPs have 
crystallised into CIL.300 As Weisner puts it ‘[t]oday, many of these proposed or 
actual prescriptions, coinciding, as they do, with domestic state practice as 
documented above, have created a new set of shared expectations about the 
legal status and rights of indigenous people that has matured and crystallized into 
customary international law.’301  
The above claim appears to be supported by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR). In the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v 
Nicaragua (Awas Tingi) case,302 the IACHR asserted that ‘there is an international 
customary law norm which affirms the rights of indigenous peoples to their 
traditional lands’.303 Also in Maya v Belize,304 the Belize Supreme Court supported 
this opinion as the senior judge in that case argued that ‘both customary 
international law and general principles of international law would require that 
Belize respect the rights of its indigenous peoples to their lands and resources’.305 
                                            
299 S Wiessner, 'Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and 
International Legal Analysis' (1999) 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 57 at 109. 
300 S Wiessner, 'Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People' (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1141 at 1152. 
301 S Wiessner, (n 299) above at 109. See also, S Wiessner, 'The United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' in A Constantines and N Zaikos (eds), The Diversity of 
International Law (Brill, 2009) at 343-362. 
302 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v Nicaragua [2001] Inter-Am Court of Human 
Rights (IACHR) (ser C) No 79. For a critique of the jurisprudence of the IACHR in relation to 
UNDRIP and IPs land, see JM Pasqualucci, 'International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of 
the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (2009) 27 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
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303 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v Nicaragua (supra) at 71. 
304 Aurelio Cal v Attorney-General of Belize, Claim 121/2007 (Supreme Court, Belize, 18 
October 2007) 127. 
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One possible authority that could support the claim that the provision of UNDRIP 
may contain or provide evidence of norms of CIL is the decision of the ICJ which 
has stated that UNGA resolutions could provide evidence for the purpose of 
establishing a rule of CIL,306 if there is ‘overwhelming evidence of a long-
established rule, or some very authoritative evidence of a recently established 
rule (such as a decision of the ICJ or a sufficiently widely accepted treaty 
provision)’.307  
However, it has also been argued that CIL in relation to land rights of IPs ‘does 
not yet exist’ but ‘there is a clear consensus within international human rights 
jurisprudence that at a minimum States must engage in good faith consultations 
with indigenous peoples prior to the exploration or exploitation of resources within 
their lands’.308 Xanthaki maintains that ‘the suggestion that indigenous rights 
already constitute uniform state practice seems over-ambitious. Such a 
suggestion actually undermines the importance of the Declaration: its adoption 
was such a success exactly because it anticipated changes to indigenous 
rights in national systems’.309 
In this thesis, it is argued that although IPs have benefited from increasing better 
protection in several States and regions across contemporary international 
society and UNDRIP seems to have been a catalyst for more positive outcomes 
in relation to IPs’ rights at the national, regional and international levels,310 the 
                                            
306 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 
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view by some scholars that some categories of IPs’ rights, including land rights, 
already have developed into CIL appear to be too hasty. Indeed, the text of 
UNDRIP anticipates that the circumstances of IPs and their rights in various 
States vary around the world.311 The varying circumstances of IPs around the 
world make it very difficult for State practice to be uniform. Therefore, to argue 
that IPs’ rights to land as provided under UNDRIP have crystallised into CIL 
appears erroneous as this overlooks the differing practices regarding IPs’ rights 
to land by various States in the Americas, Australia and Africa. 
The position of the International Law Association on the formation of CIL is that 
UNGA resolutions may constitute or create CIL,312 subject to the proviso that such 
resolutions ‘have been accepted unanimously or almost unanimously and that 
there is a clear intention by the States that support it to lay down a rule of 
international law.’313 However, in the case of UNDRIP initially States such as the 
US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand that have some IPs communities voted 
against its adoption. In addition, statements and comments by some of the States 
who voted in favour of it made it expressly clear that they had no intention to lay 
down any rule of CIL.314 Even the preamble to UNDRIP states that it ‘[s]olemnly 
proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership 
and respect’.315 Since UNDRIP was not adopted by a unanimous vote at the 
                                            
311 Para 23 preamble to UNDRIP states that: ‘Recognizing that the situation of indigenous 
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UNGA, there is strength in the argument that it may be erroneous to view UNDRIP 
or substantial portions of its provision as CIL.316  
In a futuristic sense however, there is the possibility that UNDRIP and its 
provisions may contribute to the formation of CIL on IPs’ rights at regional levels 
as it can be used as evidence to establish the existence of rules or the 
development of opinio juris.317 Although a few countries voted against it, thereby 
limiting its contribution in this respect, the ICJ has held that the limited legal weight 
of UNGA resolutions would normally be a result of opposition from a substantial 
number of States whose interests are affected specially.318 While considering the 
issue of whether a rule contained in a Convention can be considered to have 
become a CIL, the ICJ ruled that representative and widespread participation in 
a Convention would be sufficient provided such participation ‘includes that of 
States whose interests are specially affected.’319  
Although UNDRIP is not a convention or treaty, it is argued that its provision can 
be used as evidence of opinio juris at a regional level. Although four countries 
casted contrary votes,320 during the adoption of UNDRIP, they do not constitute 
a majority of States specially affected by UNDRIP most of whom voted in favour 
of it.321 The contrary votes do not represent the views of a substantial portion of 
the international community and those votes may not of themselves prevent the 
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emergence of such opinio juris on the rights of IPs at a regional level. Moreover, 
the effect of the votes by those countries that initially voted against it, has now 
been wittled down as a result of developments from the USA, Canada and 
Australia that suggest their acceptance of it.322 
Compared with ILO 107 and 169 (hard-laws), UNDRIP appears to be able to 
make a much broader impact among States as an UNGA resolution.  It is not 
legally binding and falls within the category of soft-law.323 However, as 
demonstrated in paragraphs (b)-(c) below the legal significance of UNDRIP 
cannot be dismissed on the basis that it is soft-law simpliciter. Indeed, it has been 
vehemently argued that ‘a soft law document is to be preferred to no document 
at all, and, similarly, a soft law document represents a better outcome than a 
treaty whose value is substantially impaired by a poor number of ratifications, or 
by rather ambiguous or diluted provisions.’324 Instead, its legal weight must be 
ascertained by taking into account of the fact that contemporary international law-
making and standards emerges as a result of interactions between different forms 
of law, irrespective of their legal nature.325  
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b. UNDRIP and International Human Rights Law  
Another way to understand the legal significance of UNDRIP is to consider the 
nature of its relationship with hard international human rights instruments 
discussed sub-sections 7.1.2-7.1.6 above and section 7.2 below. Although, the 
nature of the rights of IPs under UNDRIP discussed above are commonly referred 
to as sui generis (special rights), these rights are not distinct rights in the sense 
of being compartmentally different ‘from the fundamental human rights that are 
deemed to be of universal application, but rather elaborates upon these 
fundamental rights in the specific cultural, historical, social and economic 
circumstances of indigenous peoples.’326  
It follows logically, that the rights of IPs including land rights under UNDRIP 
certainly sets standards that must be respected by States within their national 
legal systems.327 Alan Boyle argues that UNGA declarations represent ‘at least 
an element of good faith commitment, evidencing in some cases a desire to 
influence state practice or expressing some measure of law-making intention and 
progressive development’.328 This is an argument that is particularly relevant in 
the area of international human rights law, where declarations of the UNGA have 
proved to be more effective instruments than hard law.329  In this respect, it has 
been argued that the UNDRIP ‘is substantially informed by international law [and 
can be] perceived as agreed interpretation of the UN human rights treaties 
concerning indigenous rights.’330  
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To buttress Xanthaki’s claim above, Boyle argues that the ‘interaction with related 
treaties may transform [declarations] legal status into something more’.331 
However, others argue that UNGA resolutions have no legal effects.332 
Nevertheless, UNDRIP’s effect and contribution to the development of the 
international law on IPs’ rights is demonstrated by its usage by international, 
regional and national bodies as a legal source and authority on the rights of IPs, 
as since its adoption, many bodies have established that UNDRIP is an authority 
of legal standards on IPs’ rights.333 In addition to the national and international 
case law referred to above, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (UNPFII) uses UNDRIP as a guide to its work on IPs.334 Likewise, the UN 
Development Group, which is composed of various UN programs, bodies and 
agencies working on development, has accepted the UNDRIP as its main 
framework for the implementation of its Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ 
Issues.335 
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The legal weight attached to the rights of IPs under UNDRIP therefore lies in the 
fact that it takes into account previous and recent normative developments in the 
general body of international human rights law with particular applications to IPs, 
which have occurred at international, regional and national levels.336 It is 
important to note that as quoted earlier in the context of the relationship between 
individual and collective rights, UNDRIP recognises and affirms that IPs are 
enitled ‘to all human rights recognized in international law, and that 
indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their 
existence, well-being and integral development as people.’337  
It then merges and crystalises such normative developments and concepts with 
long established principles and norms of general international human rights law 
to create elaborate international legal standards on the rights of IPs.338 For 
example, Article 1 provides that IPs are entitled to ‘all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal declaration of Human Rights and international human rights 
law.’339  
The land rights of IPs provided under Articles 25 and 26 of UNDRIP already exist 
under similar categories of norms articulated under ILO 169.340 Because of such 
effective synthesis and synchronisation of international, regional and national 
                                            
336 M Barelli, (n 200) above at 962. See also, W van Genugten, 'Protection of Indigenous 
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human rights law, UNDRIP establishes ‘far-reaching, comprehensive and 
innovative categories of human rights principles which are heavily grounded on 
established international human rights laws.’341  
The above argument is applicable to the land rights of IPs articulated under 
UNDRIP. Land rights of IPs under UNDRIP ought to be interpreted and 
understood in accordance with the broader body of international human rights law 
as required by various preambular paragraphs and substantive provisions of 
UNDRIP which make references to the UN Charter, ICCPR, ICESCR, the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action and the UDHR.342 Therefore, it is logical to 
argue that since the UNDRIP incorporates and make references to the rights and 
principles already existing and emerging in the general body of international 
human rights law such as land rights, freedom from discrimination and cultural 
rights, this suggests that it has strong legal significance and its provisions must 
be complied with by Member States of the UN such as Nigeria. 
c. UNDRIP as Incorporating General Principles of International Law 
Also, connected to the above arguments about the relationship between UNDRIP 
and other international human rights instruments, it is the argument in this thesis 
that a less contentious but more defensible approach in relation to the legal status 
of UNDRIP is that its provisions can be understood within the context of laying 
down general norms or principles of international law (GPIL) which can influence 
the decisions of courts.  
GPIL are recognised as sources of law at national and international levels.343 
They have been used in the resolution of disputes between various States by 
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international courts and tribunals.344 GPIL encompasses two main components: 
‘general principles’ and recognition by ‘civilized nations’. In terms of the latter, it 
appears that in the era of the UN all Member States are ‘civilized’ in the context 
of the UN Charter. However, there is more uncertainty regarding ‘general 
principles’. Some have contended that GPIL are both ‘expressions of national 
legal systems’345 and ‘expressions of other unperfected sources of international 
law in the statutes of the ICJ’.346   
Boyle and Chinkin have rightly argued that GPIL do not need to emanate 
exclusively from treaties, binding instruments or from national law.347 Rather, it is 
the recognition of such general principles by States that confer them legitimacy. 
In Chapter Nine, the way African States incorporate GPIL into their domestic legal 
systems will be examined in further detail.348 When such sources of GPIL are 
‘perfected’ as treaties, conventions GPIL and decisions of international courts and 
tribunals they create binding legal obligations upon States.349 However, where 
they have not been ‘perfected’ as CIL, treaties or by the decisions of courts their 
combined cumulative effects with other legal instruments ‘may possibly be 
considered to be expressions of a given principle’.350 It has been argued that 
UNGA and UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions may contain or express such 
principles.351 
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GPIL can emerge from their existence within the domestic legal systems of 
States.352 In line with this, it has been argued that there are common ideas of 
justice and law shared by all States.353 The international legal arena is then seen 
as a manifestation of this fact in the various customary rules and normative 
understandings that regulate the relation between international actors.354 GPIL 
could fill a vacuum in international treaties or CIL by being the basis of decision 
making in the affairs of the international community.355 Likewise, they could aid in 
the interpretation of treaties and CIL even though they are equally primary 
sources of international law.356 Bin Cheng maintains that GPIL perform three main 
functions, these are: being sources of legal rules, being guidelines for judiciaries 
in the interpretation of law and with lacunae in the law.357 
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) have provided guidance as to how to identify if GPIL have emerged. 
For a GPIL to emerge under Article 38 (1) (3) and (c) of the Statute of the ICJ they 
must exist as principles of law in many States but do not have to be of universal 
acceptance by all States and it appears no numerical criteria has been 
established. In SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Lotus case),358 the PCIJ held that 
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Article 38 (1)(3) demands that such principles should be of universal acceptance 
by States by stating that GIPL ‘is applied between all nations belonging to the 
community of states.’359 However, the facts of the case suggest that the principle 
at issue was known to be of universal application by all States. The principle in 
question was the territorial jurisdiction of States in criminal matters. It has been 
argued that based on the facts, the Court did not intend to establish a principle of 
universality in relation to GPIL.360  
Indeed, the ICJ jettisoned the requirement of universality in relation to the 
emergence of GPIL in the South West Sahara Cases (SW Sahara cases), where 
it noted that ‘[t]he recognition of a principle by civilized nations … does not mean 
recognition by all civilized nations …’.361 Similarly, the universality test was 
rejected by the same Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case where it was 
stated that ‘the evidence should be sought in the behavior of a great number of 
states, possibly the majority of States, in any case the great majority of the 
interested States.’362  
The PCIJ and the ICJ usually find evidence of GPIL by looking into various areas 
of national laws such as public, private, administrative and constitutional law.363 
For instance, in the case of International Status of South West Africa,364 the ICJ 
in order to ascertain the principles that underlie the Mandate of the League of 
                                            
359 Ibid. 
360 MC Bassiouni, (n 345) above at 788. 
361 South West Sahara Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) [1966] ICJ 4 at 
299 18 July 1966 (Judge Tanaka’s dissenting opinion). 
362 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Western Germany v Denmark, Western Germany v 
Netherland) [1969] ICJ 101 at 229, 20 February 1969 (dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs). 
363 MC Bassiouni, (n 345) above at 79. 
364 International Status of South West Africa, [1950] ICJ 146. 
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Nations had to look into the national laws of England and the US.365 However, 
this does not suggest that principles of law at national levels automatically 
translate into GPIL.366 In some instances international courts look to sources such 
as the origins of roman law.367 
In relation to the expression ‘civilized nations’ under Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ 
Statute it has been held that the expression adds nothing to the content of GPIL 
as it appears to be discriminatory and instead it should be interpreted ‘as a whole 
the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal 
systems of the world.’368 In addition, the PCIJ and ICJ do identify GPIL in the 
context of the international legal system through examining the activities and 
conduct of States in the international arena which could differ from the practice in 
domestic legal systems. For example, in the Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru),369 
the ICJ was presented with the issue of whether a State can legally impose 
qualifications on an offense to grant asylum to a foreign national who has been 
charged with the offence of embarking on military coup in Peru. The Court relied 
on GPIL as espoused under the diplomatic relationship policies between the 
United States and Latin American States including international and regional 
instruments to hold that such asylum principle was recognised.370  
                                            
365 Ibid, at 148-149 11 July 1950 (separate opinion of Judge Mc-Nair). 
366 MO Hudson, 'The Permanent Court of International Justice' (1922) 35 Harvard Law Review 
245. 
367 For example, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Western Germany v Denmark, 
Western Germany v Netherland) (supra). 
368 Ibid, separate opinion of Judge Ammoun. 
369 Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ 359 at 369 3 March 1950. 
370 Ibid at 378-379 (Judge Castilla’s dissenting judgement). 
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GPIL have been applied by the PCIJ and the ICJ in a chain of cases. In Experte 
Change of Greek and Turkish Population (Greece v Turkey),371 the Advisory 
Opinion of the PCIL declared that the principle that an international obligation 
should be incorporated in States’ legislations in order to fulfil such an international 
obligation was a GPIL.372 In Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia 
(Germany v Poland),373 it was held that the procedural rules applicable before the 
court included GPIL.374 In The Frontier Between Iraq and Turkey,375 the Advisory 
Opinion of the PCIJ affirmed that the principle in which no one may be a judge in 
their own case was acknowledged as a GPIL.376  
In the Lotus case,377 in determining if there was a principle of international law 
which could prevent Turkey from prosecuting an individual the Court conducted 
research into the teaching of experts, judicial precedents and facts which might 
prove the existence of any principle of international law and it found no such 
principle.378 In Charzow Factory (Germany v Poland),379 where the Court was to 
determine if Germany could claim any damages for harm caused by two 
companies, it was found on the basis of ‘established principles by international 
                                            
371 Experte Change of Greek and Turkish Population (Greece v Turkey) [1925] PCIJ (ser. B) No 
10, 21 February 1925. 
372 Ibid, at 20. 
373 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland) [1925] PCIJ (ser. A) 
No 6, 25 August 1925. 
374 Ibid, at 19. 
375 Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Leusenne (The Frontier Between Iraq and Turkey) 
[1925] PCIJ (ser. B) No 12, 21 November 1925. 
376 Ibid, at 32. 
377 Supra. 
378 Ibid, at 31, 
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practice and in particular by decisions of arbitral tribunals’380 that a GPIL 
connected to reparation being made where there is a breach of an obligation 
existed.  
In Lighthouses (France v Greece) (Lighthouses case),381 the Court held that the 
private law principle in which Parties to an agreement are assumed to be acting 
‘honestly and in good faith … cannot be ignored in international law’ and it was 
recognised as a GPIL.382 However, it is not all instances where the PCIJ found 
GPIL to exist and applied to cases. For example, in Serbian Loans (France v 
Serb-Croat-Slovans),383 the court found that the principle of impossibility of 
performance was not applicable to the case as a GPIL.384 However, in Brazilian 
Loans (France v Brazil),385 the Court recognised as a GPIL the principle of judicial 
interpretation contra proferendum. 
Like the PCIJ, the ICJ has used various approaches to establish the existence or 
otherwise of GPIL. For example, in Nuclear Test (Australia v France),386 the ICJ 
referred to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda which applies to 
the law of treaties to hold that the principle was also ‘of a binding character of an 
international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration’387 as a GPIL. In the 
Western Sahara case, the Court relied on the existence of the principle of self-
determination in international law by references to the UN Charter, UNGA 
                                            
380 Ibid, at 47. 
381 Lighthouses (France v Greece) (Lighthouses case) [1934] PCIJ (ser. A/B) No 62, 17 March 
1934. 
382 Ibid, at 47 (separate opinion of Judge Seferiades). 
383 Serbian Loans (France v Ser.-Croat-Slovans) [1926] PCIJ (ser. A) Nos 20 and 21. 
384 Ibid, at 39-40. 
385 Brazilian Loans (France v Brazil) [1929] PCIJ (ser. A) Nos 20 and 21. 
386 Nuclear Test (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ 253 at 268, 30 December 1974. 
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resolutions and prior decisions of the court to hold that self-determination was a 
fundamental GPIL.388  
However, in Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v India),389 where 
the issue before the Court was whether Portugal had a right of passage in the 
area in dispute. The Court rejected the GPIL in relation to the right of passage 
and opted instead for a regional CIL rule as the proper rule applicable in the case 
in dispute.390 While it has been argued that Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute in 
relation to GPIL appears to give judicial discretion to judges in the development 
of international law,391 the approaches of courts in examining whether a norm has 
attained that status has been categorised into two main approaches to wit: the 
‘categoricist’ and ‘comparativist’ approaches.392 The comparativist approach is 
said to guide in the conduct of comparative law research for the determination of 
GPIL.393 Indeed, while an investigation into the domestic laws of various nations 
will inevitably involve comparative research in the search of such principles of law 
as practiced by various States, this is not the same as the application of the laws 
practiced by other States. Strictly following this approach comes with the risk that 
it could result in the imposition of the laws recognised by majority States on a 
minority of States who may not recognise such laws.394 It appears the ICJ has 
been good at avoiding this risk as it held in SW Africa cases395 that Article 38 of 
                                            
388 Supra at 30-35. 
389 Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) [1960] ICJ 43, 12 April 1960. 
390 Ibid. 
391 CA Ford, 'Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38 (1) (c) and General 
Principles of Law' (1994) 5 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 35 at 65. 
392 Ibid, at 65-66. 
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the ICJ in relation to GPIL must be restricted to ‘the general principles of law’ 
recognised by States and not all laws recognised by States. 
The ‘categoricist’ approach used in identifying GPIL implies that a comparative 
approach is not necessary, rather they are inherent in the notion of law and legal 
principles which could be found in general propositions of law in domestic and 
international law.396 It has been argued that while the comparative approach 
encompasses the onerous task of ascertaining the practice and acceptance of 
certain principles of law in national and international law, the categoricist 
approach gives to the Court the discretion to determine GPIL by adopting 
whatever approach that seems necessary to identify such.397 Ford argues that a 
hybrid approach that synthesis the comparativist and categorisation technique 
would be more effective in the determination of whether a GPIL law has 
emerged.398 
Land rights of IPs as protected under UNDRIP illustrates the creation and 
elaboration of GPIL with a synthesis of hard and soft international law. When the 
provisions of UNDRIP and the general body of international human rights law are 
taken together with regional human rights instruments as examined above, the 
conclusion suggests that a GPIL in which land rights of IPs should be protected 
has developed.399 At the international level, evidence that UNDRIP’s provisions 
in relation to IPs’ rights are GPIL is supported by the works of the HRC, CESCR, 
and CERD.  
For example, in its Concluding Observations on the fourth, fifth and sixth periodic 
reports on the USA whilst acknowledging that the USA voted against the adoption 
                                            
396 CA Ford, (n 391) above at 73-74. See also, B Cheng, (n 357) above at 24. 
397 CA Ford, (n 391) above at 73-74. 
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of the UNDRIP, the CERD still recommended that it must ‘… be nevertheless 
used as a guide to interpret the State Party’s obligations under ICERD relating to 
indigenous peoples.’400 Similar attitudes have been adopted by CERD in relation 
to the following IPs’ rights: self-identification and recognition in Denmark401 and 
France;402 land rights in Costa-Rica403 and Guatemala;404 and free, prior and 
informed consent in Norway.405 
The argument that land rights of IPs are GPIL has been supported by 
developments at some national levels. For example, the Supreme Court of Belize 
has held that the protection of land rights of IPs is now a GPIL.406 Indeed, the 
Bolivian State has adopted UNDRIP verbatim as part of its State legislation,407 
while Ecuador and Nepal have used it as a reference point in the process of 
revising their constitutions.408 Even those States that voted against UNDRIP now 
                                            
400 Committed on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination United States of America, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/USA/CO/6 at 29, 8 May 2008. 
401 CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination Denmark, UN Doc., CERD /C/DNK/CO/20–21. 20 September 2010. 
402 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Twentieth and Twenty-First Periodic 
Reports of France, UN Doc. CERD/C/FRA/CO/20–21. 10 June 2015. 
403 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Nineteenth to Twenty-Second Periodic 
Reports of Costa Rica, UN Doc. CERD /C/CRI/CO/19–22. 25 September 2015. 
404 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourteenth and Fifteenth Periodic 
Reports of Guatemala, UN Doc. CERD /C/GTM/CO/14 – 15. 12 June 2015.  
405 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Reports 
of Norway, UN Doc. CERD /C/NOR/CO/21-22. 17 October 2016.  
406 In Manuel Coy et al v The Attorney General of Belize et al, Supreme Court of Belize, Claims 
No 171 and 172 (10 October 2007), the Belize Supreme Court held with regards to land rights of 
some Mayan peoples, that once a UNGA resolution incorporates principles of general 
international law, States cannot disregard them. It also found that UNDRIP incorporates general 
principles in relation to the land rights of IPs that must to be taken into account. See para 132 of 
the judgement as cited above.  
407 See Bolivian Rights of Indigenous Peoples Law No 3760 2007. 
408 SJ Anaya, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous people’, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9 11 August 2008 at para 54. 
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appear to have reversed their decision on it. For example, Australia has now 
formally endorsed and supports UNDRIP,409  and in an earlier case the Court of 
Australia affirmed the native title of IPs.410 Canada’s Parliament has passed a 
motion demanding that the Government should implement the standards set out 
under UNDRIP.411 In the Kenyan case of Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney 
General and Ors,412 the Kenya Court relied on the provisions of UNDRIP to 
recognise and uphold the land rights of IPs. In the more recent African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya (Ogiek 
case),413 the African Court on Human and Peoples’s Rights (African Court) 
affirmed that land rights of IPs are protected under the African Charter (see 
section 7.3 below).  
The logical conclusion from the analysis above is that IPs’ rights to land and 
natural resources have emerged as GPIL. Such emergence does not require the 
acceptance of every State in the world to be legally binding.414 It is argued that 
the views that land rights of IPs have attained the status of GPIL are strengthened 
by State practice as demonstrated above.  Indeed, Article 38 of the UNDRIP 
                                            
409 See a 2009 Media Release entitled ‘United We Stand – Support for United Nations 
Indigenous Rights Declaration: A Watershed Moment for Australia’, 3 April 2009 available here: 
<www.humanrights.gov.au/news/media-releases/2009-media-release-united-we-stand-support-
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410 In Mabo v Queensland (No2) [1992] 175 CLR 1. See also The Wik’s Peoples v The State of 
Queensland [1996] 134 ALR 637, where it was held that pastoral leases cannot extinguish 
native title. 
411 See ‘UN Experts Welcome Canada’s Backing for Indigenous Rights Declaration’, 18 April 
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accessed 07 October 2016. 
412 Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney General and Ors [2014] eKLR 1. 
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Court. See, http://en.african-court.org/images/Cases/Judgment/Application%20006-2012%20-
%20African%20Commission%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples’%20Rights%20v.%20the%
20Republic%20of%20Kenya..pdf, accessed 31 May 2017. 
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demands that ‘States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, 
shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve 
the ends of this Declaration.’ When a rule contained in UNDRIP has been 
recognised by States as a GPIL, all States are bound by it and it does not matter 
whether a State not wanting to be bound claims that it is not a Party to that 
GPIL.415 Although Nigeria abstained from voting during its adoption, the 
provisions of UNDRIP are binding on Nigeria as a Member State of the UN which 
adopted it and as a GPIL. GPIL are binding even if a State disagrees with it or 
refrains from expressing its assent or opposition to it.416 Therefore, a State like 
Nigeria is bound by the emergent GPIL requiring States to respect and protect 
land rights of IPs and is obligated in accordance with Article 38 of UNDRIP to 
adopt legislative measures to bring its provisions into effect in Nigeria by 
amending the offending sections of the Nigerian Constitution and FCT Act already 
highlighted above.417  
In the context of reconciling the seeming contradiction between solving a problem 
with origins in colonialism such as the case study in this thesis through 
international law which is characterised with Western ideological frameworks, it is 
argued that such contradiction is a positive development. It is argued that if 
international law is can adapt to the peculiar circumstances of African societies, 
then there is nothing wrong with it addressing problems that may have been 
exacerbated by colonialism in Africa. 
                                            
415 For more detailed analyses of UNDRIP, see S Errico, 'The Draft UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Overview' (2007) Human Rights Law Review at 1; J Gilbert, 
'Indigenous Rights in the Making: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples' (2007) 14 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 207; and S Allen and A 
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(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011). 
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Indeed, it was in an attempt to reconcile the above contradictions in international 
human rights law that Africa adopted the African Charter as a document that aims 
to articulate international human rights norms already existing in the international 
arena in the peculiar context of Africa that takes the special circumstances and 
values of the continent into account. Therefore, such contradictions have been 
effectively resolved by the adoption of the African Charter.  Since the case study 
is located in Africa, and having examined the legal position in relation to the land 
rights of IPs under international law and the implications on the case study of 
Abuja, it is important to examine the African regional human rights regime to 
further demonstrate that land rights of IPs have been recognised as principles of 
African regional international law. 
7.3. The African Charter and Land Rights of IPs 
All the analyses above relate to the position of the law at the general level of 
international law. The main objective of this section is to answer the research 
question: Are the land rights of IPs protected under the African Charter? Indeed, 
as the African Charter has been celebrated as an international human rights 
instrument made by Africans for Africans, it is important to examine the relevance 
of its provisions to the thesis and case study of Abuja.418 The argument that land 
rights of IPs now constitute GPIL is buttressed by the provisions of the African 
Charter and the jurisprudence of the African Commission in relation to land rights 
of IPs as demonstrated in sub-section 7.3.1 below.  
According to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU Constitutive Act),419 
one of the main objectives of the African Union (AU) is to encourage international 
                                            
418 See R Chongwe, 'African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights' (1987) 13 Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 1605; M Evans and R Murray, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
The System in Practice 1986–2006 (Cambridge University Press, 2008); and R Gittleman, 'The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, ' (1981) 22 Vermont Journal 
of International Law 667. 
419 Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in 2000 at Lomé, Togo, entered into force in 
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cooperation amongst African States ‘taking due account of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’420 as well as to 
‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights 
instruments’.421  
It appears then that the intention of the AU is to make the African Charter the 
main standard and framework for the promotion and protection of human rights in 
Africa.422 At a general level, the African Charter423 has been described as one 
instrument that uniquely establishes and makes provision for collective rights of 
peoples whilst balancing such collective rights with individual rights.424 It has been 
argued that the focus on collective rights is intended to introduce an African 
conception of human rights into the international regime on human rights.425  
Like other regional institutions,426 the African Commission has also developed its 
own jurisprudence on the land rights of IPs as provided under UNDRIP in several 
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rights law in this regard see the following cases: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingi Community v 
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ways.427   In its Report on IPs,428 the African Commission acknowledges that 
rights to land and natural resources are very important to the existence and 
survival of IPs.429 Such rights are protected under Articles 20 (right to existence), 
21 (right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources), and 22 (right to 
economic, social and cultural development) of the African Charter. Also, Article 
14 of the African Charter guarantees the right of every individual to property, and 
it is argued that this right is exercisable by individual members of IPs and as 
collectives in Africa.  
Indeed, in its Advisory Opinion430 on UNDRIP, the African Commission observed 
that the provisions of Article 21 (1) of the African Charter were in pari materia with 
Articles 10, 11 (2), 28 (1) and 32 of UNDRIP.431 Equally significant to the 
protection of land rights of IPs is the view of the African Commission to the effect 
that Articles 2 (right to the enjoyment of the rights in the African Charter without 
distinction of any kind including ethnic group) and 3 (right to equal protection of 
the law) are applicable to the benefit of IPs.432 Accordingly, the African 
Commission has concluded that ‘[b]y not protecting individual members of 
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104 The American Journal of International Law at 29-65. 
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431 Ibid. See also, the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
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indigenous communities against discrimination, the member states of the African 
Union violate Articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter.’433 Also, Article 17 (2) 
recognises the right to cultural life in community.  
In addition to the above substantive provisions of the African Charter, the African 
Commission is empowered to draw guidance from the general body of 
international human rights law like the UN Charter, the UDHR, and other 
instruments adopted by the UNGA and by African countries in the area of human 
rights.434 The African Commission applied and interpreted the afore-mentioned 
provisions of the African Charter in the case of Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria 
(Ogoni case).435 In that case, the African Commission held that the failure to 
involve the Ogoni  people in the decision process in relation to the exploitation of 
oil and gas on their traditional lands was a violation of their right to freely dispose 
of their natural resources and wealth under the African Charter.436 It also found 
that the Nigerian Government was in violation of Article 14 (right to property) of 
the African Charter in relation to the Ogoni peoples.437 The African Commission 
emphasised that ‘[i]nternational law and human rights must be responsive to 
African circumstances. Clearly, collective rights, and economic and social rights 
are essential elements of human rights in Africa.’438  
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In the more recent case of Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya  (Endorois 
case),439 the Endorois alleged that they were forcibly removed ‘from their 
ancestral lands around the Lake Bogoria area of the Baringo and Koibatek 
Administrative Districts, as well as in the Nakuru and Laikipia Administrative 
Districts within the Rift Valley Province in Kenya, without prior consultations, and 
payment of adequate compensation by the Kenyan Government.’440 They 
claimed that such forceful evictions constituted violations of their land rights as 
this resulted in their displacement as an indigenous community from their 
ancestral lands, including disrupting their pastoral enterprise. They argued further 
that there were violations of the right to practise their religion and culture in 
contravention of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the African Charter and international 
law.441  
Citing the Ogoni case442 with approval the Complainants also argued that their 
collective land rights were guaranteed under the African Charter.443 The 
Respondent State claimed that following the designation of the disputed land as 
a game reserve, it compensated and resettled members of the Endorois 
community.444 The African Commission noted that ‘[w]hat is clear is that all 
attempts to define the concept of indigenous peoples recognise the linkages 
between peoples, their land, and culture and that such a group expresses its 
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desire to be identified as a people or have the consciousness that they are a 
people.’445  
It then held that Endorois’ culture, and traditional way of life were intrinsically 
linked with their ancestral lands - Lake Bogoria and the surrounding area. It also 
found that the Endorois were unable to fully exercise their cultural and religious 
rights, and felt disconnected from their land and ancestors, as a result of the 
evictions.446 Going even further, it affirmed that ‘the alleged violations of the 
African Charter are those that go to the heart of indigenous rights – the right to 
preserve one’s identity through identification with ancestral lands.’447 To 
enable it to arrive at its findings and decision, the African Commission made 
references to several cases decided by the IACHR,448 and concluded that there 
was a violation of the land rights of the Endorois peoples449 as well as violations 
of their cultural rights,450 and their rights to natural resources in contravention of 
Article 21 of the African Charter including the right to development.451 
In case of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic 
of Kenya (Ogiek case),452 before the African Court, the Ogieks of the Mau Forests 
of Kenya,453 claimed that they are an indigenous minority ethnic group in Kenya 
                                            
445 Ibid, at para 151. 
446 Ibid, at para 156. 
447 Ibid, at para 162. The emphasis is added. 
448 Ibid, at paras 190 and 197. 
449 Ibid, at para 238. 
450 Ibid, at paras 241-251. 
451 Ibid, at paras 268 and 298. 
452 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya. Application No 
006/2012. This case emanated from the African Commission but was referred to the African 
Court. See http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#pending-cases, 
accessed 13 December 2016. 
453 See Chapter Five above for a more detailed discussion on the Ogiek as IPs. 
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comprised of about 20,000 members, about 15,000 of whom inhabit the greater 
Mau Forests.454 The Applicant alleged that in October 2009, through the Kenya 
Forestry Service, the Kenyan Government issued a thirty days eviction notice to 
the Ogiek and other settlers of the Mau Forests, demanding that they move out 
of the forest on the grounds that the forest had been designated as a reserved 
water catchment zone, and was part of the Government of Kenya’s land under 
Section 4 of the Government Land Act.455 The Applicant consequently alleged 
violations of Articles 1, 2, 4, and 17 (2) and (3), 21 and 22 of the African Charter 
by the Kenyan Government.456 The Respondent claimed inter alia that the 
Applicants were fully and adequately compensated and that ‘communal 
ownership of land is recognized under Articles 61(1) and 63 of the Constitution of 
Kenya.’457 In a provisional ruling, the African Court ordered the respondents to 
refrain from any further restriction of the Ogieks on land transactions on the 
disputed area and to refrain from any further actions, pending the determination 
of the substantive suit.458 
Giving judgment on the merits,459 and in the context of the substantive provision 
of the African Charter in promoting land rights of IPs, the African Court found that 
                                            
454 See Case Summary, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v the Republic of 
Kenya Application No 006/2012, available at: http://en.african-
court.org/images/Cases/Case%20Summaries/APPLICATION_006_OF_2012_CASE_SUMMAR
Y.pdf, at para 1, accessed 12 October 2016. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid, at para 3. 
457 Ibid, at para 8 (f). 
458 See Order of Provincial Measures, In the Matter of African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights V the Republic of Kenya Application No 006/2012, available at: http://en.african-
court.org/images/Cases/Orders/006-2012-ORDER__of_Provisional_Measures-
_African_Union_v._Kenya.pdf, at para 25, accessed 12 October 2016. 
459 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya. 
Application No 006/2012. Available at: http://en.african-
court.org/images/Cases/Judgment/Application%20006-2012%20-
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Article 14 (right to property) is applicable to safeguard the collective rights of IPs 
to land.460 Indeed, the Court also referred to Article 26 of UNDRIP and held that 
the rights enshrined therein are variable and inclusive of the rights of IPs to land 
as equally safeguarded under Article 14 of the African Charter.461 The African 
Court therefore did not have trouble in holding that by evicting the Ogiek from 
their ancestral lands against their will, the respondent State had violated their 
rights to land as guaranteed by Article 14 of the African Charter and Article 26 of 
UNDRIP.462 Likewise, it was held that there were violations of their rights to 
practice their culture contrary to Article 17 (2) and (3) of the African Charter to the 
extent that they were prevented from using their ancestral lands to practice their 
religion and culture.463 Other violations that the Court found are Article 21 (right 
to dispose of one’s property) and Article 22 (right to development) of the African 
Charter.464 
In view of the findings of the Court above, it held that the Respondent State of 
Kenya was also in violation of Article 1 of the Charter which provides that: ‘The 
Member States … parties to the Charter shall recognise the rights, duties and 
freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or 
other measures to give effect to them.’465 This decision signifies that there is now 
a GPIL in the context of the African Charter in which rights of IPs and in the 
context of this thesis their rights to land should be respected and protected in 
                                            
%20African%20Commission%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples’%20Rights%20v.%20the%
20Republic%20of%20Kenya..pdf, accessed 31 May 2017. 
460 Ibid, at para 123. 
461 Ibid, at para 127. 
462 Ibid, at paras 131-146. 
463 Ibid, at para 190. 
464 Ibid, at paras 195-211. 
465 Ibid, at paras 214-215. 
Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Abuja Peoples of 
Nigeria 
293 
 
Africa. The decision is therefore a watershed moment in the development of 
African regional law on IPs and their rights in Africa. 
The articulation and protections of land rights of IPs at international and regional 
levels raise important academic issues in relation to how the international and 
regional jurisprudence on the land rights of IPs have impacted on the domestic 
national policies, laws and practices of States in Africa.466 The impact of the 
African Charter on land rights of IPs at national levels will now be discussed in 
7.3.1 below. 
7.3.1. The African Charter and Land Rights of IPs at National Levels 
In a 2015 Concluding Observation,467 the African Commission affirmed that 
Nigeria is a Party to the African Charter having ratified it on 22 June 1983.468 It 
found that Nigeria has submitted its Initial and Periodic State Reports from 1992 
to 2014.469  Indeed, the African Charter is domesticated into Nigerian laws as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) 
Act.470 However, it was also observed that Nigeria has failed to ratify seven 
regional and international human rights treaties,471 including the Protocol to the 
                                            
466 See S Dersso, ' The African Human Rights System and the Issue of Minorities in Africa,' 
(2012) 20 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 42 and CK Nkongolo Jr, 'The 
Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights: Appraisal and Perspectives Three Decades after Its Adoption, ' (2014) 22 African 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 492. 
467 ACHPR, Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the 5th Periodic Report of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (2011 – 2014), adopted at the fifty seventh ordinary session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held from 4-18 November, 2015, in Banjul, The 
Gambia. Available at: <www.achpr.org/files/sessions/57th/conc-obs/5th-2011 
2014/concluding_observations_nigeria_5th_sr_eng.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2016. 
468 Ibid, at para 1. 
469 Ibid, paras 3 and 4. 
470 CAP 10 Laws of Nigeria 1990. 
471 ACHPR, Concluding Observations (n 467) above at paras 59 and 60. 
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African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Protocol to the African Court).472  
The reason for the above failure according to the African Commission was  ‘due 
to prolonged procedures for domestication of international law under its 
legal architecture’473 and that there was failure by the Nigerian Government to 
include the situation of indigenous communities in Nigeria in its latest Periodic 
Report.474 It therefore recommended that there was a need for Nigeria to include 
information about the legislative and policy measures that have been adopted to 
enhance the protection of IPs in Nigeria in the next Periodic Report.475  
The Protocol to the African Court empowers individuals and groups to institute 
actions before it for the enforcement of their rights under the African Charter.476 
However, Nigeria has refused to make the mandatory declaration necessary477 to 
enable individuals from Nigeria to bring cases directly before the African Court.478 
Similarly, in a 2007 Concluding Observations,479 the African Commission noted 
                                            
472   Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted on 9 June 1998 in Burkina Faso and 
came into force on 25 January 2004, available at: http://en.african-court.org/images/Protocol-
Host%20Agrtmt/africancourt-humanrights.pdf, accessed 17 October 2016. It merges the work of 
the African Commission with the African Court, thereby giving more legal wealth to the advisory 
nature of the decisions of the African Commission. 
473 ACHPR, Concluding Observations (n 467) above at para 60. The emphasis is added. 
474 Ibid, at para 89. See Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), Nigeria’s 5th Periodic Country 
Report: 2011-2014 on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
in Nigeria, (2014), available at: <www.achpr.org/files/sessions/56th/state-reports/5th-2011-
2014/staterep5_nigeria_2013_eng.pdf>, accessed 17 October 2016. 
475 FRN (n 474) above at 136. 
476 Art 2 (1). 
477 By Art 34 (6) of the Protocol to the African Court (n 471) above. 
478 ACHPR, Concluding Observations (n 467) above at para 60. 
479 ACHPR, Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the Initial Report of the 
Republic of Kenya, adopted at the Forty-First Ordinary Session    16-30 May 2007, Accra, 
Ghana, available at: <www.achpr.org/files/sessions/41st/conc-obs/1st-1992-
2006/41os_kenya_cos_eng.pdf>, accessed 17 October 2016. 
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that although Kenya was a Party to the African Charter,480 it had not domesticated 
it into its national laws including the Protocol to the African Court.481 It was 
therefore recommended that Kenya took urgent steps to domesticate the African 
Charter and the Protocol to the African Court.482 
There is a link between the concept of self-determination in international law and 
land rights of IPs as demonstrated in section 7.4 below, where the relevance of 
the concept of self-determination in advancing and articulating the land rights of 
IPs and Abuja peoples of Nigeria in particular will now be examined. In addition 
to the discusions on international human rights law in sections 7.1 and 7.2 above, 
this will provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of international law on 
land rights of IPs and the relevance to the the case study of Abuja.  
7.4. Self-Determination, IPs and the Land Rights of Abuja Peoples 
Like the concept of IPs examined in the preceding Chapter Six, the concept of 
self-determination is equally relevant to protecting rights of IPs such as land 
                                            
480 Ibid, at para 1. 
481 Ibid, at para 33. 
482 Ibid, at para 42. See also, ACHPR and IWGIA, Report on the African Commission’s Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities: Research and Information visit to Kenya, 
(ACHPR and IWGIA, 2012), available at: <www.achpr.org/files/sessions/50th/mission-
reports/indigenous-2010-kenya/misrep_specmec_indig_kenya_2010_eng.pdf>, accessed 17 
October 2016, at paras 16–16. Where the African Commission found that there were still issues 
with the land rights of IPs in Kenya leading to the dispossession of the lands of the Ogieks and 
Endorois among others. Therefore, it was recommended that Kenya should ratify ILO 169 and 
adopt UNDRIP, while noting that the Kenyan Government had agreed to abide by the decision 
of the African Commission in the Endorois case. It was also recommended that Kenya should 
implement its new National Land Policy, compensate and pay reparations to IPs dispossessed 
of their lands as well as to protect their land rights and ensure that they are consulted. It also 
emphasised that their free, prior and informed consent must be obtained before any 
developmental activities on their ancestral lands are carried out. Accordingly, in a combined 
Periodic Report, the Kenya Government claims to have now domesticated the African Charter 
and the Protocol to the African Court. Kenya also claims to have taken several constitutional, 
legislative and policy measures to protect the land rights of its IPs. Therefore, the next Chapter 
will comparatively examine the legal systems of Kenya and Nigeria in context of the relationship 
between national and international law and in the light of recent post-colonial constitutional 
reforms in Kenya. 
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rights. Without definition, the concept of self-determination is mentioned in the 
1945 UN Charter,483 as the Charter sets out to achieve international cooperation 
in economic and social contexts based on respect of ‘self-determination of 
peoples’.484 This reference to self-determination was again echoed in the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
1960485 which provided expressly that all peoples have the right to self-
determination.486 With the emergence of the UN in 1945, the right to self-
determination became an important issue under international law.487 Crawford 
argues that the concept of self-determination has four main implications in 
international law to wit: Mandated Territories under the UN; States within the 
context of seeking independence from colonial rule; other geographical political 
entities within States; and other claimants.488 However, Kingsbury identifies three 
main dimensions to self-determination in international law that include: the 
emergence of new political entities; claims by political entities to be free from 
external interference; and claims by groups within political entities for special 
recognition and protection.489  
This right is guaranteed for ‘all peoples’ under the ICCPR and ICESCR to ‘freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
                                            
483 Art 1. See also preamble to the UN Charter. 
484 Art 55. 
485 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA 
resolution 1514, adopted 14 December 1960. 
486 Ibid, at para 2. 
487 B Kingsbury, 'Self-Determination and" Indigenous Peoples"' (1992) Proceedings of the 
Annual American Society of International Law 383 and M Colchester, 'Self-Determination or 
Environmental Determinism for Indigenous Peoples in Tropical Forest Conservation' (2000) 14 
Conservation Biology 1365. 
488 JR Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 
Chapter 14. 
489 B Kingsbury, (n 487) above at 384. 
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cultural’490 development including the right to ‘freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources’.491 However, this provision has been restrictively interpreted to 
apply to populations of people within States (and colonial territories) established 
by European colonial authorities.492 This restrictive interpretation has also 
focused on the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources by post-
colonial States.493 This is as a result of the fact that international human rights law 
has its origins in the decolonisation process which was mainly predicated on 
enshrining the independence of people in areas subject to colonial domination but 
only so long as existing boundaries and borders are preserved.494 This had a 
negative impact on minorities and IPs in Africa as they have become trapped in 
pre-existing territorial units that were defined by European colonial States.495 
However, as Kingsbury argued in 1992 this narrow interpretation appears to be 
giving way to a more expansive approach that may be relevant to the articulation 
of the rights of IPs that live within such States.496 
The idea behind self-determination in the context of secession has meant that 
most States have been sensitive to it.497 Contemporarily, the concept of self-
                                            
490 See Art 1. 
491 See Art 1 (2). See also, HRC, General Comment No. 12 Article 1 (The right to self-
determination of peoples), 13 March 1984, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) at para 5. 
492 B Kingsbury, (n 487) above at 387-388. 
493 EIA Daes, 'Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination' 
(1993) 3 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 1 at 4 
494 ME Turpel, 'Indigenous People's Rights of Political Participation and Self-Determination: 
Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Struggle for Recognition' (1992) 
25 Cornell International Law Journal 579 at 580. 
495 Ibid. 
496 B Kingsbury, (n 487) above at 388. 
497 RL Barsh, 'Indigenous Peoples and the UN Commission on Human Rights: A Case of the 
Immovable Object and the Irresistible Force' (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 782 at 795 and 
CJ Iorns, 'Indigenous Peoples and Self Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty' (1992) 24 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 199 at 202-203. 
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determination goes beyond the initial narrow context of political independence or 
of groups seceding from such States to an emphasis on the need to protect and 
safeguard the rights and interests of sub-State groups within States.498 In this 
context, it has been argued that self-determination should be conceived ‘not 
simply in terms of end result, but in terms of process and political legitimation’499 
of the rights of peoples. In the context of this thesis, it is argued that the concept 
of self-determination is relevant to the protection of the land rights of Abuja 
peoples. The realisation of their land rights is in line with the principles underlying 
the right to self-determination as articulated under Article 1 (2) of the ICCPR in 
relation to the rights of peoples to social, cultural and economic development as 
well as the right to freely dispose of their resources.500  
It has also been argued that the rights of peoples under Article 27 of the ICCPR 
is connected to the right to self-determination.501 In this respect two points are 
relevant. Firstly, self-determination is herein conceived as a continuous process 
in which land rights of Abuja peoples can be located. Secondly, the right of Abuja 
peoples to self-determination would require that they be allowed to manage, 
control and occupy their ancestral lands under customary law in line with their 
                                            
498 See G Sacerdoti, 'New Developments in Group Consciousness and the International 
Protection of the Rights of Minorities' (1983) Israel Year Book of Human Rights 116; H Hannum, 
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); C Scott, 'Indigenous Self-Determination and 
Decolonization of the International Imagination: A Plea' (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 814; 
LM Graham, 'Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples after Kosovo: Translating Self-
Determination into Practice and into Peace' (1999) 6 ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 455 at 456; and I Brownlie, 'The Rights of Peoples in Modern International 
Law' (1985) 9 Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy 104. 
499 B Kingsbury, (n 487) above at 391. See also, SJ Ferrell, 'The Concepts of Self-Determination 
and Autonomy of Indigenous Peoples in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples' (2001) 14 Thomas Law Review 259 at 262. 
500 J Castellino and J Gilbert, 'Self-Determination, Indigenous Peoples and Minorities' (2003) 3 
Macquarie Law Journal 155. 
501 FL Kirgis, 'The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era' (1994) 88 The 
American Journal of International Law 304 at 307. 
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cultural rights.502 Indeed, Daes argues that the determination of whether the right 
to self-determination can validly be claimed by a group in the context suggested 
for Abuja peoples should depend on how such groups consider themselves ‘as 
distinct from the identities of other groups’.503 In Chapter Six,504 the 
distinctiveness of the various ethnic groups in Abuja viz-a-viz other ethnic groups 
in Nigeria and among themselves inter se was demonstrated. In line with this 
argument it has been submitted that IPs are certainly ‘people’ in every social and 
cultural ramification of the word.505 Following on from this approach to self-
determination American Indians and their lawyers have continuously looked to 
the principle of self-determination in advancing their rights before domestic courts 
in America.506 Similar findings have been made in the context of IPs in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand.507 
                                            
502 See A Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-determination, 
Culture and Land (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 131-196; SJ Anaya, 'A Contemporary 
Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination’ (1993)' 3 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 131 at 161-162; and M Colchester, 'Self-Determination or 
Environmental Determinism for Indigenous Peoples in Tropical Forest Conservation' (2000) 14 
Conservation Biology 1365. 
503 EIA Daes, (n 493) above at 5. See also, J Corntassel, 'Toward Sustainable Self-
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504 See sub-section 6.2.5. 
505 EIA Daes, (n 493) above at 6. 
506 CG Berkey, 'International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination for 
Indigenous Peoples' (1992) 5 Harvard Human Rights Journal 65 at 73. For critical analyses 
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America see, RA Williams Jr, 'Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial 
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and Policy, 2006). See also, JE Brady, 'The Huaorani Tribe of Ecuador: A Study in Self-
Determination for Indigenous Peoples' (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 291; and W 
Sanders, Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian Government: Rethinking Self-
Determination as Indigenous Affairs Policy: Discussion Paper No 230 (Centre for Aboriginal 
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The emergence of self-determination as a distinct right for IPs is crystallised by 
the provision for such right under UNDRIP,508 leading to the argument that this is 
a new dawn in the evolution of the concept under international law.509 In so doing, 
UNDRIP takes into account the importance of recognising the culture and identity 
of IPs in the law, policies and practices of States.510 Indeed, Thornberry argues 
that self-determination and the rights of groups such as IPs ‘are two sides of the 
same coin.’511 In the context of addressing historical injustices against IPs, 
Corntassel and Holder conclude that the recognition of their rights to self-
determination should be the first step by States in addressing such injustices.512 
In the context of Nigeria, the concept of self-determination has been used in 
articulating the rights of the Ogonis.513 However, there are others who are not so 
optimistic of the concept of self-determination in the context of the rights of IPs 
                                            
Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of Guam and Hawai'i' (1996) 18 University of Hawaii Law 
Review 623. 
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509 DB Suagee, 'Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples at the Dawn of the Solar Age' (1991) 
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Rights Review 465. 
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choosing to argue that the concept has lost its relevance and is fast disappearing 
as a relevant principle of international law.514 
Conclusion  
As highlighted in sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 above, the provisions of section 297 
(2) of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999 and section 1 (3) of the FCT Act constitute 
de jure violations of Nigeria’s human rights obligations under the provisions of the 
relevant international human rights instrument in relation to the IPs of Abuja. And 
on the authority of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,515 
Nigeria cannot rely on the provisions of its domestic laws to violate its international 
human rights treaty obligations. One possible solution to the problem is to amend 
the laws to accommodate the customary land rights of Abuja peoples. A second 
solution is for the Federal Government to resettle them and pay adequate 
compensation to them in compliance with international human rights law. A third 
possibility is that whenever this issue comes up for determination before the 
Courts of law in Nigeria, the Nigerian judiciary will be liberal minded enough to 
interpret the relevant provisions of the Nigerian Constitution and the FCT Act in 
line with Nigeria’s human rights obligation under the relevant international 
instruments examined in this Chapter. It will be demonstrated in Chapter Nine 
that recent trends in the Commonwealth suggest that domestic courts can look to 
international law to interpret the provisions of their national constitutions. 
However, at national levels land rights of IPs are often claimed and articulated 
based on customary laws, which have their foundations in the cultures and 
identities of IPs which most of the international and regional instruments 
examined above aim to preserve as a matter of cultural rights. For example, in 
                                            
514 See TH Primeau and J Corntassel, 'Indigenous" Sovereignty" and International Law: Revised 
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principle, Article 14 (1) ILO 169 makes provision for a protective approach based 
on the manner of land use, ownership and occupation in accordance with 
traditional or customary forms of use, ownership and occupation. Indeed, Article 
26 (2) of UNDRIP appears to follow a similar approach by providing for the ‘right 
to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that 
indigenous peoples possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use’.516  
However, neither ILO 169 nor UNDRIP prioritises IPs’ customary or traditional 
laws over national law, or regional and international law over national law in 
articulating IPs’ land rights domestically at national levels.517 While it appears that 
the provisions of ILO 169 require that the national laws of a State should be the 
instrument through which these rights should be protected,518 it ‘does not 
dissociate international standards (or indeed indigenous customs and laws) from 
national practice.’519 Also while Article 26 (3) of UNDRIP recognises that 
‘customs, traditions and land tenure systems’ should be the basis of IPs’ land 
rights, such protection of IPs’ land rights as provided under Article 26 (2) of 
UNDRIP seems to rely upon State law rather than international law.520  Article 21 
of the African Charter which provides for the right to freely dispose of wealth and 
resources is completely silent on customary law and its relevance to the land 
rights of IPs at national levels. The only clear direction that enjoins States to give 
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priority to customary laws of IPs are the guidelines issued by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO).521 
All the international instruments examined in this Chapter, the activities of the 
human rights treaty Monitoring Bodies in relation to State compliance with their 
human rights treaty obligations as well as the decisions of the African Commission 
place a lot of emphasis on implementation of States’ human rights obligations in 
their domestic laws. This raises interesting academic issues about the general 
relationship between national and international law, but more specifically this 
raises interesting questions about the simultaneous coexistence and inter-face 
between international human rights law and national law. Therefore, in the 
following Chapter Eight there will be analyses of the relationship between 
international law and the Nigerian legal system and in Chapter Nine, the 
relationship between international and national law in post-colonial Nigeria and 
Kenya will be comparatively examined.
                                            
521 See Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Committee on World Food Security(CFS) 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security (FAO & CFS, 2012) at para 8.2, where it is 
recommended that: ‘Where States own or control land … the legitimate tenure rights of 
individuals and communities, including where applicable those with customary tenure systems, 
should be recognized, respected and protected, consistent with existing obligations under 
national and international law, and with due regard to … regional and international instruments. 
To this end, categories of legitimate tenure rights should be clearly defined and publicized, 
through a transparent process, and in accordance with national law.’ See also, RS Knight, 
Statutory Recognition of Customary Land Rights in Africa: An Investigation into Best Practices 
for Law making and Implementation – Legislative Study 105 (FAO, 2010) at 243-286. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA: THE CASE OF 
NIGERIA 
Introduction 
In Chapter Six, it was argued and demonstrated that Abuja peoples are 
indigenous peoples (IPs) as well as minorities under international law. In the 
preceding Chapter Seven, it was demonstrated that as IPs under international 
law, Abuja peoples’ land rights are protected as such under international law and 
that the provisions of section 1 (3) of the Nigerian Federal Capital Territory Act, 
1976 (FCT Act) and section 297 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999 (Nigerian Constitution) constitute de jure violations of international 
human rights law in relation to the land rights of Abuja peoples. The aim of this 
Chapter is to examine the interaction of international and national law in Nigeria. 
This is because the case study of Abuja demonstrates the need for a viable 
relationship between international and national law in Nigeria for Nigeria to be 
following its international human rights law obligations as a Member of the United 
Nations (UN), the Commonwealth and the African Union (AU). 
As demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven, international law has various 
sources which include: treaties, customary rules of international law and general 
principles of international law recognised by civilised States.1 Other sources 
include ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’2 However, the 
enforcement and application of international law within the domestic jurisdictions 
of States can be fraught with difficulties given the fact that States are sovereign 
and may tend to put their self-interest ahead of those of the international 
                                            
1 See Art 38 (1) (a), (b) and (c) Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
2 Ibid, Art 38 (1) (d). 
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community.3 In the early development of international law, treaties operated 
mainly at the international level and did not require States to give their provisions 
effect domestically.4 However, contemporary international law protects and 
promotes human rights by demanding that States should respect and protect their 
international human rights obligations within their domestic jurisdictions.5 As the 
manner in which States implement their international obligations domestically is 
not often specified in most if not all international instruments, how States 
implement the provisions of treaties ratified by them is for them to define.6 
Inevitably, the approaches adopted by different States as to how treaties may be 
enforced and applied varies from one State to another.7 There is now a 
comprehensive body of literature on the subject about the role of domestic courts 
in the enforcement of international law.8  
                                            
3 EA Oji, 'Application of Customary International Law in Nigerian Courts' (2011) 1 Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS) Law and Development Journal 151. 
4 G van Ert, 'Canada' in D Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A 
Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 169. 
5 Ibid. This is achieved through the periodic monitoring mechanisms of the UN Human rights 
Treaty Monitoring Bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committed on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR). There are also regional bodies such as the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHPR) 
and the European Commission (EC). 
6 LL Chmura, ‘International Law in Domestic Legal Orders: A Comparative Perspective’ (1997) 
Proceedings of American Society of International Law 289; E Benvenisti, 'Judicial Misgivings 
Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts' 
(1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 159; and A Roberts, 'Comparative International 
Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law' (2011) 60 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 57. 
7 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
8 See M Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997); HH 
Koh, 'How is International Human Rights Law Enforced' (1998) 74 Indiana Law Journal 1397; 
HH Koh, 'International Law as Part of our Law' (2004) 98 The American Journal of International 
Law 43; and R Bahdi, 'Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of 
International Law in Domestic Courts' (2002) 34 George Washington International Law Review 
555. 
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To achieve the main objective of this Chapter, the following second central and 
sub-research questions are posed. The second central research question in this 
thesis is: What is the nature of the relationship between international and national 
law in post-colonial Africa? The sub-research questions are: 1) What are the 
differences in approach and how does this impact on the domestic application of 
international law? 2) What is the nature of the relationship between international 
and national law in post-colonial Nigeria? To answer these second central and 
sub-research questions, following this introduction, section 8.1 will briefly 
demonstrate the general attitude to international law by Anglophone African 
States on the one hand, and Francophone African States on the other. This is 
important because such comparative analyses will provide the reader with the 
background knowledge and information to the examination of the relationship 
between international and national law in Nigeria as well as the comparative study 
of Nigeria and Kenya in the following Chapter Nine.  
There will also be a few examples from other jurisdictions in Africa that do not fall 
within these two broad categories. This Chapter has been sub-divided into three 
main sections. Section 8.1 is aimed at answering the research questions: What 
is the nature of the relationship between international and national law in post-
colonial Africa? What are the differences in approach and how does this impact 
on the domestic application of international law in those States? Section 8.2 is 
aimed at answering the research question: What is the nature of the relationship 
between international and national law in post-colonial Nigeria?   In the final 
section 8.3, the judicial application of international law by the domestic laws of 
Nigeria will be critically examined. 
8.1. International and National Law in Post-Colonial Africa 
The main objective of this section is to answer the research question: What is the 
nature of the relationship between international and national law in post-colonial 
Africa? At an African level, international treaties, general principles of international 
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law as well as other international regimes made up of multilateral treaties 
constitute a growing part of the international regime which post-colonial African 
States have to engage with in the process of governance.9 Although the process 
of governance in post-colonial Africa operates mostly on the basis of national and 
sub-national laws and domestic institutions, there is a growing need for a viable 
relationship between national governance and institutions on the one hand, and 
international governance as well as international law on the other hand.10 It is the 
need for such viable relationship that has necessitated the adoption of national 
constitutions by some African States expressly incorporating international law into 
to them  with the objective of enhancing linkages between international law and 
national legal systems.11  
Historically some pre-colonial African States developed their parameters for 
engaging and relating with international law through customs,12 but most post-
colonial African States have chosen to do this through their national 
constitutions.13 Indeed, it is somewhat inevitable for national constitutions to 
enhance a viable relationship between national and international law as 
globalisation and the increasing interconnectedness of the global society have 
made this necessary.14 Therefore, it has become imperative for the national 
constitutions of post-colonial African States to determine whether and how 
                                            
9 TM Franck and AK Thiruvengadam, 'International Law and Constitution-Making' (2003) 2 
Chinese Journal of International Law 467 at 516. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 TO Elias and R Akinjide, Africa and the Development of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1988). 
13 TM Franck and AK Thiruvengadam, (n 9) above at 516. 
14 Ibid. 
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international treaties should be entered into by State governments, as well as how 
they should be transposed and applied in relation to domestic law. 
Questions have arisen as to whether international treaties should automatically 
become part of domestic law when they have been signed and ratified by post-
colonial African States. Should international treaties have precedence over 
national laws in domestic settings? What is the role and legal status of general 
principles of international law in the form of customary rules of international or ius 
cogens in domestic law?15 In the context of international human rights law, the 
general attitude of post-colonial African states is to implement international 
human rights law into their national constitutions as a way of encouraging the 
convergence of their constitutions with international human right instruments.16 
Indeed, it has been argued that research into ‘comparative constitutionalism today 
intersects with the study of international human rights law.’17 
At a general level, there are two main approaches that have been used to explain 
the relationship between international and national law in the existing body of 
literature on the subject. These approaches are dualism and monism.18 According 
to dualism, international law and national law are different systems of legal norms 
independent of each other in their validity.19 Dualists maintain that the two forms 
of law (international and national) are simultaneously valid and so it is possible to 
                                            
15 See T Maluwa, International Law in Post-Colonial Africa (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999). 
16 Ibid. See also, RMM Wallace and O Martin-Ortega, International Law (6th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009). 
17 G Dannemann, 'Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?' in M Reimann and R 
Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
at 1233. 
18 See T Maluwa, (n 15) above at 34; RMM Wallace and O Martin-Ortega (n 16) above at 37-39 
and R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, 
1994). 
19 RMM Wallace and O Martin-Ortega, (n 16) above at 37. 
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explain their validity from the distinct perspective of both international and national 
law and not from the perspective of either alone or in any hierarchical way.20 For 
international law to be applicable and enforceable in dualist States, it needs to be 
domesticated into national law by passing legislation through Parliament. The 
doctrine of recognition which is the cornerstone of dualism was espoused in the 
English case of Commercial Estates Co of Egypt v Board of Trade,21 where 
Justice Atkin stated that ‘[i]nternational law as such can offer no right cognisable 
in the municipal courts. It is only in so far as the rules of international law are 
recognised as included in the rules of municipal law that they are allowed 
in municipal courts to give rise to rights and obligations.’22  
On the contrary, monism maintains that international law and national law form a 
unity and that this unity23 could be achieved in two ways: firstly, by conceiving of 
international law as superior to national law, with the implication that the validity 
of the latter is dependent on the former; alternatively, national law could be 
conceived of as superior to international law, the validity of which is dependent 
on national law.24 Thus, while in one scenario we have the primacy of international 
law; in the other we have the primacy of national law.25 
                                            
20 H Kelsen, 'Sovereignty and International Law' (1959) 48 Georgia Law Journal 627 at 629. See 
also, BL Paulson; F Morgenstern, 'Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law' 
(1950) 27 British Year Book of International Law 42 and SL Paulson and BL Paulson, (eds) 
Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (Clarendon Press, 1998) at 
541. 
21 Commercial Estates Co of Egypt v Board of Trade [1925] 1 KB 271. 
22 Ibid, at 295. The emphasis is added. See also, Higgs & Anor v Minister of National Security & 
Ors [2000] AC 228 (PC) and Attorney General of Canada v Attorney General of Ontario [1937] 
UKPC 6, [1937] AC 326. 
23 H Kelsen, General Theory of Law & State (Transaction, 2005) at 351. 
24 Ibid. 
25 H Kelsen, (n 20) above at 629. 
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The practical implications of the two conventional approaches to explaining the 
relationship between international and national law discussed above becomes 
evident in the way different States approach the application or otherwise of 
international law within their domestic jurisdictions. The approaches between 
common law and civil law jurisdictions vary, in that while the former take the 
dualist approach26 the latter appear to prefer the monistic approach.27 With a few 
exceptions, the attitude of some post-colonial African States appears to have 
followed the traditions of their former colonial Governments.28 Francophone 
African countries have followed the attitude of the French in directly incorporating 
international law into their national constitutions.29  
For example, the Constitution of Algeria 1989;30 the Constitution of the Republic 
of Benin 1990;31 the Constitution of Burkina Faso 1991;32 the Constitution of the 
Central African Republic 2013;33 the Constitution of Chad 1996;34 the Constitution 
of Congo 2001;35 the Constitution of Cote d’ Ivoire 1960;36 the Constitution of the 
                                            
26 For example, the United Kingdom and most post-colonial common law States like Nigeria. 
27 For example, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. 
28 TM Franck and AK Thiruvengadam, (n 9) above at 516. 
29 The constitutional provision of the various States discussed below are as provided by 
Constitute and they are available for verification and for updated versions at: 
<www.constituteproject.org/>, accessed 15/12/2015. 
30 Art 132. (As reinstated in 1996 and revised in 2008). 
31 Art 147. 
32 Art 151. (As revised in 2012). 
33 Art 97. 
34 Art 221. (As revised in 2005). 
35 Art 184. 
36 Art 56. As amended in 2000. 
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Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) 2005;37 the Constitution of Djibouti 
1992;38 the Constitution of Guinea 2010;39 the Constitution of Mali 1992;40 the 
Constitution of Mauritania 1991;41 the Constitution of Niger 2010;42 and the 
Constitution of Senegal 200943 among others have near verbatim reproductions 
of the French Constitution 195844 which provides that ‘[t]reaties or agreements 
duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, 
subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other 
party.’45 
Indeed, the Constitution of Cape Verde 199246 goes even further to incorporate 
‘judicial acts emanating from competent offices of supranational organizations to 
which Cape Verde belongs’ as well as general ‘rules and principles of 
international law, validly approved and ratified internationally and nationally, and 
in force.’47 Other non-Francophone African countries that have adopted a similar 
positive attitude towards international law within their domestic constitutions 
                                            
37 Art 215. 
38 Art 70. (As amended in 2010). 
39 Art 151. 
40 Art 116. 
41 Art 80. 
42 Art 171. 
43 Art 98. 
44 As revised in 2008. 
45 Art 55. 
46 As amended in 1999. 
47 Art 11 (3) (4). 
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include: Ethiopia,48 Malawi,49 Namibia,50 and South Africa.51 Indeed, the three 
constitutions of Malawi52, Namibia53 and South Africa54 incorporate both 
customary international law and treaties as part of their national laws. In addition, 
the Constitutions of Malawi55 and South Africa56 contain interpretation clauses 
that empower the domestic courts to have regard to international law in 
interpreting the provisions of those constitutions. 
However, by contrast to the positive attitude of the afore-mentioned African States 
to international law, it appears most of the former British colonies have not 
adopted such similar positive incorporation of international law in terms of treaty 
law and customary rules of international law into their constitutions. For example, 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 provides that ‘[a]n international treaty which 
has been concluded or executed by the President or under the President's 
authority … does not bind Zimbabwe until it has been approved by Parliament; 
and … does not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated 
into the law through an Act of Parliament.’57 Paradoxically, like the constitutions 
                                            
48 See Art 9 (4) of the Constitution of Ethiopia 1994 which provides that ‘[A]ll international 
agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land.’ 
49 See section 211 of the Constitution of Malawi 1994 (as revised in 1999). 
50 See Art 144 of the Namibian Constitution 1990 (as revised in 2010). 
51 See section 231-133 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (as revised in 
2012). 
52 See section 211 (3). 
53 Section 144. 
54 See section 232.  
55 Art 11 (2) (c) Malawian Constitution (supra). 
56 See section 39 (1) (c) and 233.  
57 Section 327 (2). 
International and National Law in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Nigeria 
 
313 
 
of Malawi,58 Namibia59 and South Africa,60 the Constitution of Zimbabwe  2013 
provides that ‘[c]ustomary international law is part of the law of Zimbabwe’61 and 
the courts are enjoined to give effect to customary rules of international law when 
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.62 Ghana’s Constitution 199263 
merely provides that in its relationship with other States, the Government of 
Ghana shall ‘promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the 
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.’64  
It has been argued that as a general proposition (with a few exceptions) State 
practice among Anglophone African States has been the avoidance of 
incorporating international law into their constitutions, whereas the opposite is the 
case for most Francophone African States.65  Anglophone Africa appears to 
reproduce the position of English law that customary international law is part of 
English law when there is no conflict with domestic law, but treaties have to be 
incorporated. 
It would appear then that, while courts in most civil law countries, as in the case 
of Francophone African States may quite easily apply international law when 
interpreting the provisions of their constitutions or in deciding cases, in the case 
of courts in most Anglophone African States, they have less constitutional 
authorisation to have recourse to international law in interpreting the constitutions 
                                            
58 See Art 211 (3) of the Malawian Constitution (supra). 
59 Art 144 of the Namibian Constitution (supra). 
60 Section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (supra). 
61 See section 326 (1). 
62 Section 326 (2). 
63 As revised in 1996. 
64 Art 40 (c).  
65 For detailed analyses of constitutional incorporation of international amongst African States, 
see T Maluwa, (n 15) above at 40-48. 
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of such States and in deciding cases. However, in an Anglophone State like 
Zimbabwe, where the courts are empowered constitutionally (or by other laws) to 
give effect to customary rules of international law when interpreting the provisions 
of its constitution, the difference between it and a civil law country becomes 
blurred.66 Therefore, the constitutional and legal attitude of a State to international 
law would impact upon the enforceability or otherwise of international human 
rights law before the courts of that particular State as demonstrated further below. 
Inevitably, the attitude of national courts towards the application of international 
human rights law in the domestic jurisdictions of States depends on whether a 
State follows a common law or civil law approach as well as on the specific 
provisions in the constitution and laws of that State.67 A general analysis of the 
judicial decisions in this regard in both civil and common law countries is beyond 
the scope of this thesis as some of the analysis have already been done.68 
However, it should be noted that the incorporation of international human rights 
norms into the constitutional order of States as a means of checking and 
controlling State power has been increasingly practiced all over the world.69 This 
                                            
66 See generally, CM Vázquez, 'Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the 
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties' (2008) Harvard Law Review 599. 
67 There is an exception in the European Union, where the Member States are required to give 
effect to the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedom, adopted in Rome on 04 November 1950. For failure to do this a State 
may be liable in an action before the European Court of Human Rights. 
68 T Maluwa, (n 15) above at 36-39; R Higgins, (n 18) above at 205-218; A Nollkaemper, ‘The 
Effects of Treaties in Domestic Law’ in CJ Tams, A Tzanakopoulos and A Zimmerman (eds), 
Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) at 143–150; and 
TA Doherty, 'The Application of Human Rights Treaties in the Development of Domestic and 
International Law: A Personal Perspective' (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 753; J 
Quigley, 'Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights' (2005) 29 
Fordham International Law Journal 552. For how some national African courts have used 
international law in deciding human rights cases, see ME Adjami, 'African Courts, International 
Law, and Comparative Case Law: Chimera on Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence' (2002) 
24 Michigan Journal of International Law 103. 
69 AW Munene, 'The Bill of Rights and Constitutional Order: A Kenyan Perspective,’ (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 135. 
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Chapter will henceforth focus on the legal situation in Nigeria. As the case study 
in this thesis is Nigeria, it is important to examine the relationship between 
Nigeria’s State law and international law as a foundation upon which subsequent 
comparative analyses will be made with the situation in Kenya later in Chapter 
Nine below.  
8.2. Nigerian State Law and International Law 
The main purpose in this section is to answer the research question: What is the 
nature of the relationship between international and national law in post-colonial 
Nigeria? Nigeria and Africa in general engaged with international law prior to 
British colonial rule but they lost their sovereignty to European powers because 
of colonialism and consequently the loss of capacity to participate in the 
development of international law.70 However, prior to the colonial encounter, 
Nigeria like most pre-colonial African States did engage with international law in 
various ways.71 
Therefore, although some writers claim that the development of the Nigerian legal 
system is associated with the commencement of British colonial rule in Nigeria,72 
this claim has been rightly challenged by much legal scholarship as incorrect.73 
At the point of political independence of Nigeria in 1960 it acquired its treaty 
making powers as a State, and at a general level, Nigeria appears not have 
                                            
70 See TO Elias and R Akinjide, (n 12) at 22; NL Bruce-Wallace, 'Africa and International Law—
the Emergence to Statehood' (1985) 23 The Journal of Modern African Studies 575 at 578; OC 
Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of 
Legitimate Statehood in Africa' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 503; and JJG 
Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International Law 
(Springer Science & Business Media, 2013). 
71 TO Elias and R Akinjide, (n 12) above at 15. 
72 See for example, O Adewoye, The Legal Profession in Nigeria, 1865-1962 (Longman, 1977). 
73 See CN Okeke, The Theory and Practice of International Law in Nigeria (Fourth Dimension, 
1986) at 15-21. 
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jettisoned the rules of international law.74 Neither did it accept to be bound by all 
international treaties entered into by the predecessor colonial Government.75 
However it has been argued that the generality of ‘[n]ew States, above all African, 
all of them developing, act continually and untiringly to strengthen these positive 
tendencies of change in world politics and international law.’76 In a communication 
to the United Nations (UN) Nigeria stated that ‘[a]ll obligations and responsibilities 
of the Government of the United Kingdom which arise from any valid international 
instruments shall henceforth insofar as such instruments may be held to have 
application to Nigeria, be assumed by the Government of the Federation’.77 The 
post-colonial relationship between Nigeria’s national laws and international law 
began with making provision for human rights in its Independence Constitution 
1960 of international human rights norms articulated under the UN Charter,78 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),79 1948 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)80 and since 
then all subsequent Nigerian constitutions made provision for those rights.81  
Nigeria is also currently a Party to most international and regional human rights 
                                            
74 H Fox, 'The Settlement of Disputes by Peaceful Means and the Observance of International 
Law—African Attitudes' (1969) 3 International Relations 389. 
75 CN Okeke, 'International Law in the Nigerian Legal System' (1996) 27 California Western 
International Law Journal 311 at 331. 
76 M Mushkat, 'Some Remarks on the Factors Influencing the Emergence and Evolution of 
International Law' (1961) 8 Netherlands International Law Review 341at 345. 
77 See 384 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) (1961) at 207-210. 
78 The Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, and came into 
force on 24 October 1945. 
79 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) on 10 December 1948 at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. 
80 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (supra). It is the first 
instrument that gave effect to the rights articulated under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights by making them legally binding. 
81 TM Franck and AK Thiruvengadam, (n 9) above at 501-505 and CN Okeke, (n 73) above at 
328-337. 
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treaties.82 Most of the rights provided under the UDHR have been applied with 
some modifications under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1999 (Nigerian Constitution).83 Nigeria has also enacted national 
legislation which is a verbatim reproduction of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (African Charter)84 making it directly enforceable before Nigerian 
Courts of law.85 In Gbemre v Shell,86 it was held that the applicant’s right to life 
and dignity of human person was violated as a result of gas flaring in the Niger 
                                            
82 Some these are: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966; The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966, adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966; and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights, 1981 adopted in Nairobi on 27 June 1981, entered into force October 21, 1986 
among other regional and international human rights instruments. See, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-nigeria.html, accessed 10 November 2016. 
83 See sections 33-46 of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. 
84 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act No 2 
Cap A. 9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Available at: 
http://lawnigeria.com/LawsoftheFederation/AFRICAN-CHARTER-ON-HUMAN-AND-PEOPLES-
RIGHTS.html, accessed 10 November, 2016. 
85 For general analyses of the impact of the African Charter on human rights litigation in Nigeria 
and Africa, see EO Ekhator, 'The Impact of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on Domestic Law: A Case Study of Nigeria' (2015) 41 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 253; F 
Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford University Press, 2012); F Viljoen, 
'Application of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights by Domestic Courts in 
Africa’,(1999) 43' 1 Journal of African Law 12; MW Mutua, 'The Banjul Charter and the African 
Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties' (1995) 35 Vermont Journal of 
International Law 339; D Olowu, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, its 
Regional System, and the Role of Civil Society in the First Three Decades: Calibrating The 
"Paper Tiger"' (2013) 34 Obiter 29; and M Evans and R Murray, The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice 1986–2006 (Cambridge University Press, 2008). In 
addition, para 3 (b) of the Nigerian Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 
states that: ‘For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the applicant’s 
rights and freedoms, the Court shall respect municipal, regional and international bills of 
rights cited to it or brought to its attention or of which the Court is aware, whether these 
bills constitute instruments in themselves or form parts of larger documents like 
constitutions. Such bills include: (i) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
other instruments (including protocols) in the African regional human rights system, (ii) The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments (including protocols) in the United 
Nations human rights system’. The emphasis is added. 
86 Gbemre v Shell. Suit No FHC/B/CS/153/05. 
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Delta region of Nigeria by the Respondent contrary to the provisions of the African 
Charter. 
Presently, the Nigerian Constitution87 provides that: 
(1) No treaty between the Federation and any other country 
shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any 
such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly. 
(2) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any 
part thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive 
Legislative List for the purpose of implementing a treaty.  
(3) A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the 
provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall not be presented to 
the President for assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is 
ratified by a majority of all the Houses of Assembly in the 
Federation.88  
Based on a literal interpretation of Section 12 (1) above, it appears all bilateral 
treaties concluded between Nigeria and ‘any other country’ shall not have the 
force of law in Nigeria unless there is an Act of the Nigerian Parliament enabling 
their implementation in accordance with Section 12 (1) above. The constitution is 
silent on the legal status of multilateral treaties signed between Nigeria and other 
‘countries’.  
For the Federal Parliament of Nigeria to be able to legislate on any bilateral treaty 
which contains matters within the concurrent legislative competences of the 
Nigerian Federal Parliament and the Parliaments of the other 36 States that make 
up the Nigerian federation, Section 12 (3) above requires ratification by a majority 
                                            
87 As amended. Available at: 
<www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/Constitution.html>, accessed 3 
November 2016. 
88 Section 12 (1), (2) and (3). The emphasis is added. For critical analysis of this section of the 
Nigerian Constitution, see AO Enabulele, 'Implementation of Treaties in Nigeria and the Status 
Question: Whither Nigerian Courts' (2009) 17 African Journal International & Comparative Law 
326. 
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of the 36 different legislative houses. It is argued that this requirement is 
unnecessarily burdensome and difficult. In addition to the already lengthy 
processes of enacting legislation at the Federal Parliament, such requirements 
would lead to long delays in the implementation of treaties that have been already 
signed and ratified by the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
In another non-justiciable part of the Nigerian Constitution,89 it provides that ‘[t]he 
foreign policy objectives shall be … respect for international law and treaty 
obligations’.90 However, these foreign policy guidelines ‘do not reflect a binding 
commitment to international law on the part of the state.’91  Indeed, the non-
justiciability of Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution implies that the provisions 
thereunder are not enforceable by Nigerian Courts.  
The above constitutional provisions demonstrate that although Nigeria claims to 
have a positive disposition towards international law, an international treaty 
concluded between Nigeria and ‘any other country’ (bilateral treaty) requires 
further domestic legislation to give it the effect of law in Nigeria. Although the 
above provisions of the Nigerian Constitution are clear in relation to bilateral 
treaties, it will be demonstrated later in section 8.3 below that the way the Nigerian 
courts have interpreted section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution in relation to multi-
lateral treaties creates ambiguity on the constitutional basis for the application of 
international law in Nigeria. 
                                            
89 Chapter II: Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. 
90 Section 20 (d). In the case of Odafe and Ors v Attorney General of the Federation [2004] 
AHRLR 205 at 211, it was held the right of prisoners to medical care were not non-justiciable 
and unenforceable. However, a contrary decision was reached in the case of Mrs Georgina 
Ahamefule v Imperial medical Centre and Dr Alex Molokwo. Suit No IBID1627/2000. 
91 CN Okeke, 'The Use of International Law in the Domestic Courts of Ghana and Nigeria,' 
(2015) 32 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 371 at 405. 
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On the relationship between the Nigerian Constitution and other laws, like the 
previous constitutions of Nigeria since political independence the Nigerian 
Constitution proclaims itself as the ‘grundnorm’ of the land92 when it provides that:  
This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding 
force on the authorities and persons throughout the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria …  If any other law is inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, 
and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
void.93 
The supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution over other laws has been affirmed by 
the Nigerian Court of Appeal (CA) in the case of Musa v Hamza94 where the CA 
stated that:  
It [the Constitution] is a document containing the fons et origo (i.e. 
the source and origin) of the laws and rights of its people. It is in a 
sense what in Kelsenian terminology may be regarded as the 
Grundnorm of the State. The Constitution is therefore aptly 
described as the supreme law of the land. This is because it is 
a law, which does not depend upon any other for its validity.95 
By holding that the Nigerian Constitution ‘is a law, which does not depend upon 
any other for its validity’, the Nigerian CA appears then to suggest that even if any 
provision(s) of the Nigerian Constitution conflicts with any international treaty 
which Nigeria has signed and ratified, the provisions of the Constitution shall 
prevail. There is no known case as at the time of writing where the validity of any 
                                            
92 See H Kelsen, General Theory of Law & State (Transaction, 2005); U Bindreiter, Why 
Grundnorm? A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen's Doctrine (Lund University, 2000); T 
Hopton, 'Grundnorm and Constitution: The Legitimacy of Politics' (1978) 24 McGill Law Journal 
72; A Ojo, 'The Search for a Grundnorm in Nigeria—the Lakanmi Case' (1971) 20 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly 117; and J Rachuonyo, 'Kelsen's Grundnorm in Modern 
Constitution-Making: The Kenya Case' (1987) Verfassung und Recht in Übersee/Law and 
Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 416. 
93 Section 1 (1) and (3). The emphasis is added. 
94 Musa v Hamza [1982] 2 NCLR 229. 
95 Ibid, at 250. The emphasis is added. 
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provision(s) of the Nigerian Constitution has or have been challenged on the 
grounds of conflicting with Nigeria’s obligations under international treaties to 
which it is a Party. The above decision by the Nigerian CA is reaffirmed by the 
decisions of the Nigerian Supreme Court (SC) in the cases of Adigun v Attorney-
General of Oyo State,96 Attorney-General of Bendel State v Attorney-General of 
the Federation & Ors,97 Nafiu Rabiu v Kano State,98 and Obaba v Military 
Governor of Kwara State.99 
While the Nigerian Constitution is express on the legal status of bilateral treaties 
in Nigeria, it is silent on the application of customary rules of international law as 
well as general principles of international law in Nigeria.100 Christian Okeke 
argues that Nigeria recognises customary rules of international law as binding 
upon it.101 However, he maintains that Nigeria regards most customary rules of 
international law as Euro-centric and since it did not participate in the formation 
of some rules of customary international law, when such rules are not in its 
national interest they are often rejected.102  
                                            
96 Adigun v Attorney-General of Oyo State [1987] 4 SC 272 at 344. 
97Attorney-General of Bendel State v Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors 1 [1983] All 
N.L.R 208. 
98Nafiu Rabiu v Kano State [1980] LPELR-SC.49/1980. 
99 Obaba v Millitary Governor of Kwara State (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt.336) 26. 
100 See Art 38 (1) (b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, is attached to 
the United Nations Charter, as specified by Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter, signed at 
San Francisco June 26, 1945. 
101 CN Okeke, (n 75) above at 314-315. 
102 Ibid. See also, H Bokor-Szegö, New States and International Law (Akadémiai Kiadó, 1970); 
RP Anand, 'Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law' 
(1966) 15 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55; and SP Sinha, 'Perspective of the 
Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law' (1965) 14 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 121. 
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If the above perspective about customary international law is widely followed by 
post-colonial African States, it would imply that no post-colonial African State 
would accept customary international law as binding upon them. Azoro contends 
that the applicability of customary rules of international law in Nigeria remains 
unclear and uncertain.103 Others have argued that the applicability of customary 
rules of international law in the domestic jurisdictions of African States should be 
determined by the willingness and consent of such post-colonial African States.104 
As for general principles of international law, the Nigerian Constitution105 is also 
silent in this respect.  
Although section 19 of the Nigerian Constitution suggests that the foreign policy 
objectives of Nigeria shall be the observance of international law, that section is 
not justiciable and do not represent a legally binding commitment by Nigeria 
towards international law. However, the inclusion of some of the rights provided 
under UDHR into Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution and the domestication 
of the African Charter suggest that Nigeria is willing to abide by international 
human rights norms. Therefore, on the basis of section 12 of the Nigerian 
Constitution no international treaty signed and ratified by Nigeria can have the 
force of law in Nigeria unless such has been domesticated.  
The position of general principles and customary international law in the Nigerian 
legal system is less clear. It seems they are applicable in Nigeria on the basis of 
the fact that Nigerian courts often make references to the decisions of English 
                                            
103 C Azoro, 'The Place of Customary International Law in the Nigerian Legal System–A 
Jurisprudential Perspective' (2014) 1 International Journal of Research 74. 
104 See MW Janis and Y Makonnen, International Law and the New States of Africa (JSTOR, 
1985); EC Djamson, The Dynamics of Euro-African Co-operation: Being an Analysis and 
Exposition of Institutional, Legal and Socio-economic Aspects of Association/Co-operation with 
the European Economic Community (Springer, 2012); and RP Anand, 'Attitude of the Asian-
African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law' (1966) 15 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 55. 
105 Supra. 
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Courts, decisions of other courts in common law jurisdictions as well as the 
decisions of the US Supreme Court in deciding matters coming before them, 
where there is a lacuna on the subject under Nigerian law as demonstrated in 
section 8.3 below.  
8.3. Judicial Application of International Law in Nigeria 
The Nigerian Courts have decided a few cases relating to the applicability of 
international treaties in Nigeria and most but not all of them relate to the African 
Charter and its legal status in Nigeria.106 The relationship between international 
treaties and national law in Nigeria as well as their legal status in Nigeria, were at 
issue in the Nigerian locus classicus case of Abacha and Ors v Fawehinmi.107 In 
that case, the Supreme Court (SC) of Nigeria was presented with the question of 
when an international human rights treaty (the African Charter) becomes binding 
law in Nigeria. In arriving at its decision, the SC while citing with approval an 
earlier English case stated per Michael Ekundayo Ogundare Justice of the 
Supreme Court (JSC) that: 
No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have 
the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has 
been enacted into law by the National Assembly…See the recent 
decision of the Privy Council in Higgs & Anor. V. Minister of National 
Security & Ors…where it was held that - "In the law of England 
and the Bahamas ... Treaties formed no part of domestic law 
unless enacted by the legislature…" In my respectful view, I think 
the above passage represents the correct position of the law, not 
only in England but in Nigeria as well.108 
It is argued that although the decision of the Nigerian SC in the above case stated 
the correct position of the law in relation to bilateral treaties, in that case it was 
                                            
106 C Nwapi, 'International Treaties in Nigerian and Canadian Courts' (2011) 19 African Journal 
of International & Comparative Law 38 at 38. 
107 Abacha and Ors v Fawehinmi [2000] LPELR-14 (SC). 
108 Per Ogundare, JSC at 30-31, paras C-F. The emphasis is added. 
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the African Charter - a multilateral treaty - which was at issue.109 It is therefore a 
misinterpretation of Section 12 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution for the Nigerian SC 
to have held that the provisions of the African Charter were enforceable in Nigeria 
only on the ground that it has been domesticated through an Act of Nigeria’s 
Parliament. This error of misinterpretation also led the Nigerian SC to decide 
erroneously in The Registered Trustees of National Association of Community 
Health Practitioners of Nigeria and Ors v Medical and Health Workers Union of 
Nigeria and Ors.110 The SC was here presented with the issue of deciding on the 
condition for the application of an international treaty or convention in Nigeria. It 
stated that: 
By virtue of section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution, no treaty 
between the Federation and any country has the force of law except 
to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by 
the National Assembly. Thus, an international treaty entered into by 
the government of Nigeria does not become binding until enacted 
into law by the National Assembly. In the instant case, in so far as 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions have 
not been enacted into law by the National Assembly, they have 
no force of law in Nigeria, and they cannot possibly apply.111  
It is argued that although the Court was right to have held that the ILO Convention 
that was at issue was not applicable and did not have the force of law in Nigeria, 
it ought to have based its decision on the fact that Nigeria had neither signed nor 
ratified the Convention in question. To have justified its decision based on Section 
(12) (1) of the Nigerian Constitution was to misinterpret the express wordings of 
that provision. The ILO Convention at issue was not a bilateral treaty, most of the 
                                            
109 Perhaps a counter argument to this is the provision of Section 14 (b) of the Interpretation Act 
which provides that: ‘words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the 
singular’. This could explain the attitude of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in relation to 
multilateral treaties, however, the SC did not made references to the Interpretation Act in any of 
its decisions above. 
110 The Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of 
Nigeria and Ors v Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & Ors [2008] LPELR-3196 (SC). 
111 Per Mukhtar, JSC and Per Onu, JSC. The emphasis is added. 
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ILO Conventions are usually multilateral treaties. The argument is that whereas 
section 12 (1) of Nigerian Constitution expressly requires the domestication of 
bilateral treaties through domestic legislation before they have the force of law in 
Nigeria, there is no such requirement in relation to multilateral treaties going by 
the express wordings of section 12 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
However, in a much earlier case of Chief (Mrs.) Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti and 
Ors v Attorney General of the Federation112 where the issue before the SC was 
the inalienable and immutable nature of fundamental rights, the Nigerian SC 
stated that ‘[a] fundamental right is certainly a right which stands above the 
ordinary laws of the land.’113 Indeed, in the case of Abacha and Ors v 
Fawehinmi,114 the Nigerian SC determined the legal status of the African Charter 
in relation to other domestic statutory laws of Nigeria by noting that it was a law 
that superseded all domestic legislation with the exception of the Nigerian 
Constitution.115  
Therefore, it would appear that on the basis of the decision in the Abacha case, 
international treaties ratified and domesticated into Nigeria are superior to other 
domestic legislation but their legal status will be inferior to the Nigerian 
                                            
112 Chief (Mrs.) Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti and Ors v Attorney General of the Federation 
(1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 211. See also El-Rufai v Senate of the National Assembly & Ors [2014] 
LPELR-23115(CA). 
113 Chief (Mrs.) Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti and Ors v Attorney General of the Federation 
(supra) at 229-230. 
114 Supra. 
115 Ibid. On similar decisions on the legal status of the African Charter in Nigeria see also, Garba 
v Attorney-General of Lagos State Suit IBID/599/91 decided on 31 October 1991; Ohakosim v 
COP Imo State [2009] 15 (Pt. 1164); Onyirioha v IGP [2009] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1128); IGP v ANPP 
[2007] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 457 at 500; Abiodun v Attorney General of the Federation [2007] 
LPELR-8550(CA). However, see the contrary decision that the provisions of the African Charter 
cannot override provisions of domestic legislation in Nigeria in the case of Wahab Akanmu v 
Attorney General of Lagos State. Suit No M/568/91. 
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Constitution.  In an earlier case of Chief JE Oshevire v British Caledonian Airways 
Limited,116 it was similarly held that: 
It is useful to appreciate that an international agreement embodied 
in a Convention or treaty is autonomous, as the high contracting 
parties have submitted themselves to be bound by its provisions, 
which are therefore above domestic legislation. Thus any domestic 
legislation in conflict with the convention is void.117 
Likewise, in Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airlines,118 where the applicability of the Warsaw 
Convention in Nigeria was at issue, the SC of Nigeria held that since Nigeria was 
a Commonwealth country, it could continue to follow the common law tradition of 
determining the status of international law in municipal law, and hence, Nigeria 
‘shall continue to adhere to, respect and enforce both multilateral and bilateral 
agreements where their provisions are not in conflict with our fundamental law.’119 
With the decisions of the Nigerian SC in the cases of Chief (Mrs.) Olufunmilayo 
Ransome-Kuti and Ors v Attorney General of the Federation,120 and Uzoukwu v 
Ezeonu II,121 it seems the Nigerian SC has positive dispositions towards 
international human rights law in relation to the interpretation of Nigeria’s 
domestic laws. However, when the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution itself 
conflict with international human rights law, it seems such conflict would be 
                                            
116 Chief JE Oshevire v British Caledonian Airways Limited [1990] 7 NWLR (Pt. 163) at 507. 
117 Ibid, at 519-520. See also Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia 
State and Ors, [2001] SC 28/2001. 
118 Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airlines [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 498) 124. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Supra. 
121 Supra. 
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resolved in favour of the Constitution as it is regarded as the ‘grundnorm’ in 
Nigeria.122 
In Nigeria, like all other States that reserve the supremacy of their constitutions 
over other laws, there would be problems in giving effect to and enforcing the 
provision of international human rights treaties and laws that conflict with their 
constitutions. Therefore, since there is a presumption that Parliament does not 
intend to violate international law in all jurisdictions,123 it is argued that whenever 
a provision of Nigeria’s Constitution conflicts with international human rights law, 
such conflicts must as far as possible be interpreted by the courts in such a way 
as to comply with international human rights law. It must be acknowledged 
however that there is a limit to what can be done through interpretation by the 
courts. Morever, it appears that the courts have not yet been presented with a 
case where the provision of the Nigerian Constitution conflict with the obligations 
of the Nigerian State under international law. None was found as at the time of 
writing.  
There is also a dearth of judicial authorities on the legal status of customary rules 
and general principles of international law in Nigeria. Perhaps, this is because 
Section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution1999 is silent on the issue.124 Azoro argues 
that as customary rules of international law are part of the common law of 
England,125 as well as that of the Nigerian legal system by virtue of Section 32 of 
                                            
122 See section 1 (3) of the Nigerian Constitution 1999. 
123 See TA Doherty, (n 68) above at 754. 
124 See E Egede, 'The New Territorial Waters (Amendment) Act 1998-Comments on the Impact 
of International Law on Nigerian Law, ' (2000) 12 African Journal of International & Comparative 
Law 84 and CN Okeke, (n 91) above at 415. 
125 See, the following: Ex Parte Pinochet (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 61; Lord Advocate’s Reference No 
1 of 2000 (2000) SLT at 512; R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16; and Commercial and Estates Co of 
Egypt v Board of Trade [1925] 1 KB 271.  
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Nigerian Interpretation Act,126 this implies that customary rules of international law 
are applicable in Nigeria to the extent that such rules are not inconsistent with any 
domestic legislation.127 In the case of Attorney-General of the Federation v 
Attorney-General of Abia State and Ors128 the SC of Nigeria appears to have 
indirectly held that customary rules of international law were applicable in Nigeria 
when it stated that: 
While it is recognised in customary international law that the sea is 
res nullius and it is therefore, available for the enjoyment of all 
nations of the world, land-locked nations inclusive … maritime 
nations are entitled to some privileges not available to others to 
protect their security.129 
Despite the statements of the Nigerian SC in the above cases, it is argued that 
the legal status of customary international law and general principles of 
international law remain largely unclear and uncertain in Nigeria.130 However, 
Chilenye Nwapi argues that there are legal grounds to claim that customary 
international law is part of Nigerian law and enforceable before Nigerian courts of 
law.131 She argues that customary international law can be applied by courts in 
Nigeria, once proved as a matter of fact, just as Nigerian customary law is usually 
proved and recognised by courts of law in Nigeria,132 as demonstrated in Chapter 
                                            
126 Interpretation Act, CAP I23 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
127 C Azoro (n 103) above at 97 and C Nwapi, (n 106) above at 54-55. 
128 Supra. 
129 Ibid, per Michael Ekundayo Ogundare (JSC) at para 51. 
130 C Nwapi, 'International Treaties in Nigerian and Canadian Courts' (2011) 19 African Journal 
of International & Comparative Law 38 at 45. 
131 Ibid, at 54. 
132 Ibid. 
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Three.133 Indeed, in Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airlines,134 the Nigerian Supreme Court 
(SC) held that ‘Nigeria like any other commonwealth country, inherited the English 
common law rules governing the municipal application of international law …’,135 
this has in turn led to the argument that ‘a conventional rule that is at the same 
time customary international law has automatic application in Nigeria (just as it 
does in English law) as part of the common law’.136  
The English law position on the application of customary international law in 
England is demonstrated by the statement of Lord Denning in the case of Trendex 
Trading Co v Central Bank of Nigeria, where he stated that ‘… it follows to my 
mind inexorably that the rules of [customary] international law, as existing from 
time to time, do form part of our English law.’137 Indeed, in Attorney-General of 
the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State and Ors,138 the Nigerian SC 
appears to have indirectly held that this was the position in Nigeria.  
However, as the application of customary rules of international law in England is 
subject to the fact that such customary rules of international law must not conflict 
with domestic law, it would appear that where there is conflict between rules of 
customary international law and domestic law, the latter will prevail in Nigeria.139 
However, with the decision of the Nigerian SC in Abacha’s case, it remains 
                                            
133 See sub-section 3.1.1. 
134 Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airlines [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 498) 124. 
135 Ibid, at 150. 
136 E Egede, 'The New Territorial Waters (Amendment) Act 1998-Comments on the Impact of 
International Law on Nigerian Law, ' (2000) 12 African Journal of International & Comparative 
Law 84 at 162 and E Egede, 'Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the 
Domestication of Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria' (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 249. 
137 Trendex Trading Co., v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 All ER 881 at 889–890. 
138 Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & Ors (supra). 
139 See the decisions in the following English cases: Mortensen v Peters [1906] 14 Scotts LTR 
1481 and R v Cheun [1939] AC 160 at 168. 
International and National Law in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Nigeria 
 
330 
 
unclear if in fact customary international law would prevail over domestic 
legislation in Nigeria.140 
It is the argument in this thesis that a monist approach to international law as 
practiced by Francophone and civil law African States as discussed in section 8.1 
above that gives primacy to international human rights law over national law or 
some similar approach is the best way for Nigeria to be in compliance with its 
international human rights obligations. While such monist approach may not 
provide all the answers to the challenges of enforcing international human rights 
law in the domestic jurisdictions, as States need the will and ability of law 
enforcement agencies to enforce the provision of international law domestically, 
nevertheless monism seems to provide better answers to the application of 
international law in domestic jurisdictions than dualism. 
The current strictly dualist approach of the Nigerian legal system towards 
international law appears to be anti-thetical to the enforceability of international 
human rights treaties signed and ratified by Nigeria before the domestic courts in 
Nigeria. In searching for solutions within Africa to the problem of enforcing 
international human rights treaties and instruments in Nigeria, in the following 
Chapter Nine a comparative analysis will be made between the Kenyan legal 
system and its Nigerian counter-part in the context of the relationship between 
the legal systems of the two States and international law. 
Conclusion  
It has been rightly observed that States are often not trusted as effective agents 
for the protection and promotion of international human rights norms, despite the 
fact that international human rights law ‘is ultimately concerned with the conduct 
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and welfare of individuals’.141 Indeed, compared with national law, international 
law appears to be the better framework through which human rights may be 
promoted.142 There is therefore credibility in the argument in this thesis that 
international human rights law  has been more progressive in promoting and 
protecting human rights than the Nigerian domestic legal system. This argument 
is supported by the work and jurisprudence of the UN human rights treaty 
Monitoring Bodies as well as the African Commission discussed in Chapter 
Seven143 even though these are soft agencies without enforcement mechanisms. 
This is not to say that no progress has been made in terms of protecting human 
rights in Nigeria, as most of the human rights guaranteed under the 1948 UDHR 
have been applied under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, 1999.  Nigeria has ratified the two 1966 international human rights 
Covenants, the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) (infra, note 141) and has also domesticated the African 
Charter.  
However, with a situation such as we have in the case study of Abuja, where the 
Nigerian Constitution effectively terminates the land rights of Abuja peoples by its 
Section 297 (2) without adequate payment of compensation to all the affected IPs 
nor resettling all of them to some other location in compliance with international 
law, a situation arises where the Nigerian Constitution violates the rights to 
property as well as the right to be paid prompt and adequate compensation 
guaranteed under its Chapter IV. It is argued that since such rights provided under 
Chapter IV have indisputably attained the status of customary international law 
as demonstrated in the preceding Chapter Seven,144 whenever the courts in 
                                            
141 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 32. 
142 Ibid. 
143 See subsection 7.1.4-7.1.6. 
144 See subsection 7.1.2. 
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Nigeria are presented with a case on this issue they should interpret Section 297 
(2) and Section 1 (3) of the FCT Act, in line with Chapter IV of the Constitution of 
Nigeria and in accordance with Nigeria’s human rights obligations under the 
African Charter,145 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 1966,146 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(IESCR) 1966147 and the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms 
of racial Discrimination (ICERD) 1965.148  
As demonstrated in the preceding Chapter Seven, it is now clear that international 
law has evolved from an era when States were the exclusive subjects of 
international law to an era when individuals and groups such as IPs living within 
States have become direct subjects and bearers of rights under international law 
without the intervention of States as intermediaries.149 In this respect, it has been 
rightly contended that contemporary international law has progressed into ‘a 
human commonwealth encompassing individuals, States, and other 
aggregates’150 that go beyond the confines of any State. Despite this positive 
development in international law, it suffers from the problem of a lack of effective 
mechanisms for its enforcement when compared with domestic law. In this 
                                            
145 Supra. 
146 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, in accordance with its Art 49. 
147 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 
entered into Force 3 January 1976, in accordance with its Art 27. 
148 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
1965, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UNGA Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 
December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969, in accordance with its Art 19. 
149 AM Slaughter and W Burke-White, 'The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, the 
European Way of Law)' (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 327. 
150 A Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, 2005) at 217. 
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context, effective mechanisms for enforcement refer to the ability of law to provide 
sanctions and hold individuals and institutions accountable in instances where 
there are violations.  
It appears State law is more capable of using the power of coercive force by the 
State to enforce law and this is often lacking for international law.151 This implies 
that State courts are the most effective institutions through which international law 
may be enforced.152 It is because of this, that in the following Chapter Nine there 
will be comparative examination of the relationship between international and 
national law in Nigeria and Kenya. This is informed by recent constitutional 
reforms in relation to the application of international law within the domestic legal 
system of Kenya. The purpose is to compare Nigeria with Kenya to investigate if 
there are any lessons which Nigeria may glean from Kenya.
                                            
151 K Knop, 'Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts' (1999) 32 New York 
University Journal of International Law & Policy 501 at 516. 
152 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER NINE: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
LAW IN POST-COLONIAL KENYA - A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS WITH NIGERIA 
Introduction 
In the preceding Chapter Eight,1 the relationship between international and 
national law in Nigeria was critically examined. It was demonstrated that going by 
section 12 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Nigerian 
Constitution), bilateral treaties require domestication into Nigerian law before they 
can be enforced in Nigeria. In addition, it was demonstrated that judicial 
application of international law in Nigeria illustrates that, once domesticated, 
international treaties supersede the provisions of municipal legislation but remain 
legally inferior to the Nigerian Constitution.2  It was also argued in Chapter Eight 
that, while the constitution of Nigeria is silent on the legal status of customary and 
general principles of international law in Nigeria, the practice is to apply them 
whenever they are not in conflict with any domestic law in Nigeria.  
The main purpose of this Chapter is to critically examine the post-colonial 
application of international law within the domestic legal system of Kenya. This is 
informed by the recent constitutional reforms in Kenya in relation to the application 
of international law in Kenya’s legal system. The purpose is to make comparative 
analyses between Nigeria and Kenya in terms of how both states apply 
international law within their domestic legal systems. The reason for the choice of 
Kenya as a comparator is because like Nigeria, Kenya is also an Anglophone 
African State. More importantly, Kenya has embarked on constitutional reforms 
in terms of the relationship between its legal system and international law. 
Therefore, the objective herein is to find out if there are lessons that Nigeria may 
                                            
1 See section 8.2-8.3. 
2 See section 8.3. 
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learn from Kenya’s constitutional reforms. To achieve the main objective in this 
Chapter, the following research questions are posed: 1) What is the nature of the 
relationship between international and national law in post-colonial Kenya? 2) 
What are the differences and similarities in the approaches of Nigeria and Kenya 
towards international law? 3) Do either of the post-colonial African States of 
Nigeria and Kenya have anything to learn from each other in terms of the 
relationship between international and national law?  
The comparative study3 of Nigeria and Kenya in the context of the manner of 
interpretation of domestic and international law by the courts of Nigeria and Kenya 
is intended to highlight the current approaches of both States towards 
international law, and the impact that a choice of either approaches has on the 
hierarchical place of international law in both legal systems. This comparison aims 
to demonstrate the need for a protective and progressive attitude towards 
international law in Nigeria. The comparative examination will reveal the common 
historical and constitutional challenges that Anglophone African States are 
typically presented with, in terms of the application and enforcement of 
international law domestically. It demonstrates how Kenya has responded to 
these challenges and it indicates how Nigeria can improve the application and 
enforcement of international law in its domestic legal system.4 
This Chapter has been sub-divided into three main sections. In section 9.1, the 
objective is to answer the research question: What is the nature of the relationship 
between international and national law in post-colonial Kenya?  In section 9.2 the 
main task is to answer the research question: What are the differences and 
                                            
3 See Z Konrad and K Hein, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 1998) at 
5 and 6. 
4 G Dannemann, 'Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?' in M Reimann and R 
Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
385-418. 
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similarities in the approaches of Nigeria and Kenya towards international law? In 
the final section 9.3, the objective is to answer the research question: Do either 
of the post-colonial African States of Nigeria and Kenya have anything to learn 
from each other in terms of the relationship between international and national 
law? It will be argued that, if Nigeria is to keep up with its desire to operate in 
accordance with respect for international law as provided under Section 19 of the 
Nigerian Constitution, Nigeria will be required to amend its Constitution to make 
provision enabling the direct enforceability of any international instruments to 
which it is a party in Nigeria. Before the comparative analyses, the post-colonial 
legal situation in relation to the place of international law within the Kenyan legal 
system is examined in section 9.1 below. 
9.1. Kenyan State Law and International Law 
The aim in this section is to answer the research question: What is the nature of 
the relationship between international and national law in post-colonial Kenya? 
The development of Kenya’s post-colonial legal system and legal order is 
traceable to the declaration of Kenya as the East Africa Protectorate on 15 June 
1895 by the British colonial authorities.5 This marked the beginning of formal 
colonial administration by the East African Company by virtue of the Royal 
Charter.6 International law and particularly international human rights law has had 
a mixed history in the history of the Kenyan legal system.7 The 1963 
                                            
5 For a comprehensive historical analysis of this, see C Singh, 'The Republican Constitution of 
Kenya: Historical Background and Analysis' (1965) 14 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 878. 
6 See SA Koppelman and YP Ghai, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya (JSTOR, 1971) 
and JB Ojwang, Constitutional Development in Kenya: Institutional Adaptation and Social 
Change (African Centre for Technology Studies, 1990). 
7 NW Orago, 'The 2010 Kenyan Constitution and the Hierarchical Place of International Law in 
the Kenyan Domestic Legal System: A Comparative Perspective' (2013) 13 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 415. 
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Independence Constitution of Kenya, did not make provision for the direct 
application of international law or international human rights law in the domestic 
legal system of Kenya.8 This happened later in 1969,9 when a bill of rights entitled 
‘Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedom of Individuals’ was incorporated 
into Articles 14 – 30 of the Kenya Constitution 1963.10 This was as a result of the 
influence of the UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) 
and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR).11 It has been claimed that such incorporation of international human 
rights norms into the Kenyan Constitution was also due to the influence of the 
Ugandan example which was in turn inspired by the approach of the Nigerian 
Independence Constitution1960.12 
Before the adoption of the current Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, 
Kenya’s general approach towards international law was dualist.13 This was 
affirmed by the decision of the Kenyan Court in the case of David Njorege 
Macharia v Republic of Kenya,14 where the Court observed that previously Kenya 
adopted a dualist approach to international law and consequently the provisions 
of a treaty did not as a general rule have the force of law in Kenya unless it had 
                                            
8 Ibid, at 416-417. 
9 Ibid. 
10 The Kenya Bill of Rights were included as Chapter V of the Constitution of Kenyan Act No 5 
1969 as cited in NW Orago, (n 7) above at 417. 
11 TM Franck and AK Thiruvengadam, 'International Law and Constitution-Making' (2003) 2 
Chinese Journal of International Law 467 at 503. 
12  AW Munene, 'The Bill of Rights and Constitutional Order: A Kenyan Perspective, ' (2002) 2 
African human Rights Law Journal 135 at 144. 
13 Ibid. 
14 David Njorege Macharia v Republic of Kenya [2011] eKLR 1. 
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been domesticated by way of domestic legislation by the Kenyan Parliament,15 
thereby echoing the doctrine in other dualist States that national and international 
legal orders were two different and distinct legal systems.16 International law was 
not recognised as part of the corpus of national law in Kenya either under the 
defunct Kenyan Constitution 1963 nor under the Kenyan Judicature Act 1967.17 
However, in spite of this early dualist approach, Kenyan Courts had developed 
and adopted a very positive and progressive attitude towards international law by 
applying international law directly into the domestic jurisdiction of Kenya.18  
The practice under the Kenyan Constitution 1963 was towards adopting an 
approach wherein the courts permitted direct application of international law in 
Kenya in a restrictive way in so far as such international laws were not in conflict 
with the Kenyan Constitution or any other statutory provisions.19 In line with this 
general approach, in the case of Rono v Rono,20 the Court held that the practice 
that has been developed within common law theory on the application of 
international law in the domestic sphere was that in the absence of domestic 
legislation, both ratified treaties as well as customary rules of international law 
were applicable directly in the domestic jurisdiction where they did not conflict 
                                            
15 See also, Okunda v Republic [1970] EA 512. 
16 See A Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford University Press, 1987). 
17 Judicature Act 1967 CAP 8 Laws of Kenya, by its section 3 enumerated sources of Kenyan 
law to include only: The Constitution; Acts of Parliament; common law; doctrines of equity and 
statutes of general application which were in force in England as at 12 August 1897; and 
customary law. 
18 T Kabau and C Njoroge, (2011) 'The Application of International Law in Kenya under the 2010 
Constitution: Critical Issues in the Harmonisation of the Legal System,' (2011) 44 Comparative & 
International Law Journal of South Africa 293 at 296. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Rono v Rono [2005] KeCA 16. 
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with any domestic laws.21 In RM and Another v Attorney General,22 the Court 
ruled that where there was no ambiguity in domestic legislation and where such 
legislation was in conflict with international law, the common law approach 
favoured the provisions of domestic legislation in terms of supremacy.23  
Following the above decisions in RM and Another v Attorney General,24 and Rono 
v Rono,25 in Re Estate of Lerionka Ole Ntutu26 the Court relied on the provisions 
of the Bangalore Principles on Domestic Application of International Human 
Rights Norms (Bangalore Principles),27 as a basis for justifying the domestic 
application of undomesticated international human rights treaties in Kenya.28 The 
Bangalore Principles which the Court relied on in this case are principles on the 
domestic application of international human rights treaties adopted by an 
international consortium of Commonwealth judges in India in 1988.29  
                                            
21 Ibid. 
22 RM and Another v Attorney General [2006] eKLR 1. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Supra. 
25 Supra. 
26 Re Estate of Lerionka Ole Ntutu [2008] eKLR 1. 
27 Bangalore Principles on Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, the 
Bangalore Principles were released as a summary of issues discussed at a judicial colloquium 
on ‘The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms’, held in Bangalore, India 
from 24-26 February 1988, reprinted in Commonwealth Secretariat Developing Human Rights 
Jurisprudence vol 3 151 and in (1989) 1 African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law/RADIC 345. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See generally, J Ambani, 'Navigating Past the ‘Dualist Doctrine’: The Case for Progressive 
Jurisprudence on the Application of International Human Rights Norms in Kenya' in M Killander 
(ed), International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa (Pretoria University Law 
Press, 2010) at 25 and 30. 
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In terms of the hierarchical status of laws in pre-2010 Kenya, international treaties 
ratified and domesticated by Kenya ranked pari pasu with municipal legislation 
and such domesticated international treaties could be amended by a simple 
majority vote in the Kenyan legislative house.30 The problem of the applicability 
of international law in the domestic legal system of Kenya was compounded by 
very few incidences of domestication or incorporation of international treaties into 
the domestic laws of Kenya by the Kenyan Parliament with the resultant effect 
that many treaties ratified by Kenya did not have legal effect in Kenya.31 As a 
result of the afore-mentioned lacuna in Kenyan law wherein neither the 1963 
Constitution nor the  Kenyan Judicature Act 196732 made mention of international 
law as a source of law, the courts developed an unclear jurisprudence on the 
applicability of international law in Kenya.33  
The uncertainty in the jurisprudence of Kenyan courts on the applicability or 
otherwise of international law in Kenya was illustrated by the judicial attitude in 
the High Court case of Okunda v Republic,34 where the Court held that as 
international law was not mentioned as a source of law under any law in Kenya, 
such international laws do not have legal effects in the domestic legal system of 
Kenya. Therefore, there was a situation where, on the one hand, some courts 
held that international treaties had the force of law in Kenya in the absence of 
local legislation in Kenya based on the decision in Rono v Rono,35 on the other 
                                            
30 TM Franck and AK Thiruvengadam, (n 11) above at 477-485. 
31 NW Orago, (n 7) above at 417. 
32 Cap 8 Laws of Kenya. 
33 NW Orago, (n 7) above at 417. 
34 Okunda v Republic [2001] KLR 1. 
35 Supra. 
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hand, there was the situation where, as held in the case of Okunda v Republic,36 
international law was not a source of law in Kenya. In another High Court case of 
Pattini and Another v Republic,37 the Court held that although international law 
could be used as persuasive authority, international law was not a binding source 
of law in the domestic legal system of Kenya.38 Notwithstanding this uncertainty, 
the dominant legal position under the defunct Constitution of Kenya remained the 
decision of the then highest Court in Kenya, which was the Court of Appeal (CA) 
in Rono v Rono (Rono’s case).39  
It has been rightly argued that the decision of the Kenyan CA in Rono’s case 
above, wherein it was held that international customary law and treaty law were 
applicable by courts of law in Kenya if they are not in conflict with any existing 
State law, was one of the cases dealt with in pre-2010 Kenya which were  
precursors to the enactment and adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kenya 2010.40 Indeed, in that case the CA went ahead to rely on the provisions 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), which had not been domesticated by the Kenyan 
Parliament,41 to rule that a rule of customary law of succession and inheritance 
that discriminated against women was a violation of international human rights 
law.42 
                                            
36 Supra. 
37 Pattini & Another v Republic [2001] eKLR 1. 
38 Supra. 
39 Rono v Rono. Supra. 
40 NW Orago, (n 7) above at 418. 
41 Rono v Rono. Supra at para 23. 
42 Ibid. 
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9.1.1. The Kenyan Constitution 2010 and International Law 
The enactment and adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010 
(Kenyan Constitution) has been described as a departure from a dualist approach 
towards the application of international law within the domestic jurisdiction of 
Kenya,43 leading some writers to argue that Kenya has effectively adopted a 
monist approach to the application of international law within its legal system.44 
Indeed, Article 2 (5) of the Kenyan Constitution provides that ‘[t]he general rules 
of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya.’ This has been interpreted 
as implying that customary rules of international law are applicable in Kenya 
under its current Constitution.45 It is also provided that ‘[a]ny treaty or convention 
ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.’46 
Therefore, under the current Kenyan Constitution, both general principles of 
international law and all treaties or conventions ratified by the State of Kenya are 
applicable before courts of law and within the legal system of Kenya. 
However, under Article 2 (1) of the Kenyan Constitution, the constitution proclaims 
itself as the supreme law of the land and by its Article 2 (4) any law that is 
inconsistent with any of its provision shall to the extent of such inconsistency be 
void. It has been rightly argued that the afore-mentioned supremacy clause 
makes no exemption and would have to be interpreted as including international 
                                            
43 See David Njorege Macharia v Republic of Kenya (supra). 
44 J Gathii, 'Pitfalls of Adopting International Laws' (2011) Nairobi Law Monthly at 70 and M 
Mwagiru, 'From Dualism to Monism: The Structure of Revolution in Kenya's Constitutional 
Treaty Practice' (2011) 3 Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa 144. 
For a contrary opinion on this, see EO Asher, 'Incorporating Transnational Norms in the 
Constitution of Kenya: The Place of International Law in the Legal System of Kenya' (2013) 3 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 266. 
45  T Kabau and C Njoroge, (n 11) above at 294. 
46 See Art 2 (6). 
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law.47 It has also been argued that under the Kenyan Constitution, international 
law supersedes any conflicting constitutional provision.48 It would therefore 
appear that based on the supremacy clause in the Kenyan Constitution above, 
the relationship between international law and municipal laws of Kenya is not 
entirely monist. Despite the supremacy of the Kenyan Constitution, international 
laws supersede any conflicting provision of other domestic Kenyan legislations 
except for the Constitution. 
The new approach adopted in the Kenyan Constitution towards international law 
illustrates a very effective harmonisation of international law with municipal law in 
the context of being a very good example of how to establish a viable interaction 
between international and national law. It will be clearly wrong to assume that the 
Kenyan Constitution derives its legitimacy from international law. Rather it is the 
Kenyan Constitution that seeks to validate the application of international law 
within the municipal legal system of Kenya. This is not to say that international 
law may not be used in the interpretation of the provision of the Constitution in 
situations of conflict between the provision of the Constitution and those of an 
international treaty. In line with this argument, it has been rightly argued that the 
provisions of an international treaty may be used in interpreting provisions of the 
Kenyan Constitution in cases of ambiguity and conflicting provisions of the 
Kenyan Constitution with international human rights instruments.49 
It is obvious from above that the status of international law within the domestic 
legal system of Kenya has improved significantly. However, the current 
challenges appear to be how the provisions of Article 2 of the Kenyan Constitution 
which directly incorporate international law into Kenya should be interpreted by 
                                            
47 T Kabau and C Njoroge, (n 11) above at 298. 
48 See J Gathii, (n 44) above. 
49 T Kabau and C Njoroge, (n 11) above at 300. 
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the Courts in relation to international human rights treaties and their hierarchical 
status vis-à-vis the provisions of the Kenyan Constitution and domestic laws in 
situations of conflict. In the Kenyan, post-2010 Constitution High Court case of 
Re the Matter of Zipporah Wambui Mathara,50 it was held that international 
treaties ratified by Kenya superseded the provisions of Kenya’s domestic statutes 
by Article 2 (6) of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. In Wanjiku and Another v The 
Attorney-General and Another, the High Court also affirmed that ‘[t]he 
Constitution and in particular articles 2 (5) and 2 (6) gave a new colour to the 
relationship between international law and international instruments and national 
law.’51 
In David Njorege Macharia v Republic of Kenya,52 the High Court made 
references to Wambui Mathara’s53 case with approval and held that beyond the 
provisions of international treaties ratified by Kenya being directly applicable in 
Kenya under the Kenyan Constitution, their provisions superseded those of any 
Kenyan statute. This decision was upheld by the Kenyan CA.54 Also in the case 
of Karen Njere Kandie v Alssane Ba and Another, the CA asked itself the question 
‘[w]hat is a Court deciding a matter in 2015 to make of a treaty ratified without 
reservation long before the Constitution 2010 came into force. Is such a treaty or 
convention part of the laws of Kenya under Article 2 (6) of the Constitution or 
not’.55 It then answered the question affirmatively with a single sentence - ‘We 
                                            
50 Re the Matter of Zipporah Wambui Mathara [2010] eKLR 1. 
51 Wanjiku and Another v The Attorney-General and Anor [2011] High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 
Petition No 190 at para 17. 
52 Supra. 
53 Supra. 
54 See Criminal Appeal No 497 2007. 
55 Karen Njere Kandie v Alssane Ba and Anor [2015] eKLR 1. 
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think it is.’!56 This view has also been supported by the dissenting opinion of Chief 
Justice Willy Mutunga in the Supreme Court of Kenya In the Matter of the Principle 
of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate.57 However, 
in the case of Joseph Njuguna Nwaura v Republic, the Kenyan CA refused the 
Applicants’ request to quash the death penalty under Kenyan legal system as 
Kenya was not a Party to the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.58 
It appears then that the current legal position in Kenya in terms of the relationship 
between international law and municipal legislation suggest that both systems of 
laws should ‘overlap and penetrate each other’.59  From the above, it is also clear 
that the position of international human rights treaties within the domestic legal 
system of Kenya has also been significantly improved. International human rights 
treaties to which Kenya is a Party can now be directly applied by courts of law 
through the instrumentality of Article 2 (5) and (6) of the Kenyan Constitution 
2010.  
The primacy given to international law over domestic legislation under the new 
Kenyan Constitution would enable the provisions of international human rights 
instruments to have primacy over those of municipal legislation in Kenya. This is 
in line with views and contemporary developments around the world about the 
                                            
56 Ibid. 
57 In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the 
Senate. [2012] Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Application No 2 at para 11.1. See 
also, AIDS Law Project v Attorney General & 3 Others [2015] eKLR 1 at paras 54-62.; VMK v 
CUEA [2013] eKLR 1 at para 46; Republic v The Permanent Secretary of Internal Security & 
Another [2014] eKLR 1 at paras18-19; and Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 Others v Attorney General 
[2013] eKLR 1 at paras 32, 38, 43, 44 and 52.  
58 Joseph Njuguna Nwaura v Republic [2013] eKLR 1. 
59 RR Ludwikowski, 'Supreme Law or Basic Law-The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional 
Supremacy' (2001) 9 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 253 at 254. 
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significance of commitments to international human rights values at State levels,60 
and corresponds to the traditions and practices of the UN human rights treaty 
Monitoring Bodies discussed in Chapter Seven.61 
As progressive as the constitutional changes in Kenya in relation to the 
relationship between international and Kenyan State law would appear, the 
changes have nonetheless been criticized for lack of clarity and constitutional 
safeguards as to how the provisions of Article 2 (5) and (6) should be interpreted 
by the courts of law.62 It has also been argued that such general incorporation of 
international law into the domestic legal system of a State raises concerns about 
State sovereignty in relation to international law.63 The Kenyan CA expressed the 
sentiments about sovereignty in the more recent case of Kenya Airports Authority 
v MITU-Bell Welfare Society and 2 Ors where it noted that:  
The external sovereignty of Kenya is not only political but legal and 
legislative and such sovereignty is internally subject to the 
Constitution of Kenya. Neither the UN nor any international 
organization legislates for Kenya and it is impermissible to use 
Article 2 (5) of the Constitution as a basis to justify any and all 
                                            
60 M Sepulveda, 'The Constitutional Court’s Role in Addressing Social Injustice' in M Langford 
(ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 145-146; VS Vereshchetin, 'New Constitutions and the 
Old Problem of the Relationship between International Law and National Law' (1996) 7 
European Journal of International Law 29; A Peters, 'Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets 
Domestic Constitutional Law' (2009) 3 Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 
170; and GM Danilenko, 'Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and 
Practice' (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 51. 
61 See for example, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General 
Comment No 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, 3 December, 1998. E/C12/1998/24 
at para 4. 
62 NW Orago, (n 7) above at 421. 
63 Ibid, at 421-422. See also, WM Gibson, 'International Law and Colombian Constitutionalism: A 
Note on Monism' (1942) 36 The American Journal of International Law 614; P Dubinsky, 
'International Law in the Legal System of the United States' (2010) 58 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 455; and G Slyz, 'International Law in National Courts' (1995) 28 New York 
University Journal of International Law & Policy 65. 
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rules and principles of international law as part of the laws of 
Kenya. It is only general rules of international law that are part 
of the laws of Kenya.64 
It is argued that although such sentiments about State sovereignty do influence 
the attitude of certain courts towards adopting a cautious approach to 
international law that gives primacy to State law over international law as 
demonstrated by the statement of the Kenyan CA in the above case,65 however, 
since States have given up parts of their sovereignty through membership of 
international organisations as well as signing and ratifying various international 
treaties, such general incorporation of international law into national law helps to 
strengthen democratic governance by ensuring that the State keeps up with its 
international commitments under international law.66 In section 9.2 below, 
comparative analyses is made between Nigeria and Kenya in the context of their 
legal relationship with international law. 
9.2. National and International Law in Nigeria and Kenya: A 
Comparative Perspective 
The purpose of this section is to answer the research question: What are the 
differences and similarities in the approaches of Nigeria and Kenya towards 
international law? The answer to this question will help illustrate how Kenya has 
responded to the legal challenges in relation to the applicability of international 
law in its domestic jurisdiction, and how Nigeria can respond to similar challenges. 
Both Nigeria and Kenya have the common history of  British colonial rule and 
                                            
64 Airports Authority v MITU-Bell Welfare Society and 2 Ors [2016] eKLR 1 at para 118. The 
emphasis is added. 
65 See for example the decision of the US Supreme Court in Sosa v Alvarez Machain [2004] 542 
US 692. 
66 For general analyses of Kenya’s new Constitution see E Kramon and DN Posner, 'Kenya's 
New Constitution' (2011) 22 Journal of Democracy 89.  
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consequently both of them have historically and to some extent currently adopt 
common law approaches to the generality of their plural legal systems.67 By virtue 
of the colonial encounter, both Nigeria and Kenya lost their pre-colonial 
sovereignties to colonial Britain.68 Consequently, throughout the period of 
colonialism, Nigeria and Kenya disappeared from the international arena and lost 
the capacity to enter into international relations and participate in the development 
of and engagement with international law.69 
With the emergence of the UN in 1945 and the adoption by the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) of a historic resolution – the UN Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN Declaration of 
Independence),70 Nigeria and Kenya benefited from the UN Declaration of 
Independence by attaining political independence and regaining their 
                                            
67 For Kenya, see JB Ojwang, 'Constitutional Trends in Africa-The Kenya Case' (2000) 10 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 517; JS Fullerton, 'The Evolution of the Common 
Law: Legal Development in Kenya and India' (2006) 44 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 
190; and YP Ghai and P McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the 
Legal Framework of Government from Colonial Times to the Present (Oxford University Press, 
1970). For Nigeria see, TO Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian Law (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954); 
AO Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell, 1979); and BO Nwabueze, A 
Constitutional History of Nigeria (Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd, 1982). 
68 B Davidson and J Hughes, The Story of Africa (Mitchell Beazley, 1984); B Davidson, The 
Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (Cambridge University Press, 
1993); G Casely-Hayford, The Lost Kingdoms of Africa (Bantam Press, 2012); RJ Reid, A 
History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present, vol 7 (John Wiley & Sons, 2011). 
69 TO Elias and R Akinjide, Africa and the Development of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1988) at 22; NL Bruce-Wallace, 'Africa and International Law—the Emergence to 
Statehood' (1985) 23 The Journal of Modern African Studies 575 at 578; OC Okafor, 'After 
Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood 
in Africa' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 503; and JJG Syatauw, Some Newly 
Established Asian States and the Development of International Law (Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2013). 
70 Adopted by United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960. 
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sovereignties in 1960 and 1963 respectively.71 Since attaining political 
independence, Nigeria and Kenya have remained Member States of the UN as 
Parties to the UN Charter, with rights and corresponding obligations under the UN 
Charter,72 as well as Members of the African Union (AU) and the British 
Commonwealth. 
Following their membership of the UN and signing up to the UN Charter, Nigeria’s 
and Kenya’s engagement with international law continued with their incorporation 
of international human rights norms articulated under the UN Charter and the 
UDHR 1948 into their national Constitutions. As discussed in Chapter Eight73 
above, the post-colonial relationship between Nigeria’s national laws and 
international law is illustrated by the incorporation into its Independence 
Constitution 1960 of international human rights norms articulated under the UN 
Charter,74 the UDHR75 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)76 and since then all subsequent Nigerian constitutions have incorporated 
those rights.77  Nigeria is also currently a Party to most international and regional 
                                            
71 For Kenya, see JB Ojwang, (n 67) above; JS Fullerton, (n 67) above; and YP Ghai and P 
McAuslan, (n 67) above. For Nigeria see, TO Elias, (n 67) above; AO Obilade, (n 67) above; and 
BO Nwabueze, (n 67) above. 
72 Nigeria became a UN Member State on 07 October 1960 and Kenya became a Member State 
of the UN on 16 December 1963. See, <www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html>, accessed 
16 November 2016. 
73 See section 8.2. 
74 UN Charter. Supra. 
75 UDHR. Supra. 
76 ECHR. Supra 
77 TM Franck and AK Thiruvengadam, (n 11) above at 501-505; CN Okeke, The Theory and 
Practice of International Law in Nigeria (Fourth Dimension, 1986) at 328-337; and TO Elias, 
New Horizons in International Law (BRILL, 1980). 
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human rights treaties.78 Most of the rights provided under the UDHR have been 
included under Chapter IV of the current Nigerian Constitution 1999.79 Similarly, 
the 1960 amendment to the old Kenyan Constitution,80 incorporated a bill of rights 
entitled ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedom of Individuals’ into its 
Articles 14–30 of the Kenya Constitution 1963.81 Kenya is also a Party to the 
African Charter and as demonstrated in Chapter Seven82 both Nigeria and Kenya 
have participated in proceedings before the African Commission with the 
Commission ruling against both of them in two different cases.83 
In terms of the general relationship between national and international law both 
countries inherited the dualist approach of Britain as demonstrated by the 
decisions in the Nigerian case of Abacha and Ors v Fawehinmi (Abacha’s case),84 
and the pre-2010 Kenyan Constitution case of Rono v Rono (Rono’s case).85 
While the decisions in Abacha’s case and Rono’s case are similar in the sense of 
                                            
78 Some of these are: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966; The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966, adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966; and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights 1981, adopted in Nairobi on 27 June 1981, entered into Force October 21, 1986 
among other regional and international human rights instruments. See, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-nigeria.html, accessed 10 November 2016. 
79 See sections 33-46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
80 Kenya (Constitution) (Amendment No 2) Order in Council of 1960 
81 The Kenya Bill of Rights were included as Chapter V of the Constitution of Kenyan Act No 5 
1969. 
82 See section 7.3 and sub-section 7.3.1. 
83 For Nigeria see, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for 
Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria. Communication 155/96 and for Kenya see, 
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya. Communication 276/03. 
84 Abacha & Ors v Fawehinmi [2000] LPELR-14 (SC). 
85 Supra. 
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establishing that international treaties domesticated into the national laws of both 
States were enforceable, they differ in the sense that while the decision in the 
Kenyan Rono’s case included customary rules of international law, Abacha’s case 
was silent on customary international law. There are also differences in relation 
to the hierarchical status of international law vis-à-vis national legislation. While 
Abacha’s case established that once domesticated, international treaties attain a 
higher status than municipal legislation, in Rono’s case it was held that when 
there is conflict between the two, domestic law shall prevail. 
In Kenya, there is currently a remarkable departure from the purely and formerly 
dualist general approach towards international law articulated in the Rono’s case 
above. The new provisions in the current Constitution of Kenya, particularly 
Section 2 (5) and (6), expressly make both international treaties ratified by Kenya 
as well as general principles of international law, such as customary rules of 
international law and general principles of international law, applicable and 
enforceable in Kenya.86 Nigeria’s current Constitution has no equivalent provision 
and this represents a fundamental difference between the contemporary 
approaches of both States in terms of the relationship between international and 
national law.  
The point of convergence between Nigeria and Kenya appears to be that, based 
on the authority of the Nigerian SC decision in Abacha’s case, international 
treaties domesticated into Nigerian law have a higher status vis-a-vis national 
laws, and this is also the case in Kenya, as the 2010 Constitution makes it 
expressly clear that international law ‘shall form part of the law of Kenya under 
                                            
86 See the Kenyan Treaty Making and Ratification Act No 45 2012, which describes itself in the 
long title as ‘AN ACT of Parliament to give effect to the provisions of Article 2 (6) of the 
Constitution and to provide the procedure for the making and ratification of treaties and 
connected purposes.’ 
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this Constitution.’87 In terms of the relationship between the constitutions of both 
States, there is also a point of convergence as both of them proclaim their 
supremacy over any other law, and that where there is inconsistency their 
provisions shall prevail over such inconsistent laws.  
It is argued that the above supremacy clauses in both Constitutions includes 
international law. Implying that although the constitutions co-exist separately from 
international law, in the event of a conflict between the constitutions and 
international law, the former prevails.  In the two countries,88 there is no known 
case as at the time of writing in Kenya, Nigeria or at regional and international 
levels where the validity of the provision of the constitutions of both States have 
been challenged on the grounds of their conflict with or violation of international 
law. However, it has been argued that where an issue of inconsistency arises 
between the Constitution and international law within the domestic context of 
Kenya, the Constitution will prevail.89 It is argued that this is the position in Nigeria 
as well. 
Nevertheless, the legal position in relation to the supremacy of the constitutions 
of both States may be different if such issues arises before a regional or an 
international court or tribunal.90 Indeed, it has been argued that at the international 
level, where there are inconsistencies between national and international law it 
has been the consistent position that international law prevails.91 Indeed, in the 
                                            
87 Section 2 (6). See the decisions in the following cases: Re the Matter of Zipporah Wambui 
Mathara, supra; Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-General & Another, supra; and David 
Njorege Macharia v Republic of Kenya (supra). 
88 See section 1 (1) and (3) of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 and section 2 (1) and (4) of the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
89 T Kabau and C Njoroge, (n 11) above at 299. 
90 Ibid. 
91 E Denza, 'The Relationship between International and National Law' in DE Malcolm (ed), 
International Law (Oxford University press, 2006). Art 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
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case of Lohe Issa Kanote v Burkina Faso,92 the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Court) held that the provisions of the Penal Codes of the 
State of Burkina Faso on defamation were in violation of Article 9 of the African 
Charter, Article 66 (2) (c) of the Revised Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Treaty and Article 19 of the ICCPR.93 The African Court 
consequently ordered the Respondent State to amend its defamation legislation 
to make it compliant with the provisions of Article 9 of the African Charter, Article 
19 of the ICCPR and Article 66 (2) (c) of the revised ECOWAS Treaty.94 
Therefore, the validity of domestic law outside of Kenya and Nigeria does not 
depend on the constitutions of both countries but rather on the provision of 
international law.95  
It is argued that as States are expected to conform with their international 
obligations,96 courts of law should likewise interpret the provisions of their national 
laws and, where there is room to interpret the constitutions of their States, in 
conformity with their international law obligations. It is further argued that when 
presented with issues of conflict between the constitutions of both Kenya and 
Nigeria on the one hand, and international law on other hand, the courts in Nigeria 
and Kenya should resolve such conflicts by references to ratified treaties, whether 
domesticated or not as well as resolutions, international case law, general 
                                            
of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 
provides that a State cannot rely on the provisions of its domestic law to violate its international 
treaty obligations. 
92 Lohe Issa Kanote v Burkina Faso. Application No 004/2013. 
93 Ibid, at para 164. 
94 Ibid. 
95 T Kabau and C Njoroge, (n 11) above. 
96 H Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1952) at 564. 
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comments and advisory opinions of relevant international bodies.97 This should 
be the best strategy to resolve cases of inconsistencies, conflicts and ambiguities 
in their constitutions, as well as harmonising international and national law 
particularly in the context of protecting human rights. In section 9.3 below, it will 
be demonstrated that this argument is line with recent judicial developments in 
the United Kingdom (UK). 
9.3. Viability between International and National Law in Nigeria  
The aim here is to answer the research question: Do Nigeria and Kenya have 
anything to learn from each other in terms of the relationship between 
international and national law? Egede has rightly argued that it has become 
necessary for Nigeria to depart from its dualist approach to international law in 
the domestic jurisdiction of Nigeria so as to enable the direct and automatic 
enforceability of treaties ratified by Nigeria in Nigerian courts.98 Okeke has also 
expressed similar views by arguing that Nigeria should discard its dualist 
approach towards international law so as to enable an uninhibited enforcement 
of international law by the domestic courts of law in Nigeria.99  
In line with the above argument, it is argued that it is important for the Nigerian 
Constitution to be amended, in particular Section 12 (1) of the Constitution of 
Nigeria 1999 should be redrafted in the model of Section 2 (5) and (6) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010. Such amendment would enhance the 
automatic enforcement of international treaties ratified by Nigeria without 
                                            
97 See Y Shany, 'How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? A Comparative Analysis of the 
Influence of International Human Rights Conventions upon the Interpretation of Constitutional 
Texts by Domestic Courts' (2006) 31 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 341. 
98 E Egede, 'Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication of Human 
Rights Treaties in Nigeria' (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 249. 
99 CN Okeke, 'The Use of International Law in the Domestic Courts of Ghana and Nigeria,' 
(2015) 32 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 371 at 428. 
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undergoing the cumbersome processes of domestication which has already been 
criticised by the African Commission.100  
The above proposal for constitutional amendment would also provide a clear and 
unambiguous constitutional pathway, for the direct applicability and enforceability 
of general and customary rules of international law by Nigerian courts of law.101 
At the moment, it appears it would be difficult if not impossible for Nigerian courts 
of law to enforce Nigeria’s international human rights obligations under several 
international human rights treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR),102 International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (ICERD)103 and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR)104 which 
Nigeria has ratified but has not domesticated.105 The only inkling towards the 
enforceability of international human rights norms articulated under international 
                                            
100 See African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), Concluding Observations 
and Recommendations on the 5th Periodic Report of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the 
Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2011 – 2014), adopted at 
the 57th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held from 
04 to 18 November, 2015, in Banjul, Gambia at para 60 where the African Commission 
lamented about the ‘prolonged procedures for domestication of international law under its legal 
architecture’. 
101 DF Klein, 'A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights 
by Domestic Courts,' (1988) 13 Yale Journal of International Law 332. 
102 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with its Art 49. 
103 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
1965, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UNGA Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 
December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969, in accordance with its Art 19. 
104 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966, entered into Force 3 January 1976, in accordance with its Art 27. 
105 E Egede, (n 98) above and CN Okeke, (n 99) above at 428. 
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human rights treaties by courts in Nigeria is the preamble to the Nigerian 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 which states that: 
… the Court shall respect municipal, regional and international bills 
of rights cited to it or brought to its attention or of which the Court is 
aware, whether these bills constitute instruments in themselves or 
form parts of larger documents like constitutions. Such bills include; 
(i) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other 
instruments (including protocols) in the African regional human 
rights system, 
(ii) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
instruments (including protocols) in the United Nations human rights 
system ...106 
However, the above rules are merely procedural rules and do not constitute 
substantive law. The significance of constitutional amendment to the enforcement 
of human rights guaranteed under international law is illustrated by the decisions 
of the Kenyan courts in two cases. In the case of Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v 
Attorney General and Ors,107 the Applicants invoked the provisions of the new 
Kenyan Constitution to argue their case.108  
In considering whether members of the Ogiek Community were IPs and whether 
they had any recognisable rights arising from their historical and current 
occupation of East Mau Forests, the Court invoked Section 2 (6) of new 
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010.109 In so doing, it then relied on the 
                                            
106 Para 3 (b) of the Nigerian Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, 
enacted on 1 December 2009 by the Chief Justice of Nigerian pursuant to section 46 (3) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
107 Joseph Letuya and 21 Ors v Attorney General and 5 Ors (ELC Civil Suit No. 821 of 2012 
(OS). The facts of this case have already been given in Chapter Five under sub-section 5.1.5 
and will not be repeated here. 
108 Ibid, at 4-5. 
109 Ibid. 
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provisions of international human rights instruments like ILO Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 No 169 (ILO 169), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights (African Charter)110 to affirm that the Ogiek were IPs and minorities under 
international law.111  
It should be noted that although this case was commenced in 1997, it was not 
until 2014 that the newly established ELC was able to give judgement in this 
matter. It is argued that had this case been decided before the coming into force 
of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution the ELC might have arrived at a different 
decision. Indeed, the ELC observed that although this case was initiated under 
the previous Constitution of Kenya, at the time of judgment it was the new Kenyan 
Constitution of 2010 that was applicable to the case.112 
By contrast, in the pre-2010 Kenyan Constitution case of Francis Kemei and Ors 
v Attorney General and Ors,113 the Court was asked to determine the central issue 
in the case of whether the Ogieks of Kenya were IPs with rights as such.114 
International law was never invoked by any of the Parties nor by the Court. It is 
argued that were the same case to be decided under the current 2010 
Constitution of Kenya, the outcome may be different as the Court may have 
looked to international law to resolve the matter on the bases of the current 
                                            
110 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. 
111 Ibid, at 12-14. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Francis Kemei and 9 Ors v Attorney General and 3 Ors (HCCA No. 238/99 and Appeal No. 
98/2000). The facts of this case were also given in Chapter Five under sub-section 5.1.5 and will 
not be repeated here. 
114 Ibid, at 1. 
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Kenyan Constitution. This demonstrates the significance of constitutional reforms 
in the model of Section 2 (5) and (6) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya.115 
If Nigeria’s Constitution is not amended as proposed above, another alternative 
is to invoke the interpretive role and powers of courts of law in Nigeria to enhance 
a progressive interpretation of the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution in a way 
that enhances the application and enforcement of international human rights 
instruments in Nigeria. Already, the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure) Rules, 2009,116 quoted above invites Nigerian courts to do so. In 
addition to the above rules, paragraph 4 of the Bangalore Principles on the 
Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms,117 states that: 
In most countries whose legal systems are based upon the common 
law, international conventions are not directly enforceable in 
national courts unless their provisions have been incorporated by 
legislation into domestic law. However, there is a growing 
tendency for national courts to have regard to these 
international norms for the purpose of deciding cases where 
the domestic law – whether constitutional, statute or common 
law – is uncertain or incomplete.118 
                                            
115 However, it is also possible that the unfriendly climate for the independence of the Kenyan 
judiciary may also have impacted on the negative attitudes of judges to land rights of IPs in pre-
2010 Kenyan era. See M Mutua, ‘Justice under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial 
Subservience in Kenya’ (2001) 23 (1) Human Rights Quarterly 96. 
116 Supra preamble at para 3 (b). 
117 The Bangalore Principles were released as a summary of principles adopted at an 
international judicial colloquium of Commonwealth judges on ‘The Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms’, held in Bangalore, India from 24-26 February 1988. They 
are reprinted in the Commonwealth Secretariat Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence vol 3 
at 151 and in 1 African Journal of International and Comparative Law/RADIC (1989) 345. 
118 The emphasis is added. See also para 7 which states that: ‘It is within the proper nature of 
the judicial process and well-established judicial functions for national courts to have regard to 
international obligations which a country undertakes – whether or not they have been 
incorporated into domestic law – for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty 
from national constitutions, legislation or common law.’ The emphasis is added. For the 
significance of these principles on the relationship between international and national law, see M 
Kirby, 'Domestic Courts and International Human Rights Law-The Ongoing Judicial 
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Therefore, it appears that there is a growing consensus among Commonwealth 
judges that international human rights norms articulated under international 
human rights instruments are applicable within the domestic jurisdiction of States 
irrespective of whether they have been domesticated into national law or not. 
Indeed, developments in the ‘parent’ jurisdiction of Anglophone African States 
which is the UK, the judicial attitude appears to be in this direction.  
In the 2015 UK Supreme Court (UKSC) case of Cameron Mathieson v Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions,119 the UKSC used the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC),120 a treaty which the UK had ratified 
but not domesticated in the interpretation of domestic law.121 Similarly, in R (on 
the application of SG) and Ors v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,122 
Lady Hale stated that ‘[l]ikewise, our approach to both discrimination and 
justification in this case may be illuminated by reference to other international 
instruments … most notably the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.’123 Therefore, the above judicial developments in the UK adds 
credence to the common law presumption that Parliament does not intend to 
violate international law. Additionally, there is also a corollary to this common law 
presumption that Parliament does not intend to violate international law. It is 
                                            
Conversation' (2010) 6 Utrecht Law Review 168; M Kirby, 'International Law-The Impact on 
National Constitutions' (2005) 99 Proceedings of American Society of International Law 1; and 
LG Barnett, 'International Human Rights Norms and their Domestic Application: Judicial 
Methods and Mechanisms' (1999) 29 Revisita Instituto Interamericano De Derechos Humanos 
11. 
119 Cameron Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 47. 
120 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 adopted on 20 November 1989, 
entered into force on 2 September 1990. 
121 Cameron Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (supra) at paras 38-44. 
122 R (on the application of SG) and Others v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] 
UKSC 16. 
123 Ibid, at para 213. The emphasis is added. 
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argued that the way the courts in Nigeria approach the above common law 
presumption and principle of statutory interpretation will impact on the applicability 
and enforceability of international law in the domestic legal system of Nigeria.124 
Equally relevant to the above argument in the context of constitutional 
interpretation in cases where, as is the case in Nigeria, the constitution is the 
supreme law in the national legal system, is the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
which has the capacity to significantly diminish the common law general rule that 
unincorporated treaties cannot create rights and duties in domestic law.125 Courts 
of law can on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation resolve cases in 
which there are issues of conflict between the Nigerian Constitution and 
international law in favour of the latter. 
Conclusion 
Although Nigeria and Kenya have historically followed the British tradition of 
dualism, recent constitutional developments in Kenya demonstrate that Kenyan 
courts and litigants now look to international law to resolve several domestic legal 
issues before Kenyan courts of law.126 As demonstrated in Chapters Eight and in 
this Chapter, in Nigeria, international law is rarely utilised by litigants with the 
courts applying and enforcing international law only occasionally with an 
unenthusiastic attitude.127 This Chapter has undertaken comparative analyses of 
the relationship between national and international law in Nigeria and Kenya. It 
                                            
124 Ibid. 
125 RF Oppong, 'Re-imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the 
Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa' (2006) 30 Fordham 
International Law Journal 296 at 314. 
126 See T Kabau and C Njoroge, 'The Application of International Law in Kenya under the 2010 
Constitution: Critical Issues in the Harmonisation of the Legal System, ' (2011) 44 Comparative 
& International Law Journal of South Africa 293. 
127 C Nwapi, 'International Treaties in Nigerian and Canadian Courts' (2011) 19 African Journal 
of International & Comparative Law 38. 
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has demonstrated that, the implications of the changes effected in Kenya through 
the adoption of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution has enhanced greater and better 
enforcement of international law by the domestic law courts in Kenya. While this 
positive development does not imply that Kenya is now completely monist in its 
approach towards international law, the constitutional changes represents a 
remarkable departure from Kenya’s previously and purely dualist approach 
towards international law.  
Bearing in mind, Gordon Woodman’s caution that ‘[i]t must not be assumed that 
lessons on law reform are easily transferable.’128 It has been argued that for 
Nigerians to benefit effectively from the human rights protections provided under 
international law and for international law to be generally enforceable in Nigeria, 
it will be necessary to amend the Nigerian Constitution and adopt the model and 
approach of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. If for any reason an amendment is not 
possible, the courts of law in Nigeria can use their inherent powers as well as take 
inspiration from other jurisdictions like the UK in terms of recent judicial 
developments in which the UKSC has demonstrated a willingness to use the 
provisions of international treaties to interpret domestic laws and policies, even 
when such treaties have not been domesticated into UK law.  
Even though there are only a few cases in which the Nigerian courts have had 
recourse to international law, there is room to expect that Nigerian courts can rise 
above the effects of section 12 (1) of the Nigerian constitution to invoke 
international law in statutory and constitutional interpretation. Indeed, in a 
concurring opinion in Abacha’s case, Ejinwumi JSC stated that international law 
may ‘have an indirect effect upon the construction of statutes or might give rise to 
                                            
128 GR Woodman, ‘Ghana: How Does State Law Accommodate Religious, Cultural, Linguistic 
and Ethnic Diversity?’, in M-C Foblets, J-F Gaudreault-Desbiens and AD Renteln (eds), Cultural 
Diversity and the Law: State Responses from Around the World (Bruylant, Ėditions Yvon Blais, 
2010) 255-280 at 280. 
International and National Law in Post-Colonial Kenya: A Comparative Analysis 
with Nigeria 
 
362 
 
a legitimate expectation by citizens that the government, in its acts affecting them, 
would observe the terms of the treaty’.129 
It is also argued that there is a significant role for practicing lawyers and legal 
academics to play in this regard in Nigeria. Research has demonstrated that 
lawyers’ lack of knowledge and skills on how to use international law in legal 
arguments in courts have had a negative impact on the interpretive usage of 
international law by domestic courts in Canada.130 In Nigeria, this could possibly 
be the case as well because of the small number of cases where international law 
has been used in litigation.131  
Indeed, States in which litigants use international law and the decisions of 
international courts to argue their legal points before domestic courts, would 
exhibit higher usages of international law to decide and interpret the law than 
those States where only domestic laws are relied upon.132 The dearth of cases in 
which international law is applied in Nigeria would seem to suggest that the courts 
in Nigeria have less opportunity to apply and enforce international law, compared 
with States where lawyers use international law to argue cases before domestic 
                                            
129 Supra at 587. See also Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State 
& Ors (supra), where the Nigerian SC made references to international law in its decision. Also, 
see Mojekwu v Ejikeme [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt.657) at 402, where the Nigerian Court of Appeal 
invoked the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women adopted 18 December 1979, 19 ILM 33 (1980), to rule that a native law and 
custom was repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. 
130 See AF Bayefsky, 'International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts' in B Conforti and F 
Francioni (eds), Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic Courts (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997) at 303 and M Cohen and AF Bayefsky, 'The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and Public International Law' (1983) 61 Canadian Bar Review-Revue du Barreu 
Canadien 265 at 275. 
131 C Nwapi, (n 127) above at 61. 
132 Ibid. See also, M Killander, International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa 
(PULP, 2010) and P Kunig, 'The Protection of Human Rights by International Law in Africa' 
(1982) 25 German Year Book of International Law 138. 
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courts of law, as is now the case in Kenya. There is however, no known study 
that explains why lawyers do not often use international law in domestic litigation 
in Nigeria. It is argued that more could be made of the potential significance of a 
viable relationship between the domestic legal system of Nigeria and international 
law.  
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CHAPTER TEN: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
The main research objective in this thesis has been to ascertain whether Abuja 
peoples of Nigeria are indigenous peoples (IPs) under international law and 
whether their customary land rights are protected or could be protected under 
international law as IPs. This objective has been achieved in two ways. In Volume 
1, the historical background to the thesis was set out in Chapters Two and Three, 
while the case study of Abuja was introduced in Chapter Four, and comparative 
analyses between the case study and Ogiek peoples of Kenya was made in 
Chapter Five. Secondly, in Volume 2, the debates about definition of IPs in the 
literature and under international law were examined and applied to the case 
study in Chapter Six. The relevance of international human rights law to the 
protection of land rights of IPs was critically analysed in Chapter Seven. The 
relationship between the Nigerian legal system and international law was 
examined in Chapter Eight and comparative analyses of the relationship between 
international and national law in Nigeria and Kenya, was the focus in the 
penultimate Chapter Nine.  
This concluding Chapter is sub-divided into four main parts. The research 
questions, objectives and theoretical frameworks that have informed this research 
will be summarised in section 10.1 below. In section 10.2, some concluding 
remarks on the relationship between IPs’ customary law, State law and 
international law will be made. In section 10.3, certain proposals will be made 
towards a fair resolution of the legal challenges surrounding Abuja peoples’ land 
rights. Thereafter, section 10.4 will conclude with statements about the original 
contributions to knowledge which this thesis has made. 
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10.1. Research Questions, Objectives and Theoretical 
Frameworks  
In Chapter One1 as well as in Chapters Two2 and Three,3 it was demonstrated 
that legal pluralism helps in contextualising the relationship between and amongst 
different legal or normative orders in this thesis.  In Chapters Two and Three, it 
was demonstrated that legal pluralism explains the monopolisation of law by 
States. The implications of this monopolisation of law by the colonial and post-
colonial African States of Nigeria and Kenya on land rights of IPs have been 
illustrated in Chapters Four4 and Five.5 The literature on legal pluralism 
demonstrates the existence of different forms of law, and has also provided 
insights into the inherent conflict that such legal pluralism generates.6  
This thesis has therefore used Nigeria as a ‘semi-autonomous social field’,7 to 
illustrate the human rights implications of the power of State law to terminate legal 
pluralism. This thesis contributes to the existing debates on legal pluralism by 
using the case study of Abuja to demonstrate that the ability of State law to 
extinguish other forms of law (with the exception of ‘living’ customary law) as is 
the case in Nigeria has negative implications on land rights of IPs under IPs’ 
customary law and international law. Based on the comparative examination of 
                                            
1 See sub-section 1.2.3. 
2 See section 2.3. 
3 See section 3.3. 
4 See section 4.2. 
5 See BZ Tamanaha, 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global' (2008) 
30 Sydney Law Review 375 and J Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 18 The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1. 
6 BZ Tamanaha, (n 5) above and J Griffiths, (n 5) above. 
7 See SF Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study' (Summer 1973) Law and Society Review 719. 
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Nigeria and Kenya in Chapter Five, it has been suggested that Nigeria should 
replicate the recent and on-going land law reforms in Kenya in relation to the 
protection and accommodation of customary land rights in relation to Abuja 
peoples. 
The ideas of leading theorists in post-colonialism have also been examined and 
their significance to the thesis have been highlighted in Chapter Four.8 It was 
important to do this to demonstrate the continuous impact of colonialism in a post-
colonial Nigeria. In line with this aim, in Chapter Four the theoretical ideas of 
writers on post-colonialism were critically examined. Such post-colonial theories 
contextualises the legal challenges which the case study of Abuja illustrates. The 
impact of these scholarly works demonstrates the hegemonic tendencies of 
colonialism through the control of knowledge and representation, and the 
implications of these in the post-colonial Nigerian context. The literature also 
demonstrates the colonial effects of destroying the organic evolution of 
indigenous African States.9  
This thesis contributes to the existing debates on post-colonialism through using 
the case study of Abuja to explain that the idea of acquiring territories of land 
through the control and manipulation of knowledge and narration did not begin 
                                            
8 See section 4.1. 
9 See NL Bruce-Wallace, 'Africa and International Law—the Emergence to Statehood' (1985) 23 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 575; OC Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International Law, 
Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa' (2000) 41 Harvard 
International Law Journal 503; and LD King, 'State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria' 
(2001) 36 Journal of Asian and African Studies 339. See also, A Anghie, 'Finding the 
Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law' (1999) 40 
Harvard International Law Journal 1; A Anghie, 'Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, 
International Financial Institutions, and the Third World' (1999) 32 New York University Journal 
of International Law & Policy 243; A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005); A Anghie, 'The Evolution of International 
Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities' (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 739; A Anghie et al, 
The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2003); and A Anghie and BS Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law and 
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts' (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 77. 
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with European colonialism and certainly did not end with political independence 
of Nigeria in 1960. The continuous negative impacts of colonialism on land rights 
of Abuja peoples in a purportedly post-colonial Nigeria is evident in Chapters 
Four10 and Five.11 
After setting out the historical background to the thesis in Chapters Two and 
Three as well as the introduction of the case study in Chapter Four, together with 
the comparative study in Chapter Five, the first central research objective raised 
the following research questions. The first central research question was: 1. Are 
Abuja peoples of Nigeria IPs under international law and are their customary land 
rights protected under international law as IPs? To answer this question, the 
following sub-research questions were posed:  
1) Who are IPs under international law? 
2)  Is the concept of IPs relevant in the African context?  
3) Do Abuja peoples of Nigeria meet the criteria to qualify as IPs under 
international law? 
4) How are children defined under international child rights law and are 
there any insights to be gleaned from this so that IPs may be defined in a 
more positive context? 
5) How relevant is the general body of international human rights law to the 
protection of land rights of IPs and how does international law protect 
such rights?  
As the case study is in Africa and as the African region has adopted its own 
regional human rights framework - African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(African Charter),12  as a human rights instrument written by Africans for Africans, 
                                            
10 See section 4.2. 
11 See section 5.2. 
12 Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM. 58 (1982), entered into force 
21 October 1986. 
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it was significant to enquire about its relevance to the protection of land rights of 
IPs in Africa. Accordingly, the following sub-research question was posed and 
answered in Chapter Seven: 6) Are the land rights of IPs protected under the 
African Charter? 
 
The above questions were answered affirmatively in Chapters Six13 and Seven.14 
In line with the answers to sub-research questions 1), 2) and 3) in Chapter Six, 
since there are no universally acceptable criteria with which to determine if a 
particular group of people can be regarded as IPs, preference was accorded to 
the characteristics of IPs given by the African Commission,15 and African Court 
which claims to have taken the peculiarities of African societies into account.16 
However, as the Abuja peoples are comprised of eight different ethnic groups, the 
original argument has been advanced that such ethnic groups of peoples should 
as a collective be considered as IPs for the purpose of legally advancing their 
collective land rights under international law. It has been demonstrated in Chapter 
Six,17 that there is a gap in the existing body of literature on whether collective of 
peoples with distinct cultures can satisfy the criteria of IPs under both international 
law and the African Charter.18  
                                            
13 See sections 6.2-6.3. 
14 See sections 7.1-7.4. 
15 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and International Work Group 
on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Report of the African Commission’s Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations Communities, (ACPHR and IWGIA, 2005); ACHPR and IWGIA, 
Indigenous Peoples of Africa: The Forgotten Peoples? The African Commission’s Work on 
Indigenous Peoples in Africa, (ACHPR and IWGIA, 2006) at 8-14; and KN Bojosi and GM 
Wachira, 'Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An Analysis of the Approach of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 382 at 
391-400. 
16 ACHPR and IWGIA, (n 15) above at 5. 
17 See sub-section 6.2.5. 
18 For a survey of some of the recent literature on the definition of IPs, see S Pritchard (ed), 
Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights (Federation Press, 1998); R 
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After establishing that Abuja peoples are IPs under international law in Chapter 
Six, in Chapter Seven the next objective was to answer the following sub-research 
questions: 5) How relevant is the general body of international human rights law 
to the protection of land rights of IPs and how does international law protect such 
rights? 6) Are the land rights of IPs protected under the African Charter? The 
answers to these sub-research questions in Chapter Seven19 was that the general 
body of international human rights law and the jurisprudence of UN human treaty-
based Monitoring Bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) demonstrated that the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR),20 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (IESCR)21 
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1965 (ICERD)22 have substantive provisions which have and can 
been used to protect land rights of IPs.  
 
It was argued that as Nigeria is a Party to all the three international human rights 
treaties enumerated above, it is bound by its obligations under them in relation to 
                                            
Stavenhagen, The Emergence of Indigenous Peoples (Springer Science & Business Media, 
2012); and A Gupta, Human Rights of Indigenous People, vol 1 (Gyan Publishing House, 2005). 
On the issue of definition of IPs in the specific context of Africa see, AK Barume, Land Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in Africa (IWGIA, 2010). 
19 See sub-sections 7.1.4-7.1.7. 
20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, in accordance with its Art 49. 
21 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 
entered into Force 3 January 1976, in accordance with its Art 27. 
22 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
1965, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UNGA Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 
December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969, in accordance with its Art 19. 
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land rights of Abuja peoples. The relevance of specific international instruments 
such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 107 1957 
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO 107)23 and ILO 
Convention No 169 1989 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (ILO 169),24 was also demonstrated in Chapter Seven.25 
It was argued that although few States have signed up to and ratified these 
instruments, their provisions still have legal impacts in States that have not ratified 
them.26  
 
Whilst demonstrating the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 (UDHR)27 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities 1993 (Minority 
Rights Declaration),28 special attention was given to the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 (UNDRIP).29 It was demonstrated that through 
                                            
23 ILO Convention No 107 of 1957 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and 
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, adopted in Geneva, at the 
40th ILC session held on 26 June 1957, entered into force on 02 June 1959. 
24 ILO Convention No 169 of 1989 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, adopted in Geneva, at the 76th ILC session held on 27 June 1989, entered into force 
on 05 September 1991. 
25 See sub-section 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. 
26 See ILO, Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989 (No. 169): A Manual (Dumas-
Titoulet Imprimeurs 2003) at i. See also, the Australian case of Police v Abdulla [1999] 74 SASR 
337. 
27 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), proclaimed by the UNGA in Paris on 10 
December 1948 as UNGA Resolution 217(III) A, as a global bench-mark of achievements for all 
peoples and all nations. 
28 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities, UNGA Resolution 47/135, UNGA, 3rd Comm forty seventh session and ninety second 
plenary meeting, Annex, Agenda Item 97(b), UN Doc A/RES/47/135 3 February 1993. 
29 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Resolution 61/295, adopted on 
13 September 2007, adopted by a vote of 143 in favour to four against. (Australia, Canada, New 
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synthesising and incorporating human rights norms which have already been 
established under both customary international law and international human 
rights treaty law, UNDRIP is of significant legal weight even though it is soft-law.30 
In particular, it was demonstrated that a general principle of international law in 
which land rights of IPs should be protected by States has emerged. Accordingly, 
Nigeria is bound by this general principle of international law in relation to land 
rights of Abuja peoples.31 
 
In addition to the above, Chapter Seven32 also demonstrated that the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)33 is relevant to the 
protection of land rights of IPs in Africa. Indeed, the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission and the African Court illustrate that the African Charter has been and 
can be utilised by the African Commission to protect land rights, as it was done 
with the land rights of Endorois peoples of Kenya, Ogoni peoples of Nigeria,34 and 
more recently with the Ogiek peoples of Kenya at the African Court. After 
answering the above research questions in the affirmative in Chapters Six and 
Seven, the answers in turn raised the following second central research question:  
                                            
Zealand and United States), with 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, 
Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). 
30 See SJ Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9, 11 August 2008 at para 40; 
A Boyle, 'Soft Law in International Law-Making' in M Evans (ed), International Law (2nd edn, 
2006) at 141-158; A Di Robilant, 'Genealogies of Soft Law' (2006) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 499; and CM Chinkin, 'The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change 
in International Law' (1989) 38 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 850 at 850-866. 
31 See sub-section 7.2.3. 
32 See section 7.3. 
33 Adopted 27 June 1981, Organization of African Unity (OAU) Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
ILM 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. 
34 See Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya, Application 276/03 and Social and Economic Rights Action 
Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria. Application 
155/96 respectively. 
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What is the nature of the relationship between international and national law in 
post-colonial Africa? To answer this latter second central research question, the 
following sub-research questions were posed: 
1) What are the differences in approach and how does this impact on the 
domestic application of international law?  
2) What is the nature of the relationship between international and national 
law in post-colonial Nigeria?  
3) What is the nature of the relationship between international and national 
law in post-colonial Kenya?  
4) What are the differences and similarities in the approaches of Nigeria and 
Kenya towards international law?   
5) Do either of the post-colonial African States of Nigeria and Kenya have 
anything to learn from each other in terms of the relationship between 
international and national law?  
In answering the above research questions, in Chapter Eight35 the specific 
relationship between Nigerian State law and international law was examined.36  
In Chapter Nine37 there was comparative analyses of the relationship between 
international and national law in the two Anglophone African States of Nigeria and 
Kenya. The comparative examination revealed the common historical and 
constitutional challenges that Anglophone African States are typically presented 
with, in terms of the application of international law domestically. It was 
                                            
35 See section 8.2-8.3. 
36 See M Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997); HH 
Koh, 'How is International Human Rights Law Enforced' (1998) 74 Indiana Law Journal 1397; 
HH Koh, 'International Law as Part of our Law' (2004) 98 The American Journal of International 
Law 43; and R Bahdi, 'Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of 
International Law in Domestic Courts' (2002) 34 George Washington International Law Review 
555. 
37 See section 9.2. 
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demonstrated in Chapter Nine38 that Kenya has post-colonially responded to this 
challenge and the comparative exercise showed how Nigeria can improve its legal 
system and move on from its colonial legal heritage.39 In particular, it was argued 
that while Nigeria and Kenya have historically followed the British tradition of 
dualism, recent constitutional developments in Kenya demonstrate that Kenyan 
courts and litigants now look to international law to resolve domestic legal 
issues.40 It was also argued that by contrast in Nigeria, courts apply international 
law only occasionally.41  
It was demonstrated also that the changes effected in Kenya through the adoption 
of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution has enhanced better enforcement of 
international law by the domestic law courts in Kenya. Accordingly, it is the 
conclusion in this thesis that for Nigerians to benefit from the provisions of 
international law and for international law to be generally enforceable in Nigeria, 
it will be necessary to amend the Nigerian Constitution by adopting the approach 
of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. However, it has also been argued that if for any 
reason(s) an amendment to the Nigerian Constitution is not possible, the courts 
of law in Nigeria can do as the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) which 
has demonstrated a willingness to use the provisions of international treaties to 
                                            
38 See sub-sections 9.1.1 and 9.2.1 respectively. 
39 G Dannemann, 'Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?' in M Reimann and R 
Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
40 See T Kabau and C Njoroge, 'The Application of International Law in Kenya under the 2010 
Constitution: Critical Issues in the Harmonisation of the Legal System, ' (2011) 44 Comparative 
& International Law Journal of South Africa 293. 
41 C Nwapi, 'International Treaties in Nigerian and Canadian Courts' (2011) 19 African Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 38. 
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interpret domestic laws and policies, even when such treaties have not been 
domesticated into UK law.42  
In Chapters Eight and Nine, it was also maintained that although there are only a 
few cases in which the Nigerian courts have had recourse to international law, 
there is room for optimism that Nigerian courts can rise above the effects of 
section 12 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution which requires the domestication of 
international treaties by way of national legislation before they are applicable in 
Nigeria. It supported this optimism with the concurring opinion of Ejinwumi Justice 
of the Supreme Court (JSC) in the Nigerian locus classicus case of Abacha and 
Ors v Fawehinmi,43 where he stated that international law may influence the 
construction and interpretation of the law in Nigeria.44 In section 10.2 below, some 
concluding observations are made on the relationship between IPs’ customary 
land tenure, State law and international law. 
10.2. Land Rights of IPs under IPs’ Customary Law, State Law 
and International Law 
Based on the conclusions in Chapter Seven,45 it has been demonstrated that land 
rights of IPs under customary law are recognised under international human rights 
                                            
42 See Cameron Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 47 and R 
(on the application of SG) and Others v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 
16. 
43 Abacha & Ors v Fawehinmi (2000) LPELR-14 (SC). 
44 Supra at 587. See also, Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State 
& Ors (supra), where the Nigerian SC made references to international law in its decision. Also, 
see Mojekwu v Ejikeme [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt.657), at 402, where the Nigerian Court of Appeal 
invoked the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women adopted 18 December 1979, 19 ILM 33 (1980), to rule that a native law and 
custom was repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. 
45 See conclusion to Chapter Seven. 
General Conclusion 
 
375 
 
law. It was also demonstrated in Chapters Four46 and Five,47 that at national levels 
land rights of IPs are often claimed based on customary laws, which have their 
foundations from the cultures of IPs which most of the international and regional 
instruments examined in this thesis aim to preserve as a matter of human rights.  
It has also been established that the idea that protecting IPs’ land rights will 
achieve the purpose of protecting their identity and culture as defined by their 
cultural and spiritual attachment to ancestral lands are protected under Article 13 
of ILO 169, Article 25 of UNDRIP; Article 27 of ICCPR, Article 15 (1) (a) of the 
ICESCR and Article 22 (1) of the African Charter.48   
It is the conclusion in this thesis that the above provisions represent protections 
in principle of an important aspect of IPs’ land rights under international human 
rights law. In line with this, it has been argued that in principle Article 14 (1) of ILO 
169 provides a protective approach based on the manner of land use, ownership 
and occupation in accordance with traditional or customary forms of use, 
ownership and occupation by IPs. Article 26 (2) of UNDRIP appears to follow a 
similar approach as it provides for the ‘right to own, use, develop and control the 
lands, territories and resources that indigenous peoples possess due to traditional 
ownership or other traditional occupation or use’.  
However, it is also the conclusion in this thesis that neither ILO 169 nor UNDRIP 
prioritises IPs’ customary or traditional laws over national law, or regional and 
international law over national law in articulating IPs’ land rights at national 
levels.49 It is argued that the resolution of this legal problem is central to the 
protection of customary land rights of IPs in plural legal systems such as Nigeria 
                                            
46 See sub-section 4.1.1. 
47 See sub-section 5.1.4-5.1.5. 
48 See G Pentassuglia, 'Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights' (2011) 
22 European Journal of International Law 165. 
49 Ibid. 
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and Kenya. In this respect, there is need for further research to find better ways 
in which IPs’ customary land rights can be protected without depending upon the 
whims and caprices of State law. In support of the above conclusion, it has been 
demonstrated that while it appears that the provisions of ILO 169 require that the 
national laws of a State should be the instrument through which these rights 
should be protected,50 it ‘does not dissociate international standards (or indeed 
indigenous customs and laws) from domestic State practice.’51 While Article 26 
(3) of UNDRIP recognises that ‘customs, traditions and land tenure systems’ 
should be the basis of IPs’ land rights, however, such protection of IPs’ land rights 
under Article 26 (2) of UNDRIP seems to rely upon State law rather than 
international law. It is also observed that Article 21 of the African Charter which 
provides for the right to freely dispose of wealth and resources is completely silent 
on customary land tenure and its relevance to the protection of customary land 
rights of IPs at national levels. 
In Chapter Seven, the objective was to find answers to the research question: 
How relevant is the general body of international human rights law to the 
protection of land rights of IPs and how does international law protect such rights? 
Whilst it was demonstrated in Chapter Seven that land rights of IPs under 
customary law are protected under international law, in theoretical terms, it is 
argued that the reliance on State law for the recognition of the customary land 
rights of IPs at State levels promotes legal pluralism in Griffiths’ ‘weak’ sense52 
                                            
50 L Swepston, 'A New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO 
Convention No. 169 of 1989, ' (1990) 15 Oklahoma City University Law Review 677 at 696 and 
G Pentassuglia, (n 48) above at 168. 
51 G Pentassuglia, (n 48) above at 168. 
52 See J Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 18 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law. 
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and Woodman’s ‘state law pluralism’.53 This situation leaves customary land 
rights of IPs at the mercy of State law. Gordon Woodman concludes that in such 
situations of ‘plural laws’ ‘the field of deep legal pluralism … would require both 
tolerance and inventiveness in the processes of law reform, not only by the state, 
but by other bodies which hold legal authority.’54 Following Woodman’s forgoing 
academic admonition, in section 10.3 below, some possible legal and non-legal 
pathways towards resolving the challenges of protecting the customary land rights 
of Abuja peoples are presented. 
10.3. Towards a Fair Resolution of the Legal Challenges about 
Abuja Peoples’ Land Rights 
As at the time of writing, the provisions of Section 297 (2) of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Nigerian Constitution) and Section 1 (3) of 
the Federal Capital Territory Act, 1976 (FCT Act) are in de jure contravention of 
international law, in so far as compensation is not required to be paid to the IPs 
of Abuja or their resettlement undertaken by the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
Specifically, this constitutes violation of Article 27 (cultural rights) of the ICCPR, 
1966; Articles 2 (obligation to eliminate racial discrimination) and 5 (prohibition of 
discrimination) of ICERD, 1965; and Articles 1 (right to economic, social and 
cultural development) and 15 (right not to be deprived of means of subsistence) 
of the ICESCR, 1966. Nigeria is a Party to all the three international human rights 
treaties mentioned above, even though none of the three have been domesticated 
into Nigerian law. However, on the authority of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention 
                                            
53 See GR Woodman, 'Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice' (1996) 40 Journal of African 
Law 152. 
54 GR Woodman, ‘Customary Land Laws within Legal Pluralism over the Generations’, 4 SADC 
Law Journal 2014/15, 189-208 at 208. 
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on the Law of Treaties 1969,55 Nigeria cannot rely on the provisions of its 
domestic laws to violate international law as argued in Chapters Seven56 and 
Nine.57 
Nigeria is also in violation of three other ‘soft-law’ international human rights 
instruments that have been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA). In particular, Articles 2 (right not be discriminated against), 7 (right to 
equal protection of the law) and Article 17 (right to own property) of the UDHR, 
1948; as well as Articles 3 (right of minority people against discrimination), and 
Articles 4 and 5 (obligations on States to create favourable conditions for minority 
people) of the UN Minority Rights Declaration, 1993; and Articles 1 (right of IPs 
to the enjoyment of their rights as collectives),58 23 (rights to traditional practices 
and natural resources, as well as rights to the development and management of 
lands), 25 (right to spiritual relationship to land) and 26 (right to own, occupy and 
use lands acquired traditionally) of UNDRIP, 2007.59  
There are also de jure violations of Articles 20 (right to existence), 21 (right to 
freely dispose of wealth and natural resources), and 22 (right to economic, social 
and cultural development) of the African Charter, 1981. For many IPs of Abuja 
living in several villages who are or were engaged in farming, hunting and fishing 
on their traditional lands, compensation remains unpaid. Indeed, with the decision 
of the Nigerian Court of Appeal in Ona v Atenda,60 to the effect that compensation 
                                            
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Adopted 22 May 1969 in Vienna, signed 23 
May 1969, came into force 27 January 1980. 
56 See sub-section 7.1.6. 
57 See sub-section 9.2.1. 
58 See Arts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 17, 24, 33, 35, 40 and 44 of UNDRIP. 
59 See also, Arts 6 (1) and 8 (1) of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 
December 1986 at 97th plenary meeting of UNGA Resolution /41/128. 
60 Ona v Atenda [2000] 5 NWLR 244. 
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cannot be claimed unless such rights were founded upon a statute, any means of 
domestic legal remedy for the enforcement of the customary land rights of Abuja 
peoples are seemingly closed.  
It is the closing argument in this thesis, that Nigeria remains bound by the 
emergent general principle of international law in which States are obligated to 
respect, promote and protect land rights of IPs. It is the contention in this thesis, 
that the combined legal effects of the provisions of the ICCPR, IESCR, ICERD, 
UNDHR, ILO 169, Minorities Rights Declaration, UNDRIP and the African Charter 
will, sooner rather than later, combine with current positive dispositions towards 
UNDRIP by States as well as the growing consensus among legal scholars; the 
jurisprudence of the African Commission, African Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights (African Court) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) to 
provide the necessary opinio juris and State practice to metamorphose land rights 
of IPs into customary rules of international law at various regional levels.61  
It is also the closing argument in this thesis, that the solution to the problem of 
land rights of Abuja peoples is provided under UNDRIP. Article 28 provides that 
where IPs have been dispossessed of such lands they are entitled to redress for 
the lands, territories and resources confiscated, taken, occupied, used or 
damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.62 Such redress must take 
the ‘form of restitution or, where that is not possible, compensation in the form of 
equivalent lands, monetary redress, or other forms of appropriate redress, unless 
                                            
61 BJ Richardson, S Imai and K McNeil (eds), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative 
and Critical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2009); M Barelli, 'The Role of Soft Law in the 
International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples' (2009) 58 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 957; and MJ Davis, 
'The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (2008) University of South 
Wales Australia (UNSW) Law Research Paper. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_Ibid=1392569, accessed 07 October, 2016. 
62 Art 28 (1). 
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otherwise agreed’.63 Since Nigeria has not been able to pay all the IPs of Abuja 
compensation in respect of their lands since 1976 – after over 40 years - the 
Nigerian Government has demonstrated that it is either incapable of paying such 
compensation or it has deliberately refused to so.  
It is therefore the suggestion herein that Nigeria must immediately make 
restitution to the IPs of Abuja by amending the Nigerian Constitution and the FCT 
Act in a manner that expressly protects and recognises land rights of Abuja 
peoples to all farm lands and villages in the same way that Section 36 of the LUA, 
1978 accommodates the customary land rights of other Nigerians indigenous to 
the 36 States that make up the Nigerian federation (see Chapter Four at 4.1.2). If 
restitution is not deemed appropriate for any reason, then they must be 
compensated and or resettled in compliance with the international human rights 
instruments examined in Chapter Seven.64 In this respect, the guidelines of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN is apposite as it prioritises 
customary law over State law in such instances even though it is not legally 
binding.65 
Although the post-colonial State-building interest in a capital city is a legitimate 
State interest, such interests can be sufficiently achieved by restricting the 
Governments’ exclusive ownership of lands in the FCT to the Capital City (see 
Appendix 6 below). The Government has no legitimate interest in the de jure 
violations of customary land rights of Abuja peoples in relation to farm lands and 
villages which are very far from the Abuja city. The Nigerian Government is 
therefore called upon to amend the Nigerian Constitution and the FCT Act by re-
                                            
63 Art 28 (2). 
64 See sections 7.1-7.3. 
65 See Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and Committee on World Food Security(CFS) 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security (FAO & CFS, 2012) at para 8.5. 
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defining the boundaries of the lands in the FCT through restricting its exclusive 
ownership of lands to the Capital City. Otherwise, Nigeria remains in violation of 
its human rights obligations as a Member State of the UN, under the UN Charter 
and as a Member State of the African Union under the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union, 2001.66 
However, constitutional and legislative reforms in Nigeria are political processes 
undertaken by career politicians in the Nigerian Parliament. Abuja peoples have 
only three parliamentary representatives in the Nigerian Parliament, one in the 
Senate out of 10367 and two in the House of Representatives out of 348.68 As 
politics is a game of numbers which the IPs of Abuja do not have, the likelihood 
of securing sufficient numbers of votes to adopt the kind of law reforms proposed 
herein are low. This then raises the need for the conclusive proposal in this thesis. 
It is the conclusion of this thesis, that if no political solution to this problem can be 
achieved, the Nigerian judiciary is herein called upon to interpret Section 297 (2) 
and Section 1 (3) of the FCT Act in the context of the provisions of the international 
human rights instruments examined in Chapter Seven. The Nigerian Courts can 
do this whenever the opportunity presents itself by upholding the customary land 
rights of Abuja peoples in accordance with Nigeria’s human rights obligations 
under international law. It was demonstrated in the penultimate Chapter Nine69 
that the Kenyan courts now look to international law for the interpretation of their 
domestic laws just as is the case in the United Kingdom. 
                                            
66 Constitutive Act of the African Union, signed 11 July 2000 at Lomé, Togo, came into force on 
26 May 2001. 
67 See <www.nassnig.org/mp/senate>, accessed 26 November 2016. 
68 See <www.nassnig.org/mp/house>, accessed 26 November 2016. 
69 See sub-section 9.1.1. 
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10.4. Originality and Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis has made original contributions to knowledge in three main ways. 
Firstly, the case of Abuja has not been previously studied in the context of the 
rights of IPs under international law. In this context, in Chapter Six70 the case 
study has been used as a vehicle through which to illustrate the need for a more 
expansive approach to the definition of IPs under international law to cover 
peoples with different cultures and belonging to different ethnic groups in an 
African context. There is no known literature at the time of writing which has 
advanced this argument. In addition to this, the application of theories of legal 
pluralism and post-colonialism to this particular case study has also not been 
academically examined by any known literature about the rights of IPs. Therefore, 
this thesis makes original contributions to the existing body of literature on the 
rights of IPs by introducing the case study of Abuja to the existing debates on IPs 
through the theoretical lenses of legal pluralism and post-colonialism.  
 
Secondly, based on the conclusions and proposals made in Chapter Six,71 the 
original argument has been advanced that the existing attempts at defining and 
empowering IPs need to adopt the contemporary approach used by international 
law towards protecting the rights of children. It was demonstrated in Chapter Six 
that previously children were presented as citizens in waiting.72 Consequently, 
children were not viewed as individuals fully ready to participate in a world 
                                            
70 See sub-section 6.2.5. 
71 See section 6.3. 
72 See R Lister, 'Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children?' (2007) 8 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 693. For an example of the literature that justified this approach, see TH 
Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge University Press, 1950) and R Lister et al, 
'Young People and Citizenship' in M Barry (ed), Youth Policy and Social Inclusion, vol 33 
(Routledge, 2005). 
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dominated by adults.73 It was also shown that they were presented as innocent 
and frail, thereby removing them from any discussion in relation to work, politics 
and sexuality.74 Likewise, it was demonstrated in Chapter Six that they were 
presented as uncompleted human beings.75 This attitude justified a lack of formal 
recognition of children as citizens.76 References were made to the 1924 League 
of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child,77 and the 1959 UN Declaration 
on the Rights of the Child.78 It was then argued that under these two previous  
international instruments on the rights of children, there was no recognition of the 
rights of children as autonomous people like their adult counterparts.79  
 
After demonstrating the above previous approach to children’s rights, it was then 
shown that by contrast the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
(UNCRC),80 adopts a completely different approach by empowering them with the 
capacity of being legal subjects in their own right including decision-making 
powers.81 It is the conclusive argument in this thesis, that there are significant 
analogical lessons to be learned from the transformation of children’s rights under 
                                            
73 R Lister, (n 72) above at 693. 
74 P Aries, Centuries of Childhood; a Social History of Family Life. Translated from the French by 
Robert Baldick (Knopf, 1962) and KLF Calvert, Children in the House: The Material Culture of 
Early Childhood 1600-1900 (Northeastern University Press, 1992). 
75 C Jenks, 'Sociological Perspectives and Media Representations of Childhood' in J Fionda 
(ed), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart Publishing, 2001) at 23-33. 
76 See O O'Neill, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives' (1992) 6 International Journal of Law & 
Family 24. 
77 Supra. 
78 Supra. 
79 MD Freeman, The Moral Status of Children: Essays on the Rights of the Children (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) at 50. 
80 Supra. 
81 D Stasiulis, 'The Active Child Citizen: Lessons from Canadian Policy and the Children's 
Movement' (2002) 6 Citizenship Studies 507. 
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international law that could be transplanted towards international law on the rights 
of IPs. It is argued that IPs are easily presented as victims, like the previous 
approach towards children’s citizenship rights vis-à-vis adults’ citizenship rights, 
which created a binary situation. The argument is advanced that the way IPs are 
presented in international law appears to replicate this binary situation between 
‘victimised’ IPs’ citizenship rights on the one hand, and the citizenship rights of 
‘other non-victimised’ citizens on the other hand. Therefore, it has been 
suggested that it is now time to adopt a new and more progressive approach 
towards articulating the rights of IPs under international law more positively.  
 
The third and final point about originality and contribution to knowledge is in 
relation to the comparative examination of the relationship between State law and 
IPs’ customary law in Chapter Five82 as well as the comparative study of the 
relationship between international and national law in Nigeria and Kenya made in 
Chapter Nine.83 As at the time of writing, no such comparative study between 
Nigeria and Kenya on the afore-mentioned subjects has been made. In this 
modest way, this thesis makes original contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge about the relationship between State law on the one hand, and IPs’ 
customary law as well as international law on other hand. In this way, such original 
contributions to the existing body of knowledge succeeds in pointing out ways in 
which the success of law and constitutional reforms in Kenya could be 
transplanted to resolve similar legal challenges such as those which the case 
study of Abuja demonstrates in Nigeria.
                                            
82 See section 5.2. 
83 See section 9.2. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: Map showing all States in Nigeria and Abuja  
 
 
 
 
Source :  National Population Commission (NPC), 2006. 
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APPENDIX 2: Map Showing Six Local Government Areas of Abuja 
(FCT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NPC, 2006. 
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APPENDIX 3: Table showing States including Abuja by Land Size 
in Square Kilometers 
 
 
States 
 
 
Land Size Square KM 
 
 
No., of LGAs 
ABIA  4,902.238  17  
ABUJA-FCT  7,753.853  6  
ADAMAWA  38,823.307  21  
AKWA-IBOM  6,772.089  31  
ANAMBRA  4,816.214  21  
BAUCHI  49,933.873  20  
BAYELSA  9,415.756  8  
BENUE  31,276.709  23  
BORNO  75480.907  25  
CROSSRIVER  21,636.596  18  
DELTA  17,239.240  25  
EBONYI  6,421.230  13  
EDO  19,819.277  18  
EKITI  5,887.890  16  
ENUGU  7,660.166  17  
GOMBE  17,982.034  11  
IMO  5,182.818  27  
JIGAWA  24,515.620  27  
KADUNA  45,711.188  23  
KANO  21,276.872  44  
KATSINA  24,971.215  34  
KEBBI  37,727.965  21  
KOGI  29,581.885  21  
KWARA  34,467.536  16  
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Source: NPC, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAGOS  3,496.449  20  
NASARAWA  27,271.497  13  
NIGER  74,108.580  27  
OGUN  16,980.550  20  
ONDO  15,195.177  18  
OSUN  8,699.836  30  
OYO  28,245.264  33  
PLATEAU  27,216.948  17  
RIVERS  10,432.281  23  
SOKOTO  33,776.886  23  
TARABA  60,291.820  16  
YOBE  46,909.760  17  
ZAMFARA  35,170.629  14  
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APPENDIX 4: A Linguistic Map of Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 1979.
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APPENDIX 5: A Historical Map of Nigeria Showing Three Regions 
created by British Colonial Administration (1954) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism 1997.  
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APPENDIX 6: Map Showing the Capital City in the FCT Shaded Red 
 
Source: Google Maps (June, 2017). 
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